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Abstract
This thesis is a study of the federal element - that 
is, the relations between the Centre and States - in the 
politics and government of Peninsula Malaysia. It attempts 
to do this by going beyond federalism as just a matter of 
constitutional law. For the Constitution provides only the 
formal boundaries within which several crucial components 
of the political stucture operate - for example 
administrative organisations and political parties. These 
individually and in their interactions affect and are 
affected by the federal element of the political structure. 
Thus, the thesis focuses on four components of the political 
stucture - Constitution, finance, administrative 
organisations and political parties (essentially one-party 
dominance). The Chapters have been organised to reflect 
these concerns. The examination of these components suggests 
two main characteristics of federalism in Peninsula Malaysia. 
First, the Federation is tightly organised and within it the 
Centre, initially placed in a strong position vis-a-vis the 
States, has been growing even stronger. Second, the impact 
of the Centre's dominance is uneven as between States.
There seems to be no reason why, despite episodes of States* 
resistance, the former tendency should not be maintained.
The latter feature, however, is likely to be constant.
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Introduction
The study of federalism has a long pedigree, Wheare'*' 
contributes by presenting, for political scientists, a 
systematic study of federalism. To him federalism is 
essentially a matter of constitutional law although he does 
concede the importance of social, economic and political 
realities in the working of a federal system. However, to 
Livingston federalism is a function not of constitutions but
of federal societies which are shaped by these realities or
3
forces. The former and latter are indeed opposite poles on 
the axis of 'federalism' and the movement between the two 
poles is not necessarily only in one direction. Viewed in 
this way the study of federalism involves going beyond look-
Ll
ing at it as just a matter of constitutional law. For after 
all the Constitution provides only the formal boundaries 
within which several crucial components of the political 
structure operate - for example political parties and admin­
istrative organisations. These individually and in their 
interactions between them affect the federal element - that 
is, the relations between the Centre and States - of the 
political structure.Thus, this thesis in its examination of 
federalism and the federal element in Peninsula Malaysia 
focuses on four components of the political structure - 
Constitution, finance, administrative organisations and 
political parties (essentially one-party dominance).
1. Wheare, K.C., Federal Government, London, Oxford 
University Press, Third edition, 1953*
2. For example, see ibid., chapters 3* 5 and 7*
3. Livingston, W.S., Federalism and Constitutional Change. 
London, Oxford University Press, 19^ 6, chapter 1, 
especially pp. 1-12.
Examples of this include Riker, W.H., Federalism:
Origin, Operation and Significance, Boston and Toronto, 
Little Brown and Company, 196 ;^ Wildavsky, A., ed., 
American Federalism in Perspective, Boston, Little,
Brown and Company, 196?; Friedrich, C.J., Trends of 
Federalism in Theory and Practice. London, Fredrick A. 
'Praeger, Publishers, I9 6 8; Earle, V., ed., Federalism: 
Infinite Variety in Theory and Practice. Itasca, Illinois, 
F.E. Peacock Publishers, INC., 1968? Franda, M. West 
Bengal and the Federalising Process in India, Princeton 
New Jersey, Princeton University Press, I96B; and May, R. 
J., Federalism and Fiscal Adjustment, Oxford, The 
Clarendon Press, 1969*
15.
Peninsula Malaysia in comparison to the United 
States, Canada, Australia and India for example is 
relatively small. Yet it is still a Federation. Unlike 
Peninsula Malaysia, and perhaps also Switzerland, size 
was a reason for the establishment of a Federation in 
these countries. Ethnicity or communalism, as in India, 
Canada and also Switzerland, was another reason but it 
was not in the case of Peninsula Malaysia although 
communalism is a powerful force (generally centralising) 
in national politics - it is not a force that sustains 
States as such. Thus, Peninsula Malaysia represents a 
case where despite its small size it is still a Federation 
which was established essentially not because of ethnic or 
communal demands.
The thesis is confined to Peninsula Malaysia for three 
main reasons. First, the States of Peninsula Malaysia belong 
to one geographical unit and with the exception of Penang 
and Malacca had similar origins and traditions as Malay 
States. They were federated in 19^8 to form the Federation 
of Malaya and in 1957 to form the Independent Federation of 
Malaya. Only in 1963 were Sabah and Sarawak (including 
Singapore) federated with the States of Peninsula Malaya to 
form the Federation of Malaysia. Second, these new States 
within the Federation of Malaysia were provided with more 
rights compared to the States in the Federation of Malaya. 
Thus, Peninsula Malaysia represents a geographically and 
hisitorically coherent unit of analysis. Third, the 
relations between the Centre and States of Sabah and 
Sarawak have been covered by several writers. As yet there 
is no comparable treatment of the relations between the
5. Examples include Milne, R.S., and Ratnam, K.J., Malaysia: 
New States in a New Nation - Political Development of 
Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia, London, Frank Cass, 197^ : 
Roff, Margaret, The Politics of Belonging, Kuala Lumpur, 
Oxford University Press, 197^ ; Leigh, M.B., The Rising 
Moon: Political Change in Sarawak, Sydney, Sydney 
University Press, 197^ 5 Means, G.P. "Eastern' Malaysia:
The Politics of Federalism", Asian Survey, Vol. 8, No. 
April 1 9 6 8, pp. 289-308? and Ross-Larson, B., The Politics 
of Federalism, Singapore, Times Printers Sdn. Bhd., 1976.
16.
Centre and States of Peninsula Malaysia.^ Nevertheless, 
frequent reference to Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore in the 
discussion is made, as in Chapter two, when necessary.
The thesis covers essentially the post-Independence
period but the importance of history cannot be denied and
has accordingly been indicated where necessary. Throughout
the thesis the terms ‘Centre* and 'Central' will be used to
refer to.the Government whose laws, actions and policies
7
have effect throughout the Federation( in contrast to States 
and their Governments which are constituent units of the 
Federation. Of the sources used in the thesis those from 
interviews need some clarification. Since interviews, in 
most cases, were granted on the basis of confidentiality it 
is not always possible to cite or disclose interviewees. 
However, it is sometimes possible to do so without 
compromising them. On the whole they remain anonymous.
The arrangement of Chapters is dictated by the 
concerns of the thesis. Thus, the thesis is arranged into 
four main parts* Chapters one and two on the Constitution; 
Chapters three and four on finance; Chapters five, six and 
seven on administrative organisations; and Chapters eight, 
nine, ten and eleven on political parties. A conclusion 
follows.
6. A similar point is emphasized by Gagliano, F., "Political 
Science", in Lent, J.A., ed., Malaysian Studies* Present 
Knowledge and Reserch Trends, Northern Illinois University 
Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Occasional Paper,
No. 3» Detroit, The University, 1979, p. 156.
7« Sometimes Government officials, politicians and even 
scholars alike have used 'Central' and 'Federal'
Government to mean the same thing. This can be confusing. 
Only when it is unavoidable, as in quotations for example, 
will the term 'Federal' be retained. Distinguishing 
between 'Centre* or 'Central' and•'Federal' is simply for 
convenience but it may also be analytically desirable. In 
principle Federal Government refers to the system of 
levels of Government within which the Central and State 
Governments are but parts of the system. Thus, to refer 
to the Central Government as Federal Government is in 
this sense misleading.
17.
Chapter 1
The Constitution and Malaysian Federalism : Arguments at 
the time of Constitution-Making.
This chapter and the next outline the constitutional 
framework of federalism in Malaysia and as such the 
constitutional status of States in relation to each other 
and to the Centre. The discussion centres on the arguments 
over the federal idea in Malaysia which were presented at the 
time of constitution-making and also subsquent to it. The 
discussion, however, suffers from a lack of published primary 
material, especially as regards the numerous memoranda 
submitted to the . Reid Commission. Furthermore, even the 
debates in the Legislative Council, the Malayan and the 
Malaysian Parliament on the federal idea, with certain 
exceptions, have not been as illuminating as one would have 
expected.
The Reid Commission Report.^
The Reid Commission was given the task of examining
the constitutional arrangements throughout the Federation
of Malaya. It was. authorised to make recommendations for a
'federal* constitution for an independent Federation of
Malaya. In doing this the Commission was to provide for
"the establishment of a strong central government 
with States and Settlements enjoying a measure of 
autonomy ... with the machinery for consultation 
between the Central Government and the States and
1. Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Comm­
ission, 19571 Kuala Lumpur, Govt. Press, 1957* The
Federation of Malaya Constitutional Conference - a meet­
ing of the representatives of the British Government, 
the Malay Rulers and the United Malays National Organis­
ation held between Jan.-Feb. 1956 in London - recommended 
the appointment of this Commission. See Federation of 
Malaya, Self-Government for the Federation of Malaya ; 
Report of the Constitution Conference, London. Jan.-Feb. 
1956, Kuala Lumpur. Govt. Press. 1956» P. 16. The following 
were members of the Commission s Lord 'Reid as Chairman,
Sir Ivor Jennings of the United Kingdom, Sir William 
McKell of Australia, Mr. B. Malik of India and Mr. Justice
Abdul Hamid of Pakistan. The Commission and its Report
will be referred to as the Reid Commission and the Reid 
Report respectively.
18.
Settlements on certain financial matters to be 
specified in the Constitution." 2
In its v/ork the Commission toured the nine Malay States and 
the two Settlements of the Federation. It examined the memo­
randa submitted to it and received oral submissions made 
by interested groups concerning the form that federalism 
in the future independent Malaya should take.
Interested groups and political parties were faced with 
two questions: to join the new federal state or not, and if 
federation was desirable then what would be the States' 
constitutional status in relation to each other and to the
Centre? The response ranged from secessionist demands to
3
calls for a unitary Malaya. Demands for,'States rights' 
were expressed by several groups, although each group had : 
its own version of what these should be.
Several arguments were presented regarding the position 
of the former Straits Settlement' States, the predominantly 
Chinese Penang and Malacca. The Pan Malayan Islamic Party or 
Parti Islam se Malaya (PMIP or PAS) proposed to make these 
States into 'Malay States' so that the system of Malay 
'special privileges' would be extended to these States, 
complete with the selection of Malay Rulers to assure that the
h,
"special position of Malays" would be fully protected. The
2. Reid Report, p. 6. This was agreed to and recommended by 
the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Conference. See 
Fed. of Malaya, o£. cit., p. 18. Lord Ogmore advised the 
Alliance delegation Tcfthis Conference that the main point 
about the form of constitution that'it should propose was 
that the central authority must have powers over the State 
Governments. The constitution that Malaya needed, he cont­
inued, was a cross between those of Ceylon and Canada. See 
Miller, H., Prince and Premier : A Biography of Tunku Abd­
ul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, First Prime Minister of Malaya, 
London, George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1959> p. 137*
3. The Labour Party's memorandum to the Reid Commission dem­
anded .the establishment of a unitary Government for an In­
dependent Malaya. It argued that a federal structure, by
retaining the Sultans and States, was essentially feudal 
in character. See Straits Echo and Times of Malaya (SETM),
29-9-1956.
k. Means, G.P., Malaysian Politics , London, Hodder & Stough­
ton, second edition, 1976, p. 228.
19.
-L-U
Penang United Malays National Organization (UMNO) at its 10 
annual general assembly in September 1955 discussed the . 
demands that Penang should be returned to its proper 
owner, Kedah.
The problem of the former Straits Settlement States was
one of local Chinese confidence in the future Federation.
Already disenchanted by the dismantling of the Straits
Settlements in 19 8^, the loss of its free port status on
which much of its economic prosperity depended, and anxious
about Chinese rights as British subjects and their future in
an independent Malaya, the Penang Straits Chinese British
Association (SCBA) responded to the above arguments by -
declaring that
"The best solution would be for all the nine States and 
Two Settlements to enjoy political autonomy and form a 
United States of Malaya.•.Failing this, we have no alter­
native but to agitate for a dominion status for Penang, 
Malacca and Singapore - in other words, we will return 
to our former status [as Straits Settlements]." 6
7
Tunku Abdul Rahman, the leader of the Alliance', responded to
5* Straits Echo and Times Malaya (SETM), 26-9-1955* Penang 
UMNO decid ed to defer a decision on this matter until 
after independence. However, it later recommended to the 
national UMNO that Penang should be returned to Kedah. See 
UMNO, Bahagian Pulau Pinang, Memorandum (SU Bahagian Pulau 
Pinang), 3-5-1956, Kepada Setia Usaha Agong UMNO, p. 1. 
Several other UMNO organizations supported this, and also 
called for the return of Malacca to either Johore or Negri 
Sembilan. See UMNO Perlis, Cadangan Kepada Setia Usaha 
Agong UMNO bagi Surohanjaya Reid, p. 1. and UMNO, Cawangan 
Suangai Yen (Kedah), (Kasim Ahmad, Setiausaha), Shor dan 
Fikiran untok Surohanjaya Bebas, kepada Setia Usaha Agong- 
Agong UMNO. 21-5-1956. p. 1. There were also suggestions 
calling either for Malacca and Penang to be placed directly 
under Central authority or to unite both States into one 
State within the new Federation. See UMNO, Bahagian Kota 
Bahru, Fikiran-Fikiran dan Shor-Shor untuk di-kemukakan 
kepada Surohanjaya Bebas Perlembagaan, kepada Setia u¥aha 
Agong UMNO, Kelantan, 29-5- 1956, p. 1? UMNO, Kuala Langaty 
{'Selangor), Bagi Menjawab Surat Keliling Bil t SUA / 107 /
56 dan SUA /9V56 (2; kepada Setia Usaha Agong UMNO, ~ 
17-5-1956, p. 2; and UMNO Selangor, Rangka Garis Surohanjaya 
Bebas, 2^-6-1956, p. 1. Penang still pays Kedah 'lease 
money'.
6. SETM, I9 .2 .5 6 and 20.7.5 6.
7* The Alliance was a coalition of the United Malays National 
Organization (UMNO), the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), 
and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC).
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g
this secessionist sentiment by categorically declaring that
the inclusion of Penang in the Federation was•’absolutely 
o
necessary'. 7
Koh Sin Hock, a member of the Penang SCBA, expressed 
another variant of secession in his 'Malta Plan' - Penang as a 
separate State in politcal association with the United King­
dom.'*'0 On January 22, 1957» the secessionists suggested 
another variant - the recreation of a group of three States 
distinct from the nine Malay StatesThey  suggested that
"there should be a loose federation between Singapore, 
Penang and Malacca under their own autonomous Govern­
ment and the nine Malay States." 12
This call for a confederation also implied that secession by
individual States was no longer a practical alternative.
If Penang and Malacca had necessarily to be in the
Federation then their status had to be clearly defined . The
Alliance Memorandum stated that Penang and Malacca should
have the same status as the nine Malay States in the 
ISFederation. J The Penang Malayan Chinese Association (MCA)
in a separate memorandum demanded that
"The .Settlement of.Penang should not revert to the 
State of Kedah as such a move will not be consonant 
with the changes and progress that have have taken 
place within the Settlement in the last one hundred 
and fifty years ••• Penang must ... be allowed to take 
charge of its own destiny as a separate and equal State 
with the other members of the Federation ••• Kedah 
should relinquish its claim on Penang." 14
It further suggested that a new constitution for the Malayan
nation must provide strong safegards to ensure the ties
that bind State to State and State to Federation . ^
8 . For further details on the Penang secessionists
see Sopiee, M. N. » From Malayan Union to Singapore 
Separation, Kuala Lumpur, Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 
1976, pp- 71-80.
9 . ibid., p.73*
1 0.ibid,, p.7 .^
1 1.ibid.,
1 2.ibid.
13.See Alliance Memorandum to the Reid Constitutional
Commission, pp. 1-2. This will be referred to later as 
the Alliance Memorandum. See also SETM, 25-8-1956 •
14.ibid., 4-9-1956.
1 5.ibid.
21.
Such safeguards should include stringent requirements for 
any alteration of the Constitution.
The Malay States of Johore and Kelantan also 
initially, resisted the 'federal* idea. The Ruler of Johore, 
Sultan Ibrahim, was convinced that the British Adviser 
System was essential to the smooth running of the State and 
he feared that this would be destroyed by independence and 
federation. In a letter to the ’Sunday Times' he declared 
that
"I am sure many people will agree we were all very 
happy when Singapore, Penang and Malacca were the 
Straits Settlements? when Perak, Selangor, Negri 
Sembilan and Pahang were the Federated Malay States, 
and Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and Perlis 
were Unfederated Malay States.” 1?
In another statement he declared: • +
"I do not care what the other Rulers may say but as 
for Johore and myself I must have a British Adviser, 
otherwise, work cannot be carried out smoothly.” 18
The Sultan's declarations were in direct opposition to the
Alliance's demands for the speedy achievement of independence
and the dismantling of the 'adviser system*The
16. ibid. Penang MCA suggested that the Constitution should 
only be altered by a j/k majority in the Federal Legis­
lature, by a 3/^ majority of the States as constituent 
members of the Federation, and also by a 3/^ majority 
of a popular referendum.
17* Sunday Times, 18.9.1955*
18. ibid. , 15.1 2.19 55*
19* Collectively, the Malay Rulers were apprehensive about 
the move towards speedy independence because of the fate 
that befell their Indian counterparts after Indian 
Independence. To pacify them the UMNO and the Alliance 
Government pledged to protect the Rulers' rights 
and privileges by including them in the country's new 
constitution in return for their full<. support for rapid 
advancement towards Independence. See Shaw, W., Tun 
Razak: His Life and Times. London, Longman, 1976, p*103. 
UMNO realised that the Rulers' support was vital for the 
establishment of an independent federation because they 
would have "to waive some of their rights over their 
respective territories in order to establish the 
Federation". See Alliance Memorandum, p. 1. The Rulers' 
support, thus, had to be 'bought'. Interview with Mohd. 
Khir Johari, then UMNO Supreme Executive Council member 
and intimately involved within UMNO and the Alliance in 
the constitutional discussions, 29*9*80* Eight other 
Rulers assured Tengku Abdul Rahman, UMNO President and 
Alliance leader, that they disagreed with the views of 
the Sultan of Johore. See Simandjuntak, B., Malayan 
Federalism, 19^5-1963» Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University 
Press, 1969, p. 7 6.
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Sultan’s resistance was supported by the Persatuan Kebang-
saan Melayu Johor (PKMJ, the Johore Malays National Organis-
20ation) which was formed on October 22, 1955* The PKMJ 
declared that it would campaign for Johore's secession from 
the Federation and for the restoration of Johore’s former
21status as an 'independent' State under British protection.
It would seem natural that those associated with the 
PKMJ would support the Sultan in his opposition to indepen­
dence and federation. They were the traditional elite 
whose political position and social eminence depended on 
their relationship with the Sultan. They were, however, 
supplanted as the local elite after being heavily defeated 
by Alliance candidates in Local, State and Federal elections. 
Only through secession would they be able to redeem their 
former status. As Sopiee remarked,
"An independent Johore, with the Sultan restored to 
his former splendour and once more in a position to 
exercise his authority, could result in the suppla­
nting of the UMNO establishment and the reestablis­
hment of the political position and, probably morg2 
important, the social eminence of the courtiers."
In Kelantan, the Kelantan Malay United Front (KMUF),
formed on November 28, 1955» in Kota Bharu, campaigned for
secession. The KMFU saw Malayan independence and federation
as signalling the loss of Malay rights to the Chinese. Its
leader Nik Mohamad Abdul Majid, argued that since the __
federal set-up of 19^8 the Malays had gradually lost their
rights to the Chinese and also the
"Malays have been degraded into accepting, as 
Ministers Chinese and Indians." 23
In other words, the KMFU saw the Federation of Malaya as
being a sell out to non-Malay interests. The KMUF also
20. SETM, 2^-10-1955.
21. ibid. A fuller discussion of the PKMJ’s secessionist 
activities is provided by Sopiee, M.N., op. cit., 
pp. 80-85.
2 2. ibid. p. 82.
23. Straits Times, 2^-11-1955* The KMUF was obviously 
referring tothe appointment of non-Malays of the 
MCA and MIC as Ministers in the Malayan Government 
under the Member-System prior to Independence.
23.
wanted to restore the supremacy of the Islamic religion,
2 4
the Malay language and Malay customs.
Leaders of the KMUF and PKMJ had two 
characteristics in common - antagonism towards the Alliance, 
especially UMNO, and a weak political position. Lack­
ing popular support, opposed by the dominant political party 
of the time, the Alliance, and faced with an unsympathetic 
British Administration, the resistance to the 'federal* idea 
failed. Tunku Abdul Rahman had categorically stated that
"the UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance will not tolerate attempts 
from any quarter to partition Malaya on any account."25
The Alliance's conception of a federal state was
26contained in its memorandum to the Reid Commission. The 
Alliance argued that an independent Malaya should be a 
federation of eleven states^ and that the principles govern­
ing the Federal Constitution should be adopted by the 
28States. Further, it argued that the division of legislative
and executive powers between the Central and State
Governments should be based on the principle that
"there should be a strong Central government with 
states enjoying responsible government and having 
autonomous powers in certain specified matters." 29
It also recommended that the legislative and executive
powers of the Central and State Governments should be
20clearly defined. Thus, the legislative powers of the States
24. ibid.
25* Singapore Standard , 21-10-1955*
26. Unfortunately, apart from the Alliance Memorandum, 
evidence regarding the memoranda, especially that of the 
Rulers, has been sketchy. The Alliance Memorandum was 
prepared by an Alliance Ad Hoc Political Committee. It 
was submitted to the Reid Commission on September 9, 1956, 
by an Alliance delegation led by Tunku Abdul Rahman and 
comprising, from UMNO, Tun Abdul Razak, Mohd. Khir Johari 
and Senu Abdul Rahman, and from MCA, Bang Pang Hwa and 
Eng Ek Tiong, and from MIC, V.T. Sambantham and Ramana- 
than. See UMNO, Penyata UMNO, Tahun 1955-1956, p. 6 .
27. Alliance Memorandum, p. 1. See also SETM. 28-9-I95 6.
28. Alliance Memorandum, p. 10. See also Sadka, E., " Const­
itutional Change m  Malaya: A Historical Perspective", 
Australian Outlook, Vol. 11, No. 3> 1957» P* 28.
2 9. Alliance Memorandum, p. 7* See also SETM, 25-8-1956.
30. Alliance Memorandum, p. 8 .
2km
"should be stipulated and . the residuary powers 
should be vested in the Federal Government." 31
Also, the legislative powers of the Central Government
"should continue to be as in column (1) of,the second 
Schedule to the Federation of Malaya Agreement jJL9^8] . 
The States should have the legislative powers in 
remaining matters to be specified." 32
Surprisingly, it retained the principle of conferring legis­
lative power on the Centre and executive power on the States 
by recommending that
"The States should have executive authority over 
matters on which the Federal Government has legislative 
power as in column (2) to the Second Schedule £Fede- 
ration of Malaya Agreement,.19^ 83, except in matters 
relating to education." 33
Surprisingly because, in view of the Alliance's awareness
that different political parties might control the different
3^levels of government, this principle could lead to endemic 
Centre-State tension. Equally surprising was its argument 
against the provision of any formal consultative machinery 
in the exercise of executive powers because it believed 
that, in a situation where different political 
parties controlled the Central and State Governments, this 
mechanism would not be conducive to efficient government. J 
It, however, recognized that from time to time there might 
be a need for establishing an informal Centre-State
31. ibid., p. 7* It was considered necessary that the Central 
Government should have residual powers because of the 
need for a smooth and efficient administration for the 
country as a whole, especially in times of crisis.
See ibid.
3 2. ibid.
3 3• ibid.
3km ibid.
35- ibid., pp. 8-9 . See also SETM , 28-9-1956.
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arrangement•
In the area of Centre-State finance, the Alliance 
recommended that the States should be financially autonomous 
but
"the power to raise revenue and the system of alloca­
tion of funds between the State and Federal Governments 
should be as in the Third Schedule and Part 111 of the 
Federation of Malaya Agreement Ql9^8J•" 37
In land matters it recommended that the Central ovemment
should have the power to acquire land ^anywhere in the country
for any purpose of national importance after consultation
with, but not concurrence of, the State GovernmentOQ
concerned. In both financial and land matters the already 
overwhemling power of the Centre was further emphasised.
The Alliance recommended that the Upper House or 
Dewan Negara should comprise forty-five members j two members 
to be elected from each of the eleven States, twenty-two 
members and the Speaker to be appointed by the Centre,^ 9 
The Dewan Negara would thus comprise twenty-two and twenty- 
three representatives from the States and Centre.respec­
tively, On the amendment process the Alliance recommended 
that amendments to the Constitution should be made only
if approved by at least two-thirds of the Upper and Lower
Lr\
Houses of Parliament. In addition, if these amendments 
affect the rights of States then these would
36. Alliance Memorandum, p. 9* It could be argued that the 
informal consultative arrangement ;might best work when 
one party controlled both levels of government. With 
the benefit of hindsight, the Indian experience suggested 
this. However, when it was felt that the Working Committ­
ee of the Indian Congress Party, as an informal co-ordin- 
ative machinery, could be useful only so long as Congress 
controlled both levels of government, the Central Govern­
ment found it necessary, in 1952, to establish a 
National Development Council. In short, a formal consul­
tative machinery was especially necessary when different 
parties controlled the different levels of government.
See Kochanek, S., The Congress Party of India, Princeton, 
New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1968, p. 190.
37- Alliance Memorandum, p. 9 .
38. ibid.., See also SETM, 28-9-1956.
39* Alliance Memorandum, p. 3.
UO• ibid., p. 2 0,
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also have to be approved by two-thirds of the State Legis- .
ZlI
latures by simple majority vote. The recommended amendment
procedure was stringent and within which the States*
participation was necessary. Thus, the Dewan Negara and the
amendment process could'provide real safeguards to State
interests and to the federal union.
The Reid Commission seems to have relied heavily on 
Ll2the memoranda received from the Malay Rulers and the 
Alliance. The Commission recommended that independent Malaya 
should be a federation with a strong Central Government and
A3
with the States and Settlements having a measure of autonomy. ^
Regarding the status of the former Straits Settlement States,
the Commission argued that
"Our terms of reference not only require us to recom­
mend a measure of autonomy for each of the States 
and Settlements but also appear to preclude us from 
recommending any changes in their existing boundaries, 
and we have therefore not considered certain represen­
tations that changes should be made in this respect. "44
It recommended that any future boundary alterations should
depend on the agreement of the States and Settlements
Lie.
concerned. It further recommended that
41. ibid.
42. The Reid Report seemed to suggest this . See Reid Report. 
p.7. This was confirmed by E.O.Laird. Interview with E.O. 
Laird, formerly Secretary to the Reid Commission,22-10-79.
43. Reid Report, p.8 . 'National priorities' shaped the Commi­
ssion's recommendations..Interview with E.O.Laird.
44. Reid Report, p..35* 'Secessionists' and other non-federal 
demands did not represent an important part of the memo­
randa submitted. Furthermore, many demands were contrary 
to the Commission's frame of reference. Interview with
E.0.Laird.
45. The Reid Commission provided for this in Article 2 of 
the Draft Constitution of the Reid Report . This provi­
sion was probably made in response to several represen­
tations concerning several 'disputed' areas. For example 
, apart from the. question of Penang, the 'State Council' 
of 'Negri Naning' - a Minangkabau settlement incorpora­
ted into Malacca in 1845 - in its memorandum demanded 
the return of its 'sovereignty'. See Sopiee , M.N.,
op.cit., p. 84, n., 100.
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"In spite of the fundamental constitutional differences 
between the present positions of the States and 
of the Settlements we think that in future they should 
have the same degree of autonomy." ^6
The Commission pointed out that the Federation of
Malaya Agreement, 19^8, provided a Constitution which placed
overwhelming legislative powers with the Centre.^ It
was convinced that this 19^8 Constitution was based on the
unsound and impracticable principle of conferring legislative
8power on the Centre and executive power on the States. Thus,
where different political parties controlled the Central and
State Governments , such a division of powers
"would probably lead to friction and might well have 
grave consequences." ^9
It therefore recommended that
"in future legislative power and executive . 
responsibility should always go together." 50
In this respect it did not follow the Alliance*s
recommendation. Accordingly, three legislative lists were
recommended: Federal, State and Concurrent. It also
^6. Reid Report, p. 36. To ensure this the Reid Commission 
recommended Article 66 - the 'essential provisions' 
requirement that each State Constitution must provide 
for - of the Draft Constitution. It further recommended 
that these provisions should be enforceable by Parliament. 
Part 1 of the Fifth Schedule of the Draft Constitution 
contained details of the 'essential provisions'.
The Reid Commission's adherence to the principle of 
equality in terms of autonomy among the States was in 
response to the fears of the non-Malays' dominated 
Penang and Malacca concerning their status and position 
in a future independent Federation of Malaya. Interview 
with E.O.Laird.
7^. Reid Report, pp. 11-12.
^8 . ibid. , p..36. Emily Sadka argued that this principle of 
allocating the legislative and executive powers to the 
Centre and States respectively was intended to safeguard 
local autonomy, by forcing the Central Government to rule 
through eleven projections of itself. See Emily Sadka, 
op.cit., p. 2 9.
9^* Reid Report, p. 36.
50. ibid. For details see Article 75 and Schedule YL (division 
of powers) of the Draft Constitution of the Reid Report.
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recommended that residual powers should be given to States, 
convinced that
"The situation of the residual powers makes no 
difference to the construction of any of the specific
powers in the Federal List ... Moreover, it is unlikely 
that the residual power will ever come into ope­
ration because the Legislative Lists, read in the 
light of the clauses in article 68, appear to us to 
cover every possible matter on which there might be 
legislation. The only real effect of leaving the 
residual power with the States is that if some unfore­
seen matter arises which is so peculiar that it 
cannot be brought within any of the items mentioned 
in any of the Legislative Lists, then that matter 
is within the State powers." 51
Despite the above division of powers, the Commission
believed that co-operation between Central and State
Governments should be encouraged. To facilitate this it
recommended that
"There should be a general power of delegation 
conferred on both the Federal and State Governments 
with regard to the performance of any of their 
executive functions." 52
It further recommended that
"The Federal Government should be authorised to 
delegate any particular functions or duties to a 
State Government or to State officers, and State 
Governments should be similarly authorised to delegate 
to the Federal Government or Federal officers 
or to any other State Government or its officers."53
The Commission was convinced that on certain matters a
'uniformity of laws' in the various States was necessary.
On such matters Parliament should have the power to pass
64an Act on any State subject. However , such an Act would 
come into force only with the concurrence of States as 
expressed in terms of an Enactment of the State Legislative 
Assembly. Furthermore, the State Legislative Assembly in 
adopting such an Act should be entitled to make any,neces­
sary modifications. In this way the Commission believed
51. ibid. , p. 53* Means argued that the Commission gave 
residual powers to the States partly on the assumption 
that the Federation was a creature of the States from 
which ultimate authority was derived. See Means, o-p.cit.
, p. 133.
52. Reid Report, p. 36. Article 76 of the Draft Constitution 
provided for this.
53. ibid. , pp. 36-37. Article 148 of the Draft Constitution 
provided for this.
54. ibid.,p. 37* Article 70 of the Draft Constitution 
provided for this.
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that the supremacy of a State on State subjects would be 
preserved. J In making the 'uniformity of laws' recomr 
mendation the Commission had in mind the two most important 
matters on the State List, land and local govemmerit.
The Commission believed that the future prosperity 
of Malaya depended on the proper use of land and that a
tin
planned national policy for this was essential.Land 
also was ( as it remains ) a major source of revenue for 
the States. It recommended that land must remain a State 
subject because this was the basis of State autonomy and 
argued that it would neither be practical'nor desirable 
to transfer the general administration of land to the
c;o
Federation. However , it made clear that to promote 
national interest projects, like national development and 
conservation, the Centre ought to have powers to pass laws 
regarding the use of land. 7 This was further strengthened 
by the Commission's recommendation that the Centre was to 
be the sole judge of its requirements for State land and 
that, after due compensation had been worked out, the Centre 
should have the power to require the States to make available 
land which it required for federal purposes. ^ 0 The Alliance 
Memorandum had indeed recommended that the Central Government 
should have the power to acquire land anywhere in the 
country for any purpose of national importance after
55* ibid.
56. ibid. , p.37- The Reid Commission was especially keen 
on drafting and enacting a National Land Code. See
ibid. , p. 3 9.
57. ibid. , p. 37* The issue of land was especially 'sticky'. 
Interview with E.O.Laird.
58. Reid Report, p. 39«
59. ibid* 9 PP* , ^ 8~^9. As..-in.vthq_ case.rwiih-land, the Central 
Government was also empowered to formulate an overall 
policy on mining, forestry and agriculture ( all matters 
on the State List ). Under the Federation of Malaya 
Constitution of 1948, the Centre had legislative power 
for compulsory acquisition of land but the States had 
the executive authority. The Reid Commission believed 
that the Central Government was both the custodian and 
the propagator of the 'national interests'. Interview 
with E.O.Laird.
60. Reid Report, pp. ^1-^2. Article 78 of the Draft Consti­
tution provided for this.
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consulting, but not with the concurrence, of, the State 
Government concerned. The Commission, however, alluding to 
the possibility that such powers might be contrary to the 
'federal' concept and could cause Centre-State friction, 
stated that
"We think that such {"national] development ought to 
be the direct responsibility of the Federation, but 
we do not think that it is possible to give the 
Federation a completely free hand without undermining 
the autonomy of the States and possibly causing 
friction between the States and the Federation." 61
6 2Two general limitations on the exercise of such powers 
were thus recommended. First, before the Centre could 
initiate any scheme of development or conservation which 
involved interfering with State rights* the scheme should 
first be examined by an 'expert body' and followed by 
consultation between the Centre and the States in the 
National Finance Council (NFC). Second, any such scheme 
should be confined to a specified area or specified areas.
The Commission, however, did not specify who were to be 
members of this 'expert body'.
Before 1956 the States depended on Central funds 
and every year there were disputes between the Centre and 
the States over the amount to be granted. The Commission 
argued that these disputes could become more acute as 
democratic control replaced official control in the States.^ 
Furthermore f
"the States have no assurance as to the total amount 
of their incomes from grants in future years. They 
can hardly have any real financial autonomy and they 
have little direct incentive to economy, if their 
deficits are to be met every year by the Federation, 
and it is difficult for them to. plan ahead without 
a firmer assurance of their future financial 
resources." 6k
The Commission, nevertheless, candidly stated that the
federal system must continue to rely upon federal funds
for the substantial support of all levels of Government.^
6 1. ibid. , p. k6*
62. Article 8k of the Draft Constitution provided for this.
6 3. ibid. , p. 6 0.
6k. ibid.
6 5. ibid. , p. 6 1.
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It also pointed out that to maintain a given balance between
State and Central authority, the economic and financial
relations might require careful planning if the State was
not to come under direct Central supervision in fields which
were constitutionally subjects of State Legislation.^ To
achieve this States must have independent sources of income
not subject to the discretion of the Central Government if
federalism was to work.
The Commission faced this problem: how to guarantee
States* financial independence commensurate with "the
establishment of a strong central government with the States
and Settlements enjoying a measure of autonomy". It
recommended the transfer of certain State responsibilities -
education, medical and health (in the State List of the 19^8
Constitution) - to the Federal List.^ In short, shrinking
the areas of State responsibility and competence. State
expenditure could thus be reduced by narrowing the list of
State subjects with which it could constitutionally deal.
Ironically, it believed that the reduction in State
responsibilities would strengthen the States vis-a-vis the
Central Government by their having to rely less on Central
funds. However, the continual transfer of State subjects
to the Centre to match States* financial capabilities would
allow States' that "measure of autonomy" but would in time
reduce them to mere formal units of the Federation without
real powers.
States* financial independence could also be
strengthened if States were provided with wide taxing powers.
This was considered and rejected.^ The Commission .
recommended by a majority that States should not have wider
70taxing powers than those which they already had. Mr.Justice 
Abdul Hamid opposed this recommendation. He argued that 
States should be entitled to levy taxation in respect of all
6 6. ibid., p* 6 0.
6 7. Further, the Commission felt that the subjects transferred 
to the Centre were essentially national in scope and 
character and thus should properly be within the 
jurisdiction of the Centre. Interview with E.O.Laird.
6 8. Reid Report, p. 60.
6 9. ibid.
7 0. ibid.
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matters on the State List and that the Centre should not be
71entitled to levy taxation in respect of these matters. The
Commission recommended that States must continue to receive
large grants from the Centre as a right and not
"as subsidies depending on the favour of the 
Federation.” 72
It was convinced that an equalisation policy could best be
achieved by the Centre rather than by giving each State
wider taxing powers. It stated that
"we would expect that national policy will endeavour 
so far as possible to promote equally the properity 
of all parts of the that Federation, and if the States 
were entitled to raise additional revenue directly 
this objective would be difficult to achieve.'7 73
The Commission viewed grants-in-aid as the key to the
problem of State finance. Grants-in-aid, on past experience,
were not only relatively large but also the subject of
Centre-State friction. In anticipation, the Commission
recommended three steps. First, the establishment of the
National Finance Council (NFC),^ the consultative machinery
which would deal with questions of grants. Second, grants
7*5should be given for an extended period of five years.'^
Finally, development should be the Centre*s responsibility.*^
The time stretch of five years would give State authorities
the real leeway for financial autonomy, tempered with the
knowledge that a new grant would be required in five years.
The Commission recommended that
"Since every State must spend federal money the State 
Constitutions must contain appropriate provisions for 
financial control, not differing in essentials from 
those which apply to the Federal Government itself." 77
7 1. ibid.
7 2. ibid.. p. 6 1.
7 3. ibid.
74. ibid.,pp.61 & 64. The NFC was to be a purely consultative 
and advisory body. Its members comprised the Prime 
Minister, a Federal Minister, the eleven Mentri Besars
or Chief Ministers of the States. It was to meet at least 
once a year to discuss and deal with questions relating 
to centre-state financial relations.
7 5. ibid., p. 6 1.
7 6. ibid., p. 48.
77* ibid., p. 65. These provisions were contained in the
Fifth Schedule of the Draft Constitution.
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It made the adoption of these provisions by State Constitut­
ions a condition precedent to the establishment of the new 
grant system in each State.^ Apart from this, the State 
was free to do what it liked with the grants provided that 
the relevant legislation was not ultra vires.
With regard to States* right to borrow or contract 
loans, the Commission stated that
"in view of the degree of future autonomy which we 
recommend for the States, there ought to in addition 
to be more general provisions authorising the States 
to contract loans.” 79
However, it recommended that States' right to borrow or
contract loans should be one of specified financial matters
to be referred to the NFC for consultation between the Cen-^
Oq
tral and State Governments. It further argued that
"since the State and the local authorities have such 
limited independent revenue and since it is undesir­
able that such small borrowing authorities should 
compete against each other for narrowly limited 
savings, it seems essential that all loans should 
be raised by the Federal Government." 81
The Commission accepted the allegation of State financial
officers that in the past the practice was that States and
local authorities were "last in the queue" for moneys
raised by loans. To avoid this the Commission recommended
that all loans raised by the Central Government should be
made.only after considering the needs of the States.
82as well as those of the Federation as a whole.
How amendable ought a constitution to be and how
should it be amended ? On the amendment process the
Commission stated that,
"It is important that the method of amending the 
Constitution should be neither so difficult as to 
produce frustration nor so easy as to weaken serious­
ly the safeguards which the Constitution provides*" 83
?8. ibid.
79« ibid., p. 63*
80. ibid., pp. 63-64. Article 102 of Draft Constitution 
provided for this.
81. ibid., p. 64.
8 2. ibid.
83. ibid., p. 33.
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The Commission envisaged the Senate as a major safeguard "for 
States in matters concerning amendments to the Constitution. 
It recommended that in the Senate each State should have two 
representatives elected by the State Legislative Assembly 
and the Central ovemment should have eleven representatives 
appointed by the - Yang Di-Pertuan Agong. Thus, the State 
and Central Governments would have twenty-two and eleven
QIl
representatives respectively in the Senate. It further
recommended that
"amendments should be made by Act of Parliament 
provided that an Act to amend the Constitution must 
be passed in each House by a inajority of at least 
two-thirds of the members voting. In this matter the 
House of Representatives should not have the power to 
overrule the Senate. We think that this is sufficient 
safeguard for the States because the majority of 
members of the Senate.will represent the States." 85
The composition of the Senate was thus viewed by the 
Commission, as a 'block* to amendments which the majority of 
States opposed.
Sir William McKell and Mr. Justice Abdul Hamid dissen­
ted from the Commission^ recommendations. They argued that 
a Senate truly representative of the States, and one in 
keeping with modem democratic constitutions and with the 
terms of reference, should have no Central nominees and 
should
"consist of an equal number of members from each 
State, to be elected on the same franchise as that 
on which members will be elected to the House of 
Representatives.” 86
They were also opposed to the principle of indirect election
whereby State legislatures were to elect 22 Senators. They
submitted three reasons for their opposition.®*^  First, it
would make Senators responsible to the State legislatures
and not directly responible to the people of each state.
Second, the State legislatures* duties relate to domestic
powers vested in them under the Constitution and thus
84. ibid., p. 26.
85. ibid., p. 33. My emphasis.
8 6. ibid., p. 34.
8 7. ibid., p. 3 5.
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"it should not be part of their function to choose 
for the people their representatives in the national 
parliament whose functions it is to exercise powers 
national in character untrammelled by considerations 
of local concern." 88
This was a surprising reason for if the Senate was to be a
truly State body then Senators ought to reflect and defend
considerations of local (State) concern. Third, the American
experience before 1913 had shown that indirect election by
the State Legislatures had resulted in the most grave abuses.
The Commission's recommendations on emergency powers^
opened the way for Central infringements of State rights.
Such infringements would be justified, it argued, in.
situations of danger which threatened the nation. However,
"the occasions on which, and so far as possible the 
extent to which, such powers can be used should be 
limited and defined." 90
It recommended that
"It must be for Parliament to determine whether the 
situation is such that special provisions are 
required." 91
Except that 'Parliament' includes the Commission's States-
dominated Senate and thus States rights could conceivably
still be protected. In making these recommendations it was
very much aware of the violence and potential danger to
92Malaya of the still-existing Emergency. Mr. Justice Abdul
Hamid pointed out, however, that
" no request has been made from any quarter for 
inserting a part relating to Emergency provisions of 
this nature in the Constitution and no Constitution of 
the Commonwealth countries excepting India and 
Pakistan has a chapter of this kind." 93
He was particularly critical of the recommendation that
Parliament was to be the sole judge of whether special
provisions were required or not. He argued that the use of
Emergency provisions would make it necessary not only to
suspend constitutional guarantees for States but also
8 8. ibid.
8 9. ibid., pp. 74.-7 5.
9 0. ibid., p. 7 4.
91* ibid., p. 75.
92. The Emergency was declared in 19^8 when the Malayan 
Communist Party begun an armed campaign for Malayan 
Independence.
93. Reid Report, p. 10^ .
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for the Central government to take over legislative and
executive authority from the States. He believed that if
Emergency powers were at all necessary then
"it is necessary that such extraordinary powers 
should be available only on the occurance of an 
Emergency of an extremely dangerous character and not 
when Parliament without the existence of an emergency 
of any serious kind makes use of these extraordinary 
powers by making a statement that a situation has 
arisen which callsfor the exercise of those powers... 
It is in my opinion unsafe to leave in the hands of 
Parliament power to suspend constitutional guarantees
only by making a recital in the Preamble that _ _
conditions in the country are beyond the reach of 
ordinary law." 9^
The implication of this argument was that a Declaration of
Emergency could be contested in Court by a plaintiff State
as to its validity. In short, a Declaration of Emergency
could be made justiciable.^
The Reid Report recommended a federal state with a
strong Central bias. It emphasised the principle of equality
in constitutional status of States in their relation with
one another and to the Centre, The power of the States,
which seemed to be all inclusive in certain key areas,
cannot, it appeared, interfere with national planning.
While the States appeared to have power over those matters
that were traditionally State affairs, it seemed that the
Centre was in a position to control all essential matters.
The onus would seem to be with the Centre to make federalism
work and State rights meaningful. The Senate was intended to
be a 'States right* body by the Reid Commission, especially
in matters concerning amendments to the Constitution.
However, its effectiveness as a 'States right' body would
be reduced by several factors. First, its composition
and the method of selecting its members would make it only
ibid. My emphasis,
95• A similar argument was presented by Sarawak (the
plaintiff State) when it contested the validity of the 
Emergency (Federal Constitution and Constitution of 
Sarawak) Act, 1966. This case is examined later in v 
chapter two.
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partly as a 'States right' body. Second, there was no 
Constitutional provision requiring State Senators to vote 
as instructed by the State legislature concerned. Third, 
it would be very difficult for States' representatives in 
the Senate, because of party politics, to form a 'united 
front' against the political authority of the House of 
Representatives. This ability to form a 'united front' 
would in turn determine their ability in the Senate to 
block constitutional amendments that were considered 
damaging to States' rights.
The 1957 Constitution.
The Constitution of 1957# a revised version of the 
Reid Report Draft Constitution,^ created a Federation of 
eleven States; Perlis, Kedah, Penang, Selangor, Negri 
Sembilan, Malacca, Johore, Pahang and Kelantan. These States, 
with certain exceptionswere equal in their constitutional 
status and relations to one another. Their relations to the 
Centre were equal for each State but they were not equal to 
the Centre except in constitutional recognition. This 
Constitution eschewed 'special privilege' being accorded to 
any founder States, rich or poor, of the Federation. The
96. The Draft Constitution was reviewed and minor
revisions made by the Constitutional Working Commitr 
tee that met during March-May 1957* The Committee 
comprised four representatives each from the Malay 
Rulers and the Alliance Government, the High Commis­
sioner the Chief Secretary to the Government, and the 
Attorney-General as the representative of the Crown.
It was reported that the Committee found,it difficult to 
resolve several issues : the status of Penang and 
Malacca upon the withdrawal of the sovereignty of the 
Crown; financial rights of the States; and control of 
land by the States. See Straits Times. 2-5-1957, pp. 1 
& 9* Tunku Abdul Rahman admitted that the Rulers rep­
resentatives in this Committee were not initially 
sympathetic to the recommendation that the Federation 
ought to have wide powers regarding the use of land.
They believed that this could limit the autonomy of 
States. See Federation of Malaya# Legislative Council 
Debates, IO-7-I9 5 7, col. 285^ .
97* For example, Perlis was permitted some variation in the 
•essential provisions' of its Constitution. See article 
71 (5) (b). The Mentri Besar of Perlis had argued that 
because Perlis was backward it was unable to adopt 
these provisions in its entirety straightaway. See 
Federation of Malaya, op. cit., col. 2967.
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only difference in the status of the member States,
conceivably, was dictated by their origins as Malay States
or Crown Colony. But in substance and in fact, all the
founder States shared a common status.
During the debate on the Constitutional proposals
in the Federal Legislative Council, Tunku Abdul Rahman, the
Chief Minister, reemphasised that
"It is a fundamental part of the proposals as a 
whole that Penang and Malacca should take their 
places in the new Federation as equal partners with 
the Malay States." 98
Haji Ahmad, however, was especially critical of the equal
status accorded to Penang. He asked,
"Why should the Island be made a separate State 
when, we all know, it was part of Kedah. The British 
Government gained possession of the Island by lease 
and if the British administration of the Island is 
to come to end, it should revert to the State of 
Kedah." 99
Legislative powers were divided into Federal, State,
and Concurrent Lists ; with residual powers remaining with
the States.These lists also defined the extent of
Central and State executive powers. Whether each State
Government was, within defined legislative and executive
powers, autonomous appeared problematic since there were
a number of other constitutional provisions which permitted
the Federal Parliament to legislate on State matters. For
example, Article 76 accorded to the Central Parliament
with such powers 'to provide uniformity of law and policy',
particularly on land and local government matters. This
power, as pointed out by the British White Paper presented
to the British Parliament, was meant
"only for the purpose of ensuring uniformity of law 
and policy, and if any such law makes provision for 
conferring executive authority on the Federation it 
will not operate in any State unless approved by 
resolution of the Legislative Assembly of that 
State." 101
9 8. ibid.. col. 28^9 .
9 9* ibid.. col. 2909.
100.Article 7^ and the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution.
101.Colonial Office, Constitutional Proposals for the 
Federation of Malava. London, Cmnd. 210, June, 1957* 
p. 1 1.
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Tunku Abdul Rahman assured the Federal Legislature that the
application and administration of policy passed under this
102clause would be the sole concern of the States, Further­
more State Governments would find that these arrangements 
would would not operate to their detriment. Centre- 
State controversy over the constitutional interpretation of 
Article ?6 could emerge if this clause was used to justify 
Central legislation on any topic.
Tun Abdul Razak, the Deputy Chief Minister, admitted 
that Article 76 was an exception to the Reid Commission's 
general rule that legislative and executive powers should 
go together. He argued that although land was a State 
subject, this article would provide Parliament with the 
power to legislate for the purpose of uniformity and that
"We have in mind, as explained in the Reid Constitu­
tional proposals, the formulation of a National Land 
Code for the whole country at some future date." 10A
This Article, especially its section A, contained a threat
to the federal principle. It could provide the basis for an
uncheckable'central legislative interference since consent
of the State or States was not required.'1'0  ^If the Central
Government insisted on exercising this power to the fullest,
the States would be powerless and the federal principle
would then disintegrate.
Central Government power was further enhanced by
Article 9 2. This Article concerned Central Government's
power to aquire State land for,national development and
102. Federation of Malaya, op. cit., col. 285^ .
10 3. ibid.
10A. ibid., col. 2978. The National Land Code Bill was 
introduced in Parliament in August 1965* The then 
Minister of Lands and Mines, Abdul Rahman Yakub, 
stated that this Bill "is presented with the unanimous 
support of the Governments of the States," and it has 
been fully discussed and debated in the National Land 
Council. See Federation of Malaysia, Malaysia 
Parliamentary Debates (Dewan Raavat), Vol. 11, No. 8 , 
9 .8.6 5, col. 15 81.
105. However, where a law, passed under these Articles,
provides for the conferment of executive authority upon 
the Federation, it cannot operate in any State unless 
approved by the legislature of the State.
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national interest projects. The Reid Commission had 
recommended that the Central Government should have the 
power, subject to certain limitations, to pass any legis­
lation required to carry into effect any development and 
conservation scheme declared in such legislation to be in 
the national interest. The British White Paper noted that
"This important recommendation has been welcomed 
by both the Federal and the State Governments." 106
However, it warned that
"it would be neither practicable nor desirable for 
the Federal Government to use this power for the 
purpose of formulating and implementing national 
policies covering all aspects of the use of land? 
and it was clearly not the intention of the 
Commission that the power should be used in this 
way." 107
Abdul Aziz Ishak, a Central Minister, gave an assurance
that in the implementation of national development schemes
this Article
"the closest personal and direct liaison and 
understanding of the point of view of State 
Governments and officials is now and will continue 
to be maintained."108
Most damaging of all, A.rticle 150 provided, after 
a declaration of emergency, the Central. Parliament with
106. Colonial Office, op.cit., p. 12.
107. ibid. The Rulers would not have signed the Agreement 
establishing the Independent Federation of Malaya if 
land had not been placed within the State List.Only for 
the national interest were they willing to cede States• 
exclusive control over land. Interview with Mohd. Khir 
J ohari•
108. Federation of Malaya, op.cit.. col. 292 .^ Article 92 
could provide the impetus for a centripetal tendency. 
The continuance of this tendency would, however, inter 
alia, depend upon the success of the Central Government 
In tackling the vital problems like economic expansion 
and rural development. On this Sheridan wrote: "Success 
in these spheres will ensure a concentration of politi­
cal power throughout the Federation, in both the fede­
ral and state legislatures 5 whereas failures will mean 
a dispersal of that power, with all the weaknesses and 
changes inherent in a dispersal among the small politi­
cal and economic units constituting the Federation." 
Sheridan, L.A., ed., Malaya and Singapore, The Borneo 
Territories: The development of their laws and const­
itutions. London. Stevens and Sons. 1961. p. 102.
*n.
wide powers to make laws on almost all State matters. 
Furthermore, through several constitutional provisions the 
Central Government could exercise some control over the 
States. For example, Articles 9^ and 95E(^ ) required that 
the agricultural and forestry officers of the States accept 
the professional advice of the Central Government in respect 
of their duties.
The financial provisions of the Constitution further 
enhanced Central Government power. The Central ovemment 
controlled the major sources of revenue through being the 
main taxing authority. 110 Tunku Abdul Rahman justitfied this 
provision in terms of the need to equalise the levels of 
wealth among the States. He argued that if States were to be 
given important taxing powers wealthy States could become 
even more wealthy while poor States could become even more 
poorer. He believed that only the Central Government, with 
such powers, could accomplish this equalisation of wealth 
among the States.The States, except for revenue from land 
and forests, had no significant sources of revenue. Further­
more, the Central Government controlled the borrowing powers 
112of the States. States would have to depend on Central
Government allocations and grants to cover the deficits in 
113expenditure. J States, in the main, would thus be financial­
ly dependent on the Central Government.
Tunku Abdul Rahman claimed that he was aware of the 
need to achieve a level of financial independence for States. 
He pointed out that the Constitutional Working Committee, 
when examining the Reid Commission's recommendations on 
Centre-State finance, felt that the Constitution itself 
should include provisions safeguarding the financial 
positions of the States and that
109. See Part IV of the Constitution.
110. Article 96 of the Constitution.
111. Federation of Malaya, op.cit., cols. 285^-2857.
112. Article 111 of the Constitution.
113* Article 109(3)# (5) and (6) of the Constitution.
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"Such safeguards will be particularly important in 
years to come because we must expect that sooner or 
later the Government of a State will be formed by a 
political party which is in opposition to the party 
in power in the Federal Parliament." 114
However, the safeguarding of States* financial position was 
to be achieved not by the grafting of wide taxing and borrow­
ing powers but by continuing the practice whereby the Centre 
would make large grants to the States and by writing
"into the Constitution that the State Governments will 
be entitled as of right to receive certain grants and 
other sources of revenue." 115
He viewed the NFC as "a most useful forum of debate" within
which Centre-State financial relations could be discussed.
He was nevertheless confident that under the new proposals
the States would achieve "complete financial autonomy".
Centre-State co-operation was ensured in several ways.
For example, Article 81 provided that the executive authority
of every State should be so exercised so (a) as to ensure
compliance with any Federal law applying to that State, and
(b) as not to impede or prejudice the exercise of executive
authority. The onus for co-operation, it seemed, had been
placed on the States. As such, the provision ensuring
co-operation may be viewed by the States as not being much
different from Central control. State powers over land and
local government were.somewhat reduced by the establishment
of the National Land Council (NLC) and the National Council
for Local Government (NCLG). Both the Centre and the States
were represented in these bodies and the policy decisions
of the NLC and NCLG concerning land and local government
respectively were binding on both the Central and State
114. Federation of Malaya , op.cit., col* 2854.
11 5* ibid.
116. ibid., col. 2858.
117. ibid.
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Governments. There was thus joint Centre-State responsib­
ility for land and local government. In view of the composi­
tion 119of the NLC and NCLG, however, the Central Government 
needed only the concurring votes of two States in the NLC, 
and the concurring vote of one State in the NCLG, to effect 
a policy on land and local government respectively which 
would bind all State Governments.
States were not given a direct role in the amendment 
process, except that any amendment to alter the boundaries
of any State required the consent of that State, expressed
120in a law passed in the Statefs legislature. The Federal
118. Articles 91 and 95A. The NCLG was established by clause 
12 of the Constitution (Amendment) Bill, i9 6 0. Tun 
Razak justified its establishment for the sake of 
uniformity and co-ordination of local government affairs. 
He pointed out that as a result of discussion with the 
Mentri Besars and Chief Ministers of the States on this 
matter, "it has been agreed with the State Governments 
that there should be established a National Council for 
Local Government on the same lines as the National Land 
Council. It is hoped that with the establishment of 
this NCLG there will be continuous consultation between 
Federal and State Governments on matters of policy and 
legislation affecting local government." See Federation 
of Malaya, Malayan Parliamentary Debates(Dewan Raayat), 
Vol. 11, No~.""3, ££-4-19 6 0, coT."307.----------------
119. The NLC comprised a Central Minister as Chairman (with­
out the casting vote), one representative from each 
State appointed by the Ruler or Governor of the State, 
and a maximum of ten representatives appointed by the 
Central Government. The NCLG comprised similar represen­
tatives with the exception that the Chairman had the 
casting vote. The proportion of Centre to State repres­
entatives in both bodies was eleven to eleven. The NLC 
and NCLG together with the NFC were (as they remain) 
the formal centre-state bodies within which Centre- 
State issues could be tackled and co-operative federal­
ism could take root.
120. Article 2(b). R.H. Hickling suggested that some clauses 
which concern Centre-State relations, such as Articles 
71 (3 ) » 7 >^ 76 (b), and 80, should be capable of 
amendment only with the approval of the States. See 
his "The First Five Years of the Federation of Malaya 
Constitution", Malaya Law Review, Vol. k, No. 2,
p. 20 2.
kk.
Parliament was the only body, in general, concerned with the
amending process. The only strict constitutional safeguard
for the States was provided by Article 159 which required
that any major constitutional amendment should be passed by
a two-thirds majority of the full membership of both Houses 
121of Parliament, It was in the composition of the Senate 
that States could at least hope to be able to block any 
amendment prejudicial to their interests. The Reid Commission 
had envisaged the Senate, with twenty-two State elected and 
eleven Central appointed Senators, as the body most able to 
defend States* interests during the amendment process. The 
1957 Constitution, however, increased the number of Central 
appointed Senators to sixteen while the number of State 
elected Senators remained at twenty-two. If the Commission's 
recommendation had been accepted then there would be some 
semblance of a restraining safeguard against constitutional 
amendments should the State elected Senators decide to 
•'block* any such amendment. Constitutionally, the federal 
system was left unprotected since the Central Parliament 
could unilaterally amend the Constitution as long as the 
required Central majorities approved.
The 1957 Constitution established a Federation with a 
clearly strong Centre and Central bias. The functioning 
federal system would, however, largely depend on Centre- 
State harmony and co-operation, especially on finance, land 
and local government. The failure of the NFC, NLC and NCLG 
to achieve substantial agreement between the States and the 
Centre could aggravate controveries on such issues because 
of the competing and overlapping delineation of Centre- 
State responsibilities. In such controversies the self- 
restraint of the Central Parliament is important for the 
maintenance of the federal system.
121. Article 159 was amended in 1962 and this, as will be 
seen in chapter 2 , significantly affected the federal 
concept.
Chapter 2
The Constitution and Malaysian Federalism: Amendments and
Interpretati ons.
Conflicts over the interpretation of constitutional
provisions regarding federalism and Centre-State powers
have been frequent. Such conflicts emerged especially
during debates concerning certain amendments to the
Constitution and the Centre's use of Emergency provisions.
On two occasions such conflicts necessitated the
adjudication of the Courts.
Amendments to the Constitution.
In only nineteen years of Independence the
Constitution was amended no less than seventeen times,^ The
Constitution embodied the formal elements of the ’federal
bargain'. Constitutional amendments of Centre-State
provisions concerned, essentially, the process of unmaking
and remaking a formerly agreed federal relationship. The
amendment process has been crucially affected by changes in
the composition of the Senate. The provisions for amendment
were also exceeding liberal.
At Malayan Independence in 1957 the proportion of
State-elected to Centre-appointed Senators was twenty-two
to sixteen. With the formation of Malaysia in 19^ 3, the
proportion was twenty-eight to twenty-two. In 196^ the
Constitution was amended to provide for Centre-appointed
Senators to be in the majority for the first time. T^e
proportion now was twenty-eight to thirty-two. Dr. Ismail
argued that the increase of Centre-appointed Senators was
"desirable in order to get wider representations in 
the Senate consequent on the formation of Malaysia. 
This will enable His Majesty to appoint more persons 
of wider experience and ability to take an active 
part in the government of this country." 3
1. Tun Mohamad Suffian Bin Hashim, An Introduction to the 
Constitution of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Government 
Printer, 1976, p. 3^ *
2. Act 19/65, section 6 . See Federation of Malaysia, Acts 
of Parliament, 1965, Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 
1965, p. 8 8.
3. Federation of Malaysia, Malaysian Parliamentary Debates, 
Dewan Raayat, Vol. 1, No. 8 , 9*7*65, cols. IIO9-IIIO.
With Singapore's separation from Malaysia on August 9t
1965» the number of State-elected Senators was reduced
to twnty-six but the number of Centre-appointed Senators
was not similarly reduced. These changes seemed to deny
the safeguard envisaged by the Reid Commission, and
they essentially went against the spirit of the Commission's
recommendations that
"We think that there should be a substantial majority 
of elected members even though the powers of the 
Senate are to be considerably less than the powers 
of the House of Representatives; and we recommend 
that Parliament should have power to reduce the 
number of nominated members or abolish them if a 
time should come when that is thought desirable.” k
The above changes would make it difficult for the Senate
to be the repository of States' rights and for State-elected
Senators to 'block' any amendment.
The Constitutional Amendment Act of 1962: No. 1^/62: This
Act amended. inter alia. the amendment procedure of
article 159(*0 by inserting paragraph (bb) to it. Through
this amendment, only a simple majority, instead of the two-
thirds majority, in both Houses of Parliament was now
required for the passing of
"an amendment made for or in connection with the 
admission of any State to the Federation or its 
association with the States thereof, or any 
modification made as to the application of the 
Constitution to a State previously so admitted 
or associated." 5
The scope of the 'modification', however, was not clear.
On the one hand, if the amendment had dealt only
with the admission of new States, it might have been seen
simply as a device by the party currently in power to
guarantee its control over the admission of new States
should it lose the two-thirds majority in both Houses
which it commanded to secure this amendment. On the other
hand, that Parliament, by a simple majority, should be given
the power to effect "any modification made as to the
4. Reid Report, p. 23*
5* Clause Zk of Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1962. See
Federation of Malaysia. Acts of Parliament. Kuala Lumpur, 
Government Press, 1963> p. 206.
application of the Constitution to a State previously so
admitted or associated" appeared to have removed the
possibility of the Constitution serving to protect the
federal concept. With regard to the States of Malaya,
this opened the door to all manner of modifications
without the (tedious) necessity of obtaining the two-thirds
majority of the total members in each House.^ The Malayan
States* lack of power in the amending process was
highlighted in the case, examined later, of The Government
of Kelantan v. The Government of Malaya and Tunku Abdul 
7
Rahman Al-haj.
The 1962 amendment had retrospective application 
from Independence Day, August 31» 1957* This choice for 
the effective date of the applicability of the amendment, 
as Groves argued, could only be for the purpose of makingo
it applicable to the existing States. No State, however, 
had been "previously so admitted" to the Federation, 
because the Federation of Malaya Independence Act, 1957» 
which established the Federation was clearly a compact 
between Great Britain and the Rulers of the Malay States. 
This compact created a new entity, the Federation of Malaya. 
Before this there was no entity to which a State was admitted 
and upon the formation of the Federation not one of the 
original States could be spoken of as being previously 
"associated" with the Federation. States were "associated" 
only with one another and with Great Britain to form the
6. Watts claimed that the Central Government considered it 
prudent to consult State Assemblies and party organization 
before the passage of the 1962 amendment Bill. See 
Watts, R.L., New Federations: Experiments in the 
Commonwealth. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 19 66,
P. 323.
7« Malava Law Journal. 1963# p. 355* Watts argued, citing 
the 1962 amendment as an example, that because of 
coventions and the pressures of political forces, it had 
become customary for the Central Government to consult 
the State governments before the introduction of important 
constitutional amendments, even in those instances 
where the States possessed no formal powers of 
ratification. See Watts, R.L., 00.cit.. pp. 300-302.
8. Groves, H.E., "Constitutional (Amendment) Act, 1962", 
Malava Law Review. Vol. no. 2, 19&2, p. 329.
48.
Federation. As Groves argued, this amendment made it
"possible for a simple majority in the House of 
Representatives to vary at any time, as a purely 
unilateral action, any agreement which any State 
now joining the Federation may make with the 
Government of the Federation of Malaya as to its 
admission and association." 9
Later Sheridan and Groves argued somewhat differently.
Since all the States of the Federation had at any time
been "previously so admitted" all amendments to the
application in any respect of the Constitution to any
State (except for what article 161E entrenched for the
Borneo States) seemed to be outside the requirement of a
two-thirds majority.'*'0 However, no Court has yet had to
consider what an application of the Constitution "to a
State" means.
The 1963 Constitutional Amendments The Malaysia Act.,
No. 26/63>'*'~*’ The Constitution clearly provided that the
Federal Parliament may by law admit other States to the 
12Federation. However, this could be done only by an
amendment to the Constitution in view of article 1 which
enumerated the States comprising the Federation. The
Malaysia Act, apart from providing for other amendments,
provided this necessary amendment.
By virtue of this Act three new States - Singapore,
Sarawak, and North Borneo (Sabah) - were admitted into the
Federation. The Act made several amendments to the Federal
Constitution to reflect the terms of agreement between the
Federation Government, the British Government, and each of
13the three new States. J These amendments converted the 
Federation of Malaya Constitution into the Federation of 
Malaysia Constitution. They also emphasised the different
9 . ibid.
10. Sheridan, L.A., and Groves, H.E., The Constitution of 
Malaysia, New York, Oceana Publication, 1967, p. 15*
11. See Federation of Malaysia, Acts of Parliament. 1963.
Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 19^ 3* PP* 243-326.
12. Article 2(a) of the Constitution.
13. For terms of the Agreement, see Office of Commonwealth 
Relations, Malaysia: Agreement concluded between the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the 
Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore, 
'Cmnd. 2094, London, July,' I9 6 3. See also Federation of 
Malaya» Report of the Inter-Governmental Committee .19.62. 
Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 19&3*
9^.
constitutional status and power enjoyed by the new States. 
The new States were, thus, admitted on terms substantially 
at variance with those applicable to the original eleven 
States. Also, with regard to amendments, some constitutional 
limitations were introduced by the 1963 Malaysia Act 
in respect of the Borneo States. Article 161E provided 
safeguards for the constitutional position of Borneo 
States.^ These safeguards meant that any modification 
made to the application of the Constitution to a Borneo 
State required a two-thirds vote in both Houses of 
Parliament. This requirement could be waived only if the 
modification was such as to equate or assimilate the posi­
tion of that State under the Constitution to the position 
of the States of Malaya.^ The Borneo States, thus, had 
secured for themselves some safeguards against amendments 
adverse to their special interests or incompatible with 
the basic objectives for which they entered the Federation. 
As Jayakumar stated,
"in respect to the other eleven States, and in 
respect of the Borneo States in matters outside 
article 161E, Parliament has tremendous amending 
powers in the excercise of which the States do not 
have the slightest say.” 17
The debate over the Malaysia Bill in the Dewan Raavat 
(House of Representatives) provided the opportunity for 
re-examining the constitutional status of States in relation 
to one another and to the Central Government. An Opposition
1^ . See Item 3> Part IV and First Schedule of the Malaysia 
Act, 1963.
15. Article 161E provided that with regard to the 
application of the Constitution to the Borneo States 
an amendment of the Constitution would still require 
a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament 
and in a number of specified cases would require the 
concurrence of the Governor of the Borneo States or 
each of the Borneo States concerned.
16. Article l6lE(l) of the Constitution.
I?. Jayakumar, S./’Constitutional Limitations on Legislative 
Powers in Malaysia", Malaya Law Review. Vol. 5# No* H» 
17-8-63» July, 19 6 7, p. 110.
50
Member of Parliament (MP), V.Veerapan, argued that
"This Bill ••• really mutilates our Constitution 
and kills the Federation of Malaya ••• the Federal 
Government should not only have discussed this 
matter here but it should also have consulted the 
States," 18
He pointed out that the Federation of Malaya Agreement,
1957, establishing the Federation, was a compact between
the Queen of Great Britain and the Rulers of the Malay
States, This compact took effect only after it had been
approved by the former Federal Legislative Council and by
an Enactment in each of the eleven States, Equally, the
same legal procedure should also be followed before the
establishment of the Federation of Malaysia. Thus,
"the States not only have a moral right to be 
consulted but also the States may have a legal right 
••• If the Federation Government runs rough-shod 
over this moral obligation, then I should say that 
it is a breach of faith on the part of the Central 
Government. I hope the States would wake up, because 
if they do not the present amendment and those 
amendments that have taken place - like, I think, 
Article 159(*0(bb) - would further erode away the 
rights of the States ..." 19
A similar opposition was expressed by Wan Mustapha
Haji Ali, a PAS Opposition MP* He reiterated that
"... the individual States in the Federation of 
Malaya have not been consulted, and neither were 
the Rulers or Sultans of the States, though the 
Bill would change the whole constitutional set-up 
of this country." 20
21He argued further, referring to the Reid Report , that even
if the Constitution did not provide for consultation in this
matter, convention required that any major change of policy
(like this Malaysia Bill) must be based on prior
22consultation with States. Consultation with the Rulers
18. Federation of Malaya, Malayan Parliamentary Debates 
(MPD) , Dewan Raayat, Vol. 5» No. 11, 17-8-63> cols. 
1155-1156.
19. ibid., cols. 1156-1157* Article 159(4)(bb) referred to 
thel962 amendment discussed earlier.
2 0. ibid.. cols. 1164-1165.
21. Reid Report. pp. 14-15, noted that convention required 
consultation between the Central and State governments 
before any major change of policy.
22. MPD, 0£.cit., col. II6 7.
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was also necessary, he stated, because the Malaysia Bill
provided no provision which would safeguard the
constitutional position of the States of Malaya. As an
example, he pointed out that
"under clause 69 Singapore before joining Malaysia 
has safeguarded her constitutional position, whereas 
the Malay States have none at all through the 
constitutional documents of the States, and there j.s 
nothing stated here in the Bill for those States as 
prescribed for Singapore." 23
To these criticisms, Dr. Ismail, the Minister for
Home Affairs, maintained that
"if it is intended that the States should be 
consulted when the question of admission of new 
States arises, then it would have been written in 
the Constitution," 2k
However, the Constitution required that the Conference of
Rulers should be consulted and this, according to Tun Razak,
the Deputy Prime Minister, had been fulfilled. He informed
the House that
"The Conference of Rulers had been consulted on more 
than five occasions on the question of Malaysia." 25
He argued that the present case was different from the
constitutional reform years of 19^8 and 1957 when
consultation with the individual Rulers and States occurred.
Furthermore, he rightly emphasised, the Constitution, which
had been agreed to previously by all the States, provided
the Central Parliament with the power under article 2 to
admit new States. It did not, however, provide for any
consultation provision with regard to the excercise of
this article.^
The admission of three new States with substantially
more "States' rights" also led to criticisms since it
violated the principle of equality of rights and status of
States in relation to one another and to the Central
Government. Tan Phock Kin, an Opposition MP, warned that
this violation would lead to the destruction of the new
2 3- ibid.. col. II6 9.
2k. ibid., Vol. 5. no. 13* 20-8-63, col. 1351-
25- ibid., Vol. 5* No. 12, 19-8-63* col. 1316.
26. ibid., Vol. 5* No. 13* col. 1355-
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Federation because inequality would breed dissatisfaction 
among the S t a t e s T h e  Bill, as Lim Kean Siew, another 
Opposition MP, asserted, entrenched the principle of 
inequality between the States of Malaysia - the original 
eleven States on one side and the three new States on the
p Q
other. The principle of equality was first contained in
the Federation of Malaya Agreement of 1948, and this Bill,
according to Veerapan, was based on an opposite principle.
Although the Constitution provided that any other State can
be admitted, Veerapan asked ,
"Do you think honestly that the founders would want 
other people to come in with better rights, with 
better privileges, than themselves?" 29
Zulkifli Muhammed, another PAS Opposition MP, claimed that
the admission of the three new States with different rights
and status than those enjoyed by the States in the
80Federation of Malaya was unconstitutional.
Collectively, opponents agreed that the Bill would 
weaken the Central Government and would eventually lead 
to disaster. They concluded that the Bill contained the 
seeds of disunity within and the destruction of the 
Federation.
Dr. Ismail admitted that the special rights and 
status given to the new States were concessions for 
enticing these States to federate. Without these concessions 
it would not have been possible to establish the Federation. 
He informed the House that
27. ibid., Vol. 5, No. 6 , 12-8-63. col. 717.
28. ibid.. Vol. 5, No. 10, 16-8-63, cols. IO58-IO7I.
2 9. ibid., Vol. 5,,No. 11, 17-8-6 3. col. 1157*
30. ibid., Vol. 5. No. 12, col. 1248. He also criticised
the fact that the new States, unlike the original 
eleven States, were not governed by the powers given 
to the National Land Council (NLC) and the National 
Council for Local Government (NCLG). See ibid., col.
1269.
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•'In the case of Singapore, ... she is given autonomy 
in education and labour and a certain degree of 
autonomy consistent with the concept of a strong 
central government• Singapore would like its own 
citizenship in addition to the Malaysian citizenship 
with the safeguard that Singapore citizens should 
have corresponding rights with those of the Malayan 
citizens who are not Singapore citizens. In the base 
of the territories of Sarawak and North Borneo, they 
are to be federated on the same lines as other States 
in the existing Federation with certain safeguards.
It is in the light of these two different ways in 
which Singapore and the Borneo territories have 
agreed to be federated with the Federation of Malaya 
that the provisions of this Bill have to be 
reviewed." 31
Additional financial guarantees for the new States
also constituted part of the price of Federation. Thus,
Centre-State financial relations for the new States were
different from those for the original eleven States.
According to Tan Siew Sin, the Finance Minister, these
financial provisions were necessary so as to overcome the
financial and economic backwardness of the new States,
32particularly Sarawak and Sabah* But who, Tan Phock Kin
asked, was going to bear the burden of financing development
33in Sarawak and Sabah.
Singapore, however, was 'rewarded' for being 
financially and economically more developed thah the 
original eleven States and the other two new States. It 
was jealous of its wealth and fearful of the possibility 
that this 'New York' would become the future paymaster of 
the new Federation. The tenacity with which Singapore 
defended its financial interests could be seen in the fact 
that Centre-Singapore financial arrangements were to be
31l
negotiated on a yearly basis. These arrangements were 
thus subject to bargaining and, possibly, change annually 
unlike those governing Centre-State financial relations 
for the other States which had been spelled out, even to 
the last dollar, in the Constitution.
31. ibid.. cols. 1284-1285.
3 2. ibid., col. 1301.
33. ibid.. Vol. 5. No. 13, col. 1451.
34. Article 112E of the Constitution.
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Despite specific constitutional safeguards available
to the new States, opponents of the Bill warned of the danger
of clause 39 of the Bill. Clause 39(1) and (2) amended
3 *5Article 150 of the Constitution  ^by deleting the words 
"whether by war or external agression or by internal dist­
urbance" and adding "in any part of the Federation". Thus, 
it would be possible, Veerapan concluded, for,a state of 
emergency to be proclaimed irrespective of whether there was 
war, external agression or internal disturbance in any part 
of the Federation.-^ He warned that the Central Government, 
through the proclamation of a state of emergency, would have 
the powers over the States, the constitutional safeguards 
enjoyed by new States notwithstanding. The proclamation of a 
state of emergency, he warned ,
"could be in Sarawak, it could be in Borneo, it could 
be in Singapore, it could be in Johore or Kelantan - 
and what happens?" 37
He chided the new States for their lack of foresight and
remarked that,
"I hope that the people who were so eager, so careful, 
so clever, much cleverer and more careful than the 
people of the eleven States of Malaya, would also ~o 
consider the implication of this little amendment." ^
In support, Lim Kean Siew remarked that clause 39(1) and (2) 
would destroy all the rights reserved, or any rights reserved 
for the various States under this constitutional arrangement.-^ 
Furthermore, as stated by Wan Mustapha Haji Ali, this amend­
ment would alter drastically the original position as provided
Lq
in the present Constitution. To these criticisms, the 
Central Government was, characteristically, silent. As it 
turned out and as examined later, such powers were used to 
proclaim a state of emergency in Sarawak and Kelantan in 
I966 and 1977 respectively.
35* This Article governed the use of emergency powers.
36. MFD, Vol. 5 ,-No. 1 1, col. 1158.
37. ibid., cols. 1158-59.
3 8. ibid.
39. ibid., Vol. 5, No. 13, col. 1416.
40. ibid., col. 1422.
The Malaysia Bill, as the critics saw it, was an attempt by 
the Central Government to change the Malayan federal 
structure. The admission of three new States with 
substantially more power over "States' rights" and enjoying 
certain constitutional safeguards placed the original eleven 
States in an inferior constitutional position compared to 
that of the three new States. This violated the principle of 
equality of States in terms of their relations to one another 
and to the Central Government, the principle advocated by the 
Reid Commission and subsequently provided for by the 1957 
Constitution.
In criticising Tun Razak's assertion that the Bill did
not change the 'substance* of the present Constitution, Tan
Phock Kin commented that
"He must realise that with the introduction of the new 
States, the position of the present States with regard 
to the new States are entirely different, though their 
position among themselves are somewhat the same." 41
Critics of the Bill asserted that such a change in the
federal structure should necessarily be based on prior
consultation with the original eleven States of the
Federation. Did the Central Parliament have the power to
unmake and remake, through the Malaysia Act, the present
federal arrangement? This the Court would have to decide.
The 1965 Constitutional Amendment! The Government of
Malaysia (Amendment) Act, 1965, No. 31/1965 : This was an
amendment to Article 95C(1) of the Constitution. By virtue
of this amendment the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong (the Supreme
Monarch) may by order authorise the Legislatures of the
States to make and execute laws in respect of any matter in
the Federal List. This power, then restricted to the Borneo
States, was to be applicable to all the States of the
Federation. This amendment was designed, according to
Dr. Ismail, to
"smoothen the administration as between the Centre 
and the States." 43
41. ibid.. col. 1342.
42. See Federation of Malaysia, Acts of Parliament, 1965, 
Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 1965*
43. Federation of Malaysia, Malaysian Parliamentary Debates 
(MPD), Dewan Raayat, Vol. 11, No7 5t 3*6.65, col. 1058.
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Dr, Tan Chee Koon, an Opposition MP, commented that 
this amendment represented a considerable erosion of the 
powers of the State Governments, State Governments, he 
continued, should have been consulted and their approval
44
obtained prior to the Bill's introduction to Parliament.
The Central Government now had the opportunity to use the 
'imperial edict', as it was labelled, to force recalcitrant 
States into line under the guise of being, as Dr. Ismail 
justified it,
"mainly designed to smoothen the functioning of the 
machinery of government both in the States and in the 
Centre." 45
It seemed that the Bill had been directed at PAS-
controlled Kelantan which had since 1959 vigorously pursued
"its own way". Kelantan was often involved in a political
46tug-of-war with the Centre. Kelantan became, indeed, the
visible defender of 'State rights'.,Lim Chong Eu, an
Opposition MP, while referring to Kelantan's opposition to
the Bill, remarked that
"They naturally feel it very much, because they, as a 
State, have understood the constant struggles between 
State and Federal powers." 47
He further argued that a "Federation of States" must involve
the acceptance of the concept of State powers. It necessarily
followed that there must always be this constant struggle
between State and Central powers. Dr. Ismail insisted,
however, that,
"it has never been the intention of the Central Govern­
ment to take the powers from the States as enshrined in 
the Constitution ••• [and that of] all the amendments 
... in this Bill, some had been done at the request of 
the States and some after consultation with the 
States." 48
Nevertheless, the amendments represented, especially to 
Kelantan, a further encroachment of State powers.
44. ibid., cols.1038-39*
45. ibid., col. 1058.
46. Kelantan-Centre conflict over the rural development plan 
was an example. This is examined in Chapter 11. .
47. MPD, Vol. 11, N.o. 5, col. 1045.
48. ibid., col. 1058.
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The Constitution and Malaysia (Singapore Amendment) Act,
I9 6 5, No, 53 / 1965^: The Constitution did not provide for
secession. Groves believed, however, that Sabah, Sarawak
and Singapore or any other new States that might subsequently
be admitted, could be dissociated from the Federation by an
Act of Parliamnent repealing the constitutional amendments
by which they were admitted.^
This Act was preceded by the Singapore Separation
Agreement, 1965* entered into by the Central Government.
Lim Chong Eu rightly pointed out that
"neither the State Government of Singapore, 
nor indeed the Central Government, under the 
Constitution, which has not yet been amended, 
has the right to provide for the severance of a State 
from Malaysia." 51
Ong Kee Hui, a Sarawak MP, was particularly apprehensive
about the future of Sarawak.J He asked whether, if at some
future date the Governments of the Borneo States were to be
less amenable to Alliance direction* the same reason would
then be advanced for further partition of Malaysia? He warned
that this would be the beginning of the disintegration of
Malaysia.^ Abu Bakar Hamzah, a Kelantan PAS Opposition MP,
feared that the Central Government would on the same basis
take similar action with regard-ito Kelantan. Without being
specific, he warned of the consequences of Singapore's
separation on the operation on the Malaysian Federation.
Despite the questionable constitutional basis for 
separation, the amendment was passed in each House without 
any opposing vote. This case suggested that separation or 
secession must be effected through Centre-State arrangement 
rather that by unilateral action.
^9*.See Federation of Malaysia, Acts of Parliament, 1965»
pp. 2?7-279.
50. Groves, H.E., The Constitution of Malaysia, Singapore, 
Malayan Pub., p. 152.
51. MPD, Vol. Ill, Inc. 8, 9-8-1965, col. 1508.
52. ibid., col. 1508.
53. ibid.. col. 1509.
5^ . ibid., col. 1511#
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The Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1971» No. A30/1971:
This Act provided the basis for the return of party politics
and parliamentary rule after a period of Emergency rule
through the National Operations Council (NOC) which was
imposed in May 1969* Major amendments were made to the
Constitution.  ^Three amendments especially affected the
federal aspects of the Constitution. First, Articles 63 and
72 were amended and thus depriving MPs and Members of
States' Legislative Assemblies of the protection they
previously enjoyed under these Articles if they were charged
with an offence under any law passed by virtue of the
amended Article 10.^ Second, the amended Article 10, inter
alia, provided Parliament with the power to pass laws
prohibiting the questioning of any matter, right , status,
position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative established
or protected by Article 181 concerning the sovereignty of the
States' Rulers.^ But before Parliament passed such a law the
Sedition Act would apply and this made such questioning a
"seditious tendency”. Finally, changes were made to Article
159(5) which was thereby entrenched; it now cannot be
amended without the consent of the Conference. of 
< 0  - .
Rulers. 7
Intentionally or not, perhaps ironically for UMNO, the 
impact of the constitutional restructuring was to reinforce 
the institution of States' Rulers by placing it beyond and 
above public debate. Futher, they now, through the Conference 
of Rulers as a Central institution and with the entrenched 
veto, had become crucially relevant to the amendment process. 
Ironically, States' Rulers emerged with enhanced powers and
55* For a full discussion see Federation of Malaysia,
Parliamentary Debates on the Constitution Amendment Bill 
1971» Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 1972. See also 
Milne, R.S. and Mauzy, K.D., Politics and Government in 
Malaysia. Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press. 
1978, pp. 9^ -99.
56. See Article 10(^) of the Constitution. This was part of 
1971 amendments.
57* See Articles 10(^) and 181 of the Constitution.
58. See Milne and Mauzy, op.cit., pp. 96-9 7.
59* See Article 159(5) of the Constitution.
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the Centre would have to tread cautiously into the as yet 
uncharted waters of Centre-State Rulers* relations.
The Centre*s use of Emergency Provisions.
The Emergency (Federal Constitution and Constitution of 
Sarawak)Act, 1966. No. 68 / 1966: ® Following a leadership 
crisis in Sarawak, a state of emergency was declared in 
Sarawak on September 196 6. This crisis, according to Means,^ 
was largely precipitated by Central involement in Sarawak's 
politics in which several political parties were jostling 
one another to arrive at certain political alliances. As a 
result, the then Chief Minister of Sarawak, Stephen Kalong 
Ningkan, lost the support of the majority of Council Negri 
(the State Legislative Assembly) members. The Governor, 
acting on representation from this majority group, requested 
the Chief Minister to resign since he no longer had the 
confidence of the majority in the Council. The Chief Minister 
refused and was subsequently "dismissed" by the Governor. 
Penghulu Tawi Sli was then appointed as Chief Minister.
Stephen Kalong Ningkan challenged his dismissal in 
the High Court of Kuching; Chief Justice Harley declared the 
dismissal of the petitioner void on the ground, inter alia, 
that the private representation made to the Governor by 
Council members did not show a lack of confidence in the 
petitioner which could only be assessed by a formal vote in 
the legislature.^ Penghulu Tawi Sli then requested the 
Speaker to convene the Council Negri so that a proper vote 
of no confidence might be taken against the petitioner. The 
Speaker refused and Sarawak politics became tense and serious. 
This was the background to the proclamation of a state of 
emergency in Sarawak.
60.* See Federation of Malaysia, Acts of Parliament. 1Q6 6. 
Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, I9 6 6, pp. 5^5-5^7*
61. Means, G.P., Malaysian Politics. London, Hodder,and 
Stoughton, 2nd. edition, 19?6,pp. 331-8?•
62. ibid. Penghulu Tawi Sli was a Malaysian National Allian­
ce Council appointee rather than of the Sarawak Alliance 
Council.
6 3. Stephen Kalong Ningkan v. Tun Abang Haji Openg and Tawi 
Sli, in Jayakumar, S., Constitutional Law Cases from 
Malaysia and Singapore. Singapore, Malayan Law Review 
Pte. Ltd., 1971, pp. 227-2*0.
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The Emergency legislation provided for the amendment
of both the Federal and Sarawak State Constitutions. The
main aim of these amendments - especially sections 3» 4
and 5 of the Emergency legislation - was to make good the
lack of powers on the part of the Governor on which Chief
Justice Harley had based his judgement. As Tun Abdul Razak
explained, the Emergency legislation was aimed at amending
Sarawak's Constitution and providing the Governor with
"the powers to convene a meeting of the Council 
Negri in order that the question of confidence in 
the present Government of Sarawak may be put to test 
and also the power to dismiss the Chief Minister or 
the Government from office if that Government or 
that Chief Minister refuses to resign after he has 
received a vote of no confidence in the Council 
Negri." 64
The most important sections of the Emergency legisla­
tion were sections 3» 4 and 5* Section 3 amended clauses 
(5 ) and (6 ) of article 150^  by inserting after "this 
Constitution" the words "or in the Constitution of Sarawak"
and after "Constitution" the words "or of the Constitution
< -
of the State of Sarawak" respectively. These were intended 
to give the Central Parliament power while a proclamation 
of Emergency was in force to amend the State Constitution 
of Sarawak without following the procedure laid down by 
article 41 of the State Constitution. This article provided 
that any amendment to the State Constitution must be by an 
ordinance enacted by the legislature of Sarawak and by no 
other means. Section 4 drastically enlarged the powers of
64. MPD, Vol. Ill, no. 12, 19-9-6 6, col. 2061.
6 5. See Article 150(5) and (6) of the Constitution. 
Clauses (5) and (6) referred only to inconsistencies 
with the Federal Constitution and not with the 
Constitution of a State. Perhaps prompted by this 
doubt, the Central Government, when enacting the 
Emergency legislation to modify certain provisions 
of the Sarawak Constitution, made the amendments to 
these clauses. These amendments were to lapse six 
months after the Proclamation of Emergency ceased to 
be in force. See Section 3(2), The Emergency (Federal 
Constitution and Constitution of Sarawak) Act, 1966, 
in Federation of Malaysia, op.cit.. p. 546.
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the Governor of Sarawak by providing that, notwithstanding 
anything in the State Constitution, the Governor might 
summon the Council Negri, suspend standing orders and issue 
directions binding on the Speaker. Section 5 provided that 
the Governor might, in his absolute discretion, dismiss the 
Chief Minister and the members of the Supreme Council if (a) 
at any meeting of the Council Negri a resolution of no 
confidence on the Government was passed by a majority of the 
members present voting, and (b) the Chief Minister after the 
passing of such a resolution failed to resign and to tender 
the resignation of members of the Supreme Council.
This legislation was not without its opponents. D.R. 
Seenivasagam, an Opposition MP, criticised it as unconstitut­
ional and undemocractic and argued that this unlawful inter­
ference in Sarawak affairs would be the quickest way in which 
to break up Malaysia.^ He remarked that the Federal Parlia­
ments
"power to pass a Bill of this nature, to amend the 
Constitution of Sarawak, whether you have the power 
will be a matter which, I hope, will be tested and,
I hope again, as the Prime Minister says, an 
independent judiciary will interpret whether the> 
power is there or not." 67
Tan Chee Koon, another Opposition MP, felt that the House of 
Representatives did not have the power to amend the Constit­
ution of Sarawak and that this
"power rests solely with the State of Sarawak, with 
its Council Negri and with its Supreme Council." 68
Stephen Yong Kuet Tze, a Sarawak MP, argued that this legis­
lation violated one of the conditions - that of the inviola­
bility of the State Constitution - precedent to Sarawak's 
entry into Malaysia.^ He pointed out that
"The Honourable Minister for Sarawak Affairs knows this 
because during the Cobbold Commission, his people, or 
the majority of his people, strongly put forward that 
the Sarawak Constitution could not be interfered with 
or amended without the consent of the State." 70
6 6. MPD, Vol. Ill, No. 12, I9-9-I9 6 6, col. 2081.
6 7. ibid.
6 8. ibid., col. 2097.
6 9. ibid., col. 2088.
7 0. ibid.
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He warned that this legislation signalled the beginning of
the end for the safeguards negotiated and granted to
Sarawak.To this Central interference, Edmund Langgu anak
Saga, another Sarawak MP, poignantly asked,
"Why can't the Federal Government let our State Govern­
ment and the people to settle our State differences 
without the stupid blundering interference from Kuala 
Lumpur? "’72
The criticisms aside, the important question remained
whether the Central Parliament, during an emergency, could
amend the Constitution of a State. The Federal Court andt
subsequently, the Privy Council were given the task of
answering this question in a suit, examined later, brought
by Stephen Kalong Ningkan against the Government of Malaysia.
The Emergency Powers (Kelantan) Act 1977> No. 192 / 1977:
Following the political crisis in Kelantan? central rule
was imposed through a Proclamation of Emergency. With this
the Kelantan State Constitution, but not the prerogatives of
the Sultan, was suspended. The powers of the Mentri Besar(MB),
State Executive Council (Exco) and the State Legislative
Assembly (SLA) were assumed by a Director of Government,
appointed by and responsible to the PM.
Dato Hussein Onn, the PM, argued that the imposition
of Central rule was both unavoidable and necessary because of
the deteriorating security situation caused by
public disorder, demonstrations and rioting.  ^He asserted
that these resulted out of the debilitating and unresolved
political crisis that started with the no-confidence vote
against the MB in the SLA and thus
"Tidak dapat tidak, Kerajaan Pusat mesti 
campurtangan." 76
[Translation*
"Unavoidably, the Central Government had to 
intervene." J
He continued that the deteriorating security situation 
could be exploited by communists, extremists, anti-national
7 1. ibid.. col. 2092.
7 2. ibid., col. 211^ .
73• See Laws of Malaysia. Act 192. Kuala Lumpur, Percetakan 
Kerajaan, November, 1977» PP* 5-9 •
7^ . Examined in a later chapter.
75. MPD, Vol. Ill, Ho. 37, 8-11-77, col. 40.20.
76. ibid.
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and subversive elements and thus could endanger the security
77and stability of the nation as a whole.((
PAS President, Dato Asri, calling this Central inter­
vention the "Emergency of Convenience", alleged that 
the deteriorating security situation was stage-managed 
and implied that this had the foreknowledge, even backing, 
of those at the State and Centre.This allegation was 
supported by Lim Kit Siang, an Opposition MP, who also 
reminded the Central Government that parliamentary democracy 
and the system of Centre-State Government should not be
80sacrificed just for the sake of party political advantage.
Another PAS MP, Abu Bakar Umar, argued that the political
crisis could and should be solved through political means
8lrather than through the imposition of Central rule. This 
was supported by Lee Lam Thye, another Opposition MP, who 
also warned that in future Central rule would be imposed in 
States where UMNO is not satisfied with the majority party 
or parties in the SLA or the security threat could be used
O p
to justify a proclamation of emergency.
The governing party at the Centre was provided with 
the constitutional power and, through its control of the 
necessary central majority in Parliament, was able to 
impose Central rule onto a State through a declaration of 
emergency. The governing party at the Centre saw fit to 
resort to this vis-a-vis Kelantan and consequently another 
threshold in the Centre-State relations in Peninsula 
Malaysia was crossed.
Court Cases.
The Government of the State of Kelantan v. the Government 
of the Federation of Malava and Timku Abdul Rahman Piitra 
Al-ha.i; The PAS-controlled Government of Kelantan, on 
September 10, 1963, instituted an action in the High Court
??. ibid.. cols. 4122-4123.
78. ibid., cols. 4132-4137.
79. ibid., cols. 4156 and 4164.
80. ibid., col. 4154.
81. ibid.. col. 4215.
82. ibid.. col. 4228.
83. See Jayakumar, S., op.cit.. pp. 195-204.
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seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the Malaysia Act was 
null and void or, alternatively, that it was not binding on 
Kelantan. The State argued that the Act would abolish the 
"Federation of Malaya" thereby violating the Federation of 
Malaya Agreement, 1957? that the proposed changes needed the 
consent of each of the constituent States, including Kelantan; 
that the Ruler of Kelantan should have been a party to the 
Malaysia Agreement; that constitutional convention called for 
consultation with Rulers of individual States if substantial 
changes were to be made to the Constitution; and that the 
Federal Parliament had no power to legislate for Kelantan in 
respect of any matter regarding which the State*s legislature 
had competence. This last argument was perplexing. What, in 
the Act, could be considered as being within the competence 
of Kelantan*s legislature?
On 11 September, 1963» the plaintiff government gave 
notice of a motion that pending the disposal of its suit, the 
Court should by order restrain the defendents from carrying 
into effect any of the provisions of the Act. During the 
hearing, it did not answer the above question. Surprisingly, 
the Kelantan Government had not even suggested that the Act 
was not passed strictly in accordance with constitutional 
provisions relating to Acts amending the Constitution. 
Undeniably, the Act established a Federation with many new 
alterations but the crucial question was not whether these 
alterations were desirable, but whether they were properly 
effected.
In a rather swift judgement, Chief Justice Thomson held 
that : 1) Parliament in enacting the Malaysia Act so as to 
amend inter alia Article 1(1) and (2) acted within the - 
powers granted to article 159 of the Constitution. The 
Constitution which formed an integral part of the Federation 
of Malaya Agreement, 1957» to which Kelantan was a party, did 
not require consultation with any State as a condition to be 
fulfilled ; 2) the Malaysia Agreement was signed for the 
"Federation of Malaya" by the Prime Minister, the Deputy 
Prime Minister and four other members of the Cabinet. This 
was in compliance with Articles 39 a^d 80(1) of the Constit­
ution and there was nothing whatsoever in the Constitution 
requiring consultation with any State Government or the Ruler 
of any State.
65
In his reasoning, Chief Justice Thomson admitted that
the Act did bring about a new state of affairs. He continued,
"But if that state of affairs be brought about by means
contained in the Constitution itself and which were
contained in it at the time of the 1957 Agreement, of 
which it is an integral part, I cannot see how it can 
possibly be made out that there has been any breach of 
any foundation pact among the crucial parties. In 
bringing about these changes Parliament has done no
more than exercise the powers which were given to it
inl957 "by the constituent States including the State of 
Kelantan." 84
However, he introduced an interesting idea with his remarks
"I cannot see that Parliament went in any way beyond
its powers or that it did anything so fundamentally
revolutionary as to require fulfilment of a condition 
which the Constitution itself does not prescribe 
I" such as consultation with theStatesj7" 55
Thus, if the amendments, even if they complied with the Con­
stitution, attempted to effect "so fundamentally revolution­
ary" a change then certain extra-constitutional conditions 
(like consent of or consultation with States) would also 
need to be fulfilled if the amendments were to be effective. 
Jayakumar suggested that Kelantan seemed to have had this in
mind when it argued that there was a constitutional convent­
ion which called for consultation with States regarding 
substantial changes to be made to the Constitution.
What, however, determined that a change was "so 
fundamentally revolutionary"? The Chief Justice did not 
provide any clue to this. However, the documents of federation 
(1957) clearly showed that the States had consented to the 
Constitution being an exclusive declaration of rights, 
liablities and obligations of the States and the Federation.
If the States wanted any fundamental limitations of federal 
power, they should have included them in the 1957 Constitute 
ion. This was clearly the intention of the three new States 
that joined the Federation to form the Federation of Malaysia.
84. ibid. p. 203.
85# ibid. My emphasis.
86. Jayakumar, S., "Admission of New States", Malaya Law 
Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, July, 1964, p. 187, n. 31. .
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They agreed to federate only after certain terms and 
conditions were included in the Constitution, Furthermore, 
these new States had secured provisions in the Constitution 
restricting the Centre's power, with the exception of article 
1 5 0, to amend the above terms and conditions by requiring 
the concurrence of the States to such amendments. The 
original eleven States cannot now say that there were other 
limitations (not in the Constitution) which ought to apply. 
The appeal and adherence to "other limitations" would under­
mine the very purpose of the Constitution. Jayakumar 
commented *
"If the States now, after seven years, feel that they 
have given the Centre too much power, it is their own 
misfortune and their proper course would be to seek 
amendments to, but not rely on mysterious limitations 
outside the Constitution." 87
The changes brought about by the Act were properly effected.
Kelantan did not doubt the gravity of the changes effected
by the Act but this in itself could not render the Act
invalid. In this case it was asserting, as Hickling puts it,
"that a Constitution is more than mere words, and 
that custom and convention can often supply the 
spirit which the letter may lack." 88
Stephen Kalong Ningkan v. Government of Malaysia, 19 68 *^
Stephen Kalong Ningkan, in taking legal action against the
Central Government in the Federal Court, submitted that (a)
the Proclamation of Emergency was ultra vires and invalid,
and that the Emergency(Federal Constitution arid Constitution
of Sarawak)Act 1^ 9 66, which was founded on it accordingly fell
s
within it in its entirety ; (b) even if the Proclamation of 
Emergency was valid, sections 3> and 5 of the Act purport­
ed to amend the Constitution of Sarawak in a manner which had 
been committed by article kl of the Constitution of Sarawak 
to the legislature of Sarawak and was therefore beyond the 
powers of the Federal Parliament to enact.
8 7. ibid.
8 8. Hickling, R.H., "An Overview of Constitutional Changes 
in Malaysia* 1957-1977”> in Tun Mohamed Suffian, et.al. 
eds., The Constitution of Malaysia, Its Developments 
I957-I9 7 7» Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, I9 7 8, 
p. 1 0.
8 9. Jayakumar, S., Constitutional Law Cages From Malaysia 
and Singapore, pp. ^46-^61.
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The petitioner's first submission would depend on
whether the Court could review the validity of a Proclamation
of Emergency? was the Proclamation of Emergency justiciable?
Article 150, clause (1), clearly provided that ,
"If the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied that a 
grave emergency exists whereby the security or 
economic life of the Federation or of any part 
thereof is threatened, he may issue a Proclamation 
of Emergency."
Barakbah, the Lord President, felt that, in a Proclamation
of Emergency which had been issued according to the
Constitution,
"it is incumbent on the Court to assume that the 
Government is acting in the best interest of the 
State and to permit no evidence to be adduced 
otherwise. In short, the circumstances which bring 
about a Proclamation of Emergency are non 
justiciable.” 90
He further emphasised that
"the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is the sole judge and once 
His Majesty is satisfied that a state of emergency 
exists it is not for the Court to inquire as to whether 
or not he should have been satisfied." 91
Azmi, the Chief Justice, argued similarly.^ The declaration 
of non-justiciability suggested that the qualifying words 
"whereby the security or economic life of the Federation or 
of any part thereof is threatened" could not be expected 
to provide the expected safeguard against abuse of the use 
of emergency power by the Central Government.
Ong Hock Thye, the Federal Judge, argued differently.
He stated that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, under Article Al 
of the Federal Constitution, must always act on Cabinet 
advice. Similarly, it was on Cabinet advice that His Majesty 
proclaimed a state of emergency. The Cabinet never denied 
responsibility of its role in this. It was this Cabinet 
role, and not that of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. he submi­
tted, which the petitioner alleged as a case of fraud in 
that the proclamation was made, not to deal with a grave 
emergency whereby the security or economic life of Sarawak 
was threatened, but for the purpose of removing the
9 0. ibid., p. AA?.
9 1. ibid.. p. AA8.
9 2. ibid., p. 451.
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petitioner from his lawful position as Chief Minister of
of Sarawak.^ He reminded the Court that
’the inbuilt safeguards against indiscriminate or 
frivolous recourse to emergency legislation contained 
in article 150 specifically provide that the emergency 
must be one "whereby the security or economic life of 
the Federation or of any part thereof is threatened".
If those words of limitation'are not meaningless 
verbiage, they must be taken to mean exactly what they 
say, no more and no less, for article 150 does not 
confer on the Cabinet an untramelled discretion to 
cause an emergency to be declared at their whim and 
fancy. According to the view of my learned brethren, 
however, it would seem that the Cabinet have carte 
blanche to do as they please - a strange role for the 
judiciary who are commonly supposed to be bulwarks of 
individual liberty and the Rule of Law and guardians 
of the Constitution." 94
While asserting that acts of the executive, especially a
Proclamation of Emergency, should be justiciable, he felt
that in this case the petitioner had failed to make out a
good case that the Proclamation of Emergency was invalid.
To the question of justiciability the Privy Council ^
stated that
"the onus was on the appellant to prove the _
allegations on which his first submission depended. '
Their Lordships felt, however, that the appellant had failed 
to prove his allegations.
The petioner's second submission referred to the ques­
tion of whether, during an emergency, the Federal Parliament 
could amend the Constition of a State. Barakbah, L.P., felt 
that clause (5) of article 150 authorised the Federal Parli­
ament to make amendments to the Sarawak Constitution during 
an emergency.^ Azmi, C.J. , was of the same opinion, article
93. ibid., p. 454.
94. ibid., p. 455*
95. ibid*. p. 461.
9 6. On appeal to the Privy Council. See Stephen Kalang 
Ningkan v. Government of Malaysia, in ibid.. pp. 435-446.
97* ibid., p. 441.
9 8. See The Malayan Law Journal. Singapore, Malayan Law 
Journal Ltd., 1 9 6 8, p. 122.
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41(1) of the Sarawak Constitution notwithstanding.^
Ong Hock Thye, F.J., argued that
"the overriding consideration of an emergency which 
justifies an amendment of the Federal Constitution 
itself must no less justify an amendment of the State 
Constitution, so far as may be strictly necessary." 100
In the Privy Council, their Lordships felt that the
Sarawak Constitution, article 41(1) notwithstanding, could
be amended by article 150(5) during an emergency]"0  ^They
noted that the agreements and instruments relative to
Sarawak's entry into Malaysia showed that
"the parties to that Agreement must have realised 
that the powers of the Federal Parliament conferred 
by that article, during the currency" of a Proclamation
of Emergency, might be used to amend, for the time
being, the provisions of the Sarawak Constitution of 
1963." 102
They also commented on the 'width* of clause (5) of article 
150 which, subject to clause (6A), authorised the Federal 
Parliament to make laws "with respect to any matter" and 
observed that
"These words could scarcely be more comprehensive."103 
However, in view of the terms of article 41(1) of the 
Constitution of Sarawak, they felt that any amendment to 
Sarawak's Constitution during an emergency should only be 
temporary.
This case suggested that the Central Government, armed 
with emergency powers, could significantly affect Centre- 
State relations. The non-justiciability of the declaration 
of emergency could indeed lead to abuses in the use of 
emergency powers by the Central Government.
Conclusion.
The Reid Commission and the Federation of Malaya 
Constitution provided for a Federation of eleven States 
which were made constitutionally equal in their relations 
to one another and to the Centre. However, by virtue of the
99* Jayakumar, S., on.cit.. pp. 452-453*
100.ibid.. P* 461.
101.ibid., P. 444.
102.ibid.. PP . A44-445
103.ibid., P. 445.
104.i£id., P* 446.
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"special concessions" granted to the three new States, the 
Federation of Malaysia Constitution created a Federation 
within which the three new States were made more equal than 
the original eleven States. What emerged was a two-tier 
federation system: the Federation of Malaya which federated 
the original eleven States and the Federation of Malaysia 
which federated the Federation of Malaya, as a unit, with 
the three new States. The conferring of "special concessions" 
violated the principle, emphasised by the Reid Commission 
and enshrined in the 1957 Constitution, that all the States 
under the Constitution should enjoy the same status and 
rights in their relations to one another and to the Centre.
A clearly strong Centre and Central bias had been 
recommended by the Reid Commission and provided for by the 
1957 Constitution. The Central Government had, on several 
occasions, shown a liberal willingness, despite opposition, 
to use the powers, especially those within the amendment and 
emergency provisions, vested by the Constitution. These, 
together with the decisions by the Courts on the use of such 
powers, only served to emphasise the overwhelming legislative 
and, sometimes, executive dominance of the Central Government. 
In a situation where, constitutionally, the Central 
Government is dominant, the 'federalness• of the Malaysian 
nation will be significantly determined by the self-restraint 
(or the lack of it) of the Centre in the use of the vast 
powers, particularly amending powers, that it commands while 
conducting its affairs with the States.
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Chapter 3
Centre-State Financial Relations: Revenue, Expenditure, Fiscal
Imbalances and Adjustments/ and Co-ordination.
The integration of States in accordance with the 'federal 
principle' implies seme degree of legislative and executive independence 
for the ferderating States and, as a necessary corollary, seme degree of 
financial independence. The degree of financial independence attainable 
by the federating States depends on the arrangements that determine the 
pattern of Centre-State financial relations. This chapter and the next 
attempt to describe such arrangements in Peninsula Malaysia and also 
highlight seme of the problems in such relations.^ - 
The problem of Centre-State Financial Relations. ?
Centre-State financial relations are within the area of 'federal 
finance' which Ehargava defines as
"the finance of federal as well as the state governments, and the 
relationship between the two."
Several principles of federal finance have been advanced: among others,
the principles of financial responsibility, compensation, derivation,
o
needs, and equalisation. Briefly and surply, the principle of 
financial responsibility means that the responsibility for raising and 
spending money should rest with the same authority. The principle of 
compensation has tvo components: revenue-sacrifice (revenue lost) 
incurred by each State Government at the time of federation and
1. Articles 96-112 of the Constitution provide the framework for the 
working of Centre-State financial relations in Peninsula Malaysia. 
Sabah and Sarawak received additional constitutional rights in 
this area with the formation of the Federation of Malaysia..
2. Ehargava, R.N., The Theory and Working of Union Finance in India,
Allahabad, Chaitanya Publishing House, 3rd ed., 1971, p. 86.
3. For a discussion of these, see Adarkar, B.P., The Principles and
Problems of Federal Finance, London, P.S. King and Sons Ltd.,
1933, chapters 3, 6 and 7; Ehargava, R.N., cp.cit., especially 
chapters 5 and 7; Scott, A.D., "The Economic Goals of Federal
Finance", Public Finance, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1964, pp. 241-288?
Sastri, K.V.S., "Ccmnent" (on "Intergovernmental Financial 
Relations") in Hicks, U.K., et. al., Federalism and Economic 
Grcwth in Underdeveloped Countries, London, George Allen and 
Unwin Ltd., 1961, pp. 132-133. For a discussion of these in the 
context of federal states, see, May, R. J., Federalism and Fiscal 
Adjustment, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969, chapters 4-5. 
See also Watts, R.L., New Federations: Experiments in the 
Caimonwealth, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 192-198? 
Holzhausen, W., Federal Finance in Malaysia, Kuala Lunpur, 
Penerbit University Malaya, 1974, pp. 66-69? Nigeria, Report of 
the Ccnmission on Revenue Allocation, Lagos, Government Press, 
1951, chapters 3-7 by J. R. Hicks.
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disabilities subsequently suffered through the differential inpact of 
Central policy. For both of these States would have to be compensated. 
The principle of derivation is close to compensation. It means that the 
Central Government should return to those States a proportion of the 
revenue raised from within them. The principle of financial needs means 
the actual level of financial need sufficient for a State to meet its 
responsibilities satisfactorily. The principle of equalisation has two 
aspects; the short term and the long term. For the short term it is 
similar to the principle of financial needs in that since States have 
different fiscal capacities they are thus not equally able to fulfill 
their responsibilities. The financial needs for each State are thus 
uneven and equalisation seeks to equalise the financial capacity of 
States so as to equally enable them to fulfill their similar 
responsibilities. For the long term, equalisation refers to the 
development strategy necessary to equalise the basic wealth of States in 
the Federation. These principles are especially important because, 
through influencing the shape of Centre-State relations, they directly 
influence the autoncmny of States which the federal structure was 
intended to protect. Thus, in a Federation of States, the financial 
autoncmny of States is necessary, in principle, if the legislative and 
executive autonomy envisaged for them are not to prove illusory.
In an age when the role of Government was narrowly conceived and 
'dualistic' federalism was the norrri^ , perhaps logically and 
necessarily, the principle of financial responsibility was considered 
necessary for protecting the financial autoncrry of States and the 
essence of federalism. Birch was one of the proponents of this view. 
Intergovernmental financial transfers, vhen necessary, should be 
governed by this principle. Thus, Birch recommends that such transfers 
should be of the 'conditional' type, that is accompanied by 
conditions. This apart, intergovernmental financial transfers 
violate both the principle of financial responsibility 
and the essence of federalism. The application of this principle would 
be a decentralised financial system.
The principle of financial responsibility has been heavily
4~! See, for exampleT Birch, A.H., Federalism, Finance and Social
Legislation in Candada, Australia and the United States. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1955, pp. 304-305.
5. Birch, A.H., "Intergovernmental Financial Relations in New 
Federations", in Hicks, U.K., et. al., cp.cit., p. 120.
6. ibid.
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. . . . 7  . .criticised. Sastn , in a trenchant critique, argued that a strict
application of this principle would mean, first, that there would be no 
adjustment to the financial imbalances of Governments in a Federation. 
However, in practice the experience of the older Federations - Canada, 
Australia and the United States of America - has indicated the heavy and 
increasing dependence of States on a system of Central financial 
transfers. Second, it would restrict the Central Govemement's ability 
to implement a National fiscal policy. He further argued that, because 
of inter-state differences in natural resources, endowments, economic 
development and fiscal capacity which might be made worse by the 
differential implact of Central Government policy,
"federal financial transfers have necessarily to be uneven as 
between the different regional governments.
Sastri, thus, emphasizes both the inevitability and necessity of a
system of Central financial transfers and
"all that can be done about it is to try to take the matter as 
much as possible out of the busy and crowded ring of political 
conflict and place the arrangements on a systematic basis which 
relates financial allocations to the units to their relative 
needs.
What should be the basis for arranging Centre-State financial 
relations under the ever changing economic conditions and national 
priorities? This question refers essentially to three main issues that 
arise in the context of federal systems: that of fiscal (vertical) 
imbalance, fiscal (horizontal) imbalance and equalisation, and 
development needs.^  Hew Federations deal with these issues indicate 
not only how they actually function but also how they cope with both the 
centralizing (unity) and decentralizing (diversity) forces.^
Fiscal (vertical) imbalance refers to the imbalance between the 
revenue needs of each level of Government and the expenditure
7. Sastri, K.V.S., "Ccmment" (on "Intergovernmental Financial 
Relations in New .Federations") in Hicks, U.K., et. al., 
op.cit. ,pp. 129-131. May also presents a similar argument. See 
May, R.J., op.cit., pp. 55-57.
8. Sastri, op.cit., p. 131.
9. ibid. p. 139
10. The impact of development needs on Centre-State financial 
relations will be discussed in chapter 4.
11. For a recent discussion on these issues in the context of the 
Canadian Federation see Fiscal Federalism in Canada, Report of the 
Parliamentary Task Force on Federal-Financial Fiscal Arrangements, 
August 1981.
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responsibilities assigned to them by the Federal Constitution. The
allocation of revenue and responsibilities (functions) between the two
levels of Government determines this imbalance and the more that
revenues correspond to responsibilities the less will this imbalance be.
Hew then should functions and revenues be allocated to each level of
Government? In answer, J. R. Hicks suggested that the allocation of
revenue should vary with the tightness of the Federation: the derivation
principle in a loose Federation and the needs and national interest
12principles in a tight Federation. Wheare, however, had earlier 
written that
"Conditions in a variety of communities joined together in a 
federation differ too much from time to time and frcm place to 
place for a fixed division of financial resources to be laid dewn 
finally in a constitution. There is and can be no final solution 
to the allocation of financial resources in a federal system.
There can only be adjustments and reallocation in the light of 
changing conditions.
May similarly argued that, because of changing economic conditions and
new demands for public services,
'there is no reason at all why expenditure obligations and revenue 
sources should balance at either level [Centre and State].'
Flexibility and periodic review of the allocation of revenues and
expenditures between the levels of Government may thus be necessary and
in the meantime intergovernmental financial transfers are necessary and
unavoidable. The difficulties in this area are essentially caused by
the conflict of interests between the Central and State Governments.
Fiscal (horizontal) imbalance refers to the imbalance between the
State Governments' financial capacity to meet the same constitutional
responsibilities. The need to maintain national standards, in the
provision of public services for example, further emphasised this
imbalance. States in a Federation are not all of equal wealth and thus
they differ in their financial capacity to meet similar
repsonsibilities. Intergovernmental financial transfers are thus
necessary to equalise the financial capacity of States. The
difficulties in this area are essentially caused by the conflict of
interests between State Governments.
12. Nigeria, op.cit., pp. 52-56.
13. Wheare, K.C., Federal Government. London, Oxford University 
Press, third edition, 1953, p. 123.
14. May, R. J., op.cit., p. 55. See also Birch, A.H., Federalism, and 
Social Legislation in Canada, Australia and the United States, 
Chapters 2-4 & 10, and Watts, R.L., "Comments" (on "Inter- 
governmental Financial Relations") in Hicks, U.K., et.al.,
op.cit., pp. 137-138.
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Both vertical and horizontal imbalance necessitate ,a system of 
intergovernmental financial transfers: the transfer of revenue between 
the two levels of Government in the case of the former and the transfer 
of revenue between State Governments in the case of the latter. 
Objections to revenue re-distribution, especially that between the 
States, have been raised because of its allegedly adverse effects on the
efficient and productive allocations of resources within the national
1 5  . .economy. Nevertheless, as Sastn insisted,
"Political harmony seems to call for a certain redistributive 
effect, too."16
In a Federation the concern was and remains on the political 
implications of intergovernmental financial transfers on Centre-State 
relations, especially that which result in States being financially 
dependent on the Centre. Both economic and political considerations are 
important in shaping such relations which in principle should be 
satisfactory and acceptable to both Centre and States. This is not 
easily obtained for, according to Santhanam,
"Of all federal problems, financial relations between the Centre 
and Units are the most difficult."
The experience of older Federations - Canada, Australia and the United
States of America - indicates that Centre-State disputes have centred on
Centre-State financial relations precisely because the States were
/
fearful of the political implications of their financial dependence on
1 q
the Centre. Thus, as Watts stated, for newer Federations the 
provisions governing Centre-State relations are also important
"not merely for financial and economic reasons, tut for the 
political effects which may result frcm them.
In all Federations Centre-State financial relations were and are 
shaped by how the revenue and expenditure sides of the equation are
15. See for example, Scott, A.D., "Federal Grants and Resource 
Allocation", Journal of Political Economy, Vo. LX, 1952, pp. 534- 
536. For an opposite view, that supporting revenue re­
distribution, see Buchanan, J.M., "Federalism and Fiscal Equity", 
American Economic Review, XL, September 1950, pp. 583-599.
16. Sastri, op.cit., p. 133.
17. Santhanam, K., Union-State Relations in India, London, Asia 
Publishing House, 1960, p. 29. A similar view is expressed by 
Birch, A.J., cp.cit., p. xi.
18. See Birch, A.H., cp.cit.,passim? May, R.J., cp.cit., chapter 4; 
Watts, R.L., "Comments" (on "Intergovernmental Relations") in 
Hicks, U.K., et. al. cp.cit., p. 137; and Watson, M.M., 
"Federalism and Finance in the Modem Ccmmorwealth", Journal of 
Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. Ill, 1965, p. 119.
19. Watts, R.L., cp.cit., p. 137.
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tackled and the pattern of intergovernmental financial transfers. In 
never Federations, on the revenue side, the trend and emphasis have been 
towards the centralisation of tax-revenue powers. This has been 
influenced by the need for overall Governmental regulation and control 
of the economy so that
"the central government must, it seemed, have authority over the 
major arms of taxation.
On the expenditure side, however, the trend and emphasis have been
towards decentralisation so that
"the allocation of independent tax revenue resources was on the 
whole scarcely related to the expenditure likely to arise as a 
result of the distribution of functions."
The combination of centralisation with regard to tax-revenue powers and
decentralisation with regard to expenditure has resulted in fiscal
(vertical) imbalance described earlier. Thus, beyond the allocation of
tax powers, a distribution of revenue resources in the form of financial
transfers from the Centre to the States is called for so as to bring
into balance the revenue and the expensive functions of the State
Governments. Such transfers are also needed, because of inter-state
differences in financial capacity, to overcome the problem of fiscal
(horizontal) imbalance.
If financial transfers from the Centre to States are necessary and
inevitable then the type or types of financial transfers used should be
such that States' financial autonomy is safeguarded. There are in
22general three types of Central transfers; first, grants of a fixed 
amount or pre-determined in accordance with a fixed formula, including 
capitation grants and shares of central revenue or of a distributable 
pool; second, unconditional grants-in-aid of general revenue; and third, 
conditional and specific purpose grants. Different types of transfers, 
as May noted, will have different effects on the decision-making of
oo t #
State Governments. Not surprisingly and in order to save the 
principle of States' financial autonomy, according to Watts,
20. Watson, M.M., cp.cit., p. 119. For other reasons that encourage 
the centralisation trend see Watts, R.L., New Federations; 
Experiments in the Commonwealth, pp. 199-204 and 208; Watts R.L.,
Multicultural Societies and Federalism, Studies of the Royal 
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Ottawa, Information 
Canada, 1971; May, R.J., op.cit., chapter 5.
21. Watson, M.M., op.cit., p. 121. Emphasis in original. See also 
Watts, R.L., New Federations: Experiments in the Commonwealth, pp. 
199-202.
22. For a full discussion of these see Watson, M.M., cp.cit., pp. 121- 
123; Birch, A.H., "Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in New 
Federations", pp. 126-128; Watts, R.L., op.cit., pp. 209-217; May, 
R.J., qp.cit., chapters 4-5.
23. May, R.J., cp.cit., p. 164.
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"the transfers from Centre to States have normally taken the form 
of provisions in the Constitution guaranteeing unconditional 
grants or shares of central tax receipts.
In summary/ the problem of Centre-State financial relations is 
linked to three things. First, the manner in which functions and 
revenues are allocated to either the Central or State Governments. 
Second, the manner in Which financial resources are allocated among the
various States. Third, the inpact of the first and second on States'
financial autonomy.
Revenue
The Constitution provided the Central Government with the control 
of Peninsula Malaysia's richest and most elastic sources of revenue and 
the States with limited access to certain less productive and less
elastic sources of revenue. The States' limited revenue base has
reduced the States' financial capabilities and made them dependent on 
Central financial transfers. The poorer States, especially, have not 
been able to meet their constitutional responsibilities from their own 
financial resources. The States' financial weakness presents a 
potential threat to the 'federal principle' for it provides the 
opportunity for the Central Government to exercise its financial 
muscle.
Taxes; The Constitution provided that all revenue from taxation and
other forms of revenue with the exception of those items of revenue
assigned to the States should go to the Central Government. The
Central Government thus has sole responsibility for raising revenue by
means of income, customs and general sales taxation with State
2 5Governments being assigned certain items of revenue.
24. Watts, R.L., Multicultural Societies and Federalism, p. 45. .
25. Items of revenue assigned to the States are enumerated in Part 111 
of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution and include 1) revenue 
from toddy shops, 2) revenue frcm lands, mines and forests, 3) 
revenue frcm licences other than those connected with mechanically 
propelled vehicles, electrical installations, and registration
of businesses, 4) entertainment duty, 5) fees in Courts other than 
Federal Courts, 6) fees and receipts in respect of specific 
services by departments of the State Government, 7) revenue of 
tcwn boards, town councils, rural boards, local councils and 
similar local authorities other than - a) municipalities 
established under any Municipal Ordinance and b) those town 
boards, town councils, rural boards, local councils and similar 
local authorities Which have power under written law to retain 
their revenues and control the spending thereof, 8) receipts in 
respect of water supplies including water rates, 9) rents on State 
property, 10) interest on State balances, 11) receipts from land 
sales and sales of State property, 12) fines and forfeitures in 
Courts and other than Federal Courts, 13) Zakat, Fitrah, Baitul- 
Mal and similar Muslim revenue, 14) treasure trove.
Parliament/however, can frcm time to time substitute certain of these
9 6items but such substitutions irust be of a substantially equal value.
Revenue frcm lands, mines and forests represents the States' main
sources of revenue. However, the States are not similarly endowed with
these. Furthermore, the more developed States tend to benefit more from
certain assigned items, the entertainment item
for example. Table 1 provides a sumnary of Central and State
Governments' revenue for 1958-1977. In general States' domestic sources
of revenue can be classed as 1) tax revenue and 2) non-tax revenue. The
2 7former comprises land taxes, mining royalties, entertainment duties 
and licence fees. The latter comprises revenue frcm State Government 
enterprises (water suppy for example), fees for specific services, 
rents, interests and reeipts from land sales. Table 1 shows the 
contribution of tax and non-tax revenue, and Central Government grants 
and allocations to the total revenue of each State. Surprisingly, total 
Central grants and allocations to States as a percentage of their total 
revenue has declined, with the exception of Selangor. This suggests 
that States may be becoming less dependent on the Centre and therefore 
they may have a "measure of autonomy". However, the States financial 
position is not as healthy as later examination of their respective 
fiscal gap suggests.
The size and growth potential of the Centre's sources of taxable 
revenue are illustrated by Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 indicates that for 
1958-1973 each State's total tax revenue as a percentage of total 
Central tax revenue was miniscule. It further indicates that the All 
States' percentage has fallen during the same period.Table 3 compares 
each State's tax effort to that of the Central Government's. The 
disparity in the tax effort among the States reflect the disparity in 
the size of their tax bases and enphasises that States are not similarly 
endowed in those revenue sources assigned to them. When each State's tax 
effort is compared with that of the Central Government the disaprity 
widens alarmingly. Both Tables indicate the dominance of the Central 
Government in the tax-revenue structure and reflect the consequences 
of the constitutional provisions.
Two characteristics are clear: first, the smallness of the States' 
tax base and consequent tax effort, second, the differences between the
26. Article 110 (2). Most importantly item (2) of the revenue sources 
assigned to States cannot be substituted. In addition, items (9), 
(10) and (13) are similarly excluded.
27. Royalty rights for States were substituted by a tax revenue- 
sharing device in the Constitutional Amendment of 1962. This will 
be discussed later.
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States in their tax effort. These could be explained by the rather 
limited taxation powers that the Constitution provided the States with. 
Furthermore, the State sources of revenue, as Tables 2 and 3 indicate, 
possess slow growth potential and little manipulative paver. These 
could also be explained by the fact that the States have not fully 
exploited their revenue sources. On this, C. T. Edwards believed that
"In several of the assigned sources of revenue (for example land 
taxes and licence fees) the State govememtns have not sought to 
utilise untapped potential."
OQ
Three features related to the States' tax structure provide
support to the allegation that States' have generally not fully
exploited their revenue sources. First, and generally, the States' tax
3 0rates, with the exception of land rates , have remained unchanged
O *1
since 1950. x Second, there is large-scale tax avoidance (especially 
regarding licences) and a backlog in revenue collection (especially land 
rent). Finally, the tax coverage and tax rates vary considerably 
among States. Similar features also exist with regard to States' non­
tax revenue sources.
The States' reluctance to be more aggressive in exploiting their 
revenue sources by revising the tax coverage, tax rates or becoming more 
'efficient' in tax collection for example could be attributed to the 
political fact that the State Governments, heavily dependent on rural
voters, have avoided the politically distasteful and unpopular task of
3 3exploiting their revenue sources more fully. The Treasury has
28. Edwards, C.T., Public Finances in Malaya and Singapore, Canberra, 
Australian National University, 1970, p. 46.
29. ibid., p. 325.
30. See Senftleben, W., Background to Agricultural Policy in Malaysia,
Wiesbaden, Otto Harrosswitz, 1978, pp. 65-70 and table 9.
31. The lew States' tax effort is attributable to the fact that the
States have not changed tax rates for a long time. Interviews
with Mohamad Omar an officer in the Finance Section of the 
Treasury, 2-8-1980, and Tan Sri Dato Ahmad Nordin, Auditor- 
General , 16-8-1980.
32. The Auditor-General had on numerous occasions pointed out that 
arrears in revenue collection by States were partly responsible 
for the gap between estimated revenue and actual revenue. In 
1973, for example, the Auditor-General in singling out Perlis 
reported that the National Finance Council's (NFC) Ccmmittee on 
State Reserve Fund (SRF) grants to States had advised the Perlis 
State Government to take the necessary action to collect the 
arrears of revenue. See Auditor-General, Report on the Accounts 
of the State of Perlis, 1973, Kuala Lumpur, Government Printer, p.
39. See Edwards, C.T., op.cit., p. 325. States have found it
33. politically difficult to raise tax rates. Interview with Mohamad 
Omar, an Officer in the Finance Section of the Treasury. States 
lack the 'political will' to raise such rates. Interview with Tan 
Sri Dato Ahmad Nordin.
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subsequently claimed however that
"There is now a growing awareness among the States of the need to 
raise more revenue frcm State sources to finance current 
expenditure. Thus, there is a need to widen the tax base and 
review existing rates on a selective basis. Selangor and Kedah 
have in fact already announced their intention to review water 
rates.
The States were reminded in December 1976 by the Finance Minister,
Tengku Razaleigh, to continue improving their financial position through
oc
intensified efforts at revenue collection.
In Peninsula Malaysia the fiscal provisions provide for a tax-
revenue structure within which the Centre is dominant. The adoption of
such provisions may indeed, as Watson suggests, have been influenced by
the lessons drawn frcm the experience of the 'older' Federations.*^
In Australia, for example, the tax revenue structure had evolved frcm
3 7that of tax sharing, concurrent taxation and finally tax seperation.
The tax seperation established by the Uniform Inccme Tax Scheme in 1942
centralized the tax revenue structure by providing the Commonwealth
Government with exclusive pcwer over custcms and excise duties, sales
taxes and inccme taxes. In the 'newer' Federations the enphasis, as in
Peninsula Malaysia, has been towards clearly separating the tax powers
of the Central and State Governments and the centralization of tax
3 ftpowers, with few exceptions and varying degrees.
Centre-State Tax-Revenue Sharing: The Constitution through Article 110 
provided the State Governments with the pcwer to impose royalties on 
minerals mined in their states while the Central Government was entitled 
to impose duties on such minerals. This division has operated but co­
ordination and flexibility in the Centre-State handling of such mineral 
resources has proved difficult in a situation where each government was
34. Treasury, Economic Report, 1975-1976, Kuala Lumpur, Government 
Printer, 1976, p. 53.
35. Malaysian Parliamentary Debates (MPD), Dewan Raayat, Vol. 11, No. 
68, 14.12.1976, Col. 7187. See also New Straits Times (NST),
11.1.1977 and 11.10.1979.
36. Watson, M.M., cp.cit., p. 119. For a study of the experience of 
older Federations, see Birch, A.H., Federalism, Finance and Social 
Legislation in Canada, Australia and the United States, Chapters 
2-5.
37. See Prest, W., "Tax Arrangements and Inter-govemmental 
Transfers", Publius, Vol. 7, No. 3, Summer 1977, pp. 53-60. See 
also May, R.J. op. cit., pp. 57-66.
38. See Birch, A.H.," Intergovernmental Financial Relations in New 
Federations", pp. 122-126; Watson, M.M. cp.cit., pp. 120-121;
Watts R.L., New Federations; Experiments in the Ccmmonwealth, 
pp. 202-208; May, R.J., cp.cit., Chapter 5; Grewal, B.S., Fiscal 
Federalism in India, Research Mono. No. 3, Centre for Research on 
Federal Financial Relations, Australian National University, 
Canberra, 1974, pp. 17-18.
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determined to raise as much revenue as possible from such resources.
M. Suffian points out that
"At one time there was little co-ordination between the Federal 
Government and the producing States, and each was determined to 
obtain as rruch revenue as possible.. .This worked hardship on the 
mining industry."
In 1962 (Act 14/1962) the Constitution was amended with the
addition of clauses (3), (3A) and (3B) to Article 110.^ Under clause
(3) each tin-producing State is entitled to receive, on such terms and
conditions as may be provided by federal law, a minimum of ten percent
of the export duty on tin produced in the State. Under clause (3A),
Parliament is empowered to provide by law that each mineral (other than
tin)- producing State is entitled to receive, on such terms and
conditions as may be provided by federal law, a portion of the export
4 1duty on such minerals produced in the State. These two amendments
4 9favour States and were indeed designed to favour them. Hcwever, the
amendment under clause (3B) goes against them because it empowers
Parliament to provide by law prohibiting or restricting (in, or except 
in, such cases as may be provided by or under the law) the levying of 
royalties on or similar charges in respect of minerals.
Tun Abdul Razak, then the Deputy PM, during a debate in the Dewan
Raayat, gave three reasons for the above amendments. ^  First, it was 
inequitable for any mine to pay both royalty and export duty on the same 
product. Second, different States imposed different rates of royalty. 
Third, there should be uniformity in the treatment of mines throughout 
the Federation. Generally the amendments substituted States' royalty 
rights with a tax revenue-sharing arrangement. Through these amendments 
the Central Government had assumed responsibility for what used to be 
Centre-State tax responsibility. Edwards argued that the Central 
Government had been encouraged into taking up such responsibility
39. M. Suffian Hashim, An Introduction to the Constitution of 
Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Government Printer, 1976 edition, p. 190.
40. See Federation of Malaya, Acts of Parliament, 1962, Kuala Lumpur, 
Government Press, 1963, pp. 204-205. In addition Article 76(4) was 
also amended. Thus, Parliament was provided with the pcwer to 
legislate on the terms of mining leases for the purpose of 
ensuring uniformity throughout the Federation.
41. 'minerals' means mineral ores, metal and mineral oils.
42. See Suffian Hashim, "Division of Revenue", in Bartholomew, G.W., 
ed.,Malaya Law Review Legal Essays. Malaya Law Review, 1975, p.
12.
43. Malayan Parliamentary Debates (MPD). Dewan Raayat, Vol. Ill, No.
40, 29.1.62, col. 4180.
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because of the failure of the State Governments to utilise their tax 
pavers effectively.44
Several opposition MPs argued against the amendments during the 
Dewan Raayat debate. Too Joon Hing, an MP frcm Perak, argued that the 
amendment affected States' rights over mining and thus should be debated
A C
by the States themselves. A PAS MP frcm Kelantan, Zulkifli, argued
Af.
that the amendments would restrict State Pavers. Another PAS MP frcm
Kelantan, Ahmad Abdullah, argued that States were already financially
weak and the amendments would further weaken them.47 He continued that
the States were already unable to meet their constitutional
responsibilities frcm their revenue sources and suggested that there
4 8should be more financial transfers from the Centre to States.
By virtue of these amendments Parliament enacted, in 1962, the
Assignment of Revenue (Export Duty on Iron Ore) Act. This Act provided
that each iron-ore producing State is entitled to receive up to a
maximum of ten percent of the ad valorem on the value of the exported
4 9iron-ore produced in the State. Edwards believed that in this case
"the Federal Government appropriated State tax rights over iron 
ore because differences in the royalties levied by each of the 
main iron ore-producing States made the task of collecting Federal 
export tax revenue more difficult. The Federal Government has 
realised that, if the States were given complete control over 
major taxes, a widening gap would result between actual and 
potential revenue yield.
In 1964 Parliament enacted the Assignment of Export Duty (Mineral 
Ores) Act. This Act provided the States with a generous portion of 
export duty collected by the Central Government in respect of mineral 
ores (other than tin or iron-ore) produced in these States.^
44. Edwards, C.T., cp.cit., p. 325.
45. MPD, Vol. Ill, No. 40, 30.1.1962, col. 4358.
46. ibid., 31.1.1962, col. 4442.
47. ibid., col. 4480.
48. ibid., col. 4481.
49. Regarding Sabah and Sarawak, Article 112 C (4) provided that 
clause (3B) shall apply in relation to all minerals including 
mineral oils but shall not authorise Parliament to prohibit the 
levying of royalties on any mineral by the State or to restrict
the royalties that m y  be so levied in any case so that the State
is not entitled to receive a royalty amounting to ten percent ad 
valorem calculated as for export duty.
50. Edwards, C.T., op.cit., p. 325.
51. See Federation of Malaysia, The Assignment of Export Duty (Mineral 
Ores) Act, 1964, Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 1964. This Act 
was made in response to the Johore Government request for a share 
of the export duty on bauxite which Johore produced in substantial 
quantities in 1963. See Lim Heng Boon, "Federal-State financial 
relations in West Malaysia", Graduate Exercise, Faculty of 
Economics and Administration, University of Malaya, 1968/9, p. 20.
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The above tax revenue-sharing arrangements will benefit States 
differently. Mineral-rich States stand to gain most frcm such 
arrangements. Table 4 indicates this with regard to tin. M. Suffian, 
referring to Article 110(3) remarked that
"This removes the grievance of the major tin-producing States like 
Perak and Selangor that formerly saw export duty on their tin 
going into federal coffers."
It is not surprising that rice producing States, such as Kedah, have
consistently argued that although their rice is not exported they should
be accorded preferance because they have managed to save foreign
exchange for the country. In July 1978, the Mentri Besar (MB) of
Kedah, Syed Nahar Shahabudin, suggested that based on Kedah's fifty
percent contribution to Malaysia's rice production the Central
Government should give special attention to Kedah in the allocation of
aids and grants. ^  Notwithstanding Suffian's earlier remark, Perak
had claimed that the ten percent share for export duties on tin was not
adequate considering that it was and still is a major producer of tin
and that tin is a depleting asset. ^  In January 1978, the National
Finance Council (NFC)^ at a meeting decided to recommend an increase
of revenue payment to tin-producing States through a new formula. Dr.
Mahathir Mohamad, the then Deputy PM, as Chairman of the NFC meeting
then, disclosed that
"The States have asked us to give them twenty percent [in place of 
the present ten percent] of the export duty of the tin produced by 
them. But the Federal Government has devised a formula whereby the
51. (Cont.) The Act provided for one half of the export duty on bauxite,
wolframite, sheelite, columbite-tantalite, copper, ilmenite, 
zincon, morazite and manganese to be assigned to the respective 
Peninsula States. Tin and iron were already covered by the 1962 
amendments discussed earlier.
52. M. Suffian Hashim, op.cit., p. 12.
53. See Abdullah Ayub, "Financial Provisions of the Malaysian
Constitution and their Operation in Practise", in M. Suffian 
Hashim, et.al., The Constitution of Malaysia: Its Development, 
1957-1977, Kuala Lunpur, Oxford University Press, 1978, p. 309.
See also Straits Times, 24.4.1974; New Straits Times (NST) 
7.3.1978; and Berita Harian, 9.11.1978. Kedah's argument has 
consistently been opposed by other States within the NFC.
Interview with Mohamad Omar.
54. The Star, 31.7.1978.
55. ibid. The Selangor State Government, for exanple, has attempted to
increase State revenue from tin through direct participation of 
its own State Corporation in tin mining. See New Straits Times, 
24.7.1978.
56. See NST, 29.1.1978. The NFC's meeting was chaired by Dr. Mahathir 
Mohamad and attended by States' Mentri Besars and Chief Ministers, 
and seme Cabinet Ministers. The NFC's role in co-ordinating and 
smoothing Centre-State financial relations will be discussed 
later.
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export duty and the surcharge will be caribined and a flat ten 
percent given to the States.
He believed that under such a system the tin-producing States of
Selangor, Perak and others would stand to gain an additional total
annual revenue of $14 million.^®
Tax revenue-sharing could increasingly be used to benefit the
States if the Central Government decides to exercise its pcwers under
Article 110(4). This Article provided that Parliament may by law assign
to the States (other than a Borneo State), first, the whole or any
portion of the poceeds of any tax or fee raised or levied by the
Federation and, second, the responsibility of collecting for State
purposes any tax or fee authorised by Federal law. To date no such law
has been enacted. This Article provides the Central Government with the
basis for creating a mechanism for seme form of tax devolution. Such a
possibility depends not insignificantly on a political decision which
may be hastened by political pressure frcm the States. In Peninsula
Malaysia since 1962 tax revenue sharing has been confined only to
revenue raised frcm mineral ores. The use of this system is more
5 9widespread in other Federations like India and Nigeria.
Borrowing and Loans; Article 111 governs the borrowing pcwer of both the 
Central and State Governments. This article prohibits the Central 
Government frcm borrowing except under the authority of Federal law. A 
State Government shall not borrow except under the authority of State 
law, and State law shall not authorise a State Government to borrcw 
except frcm the Federation or, for a period of not exceeding twelve 
months, frcm a bank approved for that purpose by the Central 
Government.^  The Central Government, thus, has ccmplete pcwer under 
the Constitution to determine the pattern and conditions of borrcwing or 
contracting of loans by the State Governments of Peninsula Malaysia.
The States are dependant on the Central Government for much of 
their finances. The Central Government could take advantage of the 
States' dependance and consequently assume de facto or indirect 
responsibility over those subjects or areas of States' competence. The 
States' very restricted power to borrcw further emphasized States'
57. ibid.,
58. ibid.
59. See Grewal, B.S., op.cit., pp. 20-22; Watson, M.M., cp.cit., pp. 
121-122; Watts, R.L., op.cit., pp. 211-213; and May, R. J.,
op.cit., pp. 114-123 and 134-145.
60. For Sabah and Sarawak Article 112B provides that borrcwing within 
the State must have the approval of the Central Bank of the 
Federation.
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dependance. This has been a source of difficulty, and in seme cases also 
of irritation, particularly for States like Kelantan (controlled by the 
Parti Se-Islam Malaysia -PAS- or the Pan Malayan Islamic Party -PMIP- 
fran 1959 to 1969), controlled by a party different frcm that 
controlling the Central Government. Such States, starved of finance, 
could be forced to seek seme other means of finance. Kelantan was one 
such case.^
For 1963 the Auditor General noted that because the Kelantan 
Government's total cash and bank balances were less than the Central 
Government's credit balance with the State in the Consolidated Revenue 
Account, the Kelantan Government was able to rely largely on Central 
Government's cash to pay its bills. He reported that
"This situation continues at the date of this Report. It appears 
therefore that the State Government has borrowed Federal funds 
without the authority of State law contrary to the Federal 
Constitution.
61. Kelantan's increasing need for finance frcm 1962 onwards was 
partly attributable to its very costly Sungai Kelantan Bridge. The 
State Government had requested a Central loan but it refused to 
agree to the central loan terms, part of which was the submission 
of the bridge plans to the Federal Public Works Department. Denied 
a Central loan it proceeded to construct the bridge, now costing 
$5.5 million, attempting to finance it out of State funds. See The 
Straits Times, 1.3.1962 and 1.6.1962. The Auditor-General reported 
that "Although it was appreciated that a loan would be needed, 
the project was put in hand without a loan having first been 
negotiated with the Federal Government." See Auditor-General, 
Report on the Accounts of the State of Kelantan, 1962, Kuala 
Lumpur, Government Printer, 1963, p. 3. Writing on the State's 
accounts for 1963, the Auditor-General reported that "the manner 
in which this project has been undertaken is not such as is likely 
to safeguard public funds to best advantage or ensure value for 
money.. .Like the 1962 Estimates, the 1963 Estimates gave the 
Assembly no indication of the total cost of the project, and in my 
opinion, the Assembly's control over this expenditure was thereby 
correspondingly weakened." See Auditor-General, Report on the 
Accounts of the State of Kelantan, 1963, Kuala Lumpur, Government 
Printer, 1964, p. 4. The State partly paid for the bridge by 
raising a loan of $3 million frcm the Banks. According to the 
Auditor-General this loan was raised with due authority during 
Nov.-Dec. 1964 but had not been repaid within the twelve months as 
required by the Federal Constitution. The State in 1966 passed a 
law to raise a new loan of $2 million frcm the Banks to repay the 
existing one and, accordingly to the Auditor-General, the Central 
Government agreed to this arrangement. See Auditor-General, Report- 
on the Accounts of the State of Kelantan, 1964, Kuala Lumpur, 
Government Printer, 1966, p. 7. By September 1969 the balance of 
$4,185 million still to be repaid by the State Government was 
fully settled by a loan of $4.2 million frcm the Central 
Government. See Auditor-General, Report on the Accounts of the 
State of Kelantan, 1968, Kuala Lumpur, Government Printer, 1970, 
p. 41. It seemed that Kelantan got away with disobedience.
62. Auditor-General, Report on the Account of The State of Kelantan, 
Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 1967, p. 5.
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He reported that the Attorney General implemented two measures to 
overcome the above de facto State borrcwing.^ First, Central 
Government's cash with Kelantan's was segregated and placed in a Special 
Bank Account. Second, Central Government's credit balance with Kelantan 
was reduced frcm about $6 million to just over $1 million when the 1964 
accounts were closed. Despite these measures, the Auditor-General 
reported that
"The situation has not been wholly satisfactory in 1965 and is now 
under review. It appears that the State has again in effect used 
Federal money for its own purposes."
On February 20, 1964, the Kelantan State Government made a financial
arrangement with a private conpany to raise additional revenue. The
State Government granted a mining and forest concession to the
Tirribermine Industrial Corporation Limited in return for advance payments
of royalty amounting to $2.5 million. When the Corporation extracted the
timber and minerals on which the royalty was due, it had to pay fifty
percent of the royalty due and retain the other fifty percent until the
whole prepaid amount was refunded. In certain circumstances the
agreement stipulated that the amount advanced could be forfeited.
The appropriateness of the above financial transaction depended on
what constituted borrcwing. On this, the Auditor-General commented that
"There is no law requiring the company to make a prepayment in 
respect of royalties. As the prepayment is to be set off against 
forest royalties paid after the third year, this appears to 
constitute borrcwing by the State contrary to Article 111(2) of 
the Federal Constitution. This is the view of the Attorney-General 
with which the State disagrees.
The appropriateness of the transaction was challenged by the Central
Government (under Article 130) in the Federal Court in the Government of
Malaysia v the Government of the State of Kelantan. ^  The Central
Government argued that such a transaction amounted to borrcwing and
because this borrowing arrangement was not authorised by State law it
was, therefore, unconstitutional. The Federal Court held that such a
transaction did not amount to borrcwing since there was no legal
relationship of lender and borrower between the State Government and the
63. Auditor-General, Report on the Account of the State of Kelantan, 
1964, Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 1966, p. 7.
64. ibid
65. Auditor-General, Report on the Account of the State of Kelantan, 
1964, p. 2.
66. Malaya Law Journal, 1968, p. 129. See also Jayakumar, S., 
Constitutional Law Cases from Malaysia and Singapore, Singapore 
Malaya Law Journal Pte Ltd., 1971, pp. 206-225.
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Corporation. Furthermore, the State Government was not obliged to repay
if the advance payments were forfeited for breach of condition.
In 1971 the Constitution was amended so as to negate the above 
6 7Court's decision. By amending Article 160, through adding Clause 
(2), the meaning of borrcwing was extended. "Borrow" now includes the 
raising of money
"by entering into an agreement requiring payment before the due 
date of any taxes, rates, royalties, fees or any other payments or 
by entering into any agreement whereby the Government has to repay 
or refund any benefits that it has enjoyed under that 
agreement.
An opposition MP in the Dewan Raayat, V. Veerapan, during the amendment 
debate, argued that it was indeed the intention of the framers of the 
Consttitution that the States should borrcw from the Federation, except 
in cases of short-term loans which they can borrcw from the banks. He 
believed, however, that this amendment was intended to defeat the case 
which was heard and settled in the country and that
"if the States are prevented frcm entering into any such 
agreement, the States would be deprived of putting up some 
projects which will be for the benefit of the people of those 
particular States. For example, if a State Development Corporation 
or scmething like that would like to put up a building - the State 
does not have the money and then allows him a period of time to 
collect the rents and after that that building becomes the State's 
own property - you cannot do it.. .it also prevents the Federal 
Government frcm approving such a thing because the provision in 
the word "borrcw" does not allcw the Federal Government to even 
sanction such an arrangement.
In reply, the Attorney-General, Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Yusuf, assured the
Dewan Raayat that the amendment was intended solely to tighten the word
"borrcw". He stated that, as a result of the Kelantan case,
". .we have to amend the definition of "borrcwing" so as to make it 
clear that in future such a method of borrcwing is clearly not in 
accordance with what is really defined by the Article in the 
Constitution. There is no other implication involved in that 
case.
Aware of the States' funding problems, the Central Government in
February 1975 announced it was considering relaxing its restrictions on
borrcwing or contracting of loans so as to enable these States to raise
7 1funds for development. Tan Sri Chong Hon Nyang, the Minister without 
Portfolio, subsequently informed the Dewan Raayat that the Central
67T. The Constitution (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, 1971 (Act A31/1971).
68. MPD, Vol. 1, No. 7, 33.3.71, col. 554.
69. ibid, col. 558.
70. ibid, cols. 558-559.
71. NST. 9.2.75.
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Government had agreed in principle to allow State Governments to obtain 
loans frcm within or outside the country provided the sources were
70
approved by it and the repayment period did not exceed five years.
The relevant Constitution (Amendment) Bill was introduced in
Parliament in July 1976. The Constitution (Amendment) Bill, 1976,
7 3sought to amend, among others, Article 111(2). The PM, Datuk Hussein 
Onn, / in introducing the Bill stated that
" The intention of the amendment is to relax the restrictive 
provision which is at the moment existent in the Constitution with 
regard to borrowing by State Governments.
This amendment was necessary, he continued, in view of the States'
increasing developmental and financial requirements frcm time to time.
Accordingly it was thought desirable that States should be able to
borrcw or contract loans frcm any source with the prior approval of the
Central Government, and provided also that the repayment period did not
7 5exceed five years. However, the principle of the centralization of 
borrcwing powers had been left unchanged. In response, the Chief 
Minister of Penang, Dr. Lim Chong Eu, who was also an MP, approvingly 
remarked that
"this will enable the Federal Government to work more closely with 
the State Governments and vice-versa ... particularly with regard 
to the securing of funds for financing projects in the States. I 
hope that the Federal Government, once this Constitutional 
(Amendment) Bill is passed, will set up a Comnittee or a body 
which will enable the Federal Government to work closely with the 
State Governments which seek to apply for the provisions of this 
particular amendment to be made applicable to their States."
His suggestion for the establishment of a ccmmitte seemed curious since
the NFC had already been established essentially to handle Centre-State
financial relations in general and loan requirements, among others, in
particular. He also, again rather curiously, expressed his gratitude to
the Central Government
"for having given the State Government of Penang every opportunity 
to make use of the development funds through these particular 
provisions of the Constitution. I am sure that the amendment will 
make it easier for all the other States in the Federation in 
future to do so.
72. ibid, 8.7.76.
73. For details of the approved Bill, see Federation of Malaya, Acts 
of Parliament (Act A334), Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 26.8.76, 
p.23.
74. MPD, Vol. 11, No. 19, 12.7.76, col. 2035.
75. ibid.
76. ibid, Vol. 11, No. 20, 13.7.76, col. 2168.
77. ibid.
93.
He seemed to imply that even before this amendment the State Government 
of Penang had received favourable loan treatment from the Central 
Government ccnpared to the other States.
In amending Article 111(2) the Central Government became the final 
guarantor of loans. It was therefore anxious to ensure that the States
70
obtained the most favourable financial terms. Abdullah Ayub, the 
Secretary General of the Ministry of Finance, indicated What the Central 
Government would insist upon in considering loan applications frcm the 
States:
"It is essential for the Federal Government to ensure that the 
State Government do not borrcw more than what they can afford as 
this would effect their own viability and the credit standing of 
the Federation.
In addition, State loan applications would be approved by the Central
Government on the basis of the economic viability of the State projects
that the loans would help finance and the interest rates for such loans
8 0would be the economic rates. However, most States, especially the
richer ones like Selangor, are usually reluctant to use the facility
provided by the Amendment to Article 111(2) because to do so would
oblige them to defend the economic viability of their projects and thus
8 1make them subject to close examination.
Since Independence the amounts of Central Government loans to
State Governments, with the exception of Negri Sembilan and Selangor,
have been increasing. Table 5 indicates this trend for the 1961-1976
period. Generally, most of these loans were used to finance the States'
8 2own development schemes. These include the following: land
development, such as the group settlement schemes and the fringe
alienation schemes; low-cost housing schemes; water supply schemes;
agricultural projects; and industrial estates schemes. Occasionally
Central loans had been used to finance States' operating 
8 3expenditures. For example, the Kelantan Government received a loan
of $1 million from the Central Government in December 1967 for meeting
84.
the payment of salaries of Officers of the Kelantan Government.
78. Abd. Ayub, cp.cit., p. 318.
79. ibid.
80. Interview with Tain Sri Dato Ahmad Nordin.
81. ibid.
82. The sources of finance for States' development expenditure will be 
discussed in Chapter 4. As will be seen, loan finance forms an 
important proportion of States' development expenditure.
83. For details see Federation of Malaysia, Financial Statements, 
section on States' loans due to Federal Government.
84. See Auditor-General, Report on the Accounts of the Federation of 
Malaysia, 1967, Kuala Lumpur, Govt. Printer, 1970, p. 160.
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Centre-State differences over loan terms and conditions had 
semetimes soared Centre-State relations. These differences for instance 
as already mentioned, have plagued the financial relations between the 
Kelantan Government and the Central Government. In the 1967 loan grant 
to Kelantan, for example, the Auditor-General reported that
"to date, a loan agreement has not been executed due to 
differences over the terms and conditions which have, so far, not 
been resolved.
The States' heavy dependence on Federal loans to finance either 
their operating or development expenditures would involve a further 
sacrifice of the independence of States' initiative and action. This is 
because decisions as to which projects are to be accepted as a loan 
camdtment are a Central rather than a State responsibility. It could be 
reasonably argued that with regard to internal loans , at least, richer 
States should be allowed to raise their own loans and poorer ones 
allowed to borrcw frcm the Central Government on easy terms.
Before the 1976 amendment, a recommendation that poorer States 
should be charged lower interest rates when contracting loans was 
opposed by richer States, and a uniform interest rates structure, 
usually below the commercial interest rates, was established.®® 
Nevertheless, seme States, especially the poorer ones, had consistently 
failed to meet either the interest payments or part-payment of the loans 
contracted. In such cases the Central Government had usually cancelled
07
these loans as bad debts.
The Central Government has complete powers over external and 
internal public borrcwing in Peninsula Malaysia. In other Federations, 
Central Government powers over this are different. In Australia for 
example, the Australian Loan Council, essentially a Centre-State body,
00
controls both external and internal public borrcwing. Thus, neither
the Central nor the State Governments have any independent borrcwing
power. A distinction is sometimes made between external and internal
public borrcwing with the Central Government usually having complete
powers over the former and State Governments having qualified pcwers
8 9over the latter, as in India and Nigeria.
85. ibid. The Straits Times, 22.12.67, however, under the 
headlines, "Kelantan accept loan terms" reported otherwise. 
Kelantan-Central Government differences over loans highlighted 
again in 1968. See "Sardon: I would be first to oppose loan to 
PMIP", in ibid., 18.5.68.
86. Interview with Tan Sri Dato Ahmad Nordin.
87. ibid.
88. For a discussion of the Australian Loan Council, see Jay, W.R.C., 
"The Australian Loan Council", Publius, Vol. 7, No. 3, Summer 1977, 
pp. 101-117.
89. See Watts, R.L., cp.cit., pp. 218-219.
96.
Central Grants: Under Article 109 of the Constitution the Central
Government must make two kinds of grants to each State for each 
9 0financial year: the capitation grant and State road grant. The
capitation grant was initially calculated in the following way:
1) 15 dollars per person for the first 50,000;
2) 10 dollars per person for the next 200,000; and
3) 4 dollars per person for the remainder of the State's 
population.
The capitation grant was initially made based on the 1957 population
census. The next census was due in 1967 but was delayed for three years.
The 1970 census was accepted as the basis for capitation grant
9 1calculation only frcm 1972. Since the last census should have been
held in 1967 rather that 1970, the Central Government agreed to make a
compensatory ex-gratia payment to all the States of Peninsula 
9 2Malaysia.
The rates of the capitation grant could be revised by 
Parliament.^ In December 1976, after consulting the NFC^ the 
Central Government introduced a Bill - The Capitation Grant Bill - in 
Parliament to revise the above rates frcm January 1, 1976, as 
follows
1) 20 dollars per person for the first 100,000;
2) 10 dollars per person for the next 150,000;
3) 6 dollars per person for the next 250,000; and
4) 3 dollars per person for the remainder.
During the debate on the Bill in the Dewan Raayat, the Finance Minister,
Tengku Razaleigh, stated that the Bill was designed to give more
financial help to States, especially those which were poor and having a 
9 6small population. In this way, he continued, it would be possible to
bring into balance poor States with small population with that of rich
9 7States with larger papulation. An UMNO MP, Suhaimi Haji Kamaruddin,
90. Part 1, Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. Article 112 and Parts 
IV and V of this Schedule provide additional sources of revenue to 
Sabah and Sarawak over and above those enjoyed by the States of 
Peninsula Malaysia.
91. Auditor-General, Report on the account of the State of Perak,
1973, Kuala Lumpur, Government Printer, p.48
92. ibid.
93. Article 109(2) of The Constitution.
94. Abd. Ayub, cp,cit., p.310. See also Treasury. Economic Report, 
1977/78, Kuala Lumpur, Govt. Printer, 1978, p. 78.
95. See MPD, Vol. 11, No. 68, 14.12.76, col. 7201.
96. ibid, cols. 7200-7201.
97. ibid, col. 7209.
97.
nevertheless called for more financial help so that the States could
98effectively achieve their development goals.
99The 1977 population Census for each State would new be used
for calculating the amount of capitation grant awarded to each State.
With these new rates the poorer States would receive higher rates of
increases while the 'richer* States WDuld receive lower rates of
increases. 'Poorer' States like Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu and Kedah,
would have their capitation grant increased by 51%, 24%, 25% and 14%
respectively for 1977.^^ The 'richer' States like Selangor and Perak
for example, would have their capitation grant increased by only 1.5%
and 2.3% respectively for 1977.^^
A State road grant is also payable to each State for each 
102financial year. This grant is calculated by multiplying the average 
cost to a State of maintaining a mile of State road by the total mileage 
of State roads in that State. The Central Government, hcwever, 
determines after consulting the NFC, the minimum average cost to a State 
of maintaining a mile of State road.
The calculation of the State road grant also depended on what 
constituted a State road. Centre-State controversy over this occurred 
because the term was not clear. The Federal roads Ordinance, 1959, 
contained a provision allowing for the declaration of certain roads, 
bridges, ferries and other means of communication as Federal roads. A 
State road was thus defined as any public road other than a Federal road 
and any other non-Federal road to which the public had access. To 
clarify what constituted a State road, the Constitution was amended in 
1966 thereby adding to the definition of State roads for road grant 
purposes any bridges, viaducts, or culverts that form a part of the 
road.1^
Until 1970, the rate used to calculate the State road grant was 
$4,500 per mile. In 1970 a ccmmittee appointed by the NFC recommended 
that this rate be raised to $4,600 per mile. The NFC accepted this and
98. ibid, col. 7208. The Capitation Grant Bill was passed on December 
14, 1976 and formally gazetted as Act A367, Capitation Grant Act, 
1976.
99. The 1977 Population cencus was not held and only in 1980 was the 
census conducted.
100. Treasury, cp.cit., p. 78.
101. ibid.
102. Article 109(1) (b) and Part 11 of the Tenth Schedule of the 
Constitution.
103. See Act 59/1966 which amended the Tenth Schedule, Part 11 of the 
Constitution, governing State road grants.
98.
decided that the new rate should apply frcm 1971 The States 
lobbied for this rate to be further increased. In 1974 the Treasury 
reviewed this rate and reccranended that because of increasing cost of 
road maintenance this rate should be increased to $5,000 dollars per 
mile.10  ^At an NFC meeting in February 1974-^ after representation 
by the States, the Treasury's reccnnmendation was approved with effect 
frcm 1974. Again in February 1977, the NFC accepted the Treasury's 
recommendation to raise this rate to $6,000 per mile with effect frcm 
1974.107
The capitation and State road grants are constitutionally 
guaranteed and thus are unconditional grants, although the Central 
Government through Parliament has complete discretion and power to 
change the rates used to calculate them. Both rates have now been 
revised upwards not at regular but at irregular and ad hoc intervals. 
Table 6 indicates the different amounts of capitation and State road 
grants made to each State for the 1958-1976 period. For capitation 
grants, it indicates that although the amount for each State has 
increased, as a percentage of each State's total revenue it has fallen, 
and thus suggests lesser States' dependance on this type of grant. For 
State road grants there is no uniform trend. It indicates that on the 
one hand for seme States - Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Pahang, Perlis and 
Trengganu - both the amount and as a percentage of total State revenue 
has increased. On the other hand, for other States - Malacca, Negri 
Sesnbilan, Penang, Parak and Selangor - the amount has increased but as a 
percentage of total State revenue it has fallen. Thus, it suggests that 
dependance on this type of grant is increasing in the former and falling 
in the latter. Generally, the States' dependance on the two types of 
grant is not uniform.
New Grants: The Central Government is enpowered to make new grants to
108States for specific reasons and purposes. To date it has created 
two such grants: The Balancing Grant (B.G. or the Revenue Equalisation 
Grant) and the Revenue Growth Grant (RGG).
In 1974, the Central Government created the BG after agreement 
with the States, and will be paid only to the States with per capita
104. See Auditor-General, Report on the Account of the State of Penang, 
1971, Kuala Lumpur, Govt. Printer, 1973, p. 47. See also M. 
Suffian, An Introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia, p. 185.
105. Treasury, op.cit., p. 78
106. M. Suffian, op.cit., p. 185
107. Treasury, cp.cit., p. 78 See also Abd. Ayub, cp.cit., p. 310
108. Article 109(3) and (6) of the Constitution.
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109income lower than the national average. There were several States
with lcwer than average income, but only two States received such a
grant in 1974: Kelantan and Perlis. The BG due to Kelantan, based on its
unaudited 1973 accounts, amounted to $3,563 million, of which $1.2
million and $.3 million were received in 1974 and 1975
respectively.^^ Perlis received BG amounting to $4 million in
September 1975.111
Parliament approved the RGG Bill on December 14, 1976. In the
Dewan Raayat, the Finance Minister, Tengku Razaleigh, explained that
this grant was intended to increase the financial assistance given to
State Governments but it should be used only for carrying out specific
development projects: water supply, public housing, industrial estates
1 1 3development and other development projects approved by the NFC. It 
was created, he continued, on the premise that State Governments should 
also benefit frcm the growth of Central revenue since that growth is a 
product of Centre-State efforts. Furthermore, seme Central Government 
decisions could also result in new expenditure commitments for the State 
Governments, for example, its decision to implement the Cabinet 
Committee Report on Wages and Salaries.
The RGG is payable only When the Central Government's revenue in 
a given fiscal year and after deducting tin duties and taxes raised 
under the Road Traffic Ordnance, 1958, increases by more than 10% over 
the previous year's collection. The maximum amount of RGG 
distributed to the State Governments should not exceed $50 million per
year so as not to adversely affect the Central Government's capacity to
1 1 5  . . .meet other expenditure commitments. The Finance Minister, however,
11 f%is empowered to vary the total amount to be disbursed to States.
109. Auditor-General, Report on the Account of the State of Kelantan, 
1974, Kuala Lumpur, Govt. Printer, 1977, p.49.
110. ibid.
111. Auditor-General, Report on the Account of the State of Perlis, 
1974, Kuala Lumpur, Govt. Printer, 1977, p. 28.
112. Treasury, cp.cit., p. 78. See Federation of Malaysia, Laws of
Malaysia, Act 181, Revenue Growth Grant Act, 1977, Kuala Lumpur, 
Government Press, March 1977.
113. MPD, cp.cit., cols. 7185-7187. See also Federation of Malaysia, 
Laws of Malaysia, • Act 181, Revenue Grcwth Grant Act, 1977, Section 
6.
114. See Federation of Malaysia, cp.cit., Section 2(2). Tengku 
Razaleigh argued in the Dewan Raayat that in the calculation of 
the RGG revenue from export duties on tin and the Traffic Ordnance 
taxes have been excluded because these are partly shared with the 
State Governments through the assignment of tin export duty grant
and the road grants. See MPD, op.cit., col. 7186 and Treasury,
cp.cit., p. 78.
115. Treasury, ibid.
116. See Federation of Malaysia, cp.cit., Section 3 (a).
101.
The first 50% of the total RGG to be disbursed will be distributed 
equally. The second 50% will be distributed on the basis of the 
population of each State as determined at the last census taken before 
the preceding financial year, at two shares for the first 500,000 of the 
State's population, one share for the next 500,000 and one-half share
117
for the remainder.
The first payment of the RGG was made in 1977 and totalled $49.8
million.1-^ Column (a) of Table 7 indicates the allocation of the RGG
to each State in Peninsula Malaysia. Table 7 uses the divergence index
to establish the effective weight age given to population and incane
(measured in Gross Domestic Product - GDP) in the distribution of the 
119RGG to the States. The effective weightage given to population can 
be seen if the State's share in the RGG is compared with its share in 
the total Peninsula Malaysia population. The effective weightage on 
income can be similarly measured by comparing the State's share in the 
total RGG with its share in the total Peninsula Malaysia GDP. The 
divergence index then is the quotient of each comparison mutliplied by
100. On population, Column (d) indicates that the divergence index for a 
State is closely inversely related to the State's percentage share of 
the total population in Column (c). In other words, the smaller the 
State's share in the total population the bigger the divergence index 
for that State, and the more it tends to benefit frcm the system of RGG. 
On income, Column (f) indicates that the divergence index for a State is 
similarly closely inversely related to the State's percentage share of 
the total Peninsula Malaysia's GDP in Column (e). Thus, the smaller the 
State's percentage share in the total Peninsula Malaysia's GDP, the 
bigger the divergence index for that State and the more it tends to 
benefit frcm the system of RGG. The Table seems to confirm the 
Treasury's claim regarding the method of allocating RGG that
"This method of payment is designed to favour States with smaller 
population who are less d 
normally much narrower.
The system of RGG seems to indicate the Central Government's willingness
to initiate an approach that would benefit the fiscal capacity of lew
inccme States.
117. ibid. Section 4 (a) and (b).
118. NST, 11.1.77. The total was for Malaysia as a whole.
119. Ehabatosh Data used the divergence index in assessing the
financial transfers of India's Seventh Finance Commission. See 
Ehabatosh Datta, "Our Crumbling Federal Finance System: Seventh 
Finance Ccmmission's Award", Economic and Political Weekly,
January 13, 1979, pp. 71-78.
120. Treasury op.cit., pp. 78-79.
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In Parliament Tengku Razaleigh stated that
"The Federal Government finds it timely to give these grants 
because the State Governments' financial sources are limited, and 
they cannot meet their increasing expenditure... with these grants 
the Federal Government hopes that they will be able to implement 
their development pojects more smoothly. "121
The RGG are, hcwever, conditional grants in that the State Governments
will receive the RGG only when the Central Government revenue increases
by 10% or more in a given financial year and they are required to use
these grants, as mentioned earlier, only for specific development
projects. Abdullah Ayab claimed that the limitations placed on the use
of the RGG were designed to encourage the State Governments to place
greater emphasis on basic socio-economic requirements and a higher rate
12?of economic expansion.
On October 10, 1979 the Deputy Finance Ministr, Rafidah Aziz,
introduced the Revenue Growth Grant (Amendment) Bill in Parliament in
order to make amendments to the Revenue Grcwth Grant Act, 1977.^^ She
explained to the Dewan Raayat that in 1978 Central Government revenue
did not increase by 10% and thus RGG were not allocated to the 
1 2 4States. Therefore, she continued, to improve the States' financial 
position further, the Bill proposed several amendments so that States 
should still receive the RGG whenever there is an increase in Central 
Government's revenue in a given financial year, and the maximum amount 
of RGG was increased from $50 million to not more than $100 
million. Of this $100 million the first $50 million would be 
allocated based on the present system and the next $50 million based on 
such State’s per capita GDP as a proportion of the national average per
capita GDP, both of which would be determined by the Central
126Government. The latter method of allocation was considered suitable
and necessary, Rafidah Aziz argued, to enable the less developed States
to increase the pace of their development so that the gap between them
1 2 7and the more developed States could be narrowed. These amendments, 
she explained, apart from helping States to finance development, were
121. NST. 11.1.77:
122. Abdullah Ayub, cp.cit., p. 311.
123. MPD, Vol. 1, No. 73, 10.10.79, col. 39. Act A475 is the approved 
version of the Bill. See Federation of Malaysia, Laws of Malaysia, 
Act A475, Revenue Growth Grant (Amendment) Act, 1980, Kuala Lumpur, 
Government Press, 31.1.80.
124. MPD, cp.cit., col. 39.
125. ibid, col. 40. See also Federation of Malaysia, cp.cit., Section
2.
126. MPD, ibid, col. 40 and Federation of Malaysia ibid, Section 5.
127. MPD, ibid, cols. 40-42.
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aimed at assisting the States, especially the underdeveloped ones, in
coping with the rising operating expenditure brought about by the
128increasing pace of development. Nevertheless, several MPs argued
for even more financial help to be given to underdeveloped States and
129that States should be closely supervised in the use of such help.
The new RGG are still conditional grants although the conditions
governing their allocations are now more generous. There are two
130conditions governing their use. First, the allocation of RGG out of
the first fifty million dollars to each State is for generally
supplementing its revenue and thus there are no "strings" attached as to
how this portion of the RGG is used. Second, however, the allocation of
the second fifty million dollars to each State can be used only, as
before, for specific development projects. In the case of the first, the
conditions governing the RGG's use are more generous.
Central grants and allocations comprise the Capitation and State
Roads Grants, Balancing Grant and the RGG, grants from the State Reserve 
131Fund (SRF), other conditional grants and Assignment of a Percentage 
of Export Duty on Minerals. Together, they make up a significant 
proportion, although unequal, of each State's yearly total revenue.
Table 1 indicates this. On a per capita basis the amounts of Central 
grants and allocations made to States are also unequal. Table 8 
indicates this. Table 9 again uses the divergence index to establish if 
there was any effective weightage given to population and income 
(measured in GDP) in the distribution of total Central financial 
transfers to States. On population column (c) indicates that the highest 
divergence index is 173.3 for Tregganu and the lcwest is 73 for Penang. 
For four States - Kedah, Negri Sembilan, Perak and Selangor - the 
divergence ratio is between 90 and 110. If the range is extended to 20 
percent either way, Johore, kelantan and Malacca will ccme in. Pahang 
and Perlis have divergence indices of 159.6 and 150 respectively. In the 
main, population appears important in determining the pattern of Central 
financial transfers to the States. On income, column (e) indicates that 
the highest divergence is 312 for Trengganu and the lcwest is 52.6 for 
Selangor. Only Perak, Johore and Negri Sembilan are within the
128. ibid, cols. 40-4T.
129. ibid., cols. 43-66 and MPD, Vol. 1, No. 75, 12.10.1979, cols. 31- 
397"
130. Federation of Malaysia, op.cit., section 7.
131. This will be discussed later with regard to the problem of fiscal 
imbalances since grants out of the SRF had been used solely to 
meet the deficits of some States.
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divergence ratio of 80 and 120, suggesting that incane is not similarly 
as important as population in determining the pattern of Central 
financial transfers to the States. However, interestingly, column (e) 
suggests an inverse relationship, although not in direct proportion with 
column (d). This suggests that seme lew income States tend to benefit 
more from the present system of Central financial transfers to States. 
Expenditure.
The Constitution specifies the areas of responsibilies for both
the Central and State Governments as enumerated in the Legislative 
1 3 2Lists. Recall that, among others, the financial autonomy of States
was sought through transferring previously State responsiblities to the
Central Government, and thus reducing the areas of State 
. . • 1 3 3responsibility. Central and State Governments can spend money,
through the Supply Bill, within their areas of competence. Parliament is
responsible for legislation relating to financial and accounting
procedure. 1 Before promulgating such legislation the Central
Government has to consult the NFC. The "essential provisions" and all
the State Constitutions affirm that no moneys shall be withdrawn from
the State Consolidated fund " except in the manner provided by Federal 
1 3 5Law." Accordingly, Parliament enacted two important Ordinances:
the Financial Procedure Ordinance 1957, and the Audit Ordinance, 1957.
1 3 6Both came into force on January 1958. Sheridan commented that
"While the validity of certain provisions of the Financial 
procedure Ordinance, 1957, might, perhaps, have been challenged by 
a vigilant State Government, the financial system created by Part 
IV Of that Ordinance has been accepted and is in operation in the 
States."137
The Financial Procedure Ordinance did not confer upon the States
financial authorities the power of virement but such power was conferred
1 3 8upon the Central Treasury in relation to heads of expenditure in 
the Central Estimates. Thus, as Sheridan commented,
132. Nonth Schedule of the Constitution.
133. See Chapter 1.
134. Federal List, Section 7 (f) and (g) of the Constitution.
135. Eight Schedule, Section 17 (2) of the Constitution.
136. This being the date appointed under the former Ordinance, pursuant 
to Article 165(4) of the Constitution, for the coming into force 
of the provision of Part Vll of that Constitution.
137. Sheridan, L.A., et.al., Malaya and Singapore, the Borneo 
Territories: The Development of their laws and constitutions,
London, Stevens and Sons, 1961, p. 94.
138. Section 15(4) of the Financial Procedure Ordinance.
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"Since every State spends federal money, the Federation has, 
through the federal constitution and federal law, virtually 
complete control over the principles of State finances and 
financial procedures, subject to the (somewhat nebulous) control 
of the NFC, on which the State representatives outnumber those of 
the Federation."
In August 1961, several amendments to the Financial Procedure
Ordinance, 1957, were effected through "The Financial Procedure
(Amendment) Bill" In the Dewan Raayat, The Finance Minister, Tan
Siew Sin, claimed that the Bill had the consent of the State Governments
through their participation in the NFC which agreed to the terms of the
draft Bill on June 9, 1 9 6 1 . Of special interest to the States was
Clause 10 of the Bill Which sought to ensure, as explained by Tan Siew
Sin, that as far as possible any surplus monies held by the State
Government should be invested locally and the Treasury's approval should
be obtained before such monies were invested in other than on deposit
in licensed banks in the Federation or in securities isssued by the
1 4 2Central Government. Thus, he emphasised that this
"will enable the Minister of Finance to ensure that the Federation 
has the first opportunity of putting to good use any surplus funds 
which may be available to the States."
This provision further tightens the Central Government's control over
State finances.
A large portion of both Central and State Governments'
expenditures go tcward personal emoluments. The Constitution empowers
the Central Government to control the size and salaries of the States'
public services. Central Government approval is required for any State
which wants to expand its establishment or the establishment of any of
its departments or alter the rates of established salaries and
emoluments if the effect of this is to increase the Central Government's
financial liability over pensions, gratuities or similar allowances for
139. Sheridan cp.cit., P .95. States usually had to 'clear' their 
estimates with the Central Treasury before submitting them to 
their respective State Legislative Assemblies. Johore, however, 
because it was a rich State, only had to consult the Treasury 
regarding its estimates. See Subramaniam, Margaret, "A Survey of 
Ccnparitive Attitudes of the Higher Civil Servants, Federal and 
State", Graduate Exercise, Faculty of Economics and Administration, 
University of Malaya, 1970/1971, p. 11.
140. See Malayan Parliamentary Debates (MPD), Dewan Raayat, Vol. Ill,
No. 14, 8.8.61. col. 1444.
141. ibid., cols. 1445-1146.
142. ibid., col. 1466.
143. ibid.
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144which it is responsible.
The Central Government had previously conducted reviews of salary
schemes. Such reviews affect the salaries paid to personnel of both the
Central and State Governments' Civil Services. Thus, Central Government
decisions on salary schemes will increase States' financial burden
regarding personal emoluments. Several States have been increasingly
dependant on Central financial help to meet the additional expenditure
on personal emoluments after every Central Government's pay review. The
Finance Minister, Tan Siew Sin, admitted in the Dewan Raayat on January
19, 1967, that the Central Government's pay reviews had substantially
145increased the States financial commitments. Consequently, he
continued, in 1965 and 1966 for example the
"Federal Treasury had, on a number of occasions, no choice but to 
issue money from the State Reserve Fund to sane States, a few of 
which had literally no mcnev to pay even the current salaries and 
wages of their employees."
He warned, however, that
"the Federal Government will not consider any request for help 
frcm any State unless the Treasury is satisfied that the State 
concerned has practised the utmost economy and done everything it 
could to help itself by increasing its revenue to the maximum 
extent possible fran the sources available to it."
In 1971, SRF grants to subsidise the cost of arrears arising frcm
the implementation of the recommendations of the Suffian Salaries
Commission totalling $1.3 million, $1.18 million and $1.3 million were
148granted to Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu respectively. The States' 
cprating expenditure increased in 1977 by 45 percent, due mainly to the
increase in salaries because of the implementation of the Cabinet
Recommendations following the Central Government's rejections of of the 
Ibrahim Ali Salaries Report. The implementation of the new salary
schemes was expected to cost the State Governments $140 million. The
Treasury reported:
144. Articles 98 and 112 of the Constitution. Pensions and gratuities 
relating to all Officers, Central or State, are paid by the 
Central Government and are charged on the Federal Consolidated 
Fund.
145. Malaysian Parliamentary Debates (MPD), Dewan Raayat, Vol. Ill 
No. 15, 19.1.67, col. 2600.
146. ibid.
147. ibid., col. 2601.
148. Auditor-General, Report on the Account of the Federation of 
Malaysia, 1971, Kuala Lunpur, Government Printer, 1973, p. 172.
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"A number of State Governments have approached the Federal 
Government for financial assistance to meet this cost and so far 
the Federal Government has received total requests of about $90 
million. "®9
Table 10 ccnpares the Central and State Governments' expenditure. 
It indicates that State Government expenditure as a whole, and more so 
individually, is quite dwarfed by that of the Central Government. 
Although both the Central and State Governments expenditures grew in the 
period 1958 to 1975, the all States' prcentage has fallen during the 
same period. Table 11 indicates that the Central Government has a higher 
per capita expenditure compared to that of the State Governments for the 
period 1958 to 1975. Both the Central and State Governments per capita 
expenditures grew during the same period. However, with the exception of 
Pahang and Selangor, each State's per capita expenditure as a percentage 
of the Central Government's per capita expenditure has, in varying 
degrees, fallen during the same period. The all States' percentage has 
also fallen during this period. Tables 10 and 11 indicate the dominance 
of the Centre in the public sector expenditure structure.
Central grants and allocations make up an important percentage of 
each State's expenditure. Table 12 indicates this. The annual average 
percentage for each State for the 1958 to 1975 period exceeds 24 percent 
and in Perlis's case exceeds 60 percent. The disparity in the prcentages 
among the States indicates the differences in fiscal capacities among 
States and consequently the level of dependance on Central Grants and 
allocations I their respective expenitures. In the main, however, and 
with the exception of Selangor and Trengganu, each State's percentage 
and thus its level of dependence has fallen in the 1958 to 1975 period.
The lack of financial resources have affected States' expenditure 
in varying degrees, as indicated in the varying sizes of the 
'surpluses' or 'deficits' of the State Governments. Table 13 indicates 
this. Although several States have regularly run up yearly deficits, 
only the expenditure pattern of the PAS-controlled Kelantan Government 
had been regularly and unfavourably crarmented upon by the Auditor- 
General in his reports on the accounts of that State. The Auditor- 
General, referring to the 1962 Kelantan Government's expenditure on the 
Bridge Project, commented that
149. Treasury, ibid.~p* 79, All the States except Negri Sembilan 
applied for Central Government help. The total amount granted 
to these States was $75 million. Interview with Mohamad Omar.
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"Unless...the existing levels of ordinary revenue and expenditure 
alter substantially, it appears that the State will be unable to 
meet the anticipated expenditure of $5 m upon the completion of 
the Bridge in 1963 and 19§4 unless it is able to raise a loan frcm 
the Federal Government.
After protracted discussion the Central Government in 1969 agreed to
grant a loan of $4.2 million to the Kelantan Government to cover the
151cost of the Bridge Project.
Fiscal Imbalances and their Adjustments.
Centre-State financial relations in Peninsula Malaysia have been 
influenced by the problem of financial imbalances. There are, as 
discussed earlier, two types of financial imbalances: Central/State or 
vertical imbalance and the State/State or horizontal imbalance. Both 
affect the States' ability to achieve their expenditure objectives more 
effectively.
In Peninsula Malaysia, vertical imbalance describes a situation
in which State Governments are unable to finance their cwn expenditure
on their limited field of responsibility frcm their own sources of
revenue. There is thus a fiscal gap, as columns (c) and (d) of Table 14
indicate, due to the difference between the States' expenditure and
their domestic revenue. It implies that States do not possess tax powers
or the financial autonomy commensurate with their fields of
responsibility. Thus, since the Central Government controls the major
revenue sources and States' borrowing, vertical imbalance denotes the
States' need and dependance, although in varying degrees, on financial
support frcm the Central Government. This imbalance would worsen if
152States' development expenditure were to be taken into account and 
would increasingly emphasise the role of Central financial transfers in 
Centre-State financial relations. The all States' average in Table 14 
indicates that the size of the fiscal gap in terms of amount and 
percentage, columns (c) and (d) respectively, has been increasing during 
the 1958-1975 period. This suggests that, as a Whole, the States' 
financial capacity to meet their responsibilities has fallen during the 
same period.
Horizontal or fiscal imbalance in Peninsula Malaysia describes a 
situation in which the different States have different fiscal capacities 
as indicated by the differing sizes of the fiscal gap in columns (c) and 
(d) of Table 14. The fiscal imbalance of sane of the States is evidently
150. Auditor-General, Report on the Account of the State of Kelantan, 
1962, p. 4.
151. See footnote 61.
152. See Chapter 4.
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changing and is greater than that of the others. Column (e) of Table 14 
compares the fiscal performance of various States in terms of the per 
capita domestic revenue (tax ratio). It indicates that, in varying 
degrees, each State's tax ratio, hence its fiscal performance, has 
improved for the 1958-1975 period. When the States' annual average tax 
ratios are compared to their annual average per capita GDP, the pattern 
that emerges suggests that, in the main, there is a direct relationship 
betwen a State's tax ratio and the level of its economic development 
(measured in GDP). Table 15 suggests this.
There are several reasons, apart frcm the fact that States do 
not possess tax pavers commensurate with their responsibilities, for the 
existance of fiscal imbalances in the States of Peninsula Malaysia. 
First, as indicated earlier, State Government revenues are not as 
elastic and productive as that of the Central Government's. Second,
State Governments' operating expenditure is, to a certain extent, 
dictated by Central Government policies especially that regarding the 
revision of salaries in the public sector since it has been the Central 
Government's policy to standardise salaries throughout the Federation. 
Third, State Governments do not directly benefit frcm inccme tax and 
export duties revenue generated by the output of their development 
projects because this revenue accrues to the Central Government. Thus, 
State Governments' revenues have not been able to increase 
significantly. Fourth, the Central Government provides the bulk of the 
financing for States' development expenditure but the States have to 
maintain these development projects and thereby imposing additional 
strain on the States' operating expenditure. Finally, the States may not 
have been efficient, for whatever reasons, in generating enough revenue 
from their assigned sources of revenue.
Fiscal imbalances are adjusted usually with two things in mind. 
First, to fill the States' fiscal gap (vertical adjustment). Second, to 
equalise inter-State fiscal capacities - to establish fiscal equity 
among the various States (horizontal adjustment). Fiscal imbalances m y  
be adjusted by:
1) Central grants and allocations;
2) transferring more State functions to the Central Government;
3) increasing the fiscal autonomy of the State Governments by a 
redistribution of tax powers from the Central Government to the 
State Governments (tax devolution); and
4) changing the ratio of distribution under the tax revenue- 
sharing arrangements.
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The Constitutional prescription for achieving States' financial autonomy
in Peninsula Malaysia has been based on transferring functions to the
Centre (adjustment (2)) rather than providing States with more tax-
1 SIrevenue powers (adjustment (3)). The Centre is provided with the
power and responsibility of adjusting fiscal imbalances. This it has 
done, since Independence, by increasing and introducing new Central 
grants (adjustment (1)) and changing the ratio of distribution under the 
tax revenue-sharing arrangements (adjustment (4)).^^ Thus, for the 
States of Peninsula Malaysia, Central grants and allocations and tax 
revenue-sharing arrangements represent the main sources for the 
adjustment of fiscal imbalances. These include, in the main, the 
capitation and State road grants, lately the balancing and revenue 
growth grants, other conditional grants and the assignment of a 
percentage of export duty on tin, iron ore and other minerals. On top of 
this the Central Government also makes grants out of the State Reserve 
Fund (SRF).
SRF grants have usually been used to overcome the difficulties
. . 1 5 5of seme of the deficit States. These grants are made on an ad hoc
basis and thus do not constitute an assured source of income to the
1 5 6States. Table 16 indicates the distribution of such grants. The
final decision on the amount of grants out of the SRF rests with the
1 5 7Central Government and not with an independant and impartial body.
In this the States are merely consulted through their representatives on
153. See Chapter 1.
154. There have, however, been calls for adjustment (3) - tax 
devolution - to be also used in adjusting fiscal imbalances. 
Interview with Tan Sri Datuk Ahmad Nordin. See also Berita Harian, 
9.11.78 and NST, 23.6.80.
155. Article 109(6) of the Constitution governs the use of the SRF for 
grant purposes. It provides that "the Federation may from time 
to time, after consultation with the National Finance Council, 
make grants out of the State Reserve Fund to any State for the 
purpose of development or generally to supplement its revenue."
156. There is usually a two year gap, after each financial year, before 
SRF grants are made because they are awarded on the basis of the 
audited account for the deficit year. These grants are made based 
on the recommendation of the Treasury Committee within the NFC. 
Interviews with Mohamad Omar and Tan Sri Datuk Ahmad Nordin. For a 
study of this NFC's committee work from 1960-1965, see Holzhausen, 
op.cit., pp. 149-152.
157. The method of making SRF grants is rather subjective. This has 
encouraged States to practice deficit financing because they knew 
that deficits will be covered by SRF grants. Interview with Tan 
Sri Datuk Ahmad Nordin. Table 13 indicates that the States' 
financial position has worsened frcm 1958 to 1975, with the 
exception of Penang, Perlis and Trengganu.
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the (simply advisory) NFC. A comparison of Tables 16 and 13 indicates
that between 1958 and 1975 SRF grants were made to cover the deficits of
only certain States. It suggests that not all deficits in the States'
accounts were accepted as 'real' deficits. When the States' deficits and
surpluses are conpared with their wealth or level of income (measured in
per capita GDP as a percentage of the Peninsula Malaysia mean), as in
Table 17, it indicates that, in the main, richer States tended to have
bigger deficits ccrrpared to poorer States.
Central grants and allocations to States have to vary within
wide limites because the financial capacities and needs of the State
Governments vary within wide limits. However, in Peninsula Malaysia, in
comparing the per capita annual average State domestic revenue with the
per capita total State revenue (including Central grants and
allocations) for the 1958-1975 period, it is evident that the pattern of
disparity among the States is not much changed. Table 18 illustrates
this. It thus suggests that Central grants and allocations have not dene
much to equalise the financial capacities of States and that Central
transfers for fiscal adjustments are not based solely on the criterion
158of financial need. In this context, the new Revenue Growth Grant
is a move in the right direction since it tends to benefit low income
States more than the higher income States.
In Peninsula Malaysia, the Central Government and Parliament
control the levels and types of financial transfers to States even for
constitutionally guaranteed grants like the capitation and State road
grants. In this the NFC, discussed later, acts only as a consultative
and advisory bod/. In India the (also advisory) Finance Commission and
Parliament, hence the Central Government, determine the levels and types
159of financial transfers to States. A novel way of handling such 
financial transfers is provided by the example of the Cortmonwealth 
Grants Commission in the Australian Federation.
Co-ordination of Centre-State Financial Relations.
The problem of financial imbalance is a dynamic one. It puts a 
premium on the flexibility and adaptability of the financial provisions 
of the Constitution to meet the ever changing conditions. In Peninsula 
Malaysia the Constitution does provide the basis for flexibility and
158. Holzhausen was also of this opinion. Holzhausen, op.cit., p. 143.
159. See Grewal, B.S., op.cit., pp. 19-24 and May, R.J., op.cit., pp. 
114-123.
160. See Lane, W.R. "The Grants Commission and Equalisation Grants", 
Publius, Vol. 7, No. 3, Summer 1977, pp. 69-99 and May, R.J. 
cp.cit., pp. 60-66.
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change in inter-governmental financial relations. The Central 
Government, advised by the NFC and through Parliament, is ultimately 
responsible for achieving this.
The NFC is responsible for co-ordinating Centre-State financial
1 fi9relations. Article 108 of the Constitution provided for the 
establishment of the NFC and that it should comprise the PM, who 
presides (or in his absence, another Central Minister representing him 
and who shall preside in the PM's absence), one Central Minister 
appointed by the PM and one representative frcm each of the States 
appointed by the Ruler or Governor of that State. It is thus a formal 
Centre-State body. It shall meet at least once a year or when summoned 
by the PM or at the request of at least three States. It can deliberate 
on any matter of financial policy referred to it. The Central Government 
is obliged to consult the NFC on the following matters:
1) the assignment to the STates of the whole or any portion of the 
proceeds of any federal tax or fee;
2) any proposal to introduce a bill varying the rates of the 
capitation grant or affecting the receipt by a State of export 
duty cxi tin or other minerals produced in the State;
3) the making of grants by the Federation to the States;
4) the making of grants frcm the State Reserve Fund;
5) the annual loan requirements of the Federation and States and 
the exercise by the Federation and the States of their 
borrowing powers;
6) the making of loans to any States; and
7) the making of development plans.
However, the NFC's decisions are not binding. It performs merely an 
advisory function and the Central Government may or may not accept its 
recommendations. It provides, at least, a useful arena for the airing of 
State views regarding financial problems that affect the State. The fact 
that the NFC is purely advisory reduces its importance as an inter­
governmental body to co-ordinate Centre-State financial relations in 
Peninsula Malaysia.
Conclusion
The Constitution provided for a pattern of Centre-State financial 
relations which is dominated by the Central Government because it 
controls most of the richest and productive revenue sources and areas of
1ST. Articles 110(2), (3), (3A), (4) (a), 110(3B) andll2D(s).
162.The NFC's deliberations and its reports have not been made 
public.
163. Articles 103 (4)-(5) and 109(6) of the Constitution.
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expenditure. Thus, large scale Central transfers to the State 
Governments were and still are inevitable and necessary to fulfil 
their expenditure ccximitments. The level of fonancial dependance, 
however, varies from one State to another indicating the difference in 
their fiscal capacity. The pattern of inequalities in wealth is plainly 
evident among the States of Peninsula Malaysia. These inequalities 
resulted from a variety of factors including the unequal endowments in 
natural resources among the States and the differential inter-State 
impact of Central policy. These make it necessary that Central financial 
transfers should take into account the inter-State differentiation that 
exist so as not to worsen the inter-State inequalities. Furthermore, 
such transfers must be based on some notion of the 'financial need' of 
lew income States. The introduction of the Revenue Growth Grant suggests 
a move towards this.
126.
CHAPTER 4
Centre-State Financial Relations; Inpact of Development.
The field of development, potentially, offers the Central 
Government, especially through its planning and funding, with 
opportunities to influence the development of the States. This chapter 
examines the impact of Central Government's development planning and 
funding on the States and on Centre-State relations. The Central 
Government can deliberately pursue an equalisation policy (equalising 
inter-State wealth and prosperity) by giving 'special preference' to 
'poor' States in its development allocations. This involves a 
redistribution of revenue and resources from rich to poor States. 
Equalisation through development is one of the long-term methods for 
equalising the fiscal capacities of States. The decision to pursue an 
equalisation policy through development is essentially a political one. 
Political pressure for such a policy depends on the outcome of the 
tussle between rich and poor States.
The Constitution did not assign the subject of development to any 
of the Legislative Lists. However, it provided the Central Government in 
Peninsula Malaysia with the constitutional basis for pursuing a national 
development plan for 'national interests'. Article 92(1) provided that,
"If, after a recommendation frcm an expert committee and after 
consultation with the National Finance Council, the National Land 
Council and the Government of any State concerned, the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong is satisfied that it is conducive to the national 
interest that a development plan be put into operation in any area 
or areas in one or more of the States, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
may, after publishing the plan, proclaim the area or areas as a 
development area; and thereupon Parliament shall have power to 
give effect to the development plan or any part thereof, 
notwithstanding that any of the matters to which the plan relates 
are matters with respect to which, apart frcm this Article, only 
States would have power to make laws."
This Article was recommended by the Reid Commission with equalisation as
one of the goals deemed to be in the national interests. ^ The
Commission, however, was aware that such powers over national development
vested in the Central Government could undermine State autoncny and
cause Centre-State conflict.^ Article 92(1) in effect means that the
Central Government has wide ranging powers in the area of development.
VJhat constitutes development is defined loosely as that which is
"conducive to the nationl interest" even if such development were to
impigne on States' areas of competence. The Central Government is thus
1. Reid Report, pp. 46-49.
2. ibid.
127.
left with the responsibility and opportunity for determining what 
development in the national interests means. It, in addition to Article 
92(1), has substantial powers over the major areas of expenditure and 
commands massive financial resources. It is thus placed in a dominant 
position vis-a-vis the States and this would tend to be further 
emphasised in situations of increasing demands for rapid economic 
development.
Development planning in Malaysia is highly centralised.
Briefly, the Central Cabinet has ultimate responsibility for planning 
and the National Development Planning Committee (NDPC) is responsible 
for the detailed consideration of many of the policy problems. The 
Economic Planning Unit (EPU) in the Prime Minister's Department acts as 
the Secretariat to the NDPC. State Government representatives on the NFC 
and the National Land Council (NLC) are merely consulted in the planning 
for national development.
The States of Peninsula Malaysia differ in size, resource 
endowment (both human and natural) and level of economic and social 
development.^ The per capita State Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
section of Table 1 indicates this. Although the Constitution did not 
assign to the Central Government the responsibility for equalising 
inter-State wealth and prosperity, the Reid Commission clearly expected
c
the Central Government to commit itself to such a policy.
As early as in 1955, before the introduction of Malaya's First 
Five Year Plan (FFYP, 1956-1960), there were already demands for greater 
Central Government effort in developing both the rural areas and the 
underdeveloped East Coast States of Kelantan and Trengganu. For example, 
Ibrahim Fikri, a Federal Councillor from Trengganu, speaking during the 
debate over the FFYP in the Federal Legislative Council (FLC), insisted 
that development allocations should be based on relative need.
The Central Government, however, in the FFYP did not commit itself to an 
equalisation policy. It followed the strategy of intensifying public 
investment in an expanding and advanced modem sector, essentially in
3"! See Chapter 6.
4. For an economic analysis of these differences, see Lim Kok Cheong,
"Aspects of Regional Economic Problems and Policy in Malaysia", 
Southeast Asian Affairs, 1979, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) Limited, 1979, pp. 
200-210.
5. Reid Report, p. 61.
6. See Rudner, M., Nationalism, Planning and Economic Modernisation
in Malaysia; The Politics of Beginning Development, Beverley 
Hills, Sage Publications, 1975, p.43.
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the West Coast States, convinced that this would generate "spill over"
or "linkage" effects and thereby inducing progress in the backward
7areas of the East Coast States especially. This strategy was heavily
Q
criticised. The Central Government was accused of favouring the West 
Coast States and demands for an equalisation policy giving priority in 
development allocations to the East Coast States were made. In 1958, in 
the wake of an economic recession that hit the East Coast States 
hardest, Tuan Hj. Abdul Khalid warned the FLC that to neglect these 
States would create "extreme dissatisfaction" and would endanger the
Q
"spirit of Federation". Despite calls for an equalisation policy, 
the Central Government continued its former strategy in the Second Five 
Year Plan (1961-1965).10
The First Malaysia Plan (IMP), 1966-1970^ -^ , contained two 
objectives that might be implied to indicate the Central Government's 
commitment not to perpetuate inter-State differences indefinitely. These 
objectives^ were:
"1) to promote integration of the people and States of Malaysia by 
embarking upon a development plan explicitly designed to 
promote the welfare of all, and
2) to improve the economic and social well being of all sectors 
of the population and to redress the imbalance between rural 
and urban areas."
However, the Central Government, in making its development plan 
allocation, preferred looking at differences in the level of socio­
economic development frcm a geographical point of view and not frcm that 
of the constituent States.^ The Central Government divided Malaysia 
into two geographical regions: West (Peninsula) Malaysia and East 
Malaysia.
The States of Peninsula Malaysia were treated collectively as a 
unit. No attempt was made to equalise the large differences in the level
71 See Malaya, Economic Secretariat, A Plan of Economic Development 
for Malaya, 1956-1960., Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 1956; 
Federation of Malaya, Report on Economic Planning in the 
Federation of Malaya, 1956, Kuala Lumpur, Government Press,
1957; and Rudner, M., op.cit., p. 43.
8. ibid.
9. ibid.
10. Federation of Malaya, Second Five Year Plan, 1961-1965, Kuala 
Lumpur, Government Press, 1961.
11. Federation of Malaysia, First Malaysian Plan, 1966-1970, (FMP), 
Kuala Lurrpur Government Press, 1965.
12. BMP, p. 2.
13. The need to equalise wealth and prosperity among the States of
Peninsula Malaysia was not even mentioned in the FMP. The Table
showing the allocation of public development expenditure was 
according to two geographical regions, East and West Malaysia. See 
BMP, pp. 69-70.
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of socio-economic development between the much poorer East Coast States 
of Peninsula Malaysia.”^  Holzhausen remarked that
"the large public investment expenditures foreseen under the 
development plan in the Federal Capital and in the industrial 
towns on the West Coast tend to further aggravate the already 
existing differences in the level of development in West 
Malaysia.
The FMP1 s agricultural policy also did not give preference to the 
development schemes in the more backward States of Peninsula Malaysia. 
The schemes of large-scale irrigation and land development, to which the 
Central Government was ccmnitted to and which were partly financed by 
the Vforld Bank, were selected for their productive viability rather than 
for reasons of equity.^
The Second Malaysia Plan (SMP), 1971-1975^, committed the 
Central Government to more action towards achieving inter-State 
equalisation in Peninsula Malaysia. In this the SIP aimed to correct 
economic imbalance and achieve regional balance. Regarding economic 
imbalance, the SMP pointed out that
"the imbalances of pressing concern occur in the pattern of 
ownership and control of economic activity, in the distribution of 
income as well as in employment.
14. The equalisation policy was aimed essentially at uplifting the 
economically backward States of East Malaysia, see BMP, p. 71.
15. Holzhausen, W., Federal Finance in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur,
Penerbit University, Malaya, 1974, p. 39.
16. Such schemes included the Muda (Kedah) and Kemubu (Kelantan) 
irrigation projects for the double cropping of rice, and the 
Jengka Triangle land development projects in Pahang.
17. Federation of Malaysia, Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975, (SMP), 
Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 1970. The SMP continued the 
practice of treating East Malaysia seperately and as an area of 
special development needs. It required, and received, extra money 
from a Central Government that felt a special responsiblity over 
it. Significantly, the East Coast States of Peninsula Malaysia 
which were equally poor and with less potential than the East 
Malaysian States of Sabah and Sarawak were not equally treated by 
the Central Government. There seemed, however, to be a bargaining 
dimension as to why the East Malaysian States were 'favoured'. 
According to sources with the Economic planning Unit, Sabah and 
Sarawak fought very hard for what they wanted from the Central 
Government in development projects and they invariably got 
practically what they asked for in the SMP. The Peninsula 
Malaysian States, however, traditionally did not place so much 
emphasis on acquiring Central Government development largesse 
per se and had been somewhat disappointed accordingly. See 
Osborn, James, Area, Development Policy and the Middle City in 
Malaysia, University of Chicago, Department of Geography, Research 
Paper No. 153, 1974, pp. 96-97.
18. SMP, p. 36.
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Economic balance would be achieved by various means including regional
development and an increase in the role of the States. The strategy
would aim at increasing rural incomes, especially in the rural areas of
the East Coast of Peninsula Malaysia, and at urbanisation and
industrialisation programmes leading to greater geographic dispersal of 
19industries.
Regarding regional imbalance, the SMP proposed the modernisation . 
of rural areas through the location of projects in specific regions. It 
hoped that these projects
"will help to reduce the marked economic disparity among the 
States and within each State that now exists." .
Such projects were regional in scope and located in States with per
capita incomes well below the national average and designed to raise
farm incomes.^
The SMP, however, did not provide a breakdown of its plan
allocation to the States of Peninsula Malaysia. The Mid-Term review of
the SMP indicated, however, that the States Economic Development
Corporations (SEDC) were allocated $192.93 million.^ The SEDCs were
expected to provide a strong stimulus to develop less-develcped States
and widen opportunities for Malays and other indigenous people in these
States to engage in a wide range of oorrmercial and industrial
activities. Public Authorities were also allocated development funds
to be expended in the States. Although no breakdown in terms of States
was provided, Public Authorities were allocated $1,187 million for the
SMP period.^
The Mid-Term Review admitted that economic imbalances existed 
between States and that the less-develcped East Coast and the rice- 
growing Northern States of Peninsula Malaysia had a relatively small 
share of the national income.^ These States not insignificantly were 
and still are heavily Malay populated States. Table 1 illustrates this
19. ibid., pp. 43-45.
20. ibid., p. 46.
21. Such projects included the Jangka Triangle and Pahang Tengarra 
areas in Pahang, Jdhore Tengah and Tanjong Penggerang regions in 
Johore, the Muda, Keanubu and Besut irrigation schemes. See ibid.
22. Federation of Malaysia, Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia 
Plan, 1971-1975, Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 1973, p. 167. The 
SEDCs are usually chaired by the Mentri Besars or Chief Ministers 
and they operate at State level. They are involved in sponsoring a 
variety of activities ranging frcm industrial and commercial 
projects to housing and agricultural projects.
23. ibid., p. 16.
24. See Federation of Malaysia, Third Malaysia Plan (TMP), 1976-1980, 
Kuala Lunpur^ Government Press, 1975, p. 233.
25. Federation of Malaysia Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysian 
Plan, p. 17.
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relationship between low income States (measured in per capita GDP) and 
the ethnic distribution in the States. The Review stated that
"In so far as these inequalities coincide with the higher 
proportion of Malays and other indigenous people in the poor 
States, the reduction of regional disparities will be an important 
means to bring about the overall racial balance.'
The Review also noted that each State's economy showed striking 
27differences. More than 90% of manufacturing output originated frcm 
the more developed West Coast States of Penang, Perak, Selangor, Negri 
Sesmbilan and Johore, with Selangor alone accounting for more than 50%. 
These States also contributed more than 80% of mining output and, 
together with Kedah, almost 80% of the agricultural output. Furthermore, 
all States, except Selangor and Penang, depended predominately on the 
primary sector.
It was made clear that regional development was expected to reduce
28the marked economic disparities which existed between States. This
strategy would involve the full exploitation of presently untapped
economic resources, especially in the less-develcped States, the
promotion of population migration to areas with large economic potential
and the expansion of the infrastructure and social services in those
States and areas which new lag in development so as to achieve greater
7Qbalance between the various regions and people residing there.
The Review re-affirmed the Central Government's commitment to
shift or disperse the location of industries frcm the more developed
30West Coast States of Peninsula Malaysia. In its own words
"The dispersal of industries to new growth centres and to the 
relatively undeveloped States, is an important element under the 
Plan for industrial development... .Besides the development of 
infrastructure, free trade zones and industrial estates have also 
been located in the less developed States in the effort to 
encourage dispersal of industries from Malaysia's main urban 
comubations."
The activities of the Federal Industrial Development Authority (FIDA) 
and the Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Limited (MIDF) for 
example were aimed at encouraging this. Frcm 1970 to 1973, the MIDF 
increased its lending to projects in less-developed States such as
26^  ibid.
27. ibid.
28. ibid., p. 18.
29. ibid.
30. ibid., p. 19.
31. ibid., p. 143.
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Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Sarawak by $11.3 million. The Locational 
Incentive Scheme was introduced to attract investment in less-develcped 
States.^
The Third Malaysia Plan (IMP), 1976-1980, proposed to pursue more 
systematically the eradication of inter-State inequalities. These 
inequalities were unambiguously viewed frcm the position of the 
constituent States. The Plan argued that
"As a result of historical patterns of development the different 
States and regions of Malaysia have shewn very different rates of 
development, resulting in very unequal distribution of income, 
amenities and opportunities. To overcome existing inequalities, a 
shift in the pattern of investment is necessary giving more 
emphasis to the less developed States."
Accordingly, the IMP emphasised that
"The States and regions which have experienced the least 
development so far and which thus contain the most poverty will be 
given the highest priority."
Such lew income and high priority States included Kedah, Perlis,
Kelantan, Trengganu and Malacca as well as Sabah and Sarawak. Under the
Plan they would be receiving considerably increased allocations. The
relative position of these States were expected to be inproved by
policies and programmes aimed at improving the States' agricultural
productivity, developing their physical infrastructure, establishing new
growth centres, promoting industrial development and locating a greater
3 7variety of Government establishments in these States.
The IMP's regional development plans were designed to avoid the 
continuation of development trends that occured in the sixties. It was 
convinced that if such development trends were continued it
"will exarcerbate further the current disparities between the 
States."^
32. ibid., p. 144, The Malaysian Industrial Estates Sdn, Barhad also 
planned to build factories in industrial estates in less developed 
States. See ibid., p. 149.
33. ibid., p. 149. On January 23, 1975, Kelantan, Trengganu, Perlis, 
Sabah and parts of Pahang, Kedah and Johore were declared 
"development priority areas" under the locational Incentive 
Scheme. Treasury, Economic Report, 1976/77, p. 123.
34. IMP, p. 217.
35. ibid., p. 39. See also Mohd. Nor Abdul Ghani "Evaluation 
Techniques in Malaysia", Socio Economic Research and General 
Planning Unit, PM's Department, Kuala Lumpur, Paper presented at 
the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation on 
Regional Seminar on the Application of Evaluation Techniques in 
Social Action Projects in Asia, Kuala Lumpur, 20-30 November,
1977, p. 11.
36. IMP, p. 39.
37. ibid., pp. 205 and 236.
38. ibid., p. 214.
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Regional development was aimed not only at bringing about closer 
integration among the States of Malaysia but also at pushing 
development further to the less-developed States in order to increase 
the per capita GDP in the least developed States.^ The IMP's 
commitment to an equalisation policy has been further re-inforced in the 
Fourth Malaysian Plan (FoMP), 1981-1985.^
Central Government development planning and implementation, apart 
frcm eroding certain States' areas of competence and thus their 
autonomous action, significantly affects intergovernmental financial 
transfers. This is so simply because development planning determines 
where and hew money is to be spent. If equalisation is one of the aims 
of a national development plan, as the IMP and FoMP declared, then it 
would be reasonable to expect that the development plan allocations to 
States should be based on their levels of income (measured in GDP) and 
aim in the long-term at equalising their relative levels of income.
Table 2 shews the IMP's original and revised alocations to the 
States of Peninsula Malaysia. The assessment of the effective weightage 
given to income (measured in GDP) is done by comparing the shares of the 
States in the total allocations with their shares in the total GDP. This 
comparison is brought out in the form of a divergence index which is 
calculated by dividing the share of a State in the total allocation by 
its share in the total GDP and then multiplying the quotient by 100. If 
a State has 4 percent of the total allocations and total GDP, its 
divergence index wri.ll be 100 and thus its share of the total allocations 
corresponds to its share of the total GDP. If all the States divergence 
indices is 100 then it will mean that the allocations will maintain the 
relative income disparity between States. The equalisation of this 
disparity will involve progressive (higher) and regressive (lewer) 
allocations to low income States and high income States respectively. In 
principle the States' inacme ranking (column (d) of Table 2) should be 
directly inversely non-match their divergence indices ranking (columns 
(j) and (1) of Table 2).
Table 2 indicates that, in the main, under the IMP's original 
allocations, low income States benefited more than higher income States. 
This is indicated by the generally inverse non-matching of columns (d) 
with (j) and the higher divergence indices in column (i). Hcwever,
States did not benefit in inverse relation to their income level. For
39. ibid., p. 119.
40. Federation of Malaysia, Fourth Malaysian Plan, 1981-1985, Kuala
Lumpur, Government Press, 1981.
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example, the lowest income State, Kelantan (divergence index of 211.1), 
benefited less than the second lowest income State, Trengganu 
(divergence index of 237.9), or, worse still, less than the seventh 
lowest income State, Pahang (divergence index of 256.7), Which benefited 
most. Kedah and Perlis, with similar income levels, benefited 
differently: Perlis (divergence index of 133.3) benefited more than 
Kedah (divergence index of 90.1). The richest State, Selangor 
(divergence index of 73.6), benefited more than the sixth poorest State, 
Malacca (divergence index of 62.5). This distributive pattern, in the 
main and with seme changes, is also indicated by the TMP's revised 
allocations to States. These changes are indicated by the increase or 
fall in the divergence indices column (k) ) and rank orders (column (1)
) compared to the divergence indices (column (i) ) and rank orders 
(column (j) ) of the TMP's original allocations. With the exceptions of 
Perak (fifth lowest income State) and Selangor (the richest State), the 
divergence indices for all the other States increased. The highest 
increases occured among, in the main, lew income States like Kelantan, 
Trengganu and Perlis with their divergence indices increasing to 258.8, 
275.9 and 144.4 respectively. Thus, under the TMP's revised allocations 
these three States benefited even more than before. Other lew income 
States like Kedah and Malacca did not do as well. The richest State, 
Selangor (divergence index of 55.9) benefited least and so it should. On 
the Whole it would seem that the TMP's original and revised allocations, 
although generally benefiting the lower income States more than the 
higher income States, were not based on a progressively increasing scale 
in direct inverse relation to the decreasing income level of States as 
indicated by the lack of a direct inverse non-match between the States' 
income level ranking (column (d) ) and their divergence indices ranking 
(columns (j) and (1)). Thus, it would seem unlikely that in the long­
term, despite the TMP's commitment to equalisation, inter-State 
disparity in income would be equalised. Not surprisingly and even with 
higher development allocations to lew income States for the 1975-1980 
period, there is generally, as Table 1 indicates, no improvement in the 
relative income (measured in per capita GDP) disparity among the the 
various States. Only Trengganu and Penang had an improvement. This 
suggests that the development allocations provided by the Central 
Government to the States ought to be radically increased and decreased 
for the low and high income States respectively if equalisation of 
inter-State income disparity is to be achieved.
Table 3 shows the FoMP's allocations to the States of Peninsula
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Malaysia and the divergence index method used in Tables 1 and 2 is again 
used. It again indicates that generally lcw income States benefited 
more, now much more than during the TMP period, than high income States. 
The lowest income State, Kelantan (divergence index of 283.7), benefited 
most but the second lowest income State, Perlis (divergence index of 
144.4), benefited less than the third, fourth and sixth lowest income 
States of Kedah (divergence index of 147.1), Trengganu (divergence 
index of 212.2) and Pahang (divergence index of 181.4) respectively. 
There is still, however, no direct inverse non-match between the States 
income level ranking (column (d) ) and their divergence indices ranking 
(column (h) ). This suggests that equalisation, also one of the FoMP's 
aims, is still not systematically pursued.
The Central Government since the FMP has shifted its perception of 
inter-State inequalities in Peninsula Malaysia frcm that based on 
geographical regions to that of the constituent States of the 
Federation. But Why? The conflict over equalisation is essentially
t
between 'rich' and 'poor' States. The Central Government's response to 
such conflict will depend partly on the States' bargaining position and 
power. It may well be that the States Which are politically strong will 
insist on obtaining at least a fair share of the Central development 
expenditure. The Central Government's attenpts at equalising inter-State 
wealth through development allocations may well reflect this political 
position. In this context political harmony must be paid for by seme 
redistributive effort. There is a communal complexion to the income 
disparity between 'rich' and 'poor' States: Malays are heavily 
concentrated in the relatively poorer States, as Table 1 indicates. Thus 
reducing the income gap between Malays and Non-Malays (one of the TMP's 
and FoMP's aims) requires also an equalisation policy to eradicate 
inter-State disparity in income. When the States communal distribution 
in their population is compared to their per capita GDP and divergence 
indices, as Table 4 does, a striking pattern emerges: there is almost a 
direct matching of rank order between columns (a) and (d) of Table 4 
but, in the main, there is also an inverse non-matching between these 
columns and column (b). Further, the five States with more than 61% 
Malays in their population have divergence indices well above 100, thus 
indicating that they benefited most frcm the TMP's and FoMP's 
allocations. Four of the five States, the exception being Pahang, are 
also the poorest States. Malacca, the fifth poorest State, with 51% of 
Malays, benefited much less than Pahang, the sixth poorest State with 
61% Malay. Table 4 suggests that communal considerations are important
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in the redistributive effort that benefited the poorest States with high 
Malay concentration.
The bulk of the allocation to each State under the IMP would be 
spent by the Central Government and its Statutory Authorities. Table 5 
indicates this. Financially at least, the State Governments, even 
including their own SEDCs^, role in development appears small. On 
the organisational plan, there has been a proliferation of Central 
Government-owned Statutory Authorities and these include the recently 
established Regional Development Authorities (RDA). Table 6 shows the 
TMP's allocations to RDAs. The RDAs are Centrally-funded and controlled 
and have been established to pursue 'regional' development and the 
creation of ' centres of growth'. The Secretary-General of the Ministry 
of Finance, Abdullah Ayub, admitted that
"the implementation of the concept of regional development and the 
creation of centres of growth has further reduced the 
responsibility of State Governments in the development field to an 
even greater extent. The State Governments have also reluctantly 
accepted the growing influence and responsibility of the Federal 
Government in initiating and implementing vast development schemes 
such as that undertaken by the Muda Agricultural Development 
Authority which manages the rice bowl of the country in Kedah, and 
the several gigantic land development schemes ... such as Pahang 
Tenggara and the Johore Tenggara and Kemubu scheme in 
Kelantan".
Both financially and organisationally the development efforts appear to 
have been decentralised through a large number of implementing agencies 
of Which the State Government is only one of many.
The Central and State Governments' development budgets are 
financed from the Federal Development Fund and the State Development 
Fund respectively. The Development Fund is a trust fund and is regulated 
by law.^ Central and State Governments' development expenditures out 
of their respective Funds are made only after the development estimates 
have been duly approved by the Dewan Raayat and the State Legislative 
Assembly respectively.
41. The SEDCs are owned by the State Governments and they have been 
institutionalised through State legislation. Since Trade, Commerce 
and Industry, including the incorporation, regulation and winding 
up of corporations are within the Federal list of the constitution 
(ninth schedule, List 1 and Federal List, section 8), Parliament 
has empowered States through the incorporation (State Legislative 
Competency) (Amendment) Act, 1973, to enact relevant laws to 
develop State Development Corporations.
42. Abd. Ayub, "Financial Provisions of the Malaysian Constitution and 
their Operation in Practise", in M. Suffian Hashim, et.al., The 
Constitution of Malaysia; Its Development, 1957-1977, Kuala 
Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1978, pp. 313-314.
43. The Development Funds Act, 1966, being the current law regulating 
the use of the Development Fund.
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The income of the Federal Development Fund^ is derived from:
1) transfer of money frcm the Revenue Account;
2) loans floated locally and abroad; and
3) grants frcm foreign countries or institutions.
The income of the State Development Fund‘d  is derived frcm these 
sources:
1) transfers of money frcm the State Revenue Account;
2) loans from the Central Government; and
3) Reimbursement frcm the Central Government.
Sources 2) and 3) are open to influence by the Central Government and 
source 3) in fact constitutes extra-constitutional grants made on the 
basis of States paying first and being reimbursed later by the Central 
Government. States' development projects under the reimbursable category 
include those for State roads, agriculture, forestry and drainage and 
irrigation* ^  in seme cases States also carry out projects under the 
national development plan on behalf of the Central Government. In these 
cases the Central Government reimburses the States for their 
expenditure and issues clear cut directions and planning guidelines to 
them.^
Table 7 coirpares the Central and State Governments' development 
expenditure for the 1961-1975 period. It indicates that each State 
Government's development expenditure is very small and is getting 
smaller. Table 6 also reflects this. Table 7 also indicates that despite 
the increase in per capita actual expenditure for all States, excepting 
Perlis, the all State Governments prcentage has fallen during the 1961- 
1975 period. This emphasises the increasing dominance of the Central 
Government in the development area. Furthermore, as Table 8 indicates, 
Central Government reimbursements and loans contribute significantly to 
the financing of the State Governments' development expenditure.
However, the amount of Central Government reimbursement and loans as a 
percentage of State Governments' development expenditure has generally 
been decreasing from 1967 onwards and hence the State Government 
dependence on the Central Government has similarly decreased. Taken 
seperately, the Central Government loans and reimbursement percentage 
has generally been increasing and decreasing respectively from 1967 
onwards. Abdullah Ayub claimed nevertheless that the Central Government
44. M. Suffian, An Introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia, Kuala 
Lumpur, Government Press, 1976 edition, p. 183.
45. See State Financial Statements.
46. M. Suffian, op.cit., p. 183.
47. Holzhausen, W., op.cit., p.43.
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"had to increase its reimbursable grants to States because sane State 
Governments were reluctant to spend money on development and had tended 
to leave the responsibility for the provision of infrastructural
4f tfacilities and development programmes to the Central Government. He
concluded:
"The Federal Government, therefore, has been taking on far greater 
responsibilities and initiative in the economic development of the 
States."49
The system of reimbursable grants, however, is open to abuse because 
once additional transfers of this kind enters into the anticipations of 
the State Governments the system becomes practically open ended. In this 
way, States may be able to use 'development planning' to put pressure on 
the Central Government to give them additional reimbursable grants. 
Conclusion.
Within the field of development the Central Government, by virtue 
of its constitutional and financial powers, is dominant and is getting 
even more dominant. However, the impact of this on the States is uneven 
and so also is there a differential inter-State impact of Central 
Government economic development policy. The Central Government's economic 
development planning, at the informal and extra-constitutional plane, 
has influenced the actual organisation of Centre-State financial 
relations through its determination of which State should get what, when 
and hew. The increasing demand for development, as reflected in the 
increasing amounts being allocated under the Central Government's 
development plans, has tended to emphasise and strengthen the power of 
the Centre in Peninsula Malaysia.
48. Abd. Ayub, op.cit., p. 313.
49. ibid.
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CHAPTER 5
Centre-State Administrative Relations in Peninsula Malaysia - 1
This Chapter describes and maps out Centre-State administrative 
relations in Peninsula Malaysia as far as the available information 
makes this possible. It begins with a brief and general discussion of 
Centre-State administrative relations, then the formal elements that 
make up these relations and ends with a discussion of attempts by the 
Central Government to federalise State bureaucracies. The discussion is 
continued in Chapter 6 through examining certain developments that have 
influenced these relations since Malayan independence and in Chapter 7 
through comparing the bureaucracies of Kedah and Pahang in their 
respective relations to the Centre.
The choice of Kedah and Pahang needs seme explaining. There are 
eleven States in Peninsula Malaysia and it would be difficult to compare 
all the States. For convenience, it is necessary to narrow down the 
number of States to be compared to a manageable number. This has been 
made easier by the fact that these States can be categorised according 
to which type of political unit they belonged to before Independance, 
and especially before the Second World War. These political units were 
the Federated Malay States (FMS), Unfederated Malay States (UFMS) and 
the Straits Settlements (SS). Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, Johore and 
Trengganu belonged to the UEMS; Pahang, Negri Sembilan, Perak and 
Selangor belonged to the FMS; and Penang and Malacca belonged to the 
SS.
These political units represented different types of political, 
administrative and financial relations with the British administration 
in Peninsula Malaya. As for States of the SS, these relations were 
'direct' and immediate, while those with the Malay States of the FMS and 
UFMS were 'indirect' in the sense that they were conducted through the 
individual Malay Royal Heads of States, Sultans or Rajas. Although 
'indirect', these relations were tighter with States of the FMS than 
with the States of the UEMS. As such, the degree of British penetration 
was higher in the former than in the latter. States, therefore, belong 
to three distinct and different political and bureaucratic traditions: 
those of the SS, EMS and UFMS. The decision to compare the bureaucracies 
of Pahang, a State of the former EMS, and Kedah, a State of the former 
UFMS, in their respective relations to the Central Government was made 
not randomly, but because each belongs to contrasting types.
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Centre-State Administrative Relations
The Federal Constitution assigns certain spheres of competence to 
both the Central and State Governments. Within these spheres both are, 
in principle, largely autonomous, free to legislate and frame their own 
policies. In principle, States should also have a comparable degree of 
administrative autonomy within their own spheres of competence. Centre- 
State administrative relations then are affected by the allocation of 
administrative jurisdiction between the Central and State Governments 
and accordingly, as Watts puts it,
"the appropriate design of administrative structure mast follow 
the functions to be performed.
While it may be possible constitutionally to devise neat boundaries
separating the Centre and States with regard to ther administrative
jurisdiction, in practice the consistent pattern has been of Centre-
State interdependence in the administrative field. This interdependence
is affected crucially by the degree of legislative centralisation on the
one hand and the degree of administrative decentralisation on the
other. ^ Theis interdepence thus necessitates a certain degree of
Centre-State administrative co-operation which is made even more
necessary by several other factors^ including constitutional
inflexibility and the ever increasing pressure on the Centre for
specialising or uniformalising standards in the Public Services for
example.
The organisation and control of the administrative agencies - 
the Public Services - affect Centre-State administrative relations in 
crucial ways.4 This is precisely because administration is crucially 
linked to the exercise of executive authority and the Government which 
organises and controls the Services is in a position to influence the 
degree of administrative autonomy for the Centre or State. Usually in 
Federations there are dual services - Central and State. The demand for 
separate State Services depends on the strength of Regional or State
T. Watts, R.L. Administration in Federal Systems, London, Hutchinson
Educational Limited, 1970, p. 57.
2. ibid., pp. 66-72.
3. For a discussion of the factors pushing towards Centre-State 
administrative co-operation, see ibid., Chapter 6.
4. For a general discussion see ibid., Chapter 3. For a discussion
of this in the context of Indian Federalism see Morris-Jones,
W.H., The Government and Politics of India., London, Hutchinson & 
Company Limited., Third (revised) Edition, 1971, pp. 127-143 and 
Chanda, A., Indian Administration, London, George Allen and Unwin 
Limited, 1958, pp. 93-139.
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loyalties, as evident in Nigeria , and is related to the fear that 
Regional or State dependence on Central Services or joint services 
controlled by the Centre may weaken Regional or State autoncrny.
Central Services can be tools for centralisation but, equally, 
they can be used to generate consensus within a Federation of disparate 
States. In the case of the latter, the principles of efficiency and 
representativeness are considered crucial in the recruitment and 
organisation of these Services. If the former principle is emphasised 
then, because of inter-Regional or inter-State differences in size, 
education and economic development, the Services will tend to be 
dominated by personnel frcm the more advanced Regions or States. Thus, 
in Nigeria, the consequence of Nigerianisation of the Central Services 
if not tempered by seme notion of Regional balance was the 
regionalisation of these Services. To counter this quota systems were 
evolved to redress somewhat this Regional imbalance. On this Cole 
wrote:
"It is an open secret that the Public Service Ccnmission gives 
preference to applicants frcm the North when the minimum of 
qualifications sure offered. In addition, pressures have 
occasionally been brought on officials in the North to accept 
positions in Lagos."
Not surprisingly, as Watts concluded,
"considerations of regional balance within the central civil 
service have been extremely, perhaps excessively, influential in 
Nigeria."8
In Canada also, the issue of Provincial representativeness in the
Q
Central Services has been especially acute.
The administration of economic policy in Federations also 
affects Centre-State administrative relations'*'8 and especially in the 
fields of economic development which usually necessitates active and 
extensive governmental role.'*''*' The demand for rapid economic 
development is most insistent in 'newer' Federations: India, Malaysia
and Nigeria for example. In these Federations the Centre has been
12allocated relatively broad powers in economic matters but States
5k See Cole, T., "Bureaucracy in Transition" in Tilman, R.O., and 
Cole, T., eds., The Nigerian Political Scene, Durham, Duke 
University Press, 1962, pp. 89-114.
6. Watts, ibid., pp. 33-43
7. Cole, T., cp.cit., p. 109
8. Watts, ibid., p. 42.
9. ibid., pp. 36-37
10. For a general early discussion, see Wheare, K.C. Federal 
Government, London, Oxford University Press, third edition, 1953, 
Chapter 7.
11. Watts, ibid., Chapter 7.
12. ibid., p. 99
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also have sane powers in these ratters. Centre-State co-cperation is 
thus necessary in pursuing economic development tut in this the Centre, 
because of its dominant position in the financing of development 
expenditure, is able to exert considerable influence.
In 'newer' Federations national development planning is used as 
the vehicle for achieving rapid economic growth. Potentially, this can 
blur, perhaps destroy, the neat boundaries that divide the Centre from 
the States. Came 11 for example has no doubt that
"National economic and social planning demand centralisation, 
which is precisely what federalism seeks to prevent... Rigorous 
State planning demands rigorous central control because of the 
need for central budgeting.
Asck Chanda was also aware of the potential danger of national planning
to federalism. He wrote:
"A constitutional charter of national planning would have 
inevitably encroached both on Federal and State functions.
The federal structure in principle implies that the planning apparatus
should function on the basis of co-cperation and consultation between
the Centre and the States, in the course of which the views and advice
of the States could be taken into account. National development planning
within a Federation necessarily involves a mix of very difficult
financial, political and administrative exercises between the Central
and State Governments. Administratively, Central initiatives in planning
have spawned Central agencies and also inter-goveramental booies.^
Their activities, however, need not necessarily lead toward the
centralisation of pcwer as the indian experience suggests. ^
13. Came 11, F.G., "Political Implications of Federalism in New 
States", in Hicks U.K., et.al., Federalism and Economic Growth in 
Underdeveloped Countries, London, George Allen and Unwin Limited, 
1961, p. 55.
14. Chanda, A., Federalism in India, London, Allen and Unwin, 1965, p. 
277.
15. Watts, R.L., New Federations: Experiments in the Ccmmonwealth, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1965, pp. 219-224 and 241-247.
16. See Morris-Jones, W.H., cp.cit., p. 152 and also his "Frcm 
Monopoly to Competition in India's Politics", Asian Review, Vol.
1, No. 1 Nov. 1967, pp. 5-6. See also Narain, 1., and Mathur,
P.C., "Union-State Relations in India: a case study in Rajasthan", 
Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies., Vol. 2, 1963-1964, pp. 
120-140, and Akindele, R.A., "Federation and Development Planning: 
Reflections on the Experience of India (1950-66) and Nigeria 
(1962-68)", The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, 
Vol. 13, No. 2, July 1972, pp. 221-239. For an examination of the 
case for national planning in Australia, see Uren, T., "The 
Federal Principle and National Planning", Public Administration, 
Vol. 34, No. 1, March 1975, pp. 98-106, and "Discussion on Mr. 
Uren's Paper", in ibid., pp. 107-112.
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In summary, Centre-State administration relations are affected by
the allocation of administrative jurisdiction to the Centre and States.
However, the State Governments' effective autonomy is influenced by many
factors including notably the extent to which they control the
administrative agencies that execute their policies and the
administrative impact of Centrally-controlled national planning.
Constitutional Basis
The Reid Commission accepted the need for a Civil Service which
should be independent from political interference and based on merit,
security of tenure and absolute freedom from the arbitrary application
1 7of disciplinary provisions. It believed that these ought to be 
attainable through an independent Public Service Commission (PSC). It 
recommended that the provisions designed to achieve these should apply 
equally to Central and State Services. It also recommended that the 
Legislature and the Government should be responsible for fixing 
establishments and terms of employment, while the PSC should be 
responsible for the internal administration of the Service as a 
professional body and
"public service matters including appointments, promotions and 
the application, when necessary, of disciplinary provisions in 
respect of members of the public service."^ -8
It further recommended that these features should also apply to State
Civil Services, convinced that
"it is essential in the interests of the proper administration of 
the States that their Services should be controlled by an 
independant body in the same way as those of the Federation.
However, it argued unconvincingly that the States should not have their
own independent PSC since
"it would be uneconomic to have separate commissions operating in 
each State, and further we believe it would add to the efficiency 
of both Federal and State services if there could continue to be a 
considerable interchange of officers between them.
It thus recommended that the PSC ought to have the same powers over
21State and Central employees. x Presumably the single PSC, through its 
powers over appointments and promotions, would effect that considerable 
interchange of officers between Central and State Services believed
17. Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission,
1957, Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 1957, p. 66. Referred 
subsequently as the Reid Report.
18. Reid Report, p. 67.
19. ibid., p. 68.
20. ibid.
21. Article 131 of the Draft Constitution.
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essential to both Services' efficiency.
The commission recarmended that positions in the Federation's 
Public Service should be divided into three categories; higher posts or 
Heads of departments, other posts in the permanent Public Service and 
temporary and casual posts. Appointments to the first should be made by 
the Central Government on the PSC's recommendation, the second by the 
PSC and the third by the department concerned. As for the States, 
the Commission emphasised that
"The State Governments should also enjoy the same powers with 
respect to their heads of department as does the Federation.
The question of the size of State administrative establishments
was also examined by the Commission. It was concerned especially with
pensionable posts within such establishments. It noted that under the
existing system the Central Government was responsible for paying the
pensions of all pensionable officers of the Central and State Services.
It held that
"So long as this arrangement continues, the sanction of the 
Federation Government is, of course, necessary for an increase in 
the number of pensionable posts and for any increase in 
pensionable emoluments." 4
It believed that it would be difficult to fill non-pensionable posts
and consequently it followed that, under the existing arrangements,
"State establishments are virtually under federal control; and so 
long as it continues, the States cannot have the "measure of 
autonomy" contemplated by the terms of reference."
It also believed, however, that it would be undesirable for States to
assume responsiblity for the payment of pensions frcm their limited
2 6funds. States were then already dependent on Central grants. Its
argument seemed to be that if the States were to assume this
responsibility their finances would be further weakened; this would
increase their dependence on Central grants and thus reduce their
capacity to enjoy the needed "measure of autonomy". It further believed
that the movement of staff between the Central and State Services was
desirable and this should not be hindered by complications arising over 
2 7pension rights.
To overcome this unsatisfactory situation the Commission sought
22. Article 134 of the Draft Constitution.
23. Reid Report, p. 68.
24. ibid.
25. ibid.
26. ibid.
27. ibid.
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sane form of shared Centre-State responsibility. Thus, it recommended 
that
"States should be under obligation to pay each year an appropriate 
pensions contribution in respect of every pensionable officer in 
their employment and that the rate of contribution should be 
determined by the Federation after consultation with the National 
Finance Council. The appropriate rate of contribution would no 
doubt be the subject of actuarial calculation before the matter 
was referred to the National Finance Council.
Further, State contributions should be paid into a National Pension Fund
managed by the Central Treasury. Along with this financial
responsibility it also recommended that
"States would have power to determine the number of pensionable 
posts and salaries attached to them, fully realising, of course, 
that every increase in the number of pensionable posts or in 
pensionable emoluments would increase the liability to pay pension 
contributions.
These recommendations dealt generally with the control of the 
nature and composition of both Central and State Services. But important 
also was the question of who should control the activities or 
functioning of these Services. To avoid Centre-State conflict and to 
promote Centre-State administrative co-cperation, the Commission 
recommended that
"there should be a general power of delegation conferred on both 
Federal and State Governments with regard to the performance of 
ary of their executive functions.1,38
This meant that
"The Federal Government should be authorised to delegate any 
particular functions or duties to a State Government or to State 
Officers; and State Governments should be similarly authorised to 
delegate to Federal Government or Federal Officers or to any other 
State Government or its Officers."3
It would thus be possible for the functioning of both the Central and
State Services or their respective personnel to be under the 'delegated
control' of either the Central or State Governments. Any such delegation
must, however,
"require the consent of the Government to which or to whose 
officers the delegation is made and should be on such terms and 
conditions as may be agreed."3^
Furthermore, any Act of Parliament requiring a State to undertake
28. ibid., and Article 135 of the Draft Constitution.
29. ibid.
30. ibid., p. 36, and Article 76 of the Draft Constitution.
31. ibid.
32. ibid., p. 37.
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executive authority for a specified purpose was made subject to payment
to the State of the costs incurred by it.33 Apart frcm the need to
establish a framework for Centre-State administrative co-operation,
these proposals were aimed also at avoiding unnecessary duplication of
staff and to make full use of the available technical resources.34
The 1957 Constitution did not establish a single all-embracing PSC
that had jurisdiction over both the Central and State Services as
recommended by the Reid Commission. It provided that there should be a
Central PSC which should on 1 Merdeka1 day have jurisdiction over
members of the Public Services of the Federation and the States of
Malacca and Penang (States of the former SS).33 Other States (those
of the former FMS and UFMS), however, were given the option of either
establishing their own State PSC or, by State law, placing all or any
persons in their State Public Services under the Central PSC.38 The
Constitution thus accorded to the States of the former IMS and DIMS a
right that was denied the States of the former SS. This, according to
3 7Hickling, was the result of a compromise. If, however, any of the 
Malay States 'after a relevant date' had not established any Service 
Commission 'corresponding in status and jurisdiction to the Public 
Service Commission', Federal law could extend, and indeed has extended, 
the Central PSC's jurisdiction to members of the State Service. But, 
excepting those of Malacca and Penang, State Civil Servants could be 
controlled by a body having a different composition and independant of 
that which control officers of the Central Government.
33. ibid., and Article 76(2) of the Draft Constitution.
34. ibid.
35. Article 139 of the Constitution. With the formation of Malaysia in 
1963, the Central PSC established branches in the Borneo States. 
These branches have jurisdiction over members of the general 
Public Services of the Federation employed in the Central 
departments in these States. See Articles 146(1), (7) and 134(2).
36. Such laws would take effect in not less than twelve months frcm 
the date of their enactment.
37. Hickling, R.H., An Introduction to the Federal Constitution, Fed. 
of Malaya, Information Services, 1960, p. 56. Here Hickling argued 
that Malacca and Penang were treated differently because, under 
the respective Constitutions of these States, their Chief 
Ministers (CM) were to be selected frcm among members of the State 
Legislative Assemblies. The State Executive Councils (Excos), 
presided over by the CMs, were responsible to the State 
Legislative Assemblies and the State Governors were to act on the 
Excos advice. It was thus felt that the Central PSC had to have 
jurisdiction over these States' services so as to ensure that a 
body truly 'independent' of the Executive controlled them. On the 
other hand, in the Malay States, the need was less urgent as the 
Mentri Besars (MB-a post similar to the CM) might be an official 
(before the 1959 State Elections) appointed frcm outside the State 
Legislative Assemblies.
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The 1957 Constitution also introduced the concept of ' joint 
services'.38 Parliament was empowered to legislate for the 
establishment of ' joint services' canton to the Federation and one or 
more of the States, or at the request of the States concerned, to two or 
more States. According to Sheridan this was designed
"To provide for the replacement of earlier arrangements under 
which, by virtue of an agreement between the Federal and State 
Governments, certain posts in the State Public Services were in
• 2Qfact filled by federal officers."
Parliament, however, did not enact any law for establishing 'joint 
services ’. The principle of and mechanism for the inter-Govemment 
secondment of officers was also established.48 Secondment is used when 
any State Government requires the services of Central officers, when the 
Central Government requires the services of State officers, or when any 
State Government requires the services of other State officers.4-*- 
Several constitutional provisions strengthened the Central 
Government's powers over the State administrative body and its officers. 
To promote administrative convenience, Article 80(4) and (6) empowered 
the Central Government, after due compensation of costs incurred by the 
State, to carpel the State and its administrative body to administer any 
specified provisions of Federal law. It was further empowered by Article 
110(4) (b) to assign to the States the responsibility for collecting for 
State purposes any fee or fees authorised by Federal law. Article 93 
permitted it to conduct enquiries, authorise surveys or collect and 
publish statistics on any matter. In the execution of such powers the 
State Governments and all their officers are obliged to assist. In this, 
the Central Government may give any directions it deems necessary. 
Sheridan and Groves commented:
"What is, perhaps, exceptional is the apparent right of the 
federal government to give directions to State government and 
State officers and authorities to accomplish these purposes. The 
article imposes a duty upon such officers and authorities to act 
as directed; but since the question of coercion is a difficult 
one, the purpose of the article is possibly merely 
directory."4^
38. Article 133 of the Constitution.
39. Sheridan, L.A., ed., Malaya and Singapore, the Borneo Territories,
The Development of their Laws and Constitutions, London, Stevens 
and Sons, 1961, p. 87. Such an agreement was for the time being 
preserved by Article 179.
40. Article 134 of the Constitution.
41. This is discussed further in Chapter 6.
42 Sheridan, L.A., and Groves, H.E., The Constitution of Malaysia,
Dobbs Ferry, New York, Oceana Publications, 1967, p. 135. They
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Article 94 empowered the Central Government to make all the States 
agriculture and forestry officers, except Sabah and Sarawak, accept its 
professional advice concerning their duties.^ However, the means of 
compelling these State officers to act as advised appear, as in the case 
of Article 93, to be uncertain.^ Interestingly also, Article 95(1) 
authorised the Central Government, through its officer or officers, to 
inspect and report on any department or work of a State Government. 
Article 95(3), however, reduced the scope of this Central Government 
scrutiny to only those departments or works involved in matters outside 
the exclusive authority of the States.
The Central Government was made responsible for the payment of 
all pensions to both Central and State Public Servants. ^  Thus, the 
practice used before Malayan independence was continued. The Reid 
Commission rightly considered this practice to be inimical to that 
"measure of autonomy" that States ought to enjoy. Its recommendation 
that there should be Centre-State responsiblity over pensions 
was designed to reduce Central control over State Establishments and 
allow the States to enjoy that "measure of autonomy". Article 112(1) 
strengthened Central Government's fiscal control over the size of a 
State's public service. It provided with minor exceptions that
"no State shall, without the approval of the Federation, make any 
addition to its establishment or the establishment of any of its 
departments, or alter the rates of established salaries and 
emoluments, if the effect of doing so would be to increase the 
liability of the Federation in respect of pensions, gratuities or 
other like allowances."
42. (Cont. j believed, however, that "fashioning an appropriate judicial
remedy to accomplish the constitutional mandate is a simple matter 
of federal legislation. Appropriate remedy might also be found by 
the Courts themselves in the comnon law tradition."
43. Article 95E(4) of the Constitution provided the exception to Sabah 
and Sarawak. Agriculture and forestry are subjects on the State 
List. State Departments of Agriculture and Forestry in all the 
States, except Sabah and Sarawak, are all staffed by officers of 
the Central Agriculture and Forestry Services.
44. Sheridan and Groves, op.cit., pp. 135-136.
45. Article 98 of the Constitution. Such payments are charged on the 
Federal Consolidated Fund.
46. These exceptions refer to non-pensionable posts. See Article 
112(2) of the Constitution. If a State wanted to increase the size 
of its Establishment or upgrade posts within this Establishment, 
it had to apply to the Central Government, through the Public 
Service Department (PSD) and Treasury, for approval. According to 
a respondent the Central Government recently had delegated the 
power of creating or upgrading posts, worth about $1,000 per 
month, to the State Governments. Thus the creation and upgrading 
of posts with this value and be lew needed no prior approval of 
the Central Government. Interview with Datuk Fozhan Runtum, Deputy 
Chief Secretary to the Central Government, 19.8.80.
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Thus, through fiscal control, the Central Government could limit the 
size and hence the 'autonomy' of a State's administrative body and its 
officers. Generally the Constitution has equipped the Central Government 
with substantial powers to penetrate and influence the functioning of a 
State's administrative body and its officers.
Central and State Public Services Commissions^
At independence, Article 139 placed the Public Services of Penang 
and Malacca, as well as Central Public Services, under the Central PSC's 
jurisdiction. The other States had two choices: either to extend the 
Central PSC's jurisdiction to their Public Services or to establish 
their own State PSCs. These States responded differently. Perlis and 
Negri Sembilan opted for the former^ so did Pahang initially but
A Q
decided later to have its cwn PSC. Jdhore, Perak, Kedah and Kelantan
5 0passed the necessary legislation to establish their cwn State PSC ,
while Selangor have established their PSCs under their respective State 
51Constitutions.
These Services Commissions are quasi-constitutional agencies.
They are supposed to protect the 'civil service' and 'service standards'
frcm political interference. They have responsibility over selection for
entry into the Civil Services, Central and State as the case may be, and
5 2over promotions and discipline in the respective Services.
47. For the history on Service Ccmnissions in Malaya, see Tilman,
R.O., Public Service Commissions in the Federation of Malaya, 
"Journal of Asian Studies", Vol. 20, Feb. 1961, pp. 181-196. He, 
however, failed to examine why Penang and Malacca were not given 
the option of establishing their own PSCs as in the Malay States.
48. Perlis (PSC (Extension of Jursidiction)) Enactment, No. 7/58; 
Sembilan (PSC (Extension of Jurisdiction)) Enactment, No. 5/59.
49. Pahang (PSC (Extension of Jurisdiction)) Enactment, No. 9/58, and 
State Service Commission Pahang Enactment, No. 22/60.
50. Jdhore State PSC Enactment, Nos. 4 and 11/59 and 13/60; Perak 
State PSC Enactment, No. 10/59; Kedah PSC State Enactment, Nos. 4 
and 9/59.
51. Selangor State Service Commission (Remuneration) Enactment, No. 
16/59 under Article XVCII of its Constitution; Trengganu State 
Service Commission Enactment, Nos. 7 and 12/59 under Article LVI 
of its Constitution.
52. Proper co-ordination and co-operation between the Central and 
State Service Commissions were found wanting. Also lacking was a 
uniformity in policy and procedure. See Fed. of Malaya, Report of 
the Committee on the Relationships between the Federal and State 
Governments (confidential), Kuala Lumpur, PM's Department, Nov. 
1961, p. 10.
158.
Central Bureaucracy
The Central Bureaucracy is made up of several services. Of 
these'*'* the Malaysian Administrative and Diplomatic Service (MADS) or 
the Perhidmatan Tadbirdan Diplcmatik (PTD), previously the Malayan Civil 
Service (MCS), is the most powerful and prestigious. The Malay 
Administrative Service (MAS), the feeder service to the MCS, was 
restructured to form the General Administrative Service (GAS) or the 
Perhidmatan Tadbir Awam (PTA). Members of the PTA could still be
recruited into the PTD. The PTD and PTA are the two most important
• . . • 5 4Central Administrative Services.
The staff of each of the Central Services are classified into four 
divisions:
1. Division 1; the administrators and professionals (usually with 
University qualifications),
2. Division II; the executive and technical (usually with post-secondary 
school qualifications),
3. Division III; the clerical and sub-professional (usually with 
secondary school qualifications),
4. Division IV; the unskilled.
These divisions form the horizontal structure of the Services.
The vertical structure of these Services ccnprises several 
5 5"schemes of service". Each scheme of Service has its own entry 
qualifications, salary scales, and promotion requirements. It is placed 
in one of the four divisions. With few exceptions, the Service's 
structure is rigid, vertically and horizontally. According to Esman, 
this has encouraged psychological and jurisdictional parochialism and 
discouraged self-improvement and innovation and consequently such 
Services
53. Other important-Central Services include the Judicial and Legal 
Service, Agricultural Service, Audit Service, Customs Service, 
Education Service, Forest Service, Geological Survey Service, 
Medical Service, Meteorological Service, Policy Service, Postal 
Service, Prisons Service, Survey Service, Telecommunications 
Service, Town and Country Planning Service and Veterinary 
Service.
54. The discussion here confines itself chiefly to the two Central 
Administrative Services - the PTD and PTA. Depending on the 
context of the discussion the acronyms MCS or PTD and MAS or PTA 
will be used. This applies also for Chapters 6 and 7.
55. Esman noted that there were approximately 1,000 active schemes of 
service to govern approximately 212,000 enployees in Peninsula 
Malaysia. See Esman, M.J., Administration and Development in 
Malaysia., Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1972, p.
72.
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"tended to be inbred and to resist external ccrnnunication and 
pragmatic co-ordination.
Since Malayan independence, the departments - the structural units
in the pre-independent Central Government - have been placed under the
57control of Central Ministries. These ministries are staffed by PTD 
officers and controlled by those PTD officers holding posts in the 
crucial divisions of planning, personnel and finance within each 
Ministry. Each Ministry is usually headed on the Civil Service side by 
the Permanent Secretary, now called the Director-General, who belongs to 
the PTD.
There are several key Central Agencies. First, the Treasury,
within the Ministry of Finance, specialises on ordinary budgeting,
expenditure control and supply administration. Second, the Public
Services Department (PSD), formerly the Federal Establishment Office
(FEO), within the Prime Minister's Department, functions as a large
staff agency responsible for recruiting and employing all Central civil
servants. It in effect controls the personnel system. Through its
control of the pension system it approves or disapproves the
establishment and grading of both Central and State Governments'
pensionable posts. It also adjudicates the pension rights of all Central
and State employees benefiting frcm the Government's non-contributing
5ftscheme. Third, the Economic Planning Unit (EPU), within the Prime 
Minister's Department, performs the development planning function 
through its control of the drafting of the development budget and the 
five-year development plans. Other Central Agencies have recently been 
established within the PM's Department. These include the Implementation 
Co-ordination Unit (ICU), the Malaysian Administration and Manpower 
Planning Unit (MAMPU) and the Socio-Economic Research Unit (SERU)
These together with the Cabinet Secretariat represent the highest 
policy-making level within the Central Government.All senior positions 
within these Central Agencies are filled by PTD officers.
The PTD officers pre-eminent position and status within the 
Central bureaucratic system is reflected in the posts they hold at the
56. ibid.
57. Esman provides a good description of the organisation of Central 
Ministries and Departments. See ibid., pp. 80-87.
58. The EPU was established in 1959.
59. Originally the ICU and MAMPU were part of the Implementation, Co­
ordination, Development Administration Unit (ICDAU). ICDAU was 
restructured to form the ICU and the Development Administration 
Unit (DAU). The DAU was later formed into the MAMPU.
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highest policy making and Ministerial levels and number of superscale
60posts within the PTD compared to other Division I Central Services 
or State Civil Services. At the Central level PTD officers are 
effectively in a position to control the bureaucratic machinery.
Apart frcm filling posts at the Central level, PTD officers can be 
posted to any State or be seconded to any State's Civil Services. This, 
as such, lends it an 'All Malaya' character. Tilman, writing on the 
PTD's predecessor, the MCS, has argued that
"A cursory observation of the institutional structure alone is 
adequate to demonstrate the dominant position enjoyed by the MCS 
in the total bureaucratic structure. The grade structure, the pan- 
governmental nature of the MCS assignments, and the broad 
geographic distribution of members of the senior administrative 
service attest to its elevated importance in the Malayan 
bureaucratic systemi.
Hcwever, because of the PTD's very uneven distribution among the States
of Peninsula Malaysia, especially to States of the former UEMS that have
their own State Civil Services, its 'All-Malaya' character is in
practice somewhat restricted.^
State Bureaucracy
The State Services have a similar four division structure.
However, only Jdhore, Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Trengganu have State
6 3Services beyond the clerical levels. These States have their cwn
60. See Puthucheary, M. The Politics of Administration, Kuala Lumpur, 
Oxford University Press, 1978, pp. 99-101.
61. Tilman, R.O., Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya, Durham, Duke 
University Press, 1964, p. 104. He further argued that in 1962 it 
was only in Kelantan that the MCS was not dominant. This is far 
frcm being the true picture. That was in fact the position and, 
with respect to the PTD, remains the case in all the non- 
federalised bureaucracies of Kedah, Jdhore, Trengganu, Perlis and 
Kelantan. See detailed discussion belcw.
62. That is restricted to those States of the former FMS and SS that 
do not have their own SCSs. In comparing the spread of federal 
officers among the States in Malaysia and India-Pakistn, Braibanti 
argued that, "The main structural differences between Malaysia and 
India-Pakistan was the percentage of officers working in the 
States and districts. In India and Pakistan these totalled 55 and 
40% respectively, in Malaysia, 18%. The difference can be traced 
to two factors: in Malaysia about half of these positions are held 
by members of State Civil Services rather than the Central cadres, 
and the foreign affairs staff in Malaysia have been amalgamated 
into the higher administrative service. See Braibanti, R., ed. 
Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent frcm the British Imperial 
Tradition., Durham, Duke University Press, 1966, p. 654.
63. Chik, S., National Ideology and Bureaucracy in Malaysia, Malaysian 
Centre for Development Studies, Occa. Paper No. 5, Kuala Lumpur, 
1978, p. 37. See also Tilman, R.O., "Bureaucratic Development in 
Malaya," in Braibanti, cp.cit., p. 561.
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State Civil Services (SCS) Whose officers hold most, if not all, of the
senior and junior State administrative posts. ^  They also have their
cwn State Clerical Services. Negri Sembilan, Pahang, Perak and Selangor
only have their own State Clerical Services. Thus, in these States, the
senior and junior State administrative posts above the clerical levels
are generally filled fcy seconded PTD and PTA officers. Penang and
66Malacca before their SCSs were integrated with the Central Service 
in 1974 had State Services beyond the clerical levels and also their own 
clerical establishments. Nevertheless, Penang and Malacca still relied 
then on seconded PTD officers to fill their senior administrative posts 
while their cwn SCSs' officers would fill the other junior 
administrative posts.^ Unlike the other nine States, Penang and 
Malacca do not use personnel frcm the Central Clerical Services. No 
States have their own professional and technical services to fill key 
posts in their technical departments. They thus have to rely on seconded 
officers of the Central Technical and Professional Services. Centre-
State inter-governmental agreements govern the appointment of seconded
,  . . .
Central officers to posts within the State bureaucracy. So we have
three categories of States with different levels of dependance on the
64. Only when such States did not have suitably qualified and 
experienced officers within their cwn SCSs for certain posts would 
they even contemplate accepting seconded Central officers to fill 
such posts within the State bureaucracies.
65. See Tilman, op.cit., p. 561, n.24.
66. See discussion belcw.
67. Under the 1955 Agreement for the Constitution of a Federation
Establishment between the Federation and each of the eleven
States, several key administrative posts within the State 
Establishment were scheduled as posts to be filled by Officers 
frcm the Central Establishment. These posts included that of the 
State Secretary, State Financial Officer, Director of Lands and 
Mines, Principle Ass. Secretary (Economic Officer), 5 DOs, 2 Ass. 
State Secretaries, and Deputy Registrar of Titles. In non-Malay 
dominated Penang, these posts were scheduled as part of the 
Central Government's response to the influence of the secessionist 
movement. See Mohamad Ghazali Md. Noor, "Federal-State 
Administrative Relationship: a case study of Penang State Civil 
Service", Graduation Exercise, Faculty of Economics and 
Administration, University of Malaya, 1972/1973, pp. 13-14, 20-21. 
However, in the former UFMS States these posts, despite the 
Agreement, have always been filled by officers of the respective 
SCSs.
68. Tilman, op.cit., p. 561.
69. See Federation of Malaya, Agreements for the Constitution of a 
Federation Establishment, 1955 and 1957, in Tilman, Bureaucratic 
Transition in Malaya, Durham, Duke University Press, 1964,
Appendix B. See discussion in Chapter 6.
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PTD and PTA: the non-federalised State bureaucracies of States of the
former UFMS Which have their own SCSs, the quasi-federalised State
bureaucracies of States of the former SS which although having their cwn
SCSs still, before 1974, depended on the PTD to fill their senior
administrative posts, and the federalised State bureaucracies of States
of the former EMS Which totally depend on the PTD and PTA.
The State Civil Service is headed by a State Secretary (S Sec).
In the States of the former EMS and SS, the S Sec is a seconded senior
PTD officer While in the States of the former UFMS he is usually an
officer of their cwn SCSs. The S Sec's post, as Table 1 illustrates, is
not uniformly graded. He heads a small Secretariat Which handles
personnel, housekeeping, local government and miscellaneous 
70functions. The Secretariat assists the Mentn Besar or Chief
Minister (MB or CM) and the State Executive Council (Exco).
Each State has several other senior officers including the State
Financial Officer (SFO), State Director of Planning (SDP) and the State
Legal Advisor (SLA). In the States of the former EMS and SS these
officers, excepting the SLA, are frcm the PTD while in the States of the
former UFMS they are normally frcm the States cwn SCSs. The SLA in each
State is a seconded officer of the Central Legal and Judicial Service.
In addition, the posts of State Development Officer (SDO) and State
Director (formerly Cctimissioner) of Lands and Mines (SDIM) are normally,
apart frcm Kedah^1, only for PTD officers.^ The SDO's post is paid
for frcm Central funds but the other posts mentioned above cure paid for
frcm State funds. Appointments of PTD officers to posts within the State
73require the approval of the State Government concerned.
Each State also has several technical departments^ which are
responsible for functions assigned to it by the Constitution. The
Division I officers who head and man these departments are, in every
case but religious affairs, drawn frcm Central Technical and
76Professional Services and posted frcm Kuala Lumpur. Their salaries 
and the departments' operating costs are paid frcm State funds. The 
subordinate technical and clerical staffs are frcm the State Service
70. Esman, op.cit., p. 90.
71. See discussion in Chapter 7.
72. Chik, op.cit., p. 37.
73. ibid., p. 90.
74. These include the Departments of Public Vforks, Irrigation and
Drainage, Agriculture, Lands and Mines.
75. Esman, cp.cit., p. 90.
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Table Is Grades of State Secretaries in 1979-
State State Secretary (S Sec)
Salary Scale
Johore
Kedah
Kelantan
Malacca
Negri Sembilan
Pahang
Penang
Perak
Perlis
Selangor
Trengganu
Superscale C 
Superscale D 
Superscale D 
Superscale E 
Superscale E 
Superscale C 
Superscale C 
Superscale C 
Superscale P 
Superscale D 
Superscale D
Salary Range for Superscale Posts in Dollars per Month.
Superscale C 3215 + 150 = 3365
Superscale D 2965 + 150 = 3115
Superscale E 2745 + 120 = 2865
Superscale F 2525 + 120 = 26^5
Source: Information obtained from Public Service Department.
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although the PSD has to approve their positions if these are 
pensionable. Esman argued that the Heads of these departments 
effectively formulated and operated their cwn programmes virtually 
independently of direction and co-ordination by the State 
Governments.^ However, this 1 autonomy1 may be reduced by their 
dependence on the State Governments for junior personnel and operating 
budgets (usually a routine procedure), the occasional intervention of 
the MB or the CM, and the SDO's activities in development matters.
Each State is divided into several administrative districts each 
with its own District Officers (DO). ^  In the States of the former 
UFMS, all the DOs belong to the respective SCSs, while in the other 
States the DOs are frcm the PTD. The DO is directly responsible to the 
State Secretary. In most States, the DO is head of the District Land 
Office Which is responsible for collecting land revenues, processing 
applications for State lands, registering the transfer of titles, 
settling small estates, chairing the non-autoncmous town boards and the
70
various District level committees. ■ The two most important of these
carmittees, the District Action Committee and District Development
Committee, have to do with rural administration and development.
The DO is often subjected to different and sometimes conflicting
pressures. Stephen Chee argued that in Selangor, as elsewhere in the
country, the DO is caught in the middle: perceived as the District's
executive head but yet subject to direction from his superiors in the
7QState and Central capitals.' Kamarudin Rani commented that
"The District Officer/Collector has the difficulty of having to 
play the role of multiple subordination: he is accountable to the 
State Director of Lands and Mines, the State Development Officer, 
the State Financial Officer, the State Secretary, as well as to 
the State political leadership in the day-to-day exercise of his 
broad areas of responsiblity.
76. ibid. p. 91.
77. Peninsula Malaysia has 71 districts. For a study of a district see 
Beaglehole, J., The District: A Study in decentralisation in West 
Malaysia, Hull Mono, on Southeast Asia, No. 6, Oxford University 
Press, 1976.
78. Esman, op.cit., p. 93, and Chee, S., "Rural Development and 
Development Administration in Malaysia." Southeast Asia 
Development Advisory Group, Paper No. 74/5, New York, The Group, 
1974, pp. 17-18.
79. Chee, ibid., p. 18.
80. quoted in ibid.
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The effectiveness of District administration, hcwever, is affected 
by the 'transient nature' of the DO. In Stephen Chee's words
"He is a federal civil servant assigned to the State Government to 
serve in a particular district. His ambition is not to become a 
local hero,.. .but to be transferred to the federal capital or to a 
ministry. The District Officer recruited directly into the State 
Civil Service may be less mobile, but even he aspires to be placed 
at the State capital."
Naturally, DOs of the PTD will look to Kuala Lumpur while those of the
SCSs will lock to the State capitals. While the career prospects and
patterns of the former are essentially governed by factors which are
external to the State within which they serve, that of the latter are
essentially governed by factors which are internal to the State. The DOs
mobility, be they PTD or SCSs officers, is also influenced by the number
of top scale posts within the respective services. In this the PTD
officers have an advantage since the PTD, compared to the SCSs, is a
much bigger service with many more superscale posts. Their mobility
it is reasonable to assume, must also be influenced by their personal
contacts and the assessment of their work by both the Central and State
Governments.
In the States of the former UFMS the general position is that 
all but the Technical and Professional Services are recruited by the 
State frcm within the State. In the States of the former IMS only the 
clerical workers and the public labour employees are similarly recruited 
but all the generalist administrators are seconded PTD an PTA officers. 
Up till October 1974, in the States of the former SS the lower level 
generalist administrators, clerical workers and public labour employees 
are similarly recruited but several senior generalist administrators cure 
seconded PTD officers. All the States Technical, Professional and 
Specialised officers are on loan or secondment from the respective 
Central Services. Central officers serving in and paid for by the State 
are, in principle, responsible to the State Government.
Federalisation of the State Bureaucracies: the administrative 
services.
Three bureaucratic traditions that developed at the State level 
remained intact at the time of Malayan indpendence. The Reid
09
Commission did not question the need for the continued existence of 
those SCSs belonging to the former UFMS and SS States. This was in
8l^  Ibid., p. 37.
82. Reid Report, paras. 66-69.
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accord with the Commission's terms of reference that States should be 
provided with a certain "measure of autonomy". However, it did not 
recommend that the former FMS States should now be given the opportunity 
to establish their cwn SCSs similar to that of the former UFMS States. 
The Constitution of 1957 also failed to provide for these States to 
establish their cwn SCSs. This seems to be a surprising omission. 
Administration is so intimately linked with the exercise of executive 
authority, Central or State, that it would be reasonable to expect that 
each level of Government within a Federation should have, or be given 
the option of having, its own Services. This omission thus provided for 
the continuance and strengthening of differences in status between the 
non-federalised, quasi-federalised and federalised State bureaucracies. 
The Constitution introduced instead the concept of 'joint services' and 
the principle of and mechanism for the inter-Government secondment of 
officers.
The establishment of joint services and the use of secondment, if
agreed by the States, could conceivably lead to the uniformalisation, or
perhaps equalisation, of status of the State bureaucracies, especially
those which are non-federalised and quasi-federalised. Potentially, such
joint services would strengthen State administrations by enlarging the
field of recruitment and attracting the best men under either State or
Central Governments. Furthermore, such Services might facilitate inter-
Government co-operation, encourage a less parochial outlook and avoid an
83uneconomic duplication in administrative bodies. However, the impact 
of joint services would be to reduce the degree of autonomy enjoyed by 
States that have their own SCSs. Would these reputed advantages, 
however, outweigh the loss of that "measure of autonomy" granted to 
States having their own SCSs? The States seemed unconvinced by these 
reputed advantages and
"that despite the enabling provisions, no joint services have in 
fact been established, and there has been no enthusiasm for 
them. "84
83. See Watts, R.L., New Federations, Experiments in the Commonwealth, 
p. 229.
84. Winslow, V.S., "The Public Service and Public Servants in 
Malaysia", in Suffian Mohamad, et.al., The Constitution of 
Malaysia: its Development, 1957-1977., Kuala Lumpur, Oxford 
University Press, 1978, p. 273. Watts argued that "In Malaya, by 
comparison with India, resistance to the establishment of joint 
services has been much stronger." See Watts, R.L.,Administration 
in Federal Systems, 1970, p. 30.
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So far, inter-Government secondment of officers has been regularly
QC
practised in the hope of strengthening State administrations.3
Federalisation of the State bureaucracies would entail two 
consequences. First, the SCSs of former UFMS and SS States would have 
to be dismantled and restructured. Second, by integrating officers of 
such Services into a cannon (that is, Central) Service, the MCS or MAS, 
the bureaucratic systems of such States would be made uniform with that 
existing in the former EMS States. Federalisation wculd affect only the 
Administrative Services, the SCSs, of the State bureaucracies of the 
former UFMS and SS States. Federalisation, however, wculd limit these 
States' former control over their administrative officers.
Attempts to federalise the fragmented bureaucratic systems of 
Peninsula Malaysia have been frequent. In early 1957, just before 
Malayan Independence, a Committee, set up with the agreement of the 
Rulers of the Malay States and the Central Government, was entrusted 
with the task of preliminary planning for the integration of the SCSs of 
the former UFMS and SS States with that of the Central Administrative
07
Service. The Rulers, the Carmittee Chairman explained, had agreed to 
the formation of such a committee because they considered that unifying 
the services wculd be in the interest of the country.88
The committee was chaired by Tuan Hj. Mustafa Alkabri.88 Its 
task was to work out a system whereby the then varying conditions of 
service of the various SCSs could be unified. Several meetings were held 
just before Independence but these failed to produce any working 
concensus primarily because certain State Governments were unwilling to 
co-operate. Several requests by the Committee's chairman to the State 
Governments for suggestions regarding the methods that should be used
qn
for integrating the Services were not answered. Despite the Rulers'
8!T Watts, ibid.
86. Discussion based on interviews, newspapers and certain Government 
Service circulars. Surprisingly, only Milne and Mauzy had 
referred, in passing at that, to such attempts at integrating the
State Civil Services. See Milne, R.S., and Mauzy, D., Politics and
Government in Malaysia, Vancouver, University of British Columbia 
Press, 1978. p. 278.
87. Straits Times, (ST), 10.1.58.
88. Malay Mail (MM), 31.10.58. The reactions of the Kedah Civil 
Service will be discussed in Chapter 7.
89. A former MCS officer (superscale B). He was later to be appointed
Keeper of the Rulers' Seal and subsequently appointed as the first 
Federal Elections Commissioner. Whether this was a committee with 
representatives from both Central and State Governments was never 
revealed.
90. ST, 10.1.58 v
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agreement, in principle, to consider the unification of the SCSs with
Q1
the Central Service, a respondent^ revealed that certain Rulers of 
the former UFMS States rejected the unification of their SCSs. They 
feared that through unification their peviously autonomous SCSs would be 
federalised and reduced to the level then existing in the former EMS 
States with the consequent loss of autonomy to the States. The former 
LJEMS States feared that the integration of their SCSs would take away 
their best men. There was seme basis for this fear. For after the SCSs 
were integrated into a common Central Service, all former State Civil 
Servants as members of a common Service wold be liable, under normal 
transfers and/or promotion exercises, to be transferred or promoted out 
of their own States. More important, the States were unreceptive to the 
integration of their SCSs because they believed that they would lose 
'control' over what used to be their cwn Civil Services. The State Civil 
Servants of the former UFMS States were under the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the respective States. Integration of the SCSs with the Central 
Service would surely erode this State pcwer. Central initiative and 
enthusiasm for the integration of the SCSs with that of the Central 
Service was rejected by the States. In despair, the Committee's chairman 
could only re-enphasise that
"A way must be found to unify the services in the interests of the 
country.
The former UFMS States, especially their rulers, had still to be 
convinced and persuaded.
The Committee lapsed after Malayan Independence and it waited for 
a new mandate to carry out its work. In November 1958, more than a year 
after the Committee's last meeting, Tuan Hj. Mustafa Albakri commented 
on the Committee's performance and stated that
"The Committee died for want of nourishment. I would not say that 
the Committee and its duties had died because there was lack of 
support by the State Civil Services. Nor would I say that the 
death was not due to lack of support by the State Civil 
Services.
Perhaps if the State Civil Servants could be convinced and persuaded as 
to the necessity for the integration of the SCSs with the Central 
Service then the Rulers resistance could have been gradually overcome.
91. Interview with a former State Secretary of Kedah, 17.12.80.
Central Bureaucrats interviewed also expressed similar views. More 
about this in Chapter 7.
92. ST, 10.1.58.
93. Standard, 2.11.58.
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Table 2 : Comparison of Grades and Salary Scales between
the Kedah SCS, MCS and MAS in 1958,in Dollars 
per Month.
Division I Salary Scales
MCS
Staff Appointment 2270 
Superscale A 197°
Superscale B 1850
Superscale C I76O
Superscale D I67O
Superscale E 1580
Superscale F 1490
Superscale G 1430
Superscale H 1360
Timescale 982+34- 1254
Timescale 592^628+34-934
Kedah SCS MAS
Superscale D
Class IA 
1057*28 - 1141
Class IIB 
836+28 -  1032
Division II Salary Scales
Timescale1
738+25 - 813 
615+25 - 715 
324+21 - 450 
280+15 - 310
Timescale: 
738+25 - 813
615+25 -  715
k!5 - 450
Source1 Federation of Malaya Staff List, as of June 1, 1959 j 
Kedah, Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure, 1959.
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The FED took over the Committee's job of planning for the 
integration of the Civil Services sometime in early 1958. Apart frcm 
getting the relevant State Governments' and Rulers approval, the problem 
of the differences of status and accompanying conflict of interests 
between the SCSs members, on the one hand, and the MAS, on the other, 
would have to be overcome. The MAS was a feeder Service to the MCS but 
the the SCSs were not. The salary scales of the SCSs were higher than 
the MAS and in fact the top posts were not only Division I posts but 
equivalent to superscale posts within the MCS. While the majority of the 
SCSs posts were Division II posts, all MASs posts were Division II 
posts. Table 2 illustrates this. It compares the Kedah SCSs, taken as an 
example of States with their own SCSs, with that of the MCS and MAS in 
terms of Divisional grades and salary scales.
Integration, at the very least, should not penalise either the 
members of the SCS or the MAS with regard to their chances of entry into 
the MCS. For SCSs members who held posts, according to Divisional grades 
and salary scales, equivalent to those existing within the MCS, 
integration should mean at least their absorption into equivalent MCS 
posts. The top echelon SCSs members would benefit through being absorbed 
into the prestigious MCS because their career and promotion prospects 
would be enhanced in a Service that contained the largest number and 
highest grades of superscale posts within the Malayan bureaucracy as a 
whole. For the lower echelon SCSs members whose posts were somewhat 
equivalent to those of the MAS, integration, at the very least, ought to 
mean that superscale posts within the SCSs or their equivalent should 
not be closed to them. The MAS had no such superscale posts and its 
members were usually promoted into the MCS to allow them the benefits of 
higher scale posts. It would seem logical that such SCS members be 
integrated into the MAS first and then by promotion into the MCS. That 
the Central Government offered to relax the conditions for promoting MAS 
officers to the MCS indicated that it was attenpting to entice lower 
echelon SCSs members fcy reassuring them that integration via the MAS 
would not necessarily limit their chances of entering the MCS. In this 
way the FEO hoped to work out a system of integrating SCS members into a
QC
common Central Service.
However, some SCSs officers were undecided because of salary 
differences between the SCSs and the MAS. They feared that they would
94: ST, 11.4.58.
95. ibid.
96. ibid.
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not be taken into the higher MCS.88 According to a respondent8 ,^ the 
two-tier approach of integrating the SCSs into the Central Service was 
resented by especially the lower echelon SCSs members. They felt that 
this would split the SCSs into two parts - the favoured small top and 
the disadvantaged big bottom. Those in the former would, on integration, 
enjoy all the benefits available within the MCS. However, those in the 
latter would be denied the usually normal and expected opportunity of 
enjoying the benefits of top posts that were available within the SCSs 
and since their Service ranking would be that of the MAS they would not 
immediately enjoy the benefits of integration. Consequently their 
aspirations for higher posts could only be met by the 'difficult' 
process of promotion into the MCS.
The PEO's offer to relax the conditions for promoting MAS 
officers into the MCS was meant also to persuade MAS officers to agree 
to the integration plan. The MAS officers must be made to feel that they 
were not losing out on the deal. They correctly saw lower echelon SCSs 
members as their cotrpetitors for MCS posts. The MAS Association, 
however, responded to the FEO's offer by submitting two claims: for a
g o
better salary scale and better service scheme. The FEO agreed to the 
former and offered a better salary scale but it ignored the latter. 
According to the FEO this offer would also include the SCSs in the 
former UFMS States.88 The MAS Association accepted the FEO's offer to 
relax the conditions for upgrading frcm MAS to MCS.1,88
The success of the FEO's integration plan depended crucially on 
its acceptance by those State Governments with their own SCSs and also 
by the Rulers of these States and members of the respective SCSs. MAS, 
already a Central Service, could not really oppose such Central 
initiative. MAS's status as a Feeder Service of the MCS had been 
established well before Malayan Independence. Apart from the lateral 
absorption of the top SCSs posts into the MCS, the MAS was proposed 
as a conduit for the absorption of lower echelon SCSs members. The 
States with their own SCSs rejected the FEQs integration plan. An 
FEO spokesman admitted that its plan was on the verge of being 
called off and stated that the plan's failure was primarily due 
to the unenthusiastic attitude of the State Governments towards
97. Interview with a senior Kedah Civil Servant, 15.12.80.
98. m, 14.4.58.
99. ibid. It was also reported that seme MAS officers might disagree 
with the Government's offer because of salary differences between 
the SCSs and MAS.
100. m, 25.5.58.
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it.-*'8-*' The opposition to the plan might in no small measure have been 
due to the fact that the Rulers themselves were not in favour of the
1 rjo
consolidation of their S C S s . T h e  Rulers, according to one 
respondent-1-^ , had not changed their previous negative view over the 
integration plan. The FEO spokesman revealed that the SCSs of Kedah and 
Jdhore had been particularly opposed to the integration, for fear that 
their good Civil Servants might be transferred to the proposed Central 
Civil Service."*'84 Despite this failure the Central Government re­
iterated its commitment towards the integration of the Civil Services. 
Its spokesman stated that the Government was considering new approaches 
to the State Governments and that
"We will have tp convince them of the advantages of 
integration."185
Attempts to convince the State Governments of the need for
integrating their SCSs were continuously pursued. Such attempts were
prcnpted by the Central Government's increasing apprehension that the
State bureaucratic apparatus might lack the capacity (in terms of
numbers, training and perhaps motivation) to implement the increasingly
1 Ofiimportant and expensive National and State Development plans. This 
apprehension was further heightened by the increasing billions of 
dollars that the Central Government had been pouring into the less- 
develcped States which, in the main, are States of the former UFMS with 
their cwn SCSs.18  ^Montgomery and Esman, in a Report188 to the 
Central Government, highlighted the shortcomings of the State 
bureaucracies, especially within the field of development. They stated 
that
"State administration in Malaysia tends to lag behind the federal. 
This is true because the States tend to perform many of the more 
traditional functions of government and have fewer financial 
resources at their disposal."188
101. Standard, 2.11.58.
102. ibid.
103. Interview with a former Kedah State Secretary.
104. Standard, 2.11.58.
105. ibid.
106. Interview with a senior MAMPU official, 25.7.80.
107. ibid.
108. Montgomery, J.D. and Esmman, M.J., Development and Administration 
in Malaysia" Report to the Government of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, 1966.
109. ibid., p. 19.
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The Report urged the Central Government to undertake the task of raising 
the standards of the States' administrative performance. Thus, it 
recommended that
"The proposed new federal facilities of in-service training, 
central procurement and the services of the DMJ should be made 
available to the State governments. The government should 
gradually achieve uniform qualifications and salaries for all 
occupants of professional posts [including posts within State 
bureaucracies] and require State governments to use federal job 
qualifications and written examinations when available."
The lower calibre and quality of State Civil Servants of the SCSs
have been gradually and widely acknowledged. Esman held that
"The State civil services were inferior to the federal and in some 
cases were afflicted with nepotism and patronage. Thus the more 
able and ambitious young graduates gravitated to the more modem 
atmosphere and greater opportunities provided by the 
MHFS... "m
Apart frcm the generally lower entry requirements, the perspective and 
orientation of the SCSs officers have been naturally circumscribed and 
conditioned, and thus limited, by the State within which they
i i o .  . . . .
serve. Their world and prospects lie within their State. Not 
surprisingly, what they believe to be "their and States' interests" 
could easily be in conflict with "Central or National" interests. Their 
narrow perception, perhaps parochialism, is further emphasised and
enhanced by their social contacts which are confined within the State
1 1 3and people of the same ilk. In comparison, Central officers 
frequently transferred in and out of Central Ministeries and the former 
FMS and SS States have a much wider perspective and work experience and, 
through their frequent visits to Kuala Lumpur for both formal and 
informal gatherings, have a much wider social universe. For the Central 
Government then, federalisation through integrating the SCSs with the 
Central Service would make uniform or equal all the State bureaucaracies 
in terms of status, skills, efficiency, and capacity and, at the same 
time, break down the social enclave and insulation that have shielded
110. ibid. , p. 20, tty emphasis.
111. Esman, op.cit., p. 95. Similar views were expressed by the Chief 
Secretary or Ketua Setiausaha Negara (KSN) to the Central 
Government, Tan Sri Dato Abdullah Ayub, in an interview, 8.8.80. 
The Malayan Home and Foreign Service (MHFS) emerged out of an 
amalgamation of the MCS with the Foreign Service and this MHFS was 
tobe renamed as MADS or PTD.
112. Interview with a senior PSD officer, 18.8.80.
113. ibid.
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the SCSs frcm Central influence.
The Central Government federalisation attempts were only
partially successful. In April 1974, it announced that the MAS would be
replaced by a new Central Service. This new Service, called the GAS or
PTA, would merge the MAS with the SCSs.^^ Hcwever, a Central
Government circular^indicated that its merger or integration plan
had not been accepted by the former UFMS States. Only Penang and Malacca
had agreed that their SCSs be absorbed: either into the PTD or the PTA.
Officers of these SCSs who were in super scale IB (a monthly salary
between $1,500 to $1,700) and above would be absorbed into the PTD and
116those be lew this scale would be absorbed into the PTA. The 
absorption was to take effect on October 1, 1974 and with this Penang 
and Malacca SCSs were abolished.
The former UFMS States which disagreed with the absorption of 
the SCSs either into the PTD or PTA were 'encouraged' to agree as soon 
as possible. SCSs members were not given the option of electing to be 
absorbed individually into either of the two Central Services.
Furthermore, any delay by the State Governments on agreeing to allcw 
their SCSs' absorption would in effect penalise SCSs members in terms of 
seniority. For if and when they were to agree to their SCSs absorption, 
SCSs members would lose seniority equivalent to the period when the SCSs 
was not absorbed after October 1, 1974. Thus,
"Jika satu masa kelak sesuatu Kerajaan Negeri memutuskan supaya 
Perhidmatan Tadbir Negerinya dicanturrikan dengan Perhidmatan Tadbir 
dan Diplomatik Malaysia dan Perhidmatan Tadbir Am, maka pegawai- 
pegawai Perhidmatan Tadbir Negiri yang berkenaan apabila ditukarkan 
secara tetap ke salah satu daripada perhidmatan tadbir tersebut akan 
kehilangan kekananan selama tempoh Kerajaan Negeri tidak bersetuju 
Perhidmatan Tadbir Negerinya disatukan.
[Translation:
"If in the future a State Government were to decide that its 
Administrative Service be unified with the Malaysian Administra­
tive and Diplomatic Service and the General Administrative 
Service, then the officers of the States' Administrative Service 
when placed on a permanent basis in either of the Federal Services 
will lose seniority equivalent to the period that the State 
Government had not agreed to the unification of its Administrative 
Service."]
114. New Straits Tirtiis (NST), 1.4.74. The Immigration, National 
Registration, Election Commission, Road Transport and Manpower 
Services were to be included in this merger to form the GAS or 
PTA.
115. See Pekeliling Perhidmatan, Bil. 25 Tahun 1974 (Service Circular,
No. 25/1974).
116. ibid., pp. 2-3
117. ibid., p.4.
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The longer the State Governments delayed the decision to join the
unification plan the more would their SCSs members be penalised and make
it more costly indeed for them to contemplate and accept absorption in
its present form.
Despite the Central Government's attempts at federalisation, the
former UFMS States had successfully preserved the autonomy of their
SCSs. Not surprisingly, the blame for the ineffectiveness of these
States as implementing agents of the Central Government development
plans has been placed squarely on the continued existence of the 
liftautonomous SCSs. A study commissioned by the EPU argued that the
former UFMS States had impeded the effectiveness of the State
Development Offices and State Economic Planning Units in the development 
1 1 9process. The study stated that
"The overall standard of these civil services is lower than that 
of the two federal civil services - Perhidmatan Tadbir dan 
Diplcmatik [PTD] and Perhidmatan Tadbir Am. [PTA]. In general, 
state civil servants are neither so well qualified nor experienced 
as they do not get the same opportunities for education, training 
and esqperience.1,120
Such opportunities could not be expected to be available within the
SCSs. The study believed that federalisation of the SCSs through
integration with the Central Service was one way of strengthening these
States planning and implementation capacity. It stated that
"The old Unfederated Malay States are simply too small to have 
their own separate civil services. Penang and Malaka recognised 
this when the professional grades of their civil services joined 
the PTA nearly two years ago. It is to be hoped that the old 
Unfederated Malay States will follow their example in the not too 
distant future."
The Central Government's federalisation plan had only succeeded in 
capturing the SCSs of Penang and Malacca. The former UEMS States refused 
to have anything to do with it. The plan failed in these States because 
the Rulers, especially that of Kadah and Johore, with no small 
encouragement from their respective SCSs, opposed it. They were fearful 
that if the plan were implemented they would be reduced to the status 
similar to that of Rulers of States of the former EMS, as mere 
figureheads with no real power especially over appointments to top posts
118. Interviews with senior Central Civil Servants.
119. Bruce, Colin, "Strengening the States' Planning and Implementation 
System", State Rural Development Project, EPU, PM's Department, 
15.1.79, p.6.
120. ibid.
121 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
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129within the State bureaucracy. Not coincidentally, the SCSs of
Penang and Malacca, States without the traditional Royal Heads but with
123
Centrally-appointed Governors, were successfully absorbed.
In the long run, SCS members would have benefited materially
from the integration of their Services with the Central Service. But
their lack of enthisiasm for integration was not surprising since they,
as a group, already enjoyed a comfortable position of high status and
1 9  Aprestige within the States. The 'old-time' State Civil Servants Who
belonged to the established and 'high' class within the respective
19^States opposed the plan. They were generally non-degree holders and 
thus had lower paper qualifications compared to the MCS (subsequently 
the PTD) officers and even the MAS (subsequently the PTA) officers. They 
were fearful that, apart from destroying their social status and 
position, integration of the SCSs would place them in competitive 
relations with members of the Central Service Which would place them at 
a disadvantage in the conpetition for promotion.12** Their high social 
status and position had been preserved fcy a high level of ' social 
insulation' as described fcy Gayl Ness:
" There were considerable family ties throughout the bureaucracy. 
Brothers and sisters of officers had married other officers or 
their sisters. A wide range of relatives - aunts, uncles, cousins 
- were in other government positions. Officers visited one another 
often and maintained closer ties with their narrow occupational 
community than they did with the variegated local communities in 
which they lived. Close friends and associates were in the same 
occupation and also tended to be fellow Malays. This pattern kept 
the occupational gentry community conscious of its cohesion and its 
seperateness. Further, when asked if they would join the Malayan 
Civil Service if they were given the opportunity, most answered in 
the negative. They had no desire to subject themselves to out-of- 
State transfers and they did not wish to compete with the better 
educated officers of the Malayan Civil Service.'
122. Interview with a senior MAMPU official, 25.7.80.
123. A senior MAMPU officer argued that States without Sovereign Rulers 
have proven to be most amenable to administrative reforms 
initiated from the Centre. Interview, 25.7.80.
124. Scott observed that in general "Most Malaysian Civil Servants are 
in fact unwilling to take on new ventures that might jeopardise 
presently adequate arrangements. They prefer, for the most part, 
to protect their present position and status rather than to take 
even moderate risks that might prcpel them higher up the status 
ladder." Scott, J.C., Political Ideology in Malaysia: Reality and 
the Beliefs of an Elite, New Haven & London, Yale University 
Press, 1968, p.138.
125. Interview with a senior MAMPU official, 25.7.80.
126. ibid.
127. See Ness, G.D., Bureaucracy and Rural Development in Malaysia: A 
Study of Complex Organisations in Stimulating Economic Development
177.
Integration would have destroyed this comfortable and happy social 
position. Their high occupational position within the State depended on 
their already high social status but this would not necessarily apply in 
an integrated Civil Service where achievement criteria (examinations and 
education) and professionalism rather than ascriptive criteria would 
apply.
Conclusion
The Constitution provided the Central Government with substantial 
powers which can affect State administration even in areas of the 
State's own competence. It also provided the framework within which 
Centre-State administrative relations can be conducted.
The historical fragmentation of Government in Peninsula Malaysia 
resulted in the fragmentation of the bureaucracy. This was consequently 
reflected in the development of a confusing array of diverse Schemes and 
obscure Titles of Service.12^ According to Tilman, that
"though it is seldom recognised even fcy members of the 
bureaucracy, the whole complex web of federal-state public 
services is legally held together by a quasi-treaty between the 
Federal Government, on the one hand, and each of the States 
individually, on the other."
The Reid Commission had recommended that this complex web of Centre-
State Public Services be placed on a simple foundation and that attempts
should be made to 'standardise' or 'uniformalise' the Public Services.
Significantly, What was not achieved at independence, although
subsequently attenpts were made but which failed, was the federalisation
of the States bureaucracies of the former UFMS States so as to make them
equal in status with that of the former FMS and SS States. The status of
the former UFMS States with their own SCSs and those States without, in
the context of administration, is clearly different. The failure of the
Central Government attempts to equalise the difference in status means
that the former UFMS States could potentially exercise more autonomy in
their relations with the Centre.
127. (Cont. j in New States, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of
California Press, 1967, pp. 160-161. My Emphasis.
128. Tilman, R.O., Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya, pp. 82-83.
129. ibid. p. 83.
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Chapter 6.
Federal-State Administrative Relations In Peninsula Malaysia - 2
This chapter examines certain developments that have influenced 
Centre-State administrative relations since Malayan Independence. This 
involves examining the expansion in the sizes of the Central bureaucracy 
compared to that of the State bureaucracies, Malayanization and 
representativeness of the Malayan Civil Service (MCS), postings and 
withdrawals of Central officers and States' dependence on such 
officers, Centre-State administrative co-ordination, national 
development planning and the co-ordination and implementation of 
development plans.
The Central Government is fcy far the largest single employer of 
public servants in Peninsula Malaysia. Table 1 compares the sizes of 
the Central and State bureaucracies and their respective annual 
percentage increses between 1962-72. It shews that in 1962 the Central 
Government employs five times the total number of monthly-salaried 
public employees employed by the eleven State Governments combined and 
fcy 1972 this increased to almost six times. Table 2 compares the 
numbers of employees, according to Divisional grades, of all State 
Services combined with those of the Central Services, it indicates that 
the Central Services have more than six times the number of Divisions 1, 
111 and IV officers and four times the number of Division 11 officers 
within the State Services combined. It also indicates that the State 
Services have a slightly higher distrubtion of Divisions 1 and 11 taken 
together compared to that of the Central Services and the reverse in the 
case with regard to the distribution of Divisions 111 and IV posts. If 
States are compared to one another and to the Central, as in Table 3 for 
1961, the distribution of Divisions is different for each State and also 
for the Central. These Tables provide a general quantification of 
Centre-State bureaucratic relations within Which the Centre is dominant. 
More important, as discussed later, is the proportion of posts, 
especially Divisions 1 and 11 posts, in the State Establishments which 
are filled fcy officers of the Central Services.
Malayanization and the Representativeness of the MCS
Several developments since Malayan Independence have influenced 
Centre-State administrative relations, Malayanization1 of the MCS 
being one of these. Malayanization of the Public Services was first
T~. For a detailed discussion of the Malayanization scheme, see
Tilman, R.O., Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya, Durham, Duke Uni. 
Press, 1964, chapter 3.
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2
mooted in 1954 by the first Malayanization Committee. The Malaya
Constitutional Conference of Februry 1956, held at London, recoiimended, 
inter alia, that Malayanization of the Public Services should be speeded 
up. The second Malayanization Committee endorsed this 
recommendation.
The MCS was included in this accelerated Malayanization plan.
Before Malayan Independence the MCS comprised almost totally of Europeans 
and although it was in principle possible for Malay officers of the Malay 
Administrative Service (MAS) to be promoted into the MCS, the rate of such 
promotion in practice was agonisingly slew. Malayanization would thus 
increase this rate. Malayanization also provided opportunities for State 
Civil Services (SCS) officers to apply for MCS posts. The Malayanization 
Committee of 1956 reported that
"four-fifth of the Malayan officers in the federal bureaucracy new
entered by promotion from the MAS and State and Settlement Civil
Services"
The MCS compared to the MAS was considered as an "All-Malaya"
Central Service in terms of recruitment and postings. Historically MCS 
officers served in the Central Government and in all the States of the 
Peninsula. They were, however, unevenly spread amongst the States 
and consequently their influence in these States was also uneven. Since 
Independence MCS officers were increasingly recruited from all the 
States and they continued to be liable to postings to any State of the 
Federation but the numbers of MCS officers holding State posts vary from 
one State to another.
The MAS in comparison had less claim to being an "all-Malaya"
Central Service although its members were recruited by the Central 
Government. Historically it was a Service only of the FMS States. It
2. Federation of Malaya, Report of the Comnittee on the
Malayanization of the Government Service, Kuala Lunpur, Govt. 
Press, 1954.
3. Federation of Malaya, Report of the Committee on the
Malayanisatian of the Public Service, Kuala Lunpur, "3ovt. Press, 
1956.
4. ibid., p. 38. It was only from 1953 onward that Malays with
Honours degrees were recruited directly into the MCS. Before 1953 
the appointment of Malayan officers to the MCS was almost 
exclusively made from the MAS and sometimes the SCSs. See 
Federation of Malaya, Report of the Committee on the 
Malayanization of the Government Service, p. 17.
5. Tilman, op.cit., p. 104, and see also Timman, R.O., "The Malay
Administrative Service, 1910-1960", in The Indian Journal of 
Public Administration, Vol. 7., April-June 1961, p. 156.
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was also a feeder Service of the MCS. Its members, then recruited only
frcm among those who were from or educated in these States especially
before the Second World War, were generally posted only within the State
frcm Which they were recruited.^
The rapid promotion of MAS Officers to the MCS ranks was one of
7the mechanisms used to achieve Malayanization. The SCSs officers of 
the former UFMS and SS States could also apply for appointment to the 
MCS. The former method was a natural progression of MAS officers into 
the MCS because MAS was after all a feeder Service. However, the latter 
method was not similarly natural because the SCSs were not in the same 
sense feeder Services.There were thus carpeting claimants, with diverse 
service backgrounds, to the benefits of Malayanization. This 
competition created problems Which the Malayanization Committee hinted 
at these problems when it reported that
"An official Committee has been appointed to report on relations, 
including recruitment, between the Malayan Civil Service and the 
Malay Administrative Service and State and Settlement Civil 
Services and the Chinese Civil Services".
The senior MAS officers, primarily those recruited frcm and
serving in the former EMS States, were to benefit most frcm the rapid
process of Malayanization. Tilman correctly pointed out that not
surprisingly
"as the MCS was Malayanized it became thoroughly permeated with 
officers Whose background and experience had been gained from 
service in the MAS. In January, 1962, of fifty-nine of the most 
senior posts held by Malayan officers of the MCS, forty-two were 
filled by Malays formerly of the MAS. These forty-two 
appointments included secretaries or permanent secretries to 
ministries, deputy secretaries, State Secretaries, Commissioners 
of Lands and Mines, and the private secretary to the Yang Di- 
Pertuan Agong".
Table 4 illustrates the preponderance of former MAS officers within the
Recruitment into the MAS, especially after the Second World War, 
was gradually widened to include those Who were from the States of 
the former IMS and SS. Since Malayan independence, recruitment 
into the MAS had been widened to include all suitably qualified 
Malays frcm all the States. When in 1974 the MAS was merged with 
other Central Services and the SCSs of Penang and Malacca to form 
the General Administrative Service or the Perhidmatan Tadbir Am 
(PTA) recruitment was widened further to include 
all suitably qualified Malaysian citizens.
7. Federation of Malaya, Report of the Committee on the
Malayanization of the Public Service, p. 38.
8. ibid., pp.39-40.
9. Tilman, "Bureaucratic Development in Malaya", in Braibanti, R.,
ed., Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British 
Imperial Tradition, Durham, N.C., Duke Uni. Press, 1966, p.595.
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MCS ranks. The number and percentage of such officers within the MCS 
had increased frcm 89 and 26.3% in 1957 to 143 and 45.4% in 1964. 
Although the total number of such officers within the MCS had been 
increasing right up to 1975 their percentages of the total number of MCS 
officers had been declining since 1964. In ccnparison, the number of 
former SCSs officers within the MCS increased frcm 30 in 1957 to 85 in
1966 and since then had steadily declined. The percentages of these 
officers within the MCS increased frcm 8.9% in 1957 to 21% in 1966 and 
since then had declined. With the excpetions of 1966 and 1971, the 
proportion of former SCSs officers within the MCS is less than half, and 
sometimes less than a third, that of the MAS. Table 4 also indicates 
the differential recruitment frcm the SCSs of the individual States of 
the former UFMS and SS.
The dominance of the former MAS officers within the Malayanized 
MCS was more emphatic if one considers the percentage of senior MCS 
posts that such officers then held. Table 5 illustrates this. It 
indicates that as Malayanization progressed the percentage of Europeans 
holding senior MCS posts fell frcm 82.6% in 1957 to zero per cent in
1967 while the percentage of direct entry Malayans holding such posts 
increased frcm zero per cent in 1957 to 41.4% in 1971. The percentage 
of former MAS officers holding such posts increased frcm 17.4% in 1957 
to 64.6% in 1963 but declined thereafter to 40.3% in 1971 while that of 
the former SCSs officers increased frcm zero per cent in 1957 to 26.7% 
in 1966 and thereafter declining to 18.3% in 1971. Table 5 also 
indicates the differential rate of recruitment frcm the SCSs of the 
States of the former UFMS and SS during the Malayanization
process. Consequently the percentages for each of these States differ. 
The declining percentages for former MAS and SCSs officers since 1963 
and 1966 respectively was due to the dramatic increase of Malayan 
officers who entered the MCS directly in tandem with the rapid decline 
of the European element. Despite this increase former MAS officers 
still held the most senior posts within the MCS, as Table 6 indicates 
for 1971. MAS officers thus gained most frcm the rapid Malayanization 
of the MCS. Writing in 1961, Tilman correctly concluded that
"today, especially among the more senior posts, the attitudes of 
the bureaucracy arellkely to be geographically 
unrepresentative". ^
10. Tilman, "The Malay Administrative Service, 1910-1960", P. 156.
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This tendency towards geographical unrepresentativeness of the MCS, as 
Table 5 shews, was due specially to the differential rate of recruitment 
frcm the MAS and SCSs under the Malayanization programme.
Malayanization, nevertheless, resulted in a rapid change in the 
composition and character of the MCS within which former MAS officers 
were dominant.
There is not quota for each State of Peninsula Malaysia in the 
Central Service. It would be reasonable, because of different sizes and 
levels of education and development, to expect that certain States would 
be under-represented and other over-represented within the Central 
Service. Table 7 illustrates the representation of States among the 
higher civil servants in the Central Civil Service. With the exception 
of Pahang, the more developed former EMS and SS States (in terms of 
Gross Domestic Product - GDP) are over-represented. The generally less 
developed former UFMS States are generally under-represented. The 
existence of the SCSs within each of these States partly explain this 
under-representation. When the numbers include both the Central and 
State Civil Services, as in Table 8, the former UFMS States have 
significantly higher representation compared to that in Table 7.
Within the MCS also, as Table 9 shews, the generally more 
developed former EMS and S S States are better represented, with the 
exception of Selangor and Malacca, compared to the generally less- 
develcped former UFMS States. As the least developed of the West coast 
States, Malacca is under-represented while Selangor is also under­
represented because, as the most developed State, the Civil Service 
competes with the attractions from the private Sector.11
On the question of States representation within the Central 
Civil Service Mavis Puthucheary commented that
"although there is some over-representation of the more developed 
States and under-representation of the less developed ones, the 
imbalance is not alarming nor has it become a major political 
issue".12
It is the strength of State loyalties, she believed, that would 
determine Whether the problem of imbalance would become a political 
issue.12 She conceded, however, that
11. Syed Haroon b. Mohamad Aljunied, "Social Background and 
Representation in the Higher Civil Service in Malaysia and 
Singapore", Unpub. M.A. Thesis, University of Malaya, 1974,
P.174.
12. Puthucheary, M., The politics of Administration; The Malaysian 
Experience, Kuala Lunpur, Oxford University Press, 1978, p. 79.
13. ibid..
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"In some states, particularly ... inthe former Unfederated Malay 
States of Johore, Kedah, Trengganu and Kelantan, there appear to 
be strong feelings of identification and 'belongingness' to one's 
hone State".
Despite this 'strength of state loyalties' amongst the former UFMS
States the imbalance of State representation within the Central Services
has not become a political issue. The 'strength of state loyalties' in
these States could be conveniently channnelled and expressed through
their own SCSs and the failure of the Central Government's plans to
federalise the SCSs attested to the strength of such loyalties. Thus
these States were specially concerned not about the imbalance of State
representation within the Central Civil Service but the ever-increasing
attempts by the Central Government and its officers to penetrate the
State administration. The States' anxiety over this had been reflected
in the failure of the Central Government's federalisation plans and the
resentment directed at Central officers serving at the State level, as
the case of Kedah will show.
The persistent preoccupation with ethnic consideration has also
tended to blur the significance of issues like State representation. A
quota system, sanctioned by Article 153 (2) and (3) of the Constitution,
regulating the recruitment of both Malay and non-Malay citizens into the
1 5Central Services reflected this ethnic preoccupation. The issue of 
ethnic representation within the Central Services has remained a 
continuing source of friction between the Malay and non-Malay political 
leaders.^
Postings and Withdrawals of Central Officers to the States and States'
dependence on such officers.
The placing of officers of the Central Establishment within a
State, in the State departments or State branches of Central
departments, is governed by agreements between the Central Government
1 7and each of the State Governments individually. Posts within the
14. ibid., pp. 79-80.
15. The quota system for the MCS was introduced in 1953 When it was
first opened to non-Malays. See Tilman, R.O., Bureaucratic
Transition in Malaya, p. 110, n.ll, and Puthucheary, M., cp.cit.,
pp. 53-54. For the MCS the quota was 4 Malays to 1 non-Malay. A
quota of 3 Malays to 1 non-Malay was and still is applied to the
Central Judicial and Legal Service, the Police Service and the 
Customs Service. See Puthuncheary, ibid., p.65, n.6.
16. Puthucheary, ibid., chapter V; Gibbons, D.S., and Zakaria Hj. 
Ahmad, "Politics and Selection for the Higher Civil Service in New 
States: the Malaysia Example," Journal of comparative 
Administration, Vol. 3, No. 3, Nov. 1971.
17. See Tilman, cp.cit., p.83, n.5 and Appendix B.
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State departments are borne on the State Estimates and that within the 
State branches of Central departments are borne on the Central 
Estimates.
Before Independence the procedure for the placing of Central 
officers was embodied in clauses 11 and 7 of the State Agreements that 
were attached to the Federation Agreement of 1948. Clause 11 
provided:
"His Highness, unless he shall otherwise direct, shall be 
consulted before any officer is posted by or on the authority of 
the High Commissioner to any post borne on the State 
Estimates".
Prior consultation was thus required before Central officers were posted 
to State posts borne on the State Estimates and this was further 
emphasised by section 2(ii) of the Federal Secretariat Circular of 
1950.19
Clause 7, referring to the posting of Central officers to Central 
posts within the State and borne on the Central Estimates, provided:
"His Highness undertakes to receive within his State such officers 
of the Federal Government as that Government may require and to 
permit such officers to exercise such lawful authority and powers 
and to perform such lawful functions as may be necessary to the 
purposes of the Federal Government".20
In this case,
"consultation mast, despite the terms of clause 7, always take 
place in respect of officers who are posted:
(a) as Heads of the Department within the State, or
(b) to the town in which His Highness the Ruler resides".2 -^
However, the question of withdrawal of Central officers after being
posted to the States was omitted. In 1955, the Federal Secretariat
Circular was amended, by the addition of paragraph 4, to cover the
9 9question of withdrawal of such officers. Thus, before any officer,
posted in accordance with the arrangements provided for by paragraphs
2(ii) and 3(i), was withdrawn, the State Government concerned should be
consulted. The withdrawal of any other Central officer frcm the State
required only the prior notice of transfer.
These procedures, used well after Malayan Independence, were in
9 31974 considered inappropriate because of
18. Federal Secretariat Circular No. 13 Of 1950 (F.S.O. 1425/49), 
Section 2(ii).
19. ibid..
20* ibid..
21. ibid., Section 3(i)
22. Federal Establishment Office Circular, No. 9 of 1955.
23. Pekeliling Perhidmatan, Bil. 14 Tahun 1974, para. 2. (Service 
Circular, No. 14/ 1974).
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"beberapa perubahan dan penyusunan pentadbiran maka cara-cara yang 
telah diaturkan itu sekarang ini didapati membangkitkan beberapa 
kesulitan bagi kedua pehak; iaitu pihak Kerajaan Perseketuan dan 
juga pihak Kerajan Negeri. Kesulitan ini juga membagkitkan 
beberapa kesulitan ke atas pegawai-pegawai yang berkenaan 
disebabkan penempatan mereka itu tidak dapat diaturkan dengan 
kemas dan ada kalanya mereka itu tidak dapat mementukan kedudukan 
mereka samada jadi ditukarkan atau pun tidak."
[Translation:
"several administrative changes and reorganisation, the present 
procedures have caused several problems for both the Federal 
Government and also the State Government. Furthermore, these 
problems have also created problems to the officers concerned 
because their placement cannot be smoothly arranged and sometimes 
they cannot be certain of their status and position; whether they 
are really transferred or not."]
New procedures for placing Central Government officers either in State
departments or State branches of Central departments were thus required,
and these were agreed by the Central and State Governments and were
introduced to replace the 1950 and 1955 procedures.2^
Regarding the posting of Central Government officers to State
branches of Central departments, when a vacancy occurs in the post of
Head of such a department, which according to the Establishment
Agreement (Perjanjian Perjawatan) should be filled by a Central
Government officer, then the relevant Central department Head has to
reccmmend the Central officer to the State Government through the State
Secretary (SSec). This should take place at least two weeks before the
posting takes effect.2  ^This procedure also applies to the posting of
Central officers as District Officers (DOs) or to senior posts in the
State departments. Central Government recommendations to fill such
posts will have to be accepted by the State Government concerned. If it
has any doubt about the Central officers' 'suitability' or
'acceptability'2 ,^ it could submit these recommendations to the State
Ruler or Governor for final appointment. The approval of State
Governments is not required for the postings of Timescale (lowest salary
scale in Division 1) Central officers to posts in the State departments.
Only the withdrawals of Central officers who are heads of State
departments require to be referred to the State Government 
27concerned.
The posting of Central officers to State branches of Central
2ftdepartments need not be referred to the State Government concerned. 
However, the State Government concerned should be notified at least two
24. ibid., para. 7 and 8.
25. ibid., para. 3.
26. ibid..
217. ibid., para. 5.
28. ibid., para. 6.
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weeks before the postings of Central officers as Heads of such 
departments became effective. The State Government concerned had to 
accept such postings unless they
"dapat memberi bukti-bukti bahawa pegawai berkenaan dahulunya 
pemah membuat kesalahan yang menyebabkan ianya tidak dapat 
diterima oleh pentadbiran negeri atau kerana sebab-sebab yang 
difikirkan menasabah pegawai itu tidak dapat diterima". 
[Translation:
"can provide evidence that the officer concerned had before been 
guilty of a crime that makes the officer unacceptable to the State 
administration or because of other justifiable reasons that make 
the officer unacceptable."]
All the States of Peninsula Malaysia depend on seconded officers 
of Central Technical and Professional Services to fill the top posts in 
the State technical departments. As indicated earlier, the former UFMS 
States have their cwn autonomous SCSs whose officers fill the 
administrative and district office posts in the respective States. In 
comparison the States of the former EMS and SS (after 1974), without 
their own autonomous SCSs, depend on seconded MCS, and then PTD, 
officers to fill similar administrative posts in each State. The 
distribution of or dependence on MCS officers among the States, as Table 
10 shows for the 1958-1975 period, was very uneven. The distribution 
or dependence was highest in the former EMS States, followed by the 
former SS States, and lowest in the former UFMS States. While the 
numbers gradually increased in the former EMS and SS States, those in 
the former UFMS States declined, even to zero in the case of Kedah since 
1971.30
Despite the new procedures the question of the posting and
withdrawing of Central officers has been a continuing source of friction
31m  Centre-State relations. This centres on the different
29. ibid..
30. The Minister without Portfolio, Datuk Hj. Mohammad Nasir, informed 
the Senate during a debate that in 1980 the number of PTD officers 
serving within State departments and State branches of Central 
departments was as follows; 50 in Perak, 45 in Pahang, 40 in 
Selangor, 34 in Penang, 27 in Negri Sembilan, 16 in Melaka, 14 in 
Kelantan, 8 in Perlis, 7 in Kedah and 4 in Trengganu. Berita 
Harian, 23.12.80.
31. On this the Committee on Relationships between the Federal and 
State Governments commented: "Difficulties have frequently been 
experienced by the Federal Government on account of refusal by 
State Governments to accept Federal officers offered to them as 
Heads of Departments. In other instances States objected to 
officers being transferred. The Ccmmittee finds that frequently 
the main reason why a State Government refused to accept an office 
was that it had heard unfavourable rumours regarding the conduct 
etc. of the officer concerned." Fedration of Malaya, Report of 
the Committee on Relationships between the Federal and State 
Govememts, (Confidential), Kuala Lumpur, PM's Department, Nov. 
1961, p.9.
Ta
bl
e 
10
: 
Nu
mb
er
 
of 
MC
S 
Of
fi
ce
rs
 
po
st
ed
 
to 
Po
st
s 
wi
th
in
 
th
e 
St
at
e 
Ad
mi
ni
st
ra
ti
on
 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 
St
at
e,
 
19
58
-1
97
5*
196.
1-1
cd D O 00 CS O NO 1—1 O CO 1—1 O rH pH On ON S rH t—1
-p D VO CO CO ■S3- CO -a- 3^- -3- -tf- -3- 3^- -3- CO CO VO S cs •
0 H rH 1—1 I—1 rH 1—1 1—1 1—1 rH r—1 rH 1—1 rH rH pH rH pH rH vo
e4 csON
rH
1
00
0 vo
P ON cs cs CS IS cs S CS CS cs 00 00 00 00 CS 1—i CO O n
g W) t—1 rH 1—1
0 0 c
,G s cd r-H
•P 0 G -P
1—10 O ON On On O n 0 0 O O 0 rH H rH t—1 pH 00 CO CO
G p Ph rH rH rH 1—1 rH 1—1 pH rH rH pH 1—1 pH CM •H
0 0 p
e 0
co G CO <H
0 0
-P <H CG cd\R NO ■3- ^3- -3- -3- VO VO VO VO VO VO VO VO NO O- 00 NO cd
cd p 0 -p
p 0 Ul
CO cd cd
G rH G
p cd On NO NO NO NO (S s CS S <s CS S CS On rH CO rH 0
CO t—1 t—1 rH •H
+5
cd
G G
0 ^ CS On O n On O O 0 On O 0 O O O O CM CM CM 0
W) rH rH rH 1—1 CM CM CM t—1 CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM xi• c 0
CO cd jjHj• 1—1 NO NO NO CN- CS CO 00 C^ - CO 00 00 00 00 00 VO 00 C^-
S 0 CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CO CO CO• co G
cd
X VO NO NO NO NO NO NO VO NO NO NO NO 00 IS NO NO NO 3
g c d ^ CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM -P
0 g 0
e 0 Cn- NO NO NO NO NO NO NO Cn- s- S S ON 00 t—1 VO VO
g Ph co CO CO CO CO CO CO CO co CO CO CO CO CO -3- -3- -;3‘ 00 m
<H U> G
G\R -=3- -3- 3^- -3- VO -3- 3^- NO NO NO NO NO cs cs ON On NO 0
0 cd rH rH 1—1 rH 1—1 H rH rH 1—1 1—1 rH pH 1—1 rH 1—1 1—1 rH Ph
.G
p cd rH O 0 O O O O CO CO CO CO CO -=3- NO 0 CM 00 •k
r.. Ph CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CO CO CM
O G
l\J
c3\& CM CM CM CM CM CO CM CM CM CM CM CM pH 1—1 pH CM CM cd
CO 1—1 iH 1—1 rH 1—1 1—1 rH 1—1 rH 1—1 1—1 pH pH pH rH rH rH rH t»JD
0 •H •H 0
p g  ^ Ph
cd W) 6
P 0 0 CO NO VO NO NO CO <S S S S C^- CS NO NO cs rH 1—1 •H
CO S  co rH H 1—1 rH 1—1 1—1 1—1 rH rH rH 1—1 tH rH 1—1 1—1 CM CM cd
G
3
cd
G
G'eR VO -3" -C3- ^3* ■=3- -a- 3^- 3^- 1—1 rH pH rH rH 1—1 rH rH rH •H
cd CO
W)• M *
w G CS NO NO NO NO NO NO NO CM CM CM CM t—1 t—1 rH t—1 1—1 cd• 0 •H
s G CO
eh
cd
• cg rH
G> CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CO CO CM 1—1 H 1—1 rH rH 1 rH cd
H S
G G
0 0 n . CO CO CO CO CO CO CO C3- 3^- CO CM CM CM t—1 pH 1 rH 08HH
cd
O G >5
?H cd ^ -3- -3- CO CO CO CO CO co CO CO CO CO CO t—1 CO rH CM cd
p t—1
0 G cd
cd S
P 1—1 NO VO -3* -a- -=3’ -3- ^3- 3^- -j" -C3- -3" 3^- 3^- CM -3- CM CO
0 <H
W 0 O
O rH
CO CO CO CO 1—1 H rH & rH rH r—1 pH 1—1 1 1 1 1 1 G
m cd cd 0
0 xi rH •H
P 0 VO 3^- -3- CM CM CM •H CM CM CM CM CM 1 1 1 1 1 -P
cd W cd cd
p > G
CO 0 < 0
VO vo vo vo VO VO VO vo VO VO VO VO VO VO -3- rH 1—1 Xi
0 P 0
O Ph
0 00 CN- c^- CS S S S CS S S CS S CS NO pH 1—1 ••
0
O
G 00 On 0 1—1 CM CO -3- VO NO cs 00 On O 1—1 CM CO -3" VO G
cd VO VO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO N© NO IS­ IS­ S cs CS cs 3
0 ON ON On On ON On ON On ON ON ON On ON ON ON On ON ON O
rH r—1 rH rH rH 1—1 rH rH 1—1 rH t—1 1—1 1—1 1—1 t—1 rH 1—1 1—1 CO
1197.
meanings given to terms like 'suitability' or 'acceptability1. For the 
States, 'suitability' or 'acceptability' refers to the Central officers' 
committment to State interests. For the Centre, the terms refer 
essentially to its officers' professional qualities. Not surprisingly, 
Central officers ccmmittment to State interests have been enphasized by 
former EMS States which do not have their own SCSs. In Selangor, for 
example, Central officers were frequently urged by the Ruler to accept
3 9and carry out the State Government instructions given to them.
Perhaps to ensure the Central officers committment to State interests,
especially those appointed to the senior administrative posts, these
States have sometimes insistently shown a marked preference for Central
3 3officers who are 'sons' of or from the State concerned.
The continuity of service of Cntral officers within State 
administration is not guaranteed: once posted to the State 
administration they do not become permanent State officers Who will 
serve out their career within the State. As is normal within the 
Central Service, officers of the MCS or now the PTD for example are 
frequently withdrawn from one State and placed on promotion in another 
or in a Ministry at Kuala Lunpur. The turnover of Central officers 
holding key administrative posts in the State administration of former 
FMS and SS States tends to be, according to certain States, 
uncomfortably fast. In Perak, for exairple, in one of the rare occasions 
when the anxiety over the impact of such rapid turnover was publically 
aired, Ismail Daud, an Alliance (then controlling the Perak State 
Government) Assembyman complained during a debate on the Royal Address 
in the State Legislative Assembly that
"It is normal to see government officers, after doing their stint 
here and gaining much valuable experience, transferred. We always 
believe in a smooth administration for the well-being of the 
people but frequent transfers will cause disruptions in 
service".
He suggested that Perak should have its own State Civil Service to 
prevent such brain drain from the State. Datuk Sri Hj. Kamaruddin, 
the MB, ignored this suggestion and replied that Government officers 
were transferred frcm time to time because their experience and 
knowledge were required in Ministries and other Government 
departments.36 Furthermore,
327 New Straits Tines (NST), 30.9.80.
33. Interview with a Senior PSD official, 18.8.80
34. Straits Times (ST), 9.12.71.
35. ibid..
36. ibid., 22.12.71.
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"Some of these officers, on receiving promotion* must also be
given posting suitable to their new positions".
This only confirms the belief that the federalised bureaucracies of the 
former FMS and SS States are but parts, indeed minor adjuncts, of the 
Central bureaucracy.
Generally each of the non-federalised bureaucracies of the former 
UFMS States, because they have their cwn SCSs, is able to develop its 
own State Government officers. These officers would, in most cases, 
serve out their careers within the State. These States are not 
dependent on PTD officers to fill the key administrative posts and are 
able therefore to ensure a much higher level of stability and 
continuity, especially among the key adminstrative personnel, witnin the 
State administration. In these States, SCSs officers do feel that they 
belong to a State organisation which is separate, different and 
autonomous of the Central organisation. PTD officers that are sometimes 
posted to these States are also subject to the tests of 'suitability' or 
'acceptability'. This apart, the source of the strain in Centre-State 
relations in this case is the posting of Central officers itself to 
these States. State Governments and SCSs officers tend to view the 
postings of such officers as symbols of Central intrusion and perceived 
as Central Government representatives their committment to the State is 
sometimes considered suspect, indifferent or neutral at best. Apart 
frcm the need to make their life bearable and keep a clean service 
record in the State, these officers are in a sense 'autonomous' for they
depend totally on their Central organisation (PTD) for support, status,
prestige and, perhaps most importantly, mobility upwards. Ideally then, 
they would prefer a short stay in the State and then a swift transfer to 
Kuala Lunpur. SCSs officers are also envious, sometimes extremely 
annoyed, about the much better opportunities available to these Central
officers with regard to holding higher scale posts and quick promotion
to such posts.
The above resentment is not confined only to State Civil Servants. 
Politicians also have similar resentment. Not surprisingly the former 
UFMS States have to be constantly reminded and persuaded of the 
necessity to accept Central officers. As an example, the MB of Perlis, 
Tan Sri Sheikh Ahmad, referred to such resentment during a debate over 
the State Civil Service in the Perlis State legislative Assembly. He 
urged Assemblmen to think rationally on the question of the recruitment 
of non-Perlis subjects to the State Civil Service and added:
37. ibid..
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"I hope you will set a good example by accepting Government 
officers sent by the Central Government".
He stated that in the past several Assemblymen had objected to non-
Perlis subjects being posted to the State Civil Service and State
OQ
scholarships being awarded to students from other States.
The need for Central officers to serve at the State level has 
increased simultaneously with the need to implement efficiently both 
the Central and State (largely Central-financed) development plans. The 
implementation of such plans requires the co-cperation of the various 
State administrations and misgivings about the capacity of State 
administration have been expressed^— usually attributed to staff 
shortages or the lew efficiency and motivation of State Civil Servants. 
The Central Government recognised that the problem was caused partly by 
the lack or low level of expertise among the State Civil Servants in the 
less-develcped States which, not coincidently, belong to the former UEMS 
with their own SCSs, and partly by the lack of proper co-ordination 
between Central and State officers. To overcome this the Central 
Government, according to Tan Sri Chong Hon Nyan, Minister without 
Portfolio, undertook to send additional experts to these States under 
the Third Malaysia Plan (IMP). Central and State officers were also 
urged to work closely to ensure maximum success in the implementation of 
development projects.^
An editorial, without naming the States but probably implying the 
former UFMS States, placed the blame squarely on State Civil Servants, 
poignantly asking,
"How do we get state civil servants to move faster, to expedite 
procedures in such vital development spheres as land and licences? 
Delays of up to five years in land matters are not unknown? and 
such delays must certainly work to the detriment of our overall 
development effort".
38. ibid., 28.4.71.
39. ibid.. The shortage of administrative officers in Perlis had been 
compounded by the State's inability to recruit adequate staff 
because it lacks the necessary financial resources. An UMNO 
Division in Perlis at a meeting charied by the MB, Datuk Hj. 
Jaafar, urged the Central Government to absorb all the 
administrative officers in the Perlis Civil Service to help solve 
the shortage of administrative officers in the State. A oarrmittee 
member explained: "The State Government has made several requests
for more officers for the last 10 years. The Federal Government 
turned down the request because the State Government wanted the 
Federal officers to be placed under the State Civil Service but 
paid by the Federal Government." NST, 21.10.80.
40. Interviews with Central Civil Servants. Misgivings, specially 
over the inefficiencies of State administrations of the former 
UFMS States were readily expressed.
41. NST, 9.6.76.
42. ibid., 21.7.78.
This underlines the importance of the States; role in the implementation 
of development plans. The editorial was in no doubt that the need was 
to reform or streamline the State administration, including its SCS, so 
as to bring about improvements in organisation, efficiency and 
motivation.^
Tengku Noor Aishah, an MP from Kelantan, claimed that the 
implementation of development projects during the First and Second 
Malaysia Plans was delayed because Central officers with responsibility 
over development at the State level were too young and inexperienced to 
moke decisions.^ She suggested that suitably qualified, experienced 
and senior Central officers should be sent to States to co-ordinate the
development programmes and hence facilitate orderly Centre-State
4S . . . .relations. Tan Sri Chong Hon Nyan, the Minister without Portfolio,
replied that the majority of Central administrative and professional
officers posted to States had adequate experience at ministerial and
departmental levels.^ He stated that
"Perhatian berat adalah ditumpukan kepada faktor-faktor seperti 
pengalaman ker ja, keutuhan, kesesuaian, kecekapan serta kebolehan 
menjalarikan kerja-kerja apabila hendak menempatkan pegawai-pegawai 
pentadbir dan professional di negeri-negeri untuk melaksanakan 
projek-projek rancangan perribangunan Malaysia".
[Translation:
"Enphasis is placed on such factors as work experience, integrity, 
suitability, efficiency and capability to carry out the tasks when 
placing administrative and professional officers in the States to 
implement projects under the Malaysia development plan."]
Although there were cases when junior and inexperienced officers were
posted to States they usually were placed under senior and capable
48department heads and issued with adequate and proper guidelines.
Such Central officers holding posts in the State Establishments 
are under terms and conditions of service determined by the Central 
Government. Certain questions arise. Who had jurisdictional 
responsibility over these officers, for exanple in matters of 
discipline? To what extent can these officers be made to comply with 
State wishes? These officers are subjected to different, sometimes 
conflicting, pulls. As Central officers they are subject to the Central 
PSC. However, it might be thought appropriate that Central officers
43. ibid., and ibid., 19.8.78.
44. Malaysian Parliamentary Debates (MPD), Dewan Rakyat (DR), Vol. 3, 
No. 26, 24.10.77., col. 2903.
45. ibid., cols. 2903-2904.
46. ibid., col. 2904.
47. ibid..
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serving in State capacities and in the execution of their 'State' duties 
should be subject to the respective State PSC. Seme State officials 
have taken this view. Tilman, in the early 1960's, wrote:
"Despite often repeated denials by federal officials, it seems 
probable that a jurisdictional clash will eventually arise though 
the traditional urge to avoid such confrontations of extremes may 
postpone it until a crucial issue forces the question".
States' dependence on Central officers could also be another way
of saying that the State bureaucracies are 'penetrated' or 'infiltrated'
by such officers. Thus, the higher the dependence, the higher the
penetration or infiltration. Enloe has no doubt that
"State bureaucracies are "infiltrated" by federally seconded civil 
servants; these persons may have served in State capacities, but 
their careers depend on evaluations made in their respective Kuala 
Lumpur Ministries, making them especially sentitive to federal 
rather than State policy needs''.^
However, as indicated earlier, this penetration is uneven among the
States. The resistance to Central penetration or infiltration is
epitomised, as discussed in Chapter 7, by Kedah's unrelenting opposition
to the Central Government's federalisation plans and Central initiated
changes. The States' dependence on Central officers would tend to
ccnprcmise or dilute their autonomy especially when these officers will
quite naturally tend to look up to the Central Government for
protection, among other things.^
Centre-State Administrative Co-ordination
The mechanisms or institutions to handle Centre-State
administrative co-ordination were not provided for by the Constitution.
Immediately after Malayan Independence both the Central and State
leadership realised that such means were necessary. A meeting of
Central Ministers and Assistant Ministers on January 11 1961 decided
that the Permanent Secretary, PM's Department, should lock into the
CO
question of the proper co-ordination between Ministries. Several 
meetings between the Permanent Secretary and the then Deputy PM, Tun 
Abdul Razak, were subsequently held. They agreed that
49. Tilman, cp.cit., p.87, n.12.
50. Enloe, C., "The Neglected Strata: States in the City-Federal 
Politics of Malaysia", Publius, Vol. 5, No. 2, Spring 1975, 
p.153.
51. Similarly, in India, States' dependence on the All-India Services 
tends to compromise their autonomy and be detrimental to the 
growth of self-government in these States. See Thakur, R.N., The 
All-India Services: A Study of Their Origin and Growth, Patna, 
Eharati Bhawan, 1970, p.256.
52. Federation of Malaya, Report of the Ccmnittee on Relationships 
between the Federal and State Governments, (Confidential), p.l.
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"a Canmittee should be set up to look into the whole question of 
relationships between the Federal and State Governments with a 
view to making recommendations, wherever possible, for their 
improvement and for a closer co-operation between the Federal and 
State Governments on the most effective and efficient means of 
executing the Second Development Plan".
Accordingly, the Canmittee on Relationships between the Federal and
State Governments was constituted with the following terms of
reference:
"To examine the present set-up of the Government with particular 
reference to the relationship between the Federation and State 
Governments and to make recommendations for further improvement in 
such relationship".
The Ccmnittee was chaired by the Permanent Secretary (new called 
the Chief Secretary to the Government or the Ketua Setiausah Negara- 
KSN), and its other members were senior Central Civil Servants.^ The 
Committee held five meetings in all.^ Its first three meetings 
examined the problems and difficulties experienced by the Central
Ministries in their dealings with State Governments. Its fourth meeting,
. . . 57with the participation of States representatives , examined the
problems and difficulties experienced by the State Governments in their 
dealings with the Central Government.
The problems affecting Centre-State administrative relations were 
both complex and delicate.^® The Canmittee felt that these were of a 
continuing and dynamic nature, requiring constant vigilance and a great
53. ibid..
54. ibid., The Deputy PM was unsuccessful in his effort to have the 
Committee's term of reference expanded so as to include a review 
of the workings of the various State Constitutions, ibid., p.2.
55. ibid., pp.1-2.
56. ibid., p. 2. These meetings were held on the 4th and 23rd
February, 5th September, 9th October, and 3rd November, 1961.
57. All the State Secretaries or their respective representatives, 
except that of Kedah and Perak, participated, ibid., p. 2.
58. The Committee considered that some of the important problems 
affecting Centre-State relations included that of the 
implementation of the Rural Development Plan, land and 
related matters, staff shortages, Public Works Department, 
financial assistance to States, Staff quarters, office 
accommodation, consultation with State Governments, lew cost 
housing, issue of licences under the Waters Enactment, railway 
crossings, army movements and manouevers, standing orders of State 
Legislative Assemblies, Ministerial visits to States and co­
ordination with public bodies, ibid., pp.3-19.
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deal of tack and close investigation.J Central and State 
representatives unanimously agreed that these problems could best be
tackled through regular interpersonal contact between Central and State
60officials. The Ccnmittee therefore recommended that it should 
become a Standing committee on Relationships meeting at least once in 
six months.^
According to a respondent, this recommendation was raised and 
discussed in the early 1960's during the Centre-State Heads of 
Governments Meeting, usually referred to as the PM/MBs/CMs 
Conference. ^  This meeting agreed that a Federal-State Committee, now 
called the Federal-State Liaison Committee (FSLC), should be established 
on a permanent basis.^ This Committee meets at least once in three 
months and are usually held in the different States in rotation.
The KSN is chairman of the FSLC. Its permanent members include 
all the State Secretaries or their representatives. Sometimes Director- 
Generals of Ministries are invited to participate in its deliberations 
if the items on the agenda touch on the responsibilities of the relevant 
Ministries.
The FSLC's frame of reference is comprehensive; all Centre-State 
administrative matters. These may include, for example, the 
implementation of development plans and local government. At its 
meetings decisions are made through musjawarah or consensus. Such 
decisions, however, are only recommendatory and State representatives 
are not obliged to implement them at the State level. Herein lies one 
of the weaknesses of the Committee and a source of conflict within it. 
Difficult problems and 'sensitive' issues are usually referred to the
59^  ibid., p.4.
60. ibid., p. 19.
61. ibid..
62. Interview with KSN, Tan Sri Abdullah Ayub, 8.8.80.
63. Owing to difficulties associated with access to minutes of both 
the PM/MBs/CMs and FSLC meetings, it is not possible to be precise 
as to the date of the Committee's formal establishment. The 
discussion is thus necessarily based on information gained 
essentially from interviews and whatever could be gleaned from 
newspapers. According to Tan Sri Abdullah Ayub, the Committee was 
established about 15 years ago. Interview with Tan Sri Abdullah 
Ayub, 8.8.80. This was supported by his then deputy in a separate 
interview. His deputy stated that the Committee had its first 
meeting in 1966 after the formation of Malaysia. Interview with 
Datuk Rozhan Kuntum, Deputy KSN, 19.8.80.
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next tier, the Heads of Governments level-the PM/MBs/CMs Conference. In 
such cases the FSLC prepares working papers to be presented for 
discussion and perhaps dicision at these Conferences.^
The usefulness of the FSLC is debatable to say the least. It 
provides a convenient arena for the airing of views concerning Centre- 
State administrative matters and for preparing the ground, so to speak, 
by drafting working papers, for the much more inportant and politically 
powerful PM/MBs/CMs Conferences. In fact it functions as a filtering 
device in the hierarchy of Centre-State co-cperation and co-ordination.
A former State Secretary of Pahang was convinced that the FSLC was not 
especially useful in smoothing Centre-State administrative 
relations.^ Apart from the PM/MBs/CMs Conferences, he felt that the 
National Finance Council (NFC) and National Land Council (NIC) were more 
important than the FSLC as Centre-State co-ordinating bodies. These 
Centre-State Councils are Constitutionally provided for, and most 
significantly, they bring together the political heads or their 
representatives of the Central and State Governments.
The FSLC ccnprises members frcm different organisational and 
bureaucratic traditions, perhaps different pedigrees. The KSN, who is 
the chairman, the Director-Generals of Central Ministries, and the State 
Secretaries of States with federalised bureaucracies are PTD officers. 
The State Secretaries of States with non-federalised bureaucracies 
belong to the respective SCSs.
National Development Planning and the Administrative Machinery for the 
Co-ordination and Implememtation of Development Plans.
The Central Government in Peninsula Malaysia is provided with 
considerable constitutional pcwers to undertake national development 
planning in the national interest.^ While the Constitution does not 
provide for the establishment of a Centre-State planning body, the 
Central Government can exercise wide ranging powers in national
64. Interview with Datuk Rozhan Kuntum.
65. Interview with a former State Secretary of Pahang, 20.8.80.
66. Article 92 of the Constitution and Article 42 of the National Land 
Code were especially designed to overcome States' exclusive 
jurisdiction over land matters in each State. However, the 
Central Government has never resorted to using the pcwers provided 
by these provisions to get around sticky States' prerogatives over 
land. Interview with Tan Sri Dato Ahmad Nordin, the Auditor- 
General, 16.8.80. See also Osborn, James, Area, Development 
Policy and the Middle City in Malaysia, Uni. of Chicago, Dept, of 
Geography, Research Paper No. 153, 1974, p.96.
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development planning but only after the recommendation of an expert
committee, consultations with the NFC and NLC and the State Government 
67concerned. .
Since Malayan Independence the Central Government has embarked on 
national development planning, essentially through the national five- 
year plans. The Central Cabinet, through its Economic Committee new 
called the National Economic Council (NEC), is ultimately responsible 
for such planning. This Committee includes the PM as chairman, Deputy 
PM and senior Cabinet members. There is thus top level political power 
at the apex of the planning machinery. Figure 1 illustrates the planning 
machinery at the Central level.
The National Development Planning Committee (NDPC) acts as the 
Consultative Committee and is responsible for the detailed consideration 
of policy problems. It reports and is responsible to the NEC. The 
Economic Planning Unit (EPU), previously called the Economic Secretariat, 
acts as the secretariat to the NDPC. Since the inception of the Second 
Five-Year Plan the Central Government has developed and refined these 
instruments of planning as essential means of guiding and accelerating 
economic development. Accordingly,
"The machinery for planning has been stengthened and expanded 
through the establishment of the Economic Planning Unit in the 
Prime Minister's Department, the establishment on a permanent 
basis, of a National Development Planning Committee, and the 
formation of an Economic Advisory Committee".
The establishment of the NDPC and EPU in 1961 was indeed, in the First
Malaysia Plan's (FMP) words, in response to the urgent
"need for a strong and permanent planning organisation to cope 
with the increasing volume of work required for proper planning, 
close co-ordination and adequate control of rapidly expanding 
economic and social programmes". 1
The NDPC comprises senior Central Civil Servants of especially
71 .the PTD. It is responsible for the formulation, implementation,
67. Article 92(1) of the Constitution.
68. The Yang Di-Pertuan Agong' s (Supreme Monarch) Address to 
Parliament, MPD, Vol. IV, No. 1, 26.4.62., col.30.
69. ibid..
70. Federation of Malaysia, First Malaysia Plan (FMP), 1966-1970,
Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 1965, p.90.
71. It is chaired by the Cabinet/js appointee*, usually the KSN who is 
both the Chief Secretary to the Central Government and Secretary 
to the Cabinet. Other members include the Governor of Bank 
Negara, Malaysia, and representatives of the Treasury, Ministries 
of Commerce and Industry, National and Rural Development, the EPU, 
and the Department of Statistics. See ibid. The States of Sabah 
and Sarawak are represented while States of Peninsula Malaysia are 
not. Interview with Datuk Suffian Majid, Director of ICU, PM's 
Department, 5.8.80.
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72progress evaluation and revision of development plans. The EPU has
several responsibilities within the planning machinery and in general
include that over national development planning, natural resources and
regional economic planning, project and development assistance and
7 3  . .project management. Specifically the EPU drafts the annual 
development or investment budget.^ It has to approve every project 
in that budget and thus it ensures that each project is consistent with 
the five-year development plan which it also drafts. ^  The 
preparation of the development budget usually occasioned conflict 
between the EPU and the Treasury. According to Esman, the
"Determination of the magnitude of the development budget caused 
an annual confrontation, pitting the stability-minded Treasury ... 
against the growth-minded EPU ... with final resolution by 
compromise in the Cabinet. What specific items were finally 
included wa determined jointly by the Treasury and EPU 
officials. 6
Specifically the Treasury and EPU officials, jointly constituted as the 
Estimates Subcommittee of the NDPC, make these determinations. On this 
Esman commented:
"That such major allocations were made by a ccnmittee of civil 
servants is an indication of their power in the Malaysian 
political system.1,77
The real pcwers of the EPU over the administration of planning rests on
its influence over the allocation of development funds through the
drafting of the five-year plans, control over access to foreign
technical assistance, and crucial roles in negotiating, together with
• 7 ftthe Treasury, economic assistance with foreign donors and lenders.
The States of Peninsula Malaysia have no particular development
responsibility. In principle. States in a Federation should be able to
plan the development of resources, such as land, that are within their
jurisdiction. In Peninsula Malaysia the States' pcwers have been
72. For details see FMP, p.90.
73. For details see Bahagian Peranchang Ekoncmi (Economic Planning
Unit), Jabatan Perdana Menteri, Kuala Lumpur, 20.6.68., pp.2-4.
74. The ordinary budget is drafted by the Treasury. The development 
budget is roughly 1/3 of the total budgetry allocations.
75. Esman, M.J., Administration and Development in Malaysia, Ithaca 
and London, Cornell Uni. Press, 1972, pp.84-85.
76. ibid..
77. ibid., p.85, n.14.
78. ibid., p.85. An Economic Advisory Canmittee also contributes to
the planning process. This committee is made up of 
representatives of the private sector - employers and trade 
unions. It submits plan proposals to the NDPC. The Support Group 
comprising the Planning and Research Unites of Central Ministries 
similarly contributes to the planning process.
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blunted by their poor finances and by the fragmentation of their pcwers 
even within their areas of jurisdiction. The planning of development in 
the States, even within their areas of jurisdiction, mast necessarily 
depend on Central funding.
At the State level, because States were not created for planning 
purposes, the planning mechanism was either non-existent or inadequate. 
Within the State administrations, the State Secretariats could have 
taken up the task of planning but in all the States they have been 
largely confined to personnel, finance, housekeeping, local government 
and land activities. Esman argued that this was because
"They were not certain that their role permitted them to intervene 
in substantive areas or that they were competent to do so".
Not surprisingly, before the establishment of State and District
Development Committees and State Economic Planning Units (SEPU), State
8 0or regional planning was not much in evidence. Esman remarked:
"Not even a sirible policy, programmatic or administrative 
innovation, except for the Selangor State Development Authority 
and a lew cost method of land development in Kelantan, originated 
in the States".
8 2Planning at the State level was then, at best, haphazard and
handicapped by the State Governments s' apparent lack of orientation
8 3towards tasks required for development. Thong Yaw Hong argued that
"Planning at the programme and project levels will only become 
really efficient When the planning approach becomes fully 
established as a way of life in the ... State Governments".84
The States' freedom in the area of development is a function of
States' financial capacity and political persuasion. The richer the
State the more capable it is to plan and finance its own development
programmes, as Selangor8^ undoubtedly was. The State controlled by a
political party different to that controlling the Central Government
would also be more likely to provide and indeed emphasise alternative
development priorities to those of the Centre. This, the Parti Islam se
79T ibid., p. 91.
80. ibid., p. 95.
81. ibid..
82. Interview with a former State Secretary of Pehang, 2.9.80.
83. Thong Yaw Hong, "Planning - The Malaysian Experience", Malaysian 
Centre for Development Studies, Kuala Lumpur, n.d., Paper 
presented at the 1st Seminar on Development in Kuala Lumpur from 
24th October - 3rd November, 1966, organized by the Malaysian 
Centre for Development Studies, p.11.
84. ibid. Thong Yaw Hong was then the Director-General of the EPU.
85. See Senftleben, W., Background to Agricultural Policy in Malaysia,
Wiesbaden, Otto Harrosscwitz, 1978, p. 72.
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Malaya (PAS) controlled Kelantan Government attempted despite financial 
contraints in land development.
The States' desire to go their own way in development natters has 
been weakened by their inescapable financial dependence on the Central 
Government. Since the same political party, the Alliance before 1969 
and the National Front after 1973, controlled all the States of
Q 7
Peninsula Malaysia , this desire at best was subject to bargaining 
with the Central party leadership. Furthermore, the Central Government 
has a vested interest in ensuring that those States that feel rich 
enough to have their own development programmes do plan in a responsible 
manner so as not to exhaust their financial resources. Thong Yaw Hong 
indicated that
"scmetimes State Governments, having their own funds for 
development projects under the State subjects, do not apply the 
same standards of economy and criteria for project implementation. 
The end result of that they expect the Federal Government to bail 
them out When they are in the red".
The States' participation within an essentially highly centralized 
planning process is, nevertheless, important. The Central Government 
with its comparatively massive financial resources takes the lead in 
planning matters to Which the States respond. Before the drafting of 
the national five-year plan, for example the EMP, circulars were issued 
by the EPU. These circulars®^ indicated the nature of States 
participation in the planning process. They outlined the procedure that 
State Governments had to follow in preparing their respective statements 
of needs and problems. In these statements States were required to 
indicate what measures should be taken and Whether they were financially 
able to take such measures to meet their needs and problems. These 
statements were then forwarded to the EPU for processing and collation 
into the first draft of the FMP after taking into account both financial 
and economic appraisals. After examining the various section of the 
draft plan, allocations were recommended accordingly. The EPU referred 
policy issues to the Cabinet when necessary. Thus, as stated by the 
circulars,
"the final draft Plan will thus emerge from the integration of the 
individual Federal Departmental Proposals and State Plans, and
86. ibid..
87. The State of Kelantan and Trengganu were controlled by the PAS 
from 1959-1969 and 1959-1962 respectively.
88. Thong Yaw Hong, op.cit., pp. 13-14.
89. As described in the Federal Department of Town and Country 
Planning, Memorandum on the Approach to the National and State 
Development, and the preparation of the First Malaysia Plan,
1966-1970, 1964, para. 1-2.
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from the various decisions which will be taken by the Federalq n
Cabinet on Federal policy".
This 'loose' or 'laissez faire'^1 planning procedure had to be 
tightened and, as one memorandum argued,
"all National and State Plans should be based upon an accurate 
assessment, at Federal level, of the needs of each State and the 
nation as a whole. It is quite impossible for individual States 
to prepare their own development plans in isolation, without an 
overall guiding policy from Federal level, from the very 
beginning".
The planning procedure was tightened by strengthening EPU guidance 
of State Governments in the preparation of the Second (1971-1975) and 
Third Malaysia Plans (1976-1980) - the SMP and TMP.^ For the latter 
the EPU initiated the collection of information from States for planning 
purposes. In 1975, the EPU contacted all State Governments through 
their State Secretaries and informed than that each State had to prepare 
working papers stating to the EPU which development projects and other 
needs each State sought to have included in Malaysia's forthcoming five- 
year plan. It provided general guidelines for such papers which the 
respective States should complete within three to four months.
Sometimes several EPU economists visited State Governments to give 
further explanations as to methods of presenting State Government 
proposals. The IMP, describing the States' subordinate position vis-a- 
vis the Centre within the planning process, stated that
"State Governments and Statutory Authorities participated in the 
initiation of plan proposals in respect of their areas of concern 
and in the deliberations on these proposals working through 
specially constituted Inter-Agency Planning Groups under the 
direction of the NDPC and the NEC"
The recommendations made following such deliberations were examined by
special committees headed by both the PM and Deputy PM before bing
considered by the NEC and the Cabinet.^
The strengthening of EPU guidance could at least ensure that
States needed to do more than just produce a collection of projects
which might hopefully be fitted into the all-Malaysia Plan. Without
this guidance States might otherwise simply 'unload' on the Central
Government a list of unrealistic and inflated projects. While there was
no evidence of this sort of exercise in unrealism, the States were
criticized for their less than forthcoming attitude in the planning
90. quoted in ibid.7 para. 4.
91. ibid., para. 13.
92. ibid. My emphasis.
93. Interview with Dr. Abdullah Sanusi, the Director-General of MAMPU,
27.7.80.
94. IMP, p.264.
95. ibid..
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exercise. In criticizing State Governments for not preparing enough 
projects for the IMP, the Chief Secretary to the Central Government, Tan 
Sri Kadir Shamsuddin stated that
"The Federal Government expects those less developed States to 
prepare more projects for a more equitable development strategy 
throughout the country".
He futher stated that the Central Government had allocated funds for
expenditure incurred in development planning but the response from SEPUs 
9 7had been poor. He was especially critical of the tendency of States
Q Q
to refer all their problems to the Central Government. States did 
not plan with any great competence and their lack of the technical 
expertise to do so made them more dependent on the Central Government.
The Central Government through the NEC, NDPC and EPU has the 
unenviable task of drawing up a viable all-Malaysia plan, of sorting out 
State requests and relating these to national prioities and financial 
availabilities. However, through its control of massive financial 
resources, it determines what these national prioities are and which 
States get what. This essentially involves a political judgement over 
two choices: maximum economic returns through rapid economic growth or 
balanced regional or State growth through equalisation policies. The 
Central Government has been increasingly committed towards the 
latter.^
The Central Government tended to view the States only as 
implementing and co-ordinating agencies in the quest to achieve national 
development priorities. The following EMP statement suggested such a 
view:
"it is necessary to improve communications with the States and 
local authorities and to promote better appreciations of national 
requirements. This understanding is particularly inportant in 
regard to such areas as the determination of priorities among 
various development programmes and the allocation of federal and 
State funds for overlall development ... it is of the utmost 
importance that governments and public and local authorities 
utilise their resources in accordance with the priorities of the 
Plan".100
It suggested also that Centre-State co-operation in the development 
field was not always smooth or without 'resistance' from the States.
The Central Government appeared to believe that Centre-State co­
operation could be achieved simply by it giving clear-cut directives and 
planning guidelines to the State Governments.101
96. NST, 30.3.76.
97. ibid..
98. ibid..
99. See discussion in chapter 4.
100. EMP, p.93.
101. ibid..
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Under the FMP for instance it proposed to provide the State Governments
with the help of the NDPC and EPU in improving their planning and
102implementation procedures through either the short-term assignment 
of Central officers to the States or the NDPC undertaking field tours of 
projects in the States. In this way the Central Government hoped that
"These arrangements will develop greater partnership and closer 
understanding between the Central and State governments and ensure 
effective implementation and smooth administration of development 
programmes". 1^
However, despite the organizational changes introduced during the 
FMP' s period, the Mid-Term Review of the EMP hinted that Centre-State 
co-operation was still lacking and emphasised the need to achieve this 
and also to increase the States' technical expertise in the development 
f i e l d . T h e  SMP endorsed these needs and stated that
"The success of the plan depends heavily on the activities of the 
State governments. Many of the important natural resources, 
notably land, forestry and minerals, are within their 
jurisdiction. The plan requires a larger and more dynamic role by 
State Governments in the achievement of national objectives. It 
is therefore essential that there be full co-cperation at every 
stage between the State and Federal Governments".
This statement comes close to saying that it was the States' duty to
make the plan a success by fully co-cperationg with the Central
Government. The SMP continued that
"To discharge their widened responsibilities effectively. State 
Governments will require a corp of better trained planners and 
administrators, with a greater awareness of national objectives 
and an ability to harness the full potential of the States' 
resources for the implementation of the plan".
Only the Central Government then had a pool of better trained planners
and administrators who as Central officers had the necessary awareness
of national objectives. On these Central officers the States would now
have to depend to increase their technical expertise and awareness of
national objectives in the development field.
Under the SMP State level planning was to be improved with the
Central Government's assistance through the establishment of the SEPU
within each S t a t e . T h e  Central EPU took the lead, in 1972, in the
establishment of such SEPUs and it also determined their
102. ibid..
103. ibid., p.94.
104. Federation of Malaysia, Mid-Term Review of the First Malaysia 
Plan, 1966-1970, Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 1969, P.130-131.
105. Federation of Malaysia, Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-75, (SMP), 
Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 1971, p.115.
106. ibid..
107. ibid..
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1 no
functions. The SEPUs' establishment, at the instigation of the
Central Government, represented an administrative decentralisation of
the planning function. Established within the State Secretariats, the
SEPU advices the State Planning Ccmmittee (SPC) with the CM or MB and
l OQState Secretary as its chairman and deputy chairman respectively.
The SPC in turn advises the State Executive Council (Exco), the top 
policy-making body in the State. By the time of the Mid-Term Review of 
the SMP, several States - Pahang, Trengganu, Johore, Perak, Selangor and 
Sarawak - already had a nucleus of planning Staff and in the majority of 
cases they were assisted by Central officers.The SEPUs' 
establishment, however, was not intended to provide the States with an 
independent planning capability but to upgrade planning at the State 
level as adjuncts of the national planning administration: that is, 
planning at the State level had to reflect and give meaning to national 
priorities. Thus the Review stated that while the main objective of the 
establishment of SEPUs
"is to enable the States to identify and formulate projects and to 
co-ordinate development activities at the State level. The long­
term objective, however, is to enable the States to prepare 
development plans consistent with the priorities in the national 
development plan".
The SEPUs were not meant to pursue State interests which were contrary
to Centrally-defined priorities. In development matters there was to be
no deviation from national priorities.
108. See Implementation, Co-ordination, Development Administration Unit 
(ICDAU), "A Guideline for the Setting up of State Planning Units", 
(unpublished), 1972, p.2. The SEPUs functions include the 
following:
1) to promote greater co-ordination in development planning, 
programming and project formulation at the State level,
2) to facilitate the drawing up of priorities for programmes and 
projects for the purpose of determining financial 
allocations,
3) to provide additional technical and economic analysis in the 
formulation of projects at State level,
4) to increase the capacity to follow up implementation of new 
programmes and projects identified by feasibility studies 
initiated at federal or State level,
5) to provide greater co-ordination in putting up requests for 
technical and financial assistance by the State Government, 
and
6) to strengthen the planning capabalities at the regional or 
State level and help to decentralize the planning functions at 
the federal level.
109. Other members include the most senior officers in the State's 
administration.
110. Federation of Malaysia, Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia 
Plan, 1971-1975, Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 1973, p.106.
111. ibid..
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Under the IMP several SEPUs, especially in less-developed States,
were strengthened so as to enable them to plan their requirements more
effectively and consistently with national objectives. At the same
time the Central EPU extended, where necessary, technical and training
assistance through its regional offices which were established to assist
the SEPUs in the identification and preparaion of development programme
1 1 3and projects, especially those to be financed from Central sources. 
Furthermore, the IMP stated that
"Experienced personnel will be deployed to help upgrade the 
planning capabilities of State Governments in the endeavour to 
strengthen the process of decentralized planning".
"Experience personnel" could only refer to Central officers for only
they, through serving in the Central planning agencies, would have the
necessary planning experience.
Under the BMP the national planning process was extended with the
addition of the 'Master Plan' technique. This technique was considered
essential in developing a comprehensive and integrated plan for the
development of a State or a major part of it. The use of this
technique should be preceded by surveys of available resources and
n e e d s . S o  far the Central Government, in association with Pahang,
Trengganu, Johore, Penang, Malacca and Sarawak had adopted this 
1 1 7technique. The adoption of such a technique, however, necessarily
requires the consent of the State Governments concerned.
The administration of the national development effort was further
decentralized by the establishment of Regional Development Authorities
(RDA). Such Authorities were established at the State level by the
Central Government after it had, with the respective State Governments'
agreement, identified several regions in a State for Centrally-funded
118development programmes. During the first part of the SMP the 
Jengka Authority and the Pahang Tenggara (Southeast) Authority in 
Pahang, the Johore Tenggara Authority in Johore, and Trengganu Tengah 
Tenggara authority in Trengganu were established. These 
Authorities were designed
112. IMP, p. 263.
113. ibid., p. 264. These Regional Offices of the EPU were established 
in Alor Star (capital of Kedah), Kota Bharu (capital of Kelantan) 
and Johore Bahru (capital of Johore).
114. ibid..
115. Mid-Term Review of the First Malaysian Plan, 1966-1970, p. 134.
116. ibid. Under Article 93 of the Constitution, the Central 
Government has overall responsiblity over inquiries and surveys.
117. ibid., p.135.
118. Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysian Plan, 1971-1975, p. 106.
119. ibid..
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"To initiate and co-ordinate the implementation of various 
programmes and projects resulting fran the various regional 
studies in Pahang, Johore, and Trengganu".
The RDAs, although centrally appointed comprise both the Centre's
and States' representatives. They operate within the States as agents
of the Central Government and are involved with the development of land,
an exclusive State right. The State Governments also have their own
statutory bodies, the State Economic Development Corporations (SEDC),
121Which are dependent on Central funding. These Corporations are 
also involved in land development projects in conjunction with Central 
agencies or independently. This implies that the States and their SEDCs 
must have an interest in the activities of the RDAs and indeed also so 
the other Central bodies like the Federal Land Development Authority 
(FELDA) and Federal Industrial Development Authority (FIDA). The 
proliferation of such Central bodies, due to the increasing national 
development needs and the administrative decentralization of the 
national development efforts, at the State level in competition with 
Stae bodies would test and tax Centre-State co-operation.
The co-ordination of development programmes is crucial to, if not
1 95
the essence of, planning.  ^ Within a Federation there are two types 
of co-ordination, the horizontal and vertical. Briefly, Ministries and 
Central departments with State branches are also involved in development 
activities and their co-ordination in such activities is referred to as 
vertical co-ordination. The following ciscussion is confined to the co­
ordination of Central and State development activities, referred to as 
horizontal co-ordination.
The State administrative machines were not devised for the co­
ordination of development programmes. The Central Government felt as 
early as 1959 with the implementation of the rural development plans 
that this weakness had to be overcome. The State Secretariats, situated 
at the centre of the State administrative structure, took little
interest in the developmental departments and were thus considered as
123unsuited for the co-ordination of development efforts.
Furthermore, Tun Razak, as Deputy PM and Minister of Rural Development 
and the inspiration behind the Central Government's rural development
120. ibid..
121. See discussion in chapter 4.
122. Hanson, A.H., The Process of Planning; A Study of India's five- 
year plan, 1950-1964, London, Oxford University Press, 1966,
p. 84.
123. Esman, cp.cit., p. 101.
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effort, felt that the Governmental agencies at the State and District
levels were not working together and that their perverse independence
1 2 4was an obstacle to rural development. To overcome this he directed 
that a State Rural Development Ccrrmittee (SRDC) and below it the
District Rural Development Committees (DRDC) be established in each
1 2 5  . . .State. The State Secretariats, not surprisingly, were excluded
from participating in this committee system.
The SRDC was chaired by the MB or CM with the State Development
Officer (SDO), a senior MCS officer of the Ministry of Rural
Development, as its executive secretary. Other members included the
State heads of all the technical departments, and MPs from the State.
The DRDC in each district was chaired by the District Officer (DO) who
was also an MCS officer in the former FMS and SS States but not in the
former UFMS States. Other members included all the District Heads of
technical departments, State Assemblyment and MPs from the district.
The SDO was the link between the SRDC and the DRDC. In each State the
DOs were and still are formally responsible to the States MBs or CMs,
normally through the State Sceretary. However, in development matters
they were and still are responsible to the SDO as an executive of both
the MB or CM and the Minister of Rural Development.In this
sense the SDO at the State level was and still is the key co-ordinator
in development matters with direct access to and control over the
District level co-ordinators, the DOs.
The establishment of State and District level committees on the
direction of the Central Government was designed to overcome What it
perceived as the unsuitability or weakness of the State administrative
machines in co-ordinating the development efforts within the State.
This canmittee system decentralized the co-ordination of national and
rural development. It bypassed the State Secretariats and allowed the
Ministry of Rural Development through the SDOs and DOs in each State to
have direct access to the local units despite the nation's federal
structure. The Central Government was initially undecided as to whether
its decentralized approach to rural development should focus on the
124. ibid..
125. Ness, G.D., Bureaucracy and Rural Development in Malaysia, 
Berkeley, Uni. of California Press, 1967, p. 144. A discussion of 
the Ministry of Rural Development and it State and District level 
committees is contained in ibid., chapter 6. This Ministry was 
established in 1960. The Deputy PM's directive was probably sent 
immediately after.
126. ibid., p. 151.
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127Negri (State) or the Daerah (District) level. If rural development
was entrusted to the State it would require a low-resource system to
advance rural uplift and this would generate the same kind of
centralising tendencies which the Central leadership wanted to 
128avoid. More important, perhaps, the Central leadership was not 
eager to promote strong centres of State autonomy. According to Stephen 
Chee,
"the crucial consideration was that the daerah or district, not 
the State (except in the east coast States of Kelantan, Trengganu
and Pahang), was the true locus of local government and the nexus
between the rural Malays and the central administration. It is 
the point at which the administration (traditional and Modem) 
works its will".
The committee system of co-ordination was reorganised and
1 ‘IDstrengthened in the early 1970's. Before this, at the Central 
level, the apex of the committee system was the Minister of Rural 
Development. New, the National Action Council (NAC) was established to 
oversee the whole national development effort. The PM chairs the
NAC and it includes senior Cabinet Ministers and Heads of the Civil
Service, the Armed Forces and Police. The Implemtation Co-ordination 
Unit (ICU) wdthin the PM's Department acts as the Secretariat to the 
NAC.
At the State level, the State Action Committee (SAC) was 
established primarily for inplementing and co-ordinating the national 
development effort at this level. The SDOs office provides the 
Secretariat to the SAC. The SAC with the MB or CM as Chairman also 
includes senior State Exco members. Alongside the SAC, the State 
Development Committee (SDC), originally SRDC, is chaired also by the MB 
or CM and with the SDO as its executive secretary. It had the same 
membership and tasks as the former SRDC.
At the District level, two committees, the District Action 
Committee (DAC) and the District Development Committee (DDC) which was 
formerly the DRDC, form part of the nation-^ wide structure of co­
ordination. The DO chairs both committees. The former is the most 
important and powerful and includes as members the Heads of all District
127. Stephen Chee, Rural Development and Development Administration in 
Malaysia, Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group, Paper
No.74/5, New York, The Group, 1974, p. 17.
128. ibid..
129. ibid..
130. The impact of this committee system on the Kedah and Pahang
administrations is discussed in the next chapter.
131. Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975, p. 106.
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technical departments of the Central and State Governments, senior
1 27police and army officers , Wakil Rakyats (State Assemblymen), and 
Penghulus (village headman). The latter committee includes only the 
Heads of the District technical departments. The DO, as chairman of 
both committees, has thus been clothed with both State and Central 
authority in development matters. The national committee system of co­
ordination which links the different levels and is responsible for co­
ordinating and implementing the development plans is illustrated by 
Figure 2.
133The activities of Central Statutory bodies m  national
development are co-ordinated at the Central level by the Ministry of 
Public Enterprises.^^ They usually deal directly wdth State 
Governments and their success may well depend on such Governments
1 35attitude to their activities within the States. The National
Petroleum Company (PETRQNAS), concerned with petroleum and its
development, was involved in difficult negotiations with the States
1 26regarding their share of petroleum revenues. The RDAs' activities 
in regional development are co-ordinated by the Federal Co-ordinating
132. The police and army officers were included because it was thought
that security matters were relevant to the success of development.
133. These bodies form part of the Central Government. They are 
totally owned, financed and controlled by the Central Government 
and are governed by Acts of Parliament. Examples include the 
Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA), the Federal Land Co­
ordination Rehabilitation Authority (FELCRA), the State Trading 
Ccnpany or Perbadanan Nasional (PERNAS) and the Urban Development 
Authority (UDA).
134. Originally established in 1974 as the Ministry for the Co­
ordination of Public Corporations and 1976 renamed as the Ministry
of Public Enterprises, See Milne, R.S., and Mauzy, D.K., Politics 
and Government in Malaysia, Vancouver, Uni. of British Columbia 
Press, 1978, p.254.
135. The lack of FELDA schemes in PAS-controlled Kelantan was an 
example. Kelantan then had persistently refused to comply with 
the National Land Council's decision on nominal premia and 
insisted on full payment in accordance with Article 83 of the 
Constitution. According to Senftelben, this "is one reason for 
the non-existence of Federal Land development schemes in Kelantan. 
In addition to that, this State only offered inferior terrain 
that did not comply with the wishes of the Federal Land 
Development Authority. It wras only when the Coalition Government 
at Federal and State level was formed in 1973 that the Kelantan 
Government changed its policy towards land alienation".
Senftleben, W., op.cit., p. 213.
136. See Milne and Mauzy, cp.cit., p. 121. The Ninth Schedule, Lll- 
2(c), and the Tenth Schedule, Part 111-3, of the Constitution 
accorded States with the right to a share of the revenue from 
mining operations within their territories. See also Malaysian 
Business, December 1974, pp.12 and 18-19.
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Figure 2s The National Committee System of Co-ordination.
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Adapted from Chee, S., Local Institutions and Rural 
Development in Malaysia, Ithaca, New York, 197^, p. 32
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Canmittee for Regional Development. This Canmittee comprises senior 
representatives of the EPU, Federal Treasury, FIDA and ICDAU.^^
130
The SEDC, established through State legislation , is designed 
to develop economic resources and carry out economic development 
programmes within the State. Although owned by the respective State 
Governments, the SEDCs' activities are subject to Central influence 
through the co-ordination of their activities by a Central 
committee , and through other responsibilities exercised by this 
committee.
At the very least the SEDCs and the States cannot go their way 
without Central Government approval. Overall, by the time of the
IMP, the planning and impementation machinery in Peninsula Malaysia can 
be approximately illustrated as in Figure 3.
National development within a Federation, because of the division 
of pcwers between the Centre and States, must of necessity be based on 
Centre-State co-operation. A newspaper editorial, Garmenting on the 
PM's remarks on Centre-State relations in the development field, 
underlined this:
"Development plans are made nationally, funds are secured for 
their implementation by the Federal Government, responsibility for 
the success of these projects rest upon the shoulders of Ministers 
who must answer queries about their progress in Parliament, and 
yet the ways and means by which all the ingredients are put to 
gether for the benefit of the people are not all within the 
command of the national administration. As a result of history, 
many matters remain constitutionally entrenched in the hands of the 
State Governments".
However, this is not really an appeal for States to co-operate with the
Central Government on an equal basis, but a call to recalcitrant States
to play their subordinate part in the national development efforts.
137. Senf tleben, W ., op.cit., p. 297.
138. See note 41 of Chapter 4. In December 1980, it was reported that
the Central Government would seek Parliament's approval to give
more pcwers to the States to control their respective SEDCs. See
The Star, 1.12.80 and NST, 1.12.80.
139. This Committee was established during the SMP period. See SMP,
P. 115. The ICDAU then served as the Secretariat to this SEDCs' 
Co-ordinating Committee. See Senf tleben, W., op. cit., p. 130.
140. For details of these responsibilities, see SMP, p. 115.
141. On December 1980, the Minister of Public Enterprises, Datin Paduka 
Rafidah, stated that her Ministry intended to table a regulation 
exercising control and co-ordination of SEDCs throughout the 
country at the next sitting of Parliament. See The Star,
8.12.80.
142. NST, 29.4.78.
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National development planning, economic or social, is dominated, 
inevitably perhaps, by the Central Government. States participate 
within the framework of national priorities Which are determined at the 
Central level and are subordinate to the national five-year plans. 
Several reasons account for this. The Constutution concentrates 
legislative, executive and financial pcwers in the Central Government.
In comparison to the States, there is a readily available pool of senior 
and experienced Central officers with the required technical knowledge 
at the Central level. These apart, the following two reasons seems to 
be the most important in explaining Central dominance. First, the same 
ploitical party, first the Alliance and then the National Front, 
controls the Governments in all the States of Peninsula Malaysia (with 
certain exceptions) as well as in the Centre. Second, the States' 
financial dependence on the Central Government places them in a 
relatively weak position vis-a-vis the Centre despite their control of 
certain matters. Planning inplies some amount of centralisation in 
decision making which the Central Government dominates because it can 
secure acceptance of national policies and programmes through the 
leverage of loans, grants and subsidies.
Central dominance has established the States as important agents 
in the top-down co-ordination of development efforts. Through the 
Centrally-directed establishment in each State of the SDOs and their 
staff, the development committees, the SEPUs and the liberal 'use' on 
secondment or loan of Central officers, Central administrative links to 
the States are being tightened. The Centrally-determined development 
programmes have simultaneously increased the centrlisation of the 
administration responsible for implementing and co-ordinating these 
programmes.
The Central and State Governments are no longer confident that the 
existing structure and areas of administration can provide an adequate 
framework for large programmes of development. This is indicated by the 
increase in the number of Central and State statutory bodies. A new 
pattern of Centre-State administrative relations may emerge, one that 
may increasingly emphasize the necessity of Centre-State co-operation in 
the development field.
Conclusion
Malayanization significantly altered the composition of the MCS 
and paved the way for the dominance of former MAS officers within it. 
Since they were educated in, recruited from and largely employed in the 
former FMS States, their dominance within the MCS underlines the 
georgraphical unrepresentativeness of this Service.
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The Central Government is by far the largest single employer of 
public employees. This, together with the complete dependence of States 
with federalised bureaucracies on the personnel of the Central 
administrative, professional and technical services have placed the 
Central Government in a strong position in its relations with these 
States. These States, after all, depend on such Central officers to 
execute their policies; The exception to this complete dependence, 
perhaps encapsulation, are the States with non-federalised 
bureaucracies. Thewe States have their own SCSs and whose officers hold 
all the key administrative posts within the State. They depend only on 
personnel of the Central professional and technical services. These 
States, in comparison to the former, do enjoy and exercise a certain 
degree of autonomy in the execution of their policies. Thus, the level 
of dependence on Central officers is uneven between States.
The Central Government's dominance in development planning and 
implementation do have an impact on Centre-State administrative 
relations, not least because the development programmes and with this 
the administrative structure new reflect a national pattern determined 
at the Central level. Indeed these development programmes represent 
strongly centralizing tendencies because they carry the imprint of 
Central perspectives.
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Chapter 7
Centre-State Administrative Relations: Kedah and Pahang compared.
This chapter compares Kedah and Pahang with regard to their 
respective administrative relations with the Centre. The bureaucracies 
of Kedah and Pahang belong, respectively, to two different bureaucratic 
traditions, those of the former Unfederated Malay States (UFMS) and the 
Federated Malay States (FMS).
Hostorical Background
Kedah: The nucleus of Kedah's administrative cadre had already been
established When all
"rights of suzerainty, protection, administration, and control 
Whatsoever"
over Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and Perlis were ceded by Siam to the
British Government in 1909. ^ Malay Government in Kedah had been well
2established by then. According to Roff, by 1909 Kedah had combined 
modem bureaucratic organization to traditional systems of State 
Government and
"Though centralized administrations of this kind were still only 
in infancy, they were staffed almost entirely by Malays".
Moreover, the Kedah ruling group was collectively dedicated to the
continuance of Malay control and the preservation of the Malay
characteristics of the State.^
Not surprisingly the British Adviser in Kedah was confronted with
a strong sensitivity among the ruling group to all attempts to overstep
the boundaries of advice and guidance.^ The first British Adviser to
Kedah, Maxwell, was reminded of this by the Sultan and members of the
State Council When his activities overstepped his 'Advisers's' role and
thus undermined Kedah's autonomy.^ When the High Commissioner,
Anderson, intervened on Maxwell's behalf he met unequivocal resistance
from members of the State Council. Immediately after Anderson's
1. Maxwell, W.G., and Gibson, W.S., Treaties and Engagements 
affecting the Malay States and Borneo, London, JAS Truscott and 
Sons, Ltd., 1924, p.88.
2. At the end of the 19th Century, there were in Kedah departments 
like the Treasury, Lands and Survey, Office of the Auditor- 
General, Posts and Telegraphic Office and Courts of Law. See 
Sharcm, bin Ahmat, "Transition and Change in a Malay State: a 
study of the economic and political development of Kedah, 1879- 
1923," Unpub. Ph.D. Thesis, Uni. of London, 1969, pp.159-160.
3. Roff, W.R., The Origins of Malay Nationalism, Kuala Lumpur, 
University of Malaya Press, 1967, p.94.
4. Sharcm, bin Ahmat, cp.cit., passim and especially chapter 6.
5. Roff, cp.cit., p.94 and Sharcm, op.cit., chapter 6.
6. Sharcm, ibid., p.258.
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departure from Alor Setar (capital of Kedah) two meetings to discuss the 
situation were held by all Malay Government officers above the rank of 
clerk. They agreed that they should boycott Government offices. This 
campaign, with few exceptions, was supported by the Malay officers 
including the District Officers. Maxwell duly recognised the strong 
Malay character of Kedah Which he emphasised in his Annual Report to the 
Kedah Government in 1909-1910:
"The State is more purely a Malay State than the States of the 
Federated Malay States. The Muhammadan, and not the Christian 
calendar is used. Friday is, as well as Sunday, a day upon Which 
the public offices are closed. The language of the Legislature, 
the Courts and the public offices is Malay. There are only ten 
European officers ... There are a few Tamil officers in the 
Medical and Postal Departments, but with the exception of these 
officers ... all the government servants are Malays; and of the 
Malays perhaps not more than a dozen understand any language 
except their cwn.
Anderson, after visiting Kedah in 1909, reported that it was 
impossible to contemplate the early entry of the States that were ceded 
by Siam to the British Government into the Federation of the Malay 
States of Pahang, Perak, Selangor and Negri Sembilan. He emphasised 
that
"This is more particularly the case in regard to Kedah Where there 
is a fully organized central administration carposed of Malays, 
seme of them, men of considerable ability and individuality ...
They are very tenacious of pcwer and privileges and no doubt the 
agitation and intrigues Which preceded the transfer was largely 
due to the apprehension that those in pcwer would be reduced to 
the position of pensioners with only titular authority and duties 
and that the actual administration would, as in the Federated Malay 
States, be placed in the hands of Europeans.
He argued that even if Kedah's finances could support a European Staff,
it would be highly impolitic and undesirable to displace the Malays.
While European assistance for supervision and direction was necessary,
he concluded that British policy should be confined to educating and
training the Malays to carry on the administration themselves. ^
Before signing the 1923 Treaty^ with the British Government the
7. ibid., p.264.
8. Annual Report of the Adviser to the Kedah Government, 1909-1910,
Federated Malay States Government Printing Office, 1910, p.13.
9. Anderson's despatch to the Earl of Crewe as quoted in Sharcm,
cp.cit., pp.255-256
10. ibid., p.256.
11. The 1923 Treaty formally defined the relationship between the 
British Adviser and the Kedah government. See Maxwell and Gibson, 
cp.cit., pp. 104-105. In 1910 Kedah had agreed to accept a British 
Adviser Whose pcwers then were not clearly defined. See Roff, 
op.cit., p.92, n.3.
Regent of Kedah secured British undertakings designed to maintain the
12Malay character of Kedah's authority and adminstration. This Treaty 
placed Kedah in a unique position in her relationship with the British 
Government and according to Sharcm Ahmat
"this Treaty was to extend to Kedah guarantees which went far 
beyond any that the British had previously granted"
It reaffirmed Kedah's Malay identity and character.
In administration the British relied on the then existing Central
institutions. Thus, officers of the all-European Malayan Civil Service
(MCS) were 'seconded' to Kedah. So also were specialist and technical
officers of Central Departments made freely available to Kedah.^
Despite the penetration of such Central officers, the Kedah
administration retained its cwn individuality as a truly Malay
administration. Roff remarks that
"Only in Kedah was there something like a truly autonomous Malay 
administration acting under British advice ... .
Jones and Purcell were similarly impressed by Kedah's conmitment to its
perceived place and role within British Malaya as a truly Malay State
with minimal foreign participation in the administration of its
affairs.^
In Kedah, and to seme extent in the other States of the UFMS,
Malays belonging to the States' Civil Services (SCS) were trained for
both subordinate and superior administrative posts in the State. The
planned training of Kedah Malays for Government posts resulted from the
Kedah Government's deliberate policy of promoting Malay political
control of the State.^ The Kedah Mentri Besar (MB), then called the
Secretary to the Government, played a crucial part in this. Using his
wide discretionary pcwers he selected candidates for higher education
and decided where they should go and What posts in the State Government
l ftthey should hold when they returned. The Kedah SCS contained salary
12. See Maxwell and Gibson, cp.cit., pp. 102-103 and 134-135
13. Sharcm, cp.cit., p.290.
14. Roff, cp.cit., p.95.
15. ibid., p.251.
16. Jones, S.W., Public Administration in Malaya, London, Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 1953, pp.92-94, and 
Purcell, V., The Memoirs of a Malayan Official, Cassell, London,
1965, p. 160. Mubin Sheppard, a former MCS officer who at one time
served in Trengganu, attached similar qualities to Trengganu.
See Sheppard, Mubin, Taman Budiman - Memoirs of an Unorthodox 
Civil Servant,Heinernan, Asia, 1980, p.44.
17. Sharcm, cp.cit,. p.303, n.l.
18. Puthucheary, M., The Politics of Administration; The Malaysian 
Experience, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1978, P.15.
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scales equivalent to those of the MCS. In 1946 there were 26 officers 
in the Kedah SCS drawing salaries of $400 per month (the starting salary 
for the MCS) or more. ^  Up till and beyond Malayan independence, as 
later discussion will shew, Kedah had a fully fledged SCS that it 
controlled.
Pahang: The experience of Pahang was different. As part of their
forward policy the British, in succession, entered into a series of
treaties with the States of Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and
20Pahang. These treaties paved the way for direct British
participation in the administration of these States, although in
principle these treaties envisaged the appointment of a British Resident
21to each State with powers only to advise the Ruler of the State. In 
these States, a different objective situation prevailed in the 1870's 
and as Swetteriham claimed,
"The British, on arriving here, found no Native Civil Service ... 
which could gradually be reformed and disciplined. On the 
contrary, an English Civil Service had to be created, and many 
years must elapse before any appreciable numbers of Malays will be 
fitted to take their due or any prominent place in the labours of 
Administration".
Following British intervention in Pahang the administration expanded
into an elaborate bureaucracy, one that was led and staffed by
Europeans including the State Civil and Specialist Services. 'To provide
for administrative uniformity' the FMS was established by the Treaty of
1895 , and the Administrative and Specialist Services of Perak,
Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang were merged to form Central 
2 4Services. A unified MCS was established 'in the interest of 
efficiency'.^
19. ibid., p.15, Table 2.3.
20. Maxwell and Gibson, cp.cit., pp.28-30, 36, 63, 66-68. In Pahang, 
resistance to British control led to the revolt of 1891-92.
See Cowan, C.D., Nineteenth Century Malaya: the origins of British 
political control., Lcxidon, Oxford University Press, 1962, p.270.
21. Ginsburg, N. and Roberts, Jnr. C.F., Malaya, Seattle, University 
of Washington Press, 1958, p.428.
22. As quoted in Roff, cp.cit., pp. 13 and 94.
23. Maxwell and Gibson, op.cit., pp.70-71.
24. Centralized departments for such matters as finance, public works, 
lands and mines, agriculture and police were established. See 
Roff, cp.cit., p. 13.
25. ibid., pp.21-22. According to Purcell the MCS was formed in 1906 
with the merging of the Malay States Civil Services and the 
Settlement Civil Services. Purcell, cp.cit., pp.290-291. See also 
Tilman, R.O., Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya, Durham, Duke Uni. 
Press, 1964, p.46, n.23. According to Allen, the title 'Malayan 
Civil Service' was invented only in 1919. See Allen, J. De Vere, 
"Malayan Civil Service, 1874-1941", Comparative Studies in Society 
and History, Vol. 12, No.2 (1970), pp. 150-151.
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The Rulers then enjoyed the rights of self-government only in 
matters relating to Malay custan and religion. Since the establishment 
fo a British Resident system in each of the States, the Rulers had only 
in theory enjoyed the right of self-government. In practice the British 
Residents had unsurped the Rulers' right in whose name they rule.^
This gulf between theory and practice, according to Cowan, was widened 
by the Federation Agreement of 1895 because
"What resulted was not a Federation of Malay States, but union 
with a British directed central government".
Emerson also commented that
"It is difficult to envisage any federal scheme in which the power 
and privileges of the component units would be in no way 
diminished".
With the establishment of the EMS the British Resident in each State was 
subordinate to the Governor of the Straits Settlements who was also the 
High Commissioner of Malaya and, below the Governor, the Resident- 
General in Kuala Lunpur.
Before the EMS was established the British Officers in the four 
States led and staffed the respective SCSs. Neverthless, there was some 
sense in which they did identify with the State in which they served and 
they were equally viewed, especially by the Rulers, as officers of the 
State. With the establishment of the EMS, administrative 
centralization^ was begun through the establishment of a unified 
Service of Central officers who then manned the State departments and 
who could be transferred between the States, several Central departments 
in each State and the federalisation of several State departments manned 
also by Central officers. This destroyed whatever autonomy enjoyed by 
the former SCSs and according to Emily Sadka,
"These changes were of importance to Rulers, who might hitherto 
have had little power, but who had at least been able to identify 
certain services and officers belonging to their own States, and 
derive some reassurance form long acquaintance with them. ^
26. Emerson, R., Malaysia; A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule, New 
York, Macmilloen, 1937, p.137.
27. Cowan, cp.cit., pp.270-271.
28. Emerson, cp.cit., p.137.
29. See Sidhu, J.S., "British Administration in the Federated Malay 
States, 1896-1920", Unpub. Ph.D. Thesis, Uni. of London, 1975, 
p. 113. For a discussion on the increasing establishment of
Central departments and the federalisation of several State
departments in the States of the EMS, see Bums, P.L., "The 
Constitutional History of Malaya with special reference to the 
Malay States of Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang, 1974- 
1914", Unpub. Ph.D. Thesis, Uni. of London, 1965, chapters6-7.
30. Sadka, Emily, The Protected Malay States, 1874-1895, Kuala Lunpur,
Oxford University Press, 1968, p.379.
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Not surprisingly the opposition to the establishment of the Federation 
came largely frcm local British administrators within the States who 
were
"jealous of the independence and freedom of action which they 
enjoyed as a result of their loosely defined authority ... Yet the 
principle of non-interfemce [by the British administrators] with 
native rulers was noisily invoked to defend the personal rule of 
Resident and Governor".
The British Residents led this opposition even to the extent of being
viewed as the chanpions of States' rights in opposition to the Colonial
Office demands.^
The participation of Malays as senior administrative officers
within the administration of the States, apart from the formal role of
the Rulers and members of th eRoyal Court, was negligible. In 1910, a
special Central Service, the Malay Administrative Service (MAS), was
created especially for Malays who had attained that level of education
and who wished to become civil servants. Its establishment was a
response to the demands for Malay participation (in effect an earlier
version of Malayanization) and a consequence of the decentralization
policy.^ The MAS was largely envisaged then as a junior service,
with the promise of being a filter or feeder service to the MCS.
The MAS was a service of the EMS only, recruited from among
suitably qualified Malays of the four States of the EMS. MAS officers
served only in their cwn States and usually held junior posts in
district administration. Their duties were more nearly clerical
31. Sadka, Emily, "The Colonial Office and the Protected Malaya 
States", in Bastin, J. and Roolvirik, R., eds., Malayan and 
Indonesian Studies; Essays presented to Sir Richard Winstedt on 
his eighty-fourth birthday, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1964, p.186. 
The principle of non-interference by British administrators in 
each State was part and parcel of, and by then the myth of a 
British Resident system based on 'advice'.
32. ibid., p. 187. See also Bums, P.L., op.cit., chapters 5-6.
33. Jones, op.cit., p.90: Puthucheary, cp.cit., p. 11; Roff, cp.cit., 
pp. 104-109; Tilman, R.O., "The Malay Administrative Service, 1910- 
1060", The Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 7, April- 
June 1961, pp.145-157.
34. Ghosh, K.K., Twentieth Century Malaya; Politics of Decentralization 
of Power, 1920-1929, Calcutta, Progressive Publishers, 1977,
pp.144-152.
35. Roff, cp.cit., p. 105. There were 4 grades within the MAS; Special 
Grade, Grade 1, 11 and 111.
36. See Roff. ibid., pp.105-107, and Sidhu ibid., p.323.
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than administrative. Promotions within the Service were agonisingly
slow and irregular.
Certain changes were introduced in 1917 so as to expedite the
3 7promotion of MAS officers into the MCS. Despite these changes and
S.W. Jones' suggestion that Clementi's decentralization plan of 1932 had
30
brought about the acceleration of promotion from the MASJ , the rate 
of filtration or promotion of MAS officers into the MCS was markedly
Pahang, as part of the EMS experienced a more direct and 
pervasive British involvement in its administration than Kedah. Without 
its own SCS, its administration came to be dominated by the mainly 
European MCS and other Central technical and professional services 
which were controlled by the Central Government at Kuala Lunpur. In 
this the Malay officers of MAS played their customary subordinate and 
junior role. This tradition of dependence was to remain up till Malayan 
independence and continued thereafter.
37. See Sidhu, ibid~ pp.323-324; Roff, ibid., pp. 107-108;
Puthucheary, op.cit., p. 11; and Allen, op.cit., p. 176.
38. Jones, op.cit., p.90. Jones also stated that as part of 
Clementi's decentralisation plan, a separate clerical service for 
each State of the EMS was created. This service was open to 
candidates of all nationalities who were bom and educated in the 
EMS with preference given to Malays. He argued that this "had a 
passing value in reviving the morale of the State Governments, and 
the sharp revision of the standing of Federal Heads was all to the 
good, since it checked the strongest influence at work in 
smothering under a purely British organization political systems 
which the British Government had been instructed only to advice". 
The so-called decentralisation policy dominated the 1920's and 
1930's but was not carried through in its entirety. Allen 
conjectured that "If decentralisation as originally envisaged by 
Guillemard and still more, Clementi, had been carried through, the 
steady growth in numbers and expansion of influence of the MCS 
would have been checked, and indeed its numbers in the EMS would 
have decreased considerably as the regimes in those States came to 
approximate more closely to the Unfederated ones. The bogus Malay 
participation in administration represented by the MAS would have 
been replaced by a genuine partnership with Malays in the State 
Governments, whose recruitment the MCS by no means controlled". 
Allen, cp.cit., p.178.
39. Puthucheary, ibid., pp. 11-12; Nordin Selat, Kelas Menengah 
Pentadbir Melayu, Kuala Lunpur, Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd., 1976, 
pp. 130-131, 144-146. Allen argued that "the way the MAS worked 
had an important legacy in that it was not through the central 
civil service that non-Eurcpeans first wrested a measure of real 
power frcm the British but through the State Governments; and it 
was men like Dato Panglima Bukit Gantang (who, having been refused
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The tradition of administrative autonomy in Kedah was due to
several factors; the flexible nature of British participation in the
State's administration, the role of the Sultan in preserving sane
semblance of 'independence' and the emphasis being placed on the use of
sons of Kedah, as officers of Kedah's cwn SCS, for most of the key
administrative posts within the State bureaucracy. The tradition that
developed in Pahang was one of total dependence on the Central Services.
This was, in no small measure, due to the more aggresive British
participation in the State's administration. While Kedah had a SCS that
it could claim as its own, Pahang could make no such claim.
Kedah's response to the Central Government's plan to federalise the
State Civil Services.
This section deals with Kedah's response to attempts by the
Central Government to federalise or, more appropriately, uniformalise
Kedah's SCS. In early 1957, th Albakri Committee^ approached the
Kedah State Government^ for its suggestions on how best to achieve
the integration of its SCS with that of the Central Services. The
Committee's memorandum on the proposal for integration of the Services
was straightforward; States with their own SCSs would have these
40
Services integrated through being merged with the MAS. This 
memorandum was submitted to the then State Secretary of Kedah who 
submitted it without comment to the State Executive Council (Exco) for 
decision. The State Exco felt that it could not decide on this matter 
either since it touched on the position of the Sultan and his authority 
in relation to the Kedah SCS. The State Exco referred the memorandum to 
the Sultan for his 'advice*. According to a respondent^, the 
Sultan's 'advice', written on the memorandum itself, was terse: 
something to the effect that
"A Sultan without a State Civil Service will be without 
authority".
39. (Cont.) entry to the MCS and turned dcwn the MAS, became Perak's
first-ever non-MCS Mentri Besar) who led the onslaught. This in 
turn strengthened the federal structure and the Malay dominance in 
the nationalist movement". Allen, ibid., p. 177.
40. See Chapter 5.
41. Discussion based on interviews with both past and present Central 
and Kedah civil servants.
42. According to Datuk Shaari, a former State Secretary of Kedah,
Kedah was not represented in the Albakri Caimittee. Interview
with Datuk Shaari, 17.12.80.
43. Interview with a former State Secretary of Kedah, 17.12.80
(subsequently referred to as "A"). Sultan Abdul Halim was then
the Sultan of Kedah.
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He feared that integration of the Services would lead to the loss of his 
power (perhaps influence) over the appointment of Kedah civil servants 
to the top posts of the Kedah bureaucracy. For integration would mean 
the transfer of pcwer over appointments from the State to the Central 
level.44 The State Exco accepted the Sultan's 'advice' and rejected 
the Albakri Committee's memorandum.4^
According to a respondent4 ,^ a State level committee comprising 
members of Kedah Civil Service Union was also established to study the 
Albakri Committee' s memorandum. The State level committee rejected the 
idea of integrating the Kedah SCS with the Central Service because, in 
this respondent's words,
"We want to have a separate identity for the Kedah Civil 
Service".47
This committee justified its decision by referring to the fact that the
40
Sultan of Kedah was also against it.
The senior and more experienced members of the Kedah SCS resented 
the fact that the integration proposal accorded them second class 
treatment since it proposed the merging of Kedah SCS with the MAS and 
thus neglected their long term of service in the SCS. Since MAS was a 
Division II Service compared to the MCS which was a Division I Service, 
the integration would only accord Kedah civil servants with Division II 
ranking. A respondent4^ commented that if the suggestion was to give 
the Kedah civil servants with Division I ranking then at least the 
integration proposal could have been discussed in more detail. The 
pervasiveness of a strong sense of loyalty among the Kedah civil 
servants hindered the acceptance of what was then viewed as a generally 
unacceptable package. ^
44. Interview with En. Zainal Rashid b. Hj. Ahmad, currently holding 
the post of Chief Assistant to the State Secretary of Kedah 
(Service Section), 15.12.80.
45. Interview with "A". Johore also rejected the proposal. "A" did 
not know, however, whether Kedah consulted Johore or not on this 
matter, or whether Johore rejected this proposal before or 
after Kedah.
46. Interview with Datuk Mohamad Sheri f, a former Kedah State 
Financial Officer in the mid-1970' s and currently the Chairman of 
the State PSC, 13.12.80. He was a member of this State level 
committee.
47. ibid.
48. ibid.
49. Interview with En. Zainal Rashid.
50. ibid. The theme of loyalty to the State of Kedah among members of 
the Kedah SCS was frequently raised in the interviews not only with 
Kedah civil servants but also with Central civil servants who saw 
this as unnecessary and unhealthy parochialism.
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Some junior members of the Kedah SCS, however, were receptive 
towards the integration proposal since it would open the door to greater 
promotion opportunities that were available within the Central Service. 
However, as far as Kedah, its Sultan and the mjority within the Kedah 
Civil Service Union were concerned, Albakri Carrmittee' s integration 
proposal was a non-starter.
The Federation Establishment Office (FEO) that replaced the 
Albakri Committee pursued a two-tier approach to the question of 
integrating the SCSs with that of the Central Services: those holding 
Division I and II posts within the SCSs would be integrated into the MCS 
and the MAS respectively. Table 1 compares the Divisions I and II posts 
within the bureaucracies of Kedah (non-federalised) and Pahang 
(federalised) held by either the officers of the Kedah SCS, the MCS and 
the MAS in 1958. Table 2 compares the salary scales of Division I and 
II posts within the bureaucracies of Kedah and Pahang held by either the 
officers of the Kedah SCS, the MCS or the MAS in 1958. The FEO's 
approach would mean that the Divisions I and II posts within the Kedah 
SCS would become, on integration, MCS and MAS posts respectively. Table 
2 indicates that of the twelve Division I posts held by the SCS, the one 
superscale D would become an MCS superscale D post. The Kedah SCS Class 
1A range of salaries was within that of the MCS Senior Timescale, and 
thus integration would have placed the six Class 1A SCS posts in the 
Senior Timescale of the MCS. The top salary of the SCS Class IB was 
higher than the lowest salary of the Senior Timescale of the MCS but the 
lowest salary of the SCS Class IB was lower than the top salary of the 
Timescale of the MCS. Integration would thus have split up the five 
Class IB SCS's posts into Senior Timescale and Timescale of the MCS. In
Division II, the SCS's Timescale range of salaries started from a lower 
level than that of the MAS Timescale although both had similar ceiling 
levels. The sixty Division II SCS's posts would on integration, have 
become MAS posts and SCS officers at the lower end of the SCS Timescale 
range of salaries (below $415) would have gained immediately. Not 
surprisingly several junior officers of the Kedah SCS were receptive 
towards the integration proposal. However, the FEO's approach also 
failed because of the unenthusiatic attitude of the Kedah State 
Government, the Sultan and the majority in the Kedah State Civil Service 
Union.51
In early 1970 's5  ^the Central Government, through the Public
51. Interview with Datuk Shaari.
52. ibid. The specific date was not revealed.
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Table 2: Salary Scales of Division I and Division II Posts
within the bureaucracies of Kedah and Pahang held by 
officers either of the Kedah SCS, the MCS or the MAS 
in 1958.
Division I
SCS
Staff Appointments,
Salary in $ per month.
Superscale A $1970 
Superscale B $1850 
Superscale C $1760 
Superscale D $1670 1
Superscale E $1580 
Superscale P $1^90 
Superscale G $1^30 
Superscale H $1360 
Kedah SCS
Class IA $1057-11^1 6
Kedah SCS
Class IB $ 836-1037 5
Senior
Timescale $ 982-125^ 
Timescale $ 592- 93^
Division II
Federal MAS 
Timescale $ ^15- 813
Kedah SCS
Timescale $ 280- 813 60
Total 72
Pahang
MCS MCS MAS
1 1
3 b
12
17
a iz iz
Kedah
Source: As for Table 1.
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Services Department (PSD) or the Jabatan Pentadbir Awam (JPA), revived
. . .its integration plan. The PSD's integration plan also contained a 
similar two-tier approach.^ Tables 3 and 4 respectively compare for 
1971 the number of Divisions I and II posts and the salary scales of 
such posts within the Kedah and Pahang bureaucracies held by officers of 
either the Kedah SCS, the Malaysian Administrative and Diplomatic 
Service (MADS) or Perhidmatan Tadbir dan Diplcmatik (PTD), and the 
General Administrative Service (GAS) or Perhidmatan Tadbir AM (PTA). As 
in the earlier plan, Divisions I and II officers of the Kedah SCS would 
be integrated with the PTD and the PTA respectively. On integration, of 
the thirteen Division I posts within the Kedah SCS, the one superscale D 
and H posts would have become superscale D and H PTD posts. The SCS 
Classes 1A and IB ranges of salaries were well within that of the PTD's 
Senior Timescale. Consequently, the other eleven Division 1 SCS posts 
would have become Senior Timescale PTD posts. In Division II the SCS's 
and PTA's ranges of salaries were similar and thus the sixty-one 
Division II SCS posts, following integration, would have become PTA 
Timescale posts. No one would have immediately benefited from this 
integration plan.
The two-tier approach, intentionally or otherwise, resulted in
cc
divisions within the Kedah SCS. J This was to be expected since 
Divisions I and II SCS officers would be absorbed into the elite PTD and 
junior PTA respectively. By integration these Division I officers would 
be free of the promotional confines of the Kedah SCS and thus enhancing 
their chances of being promoted to higher superscale posts that were 
available only within the PTD.^6
However, the majority of Division II officers of the Kedah SCS 
felt that they would not gain immediately frcm integration: they 
would gain only in the long-term through promotion frcm the PTA to
53. The federalisation plan was revived at the instigation of Tun 
Razak, then Prime Minister. Both Central and State civil servants 
interviewed attributed the driving force for this to Tun Razak.
54. Interview with Datuk Shaari. According to him the integration 
plan was dicussed, without much success, at one of the meetings of 
the Federal-State Liaison Ccmmittee under the chairmanship of Tan 
Sri Abdul Kadir Shamsuddin, then Chief Secretary to the Central 
Government. Several working papers were prepared and sunibitted to 
Kedah. Dr. Elyas Omar, the Deputy Director of the Public 
Services Department in 1980, was intimately involved in the 
preparation of such papers. Interview with Dr. Elyas Omar, 
18.8.80.
55. Interview with Datuk Shaari.
56. In 1971 the PTD had a total of 263 Superscale posts. See chapter 
6, Table 6.
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Table 4: Salary Scales of Division I and Division II Posts
within the bureaucracies of Kedah and Pahang held by 
officers of either the Kedah SCS, PTD or PTA in 1971.
Division I Kedah Pahang
Kedah SCS PTD PTD PTA
Staff Appointments.
Salary in $ per month.
Superscale A $1970
Superscale B $1850
Superscale C $1760
Superscale D $1670 1 1
Superscale E $1580
Superscale F $1480 1
Superscale G $1430 1
Superscale H $1360 1 1
Kedah SCS
Class IA $1254 4
Kedah SCS
Class IB $1094-1196 7
Senior
Timescale $ 982-1254'I 20
Timescale $ 592- 934 J
Division II
Federal PTA 
Timescale $ 310-1014
Kedah SCS
Timescale $ 310-1014 61
Total 24 - 24
Source: As for Table 3»
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the lower ranks of the PTD. This could be a lengthy and difficult 
exercise in which they would have to compete with the other PTA 
officers. Even when promoted they would most likly be quite advanced in 
age and thus could not realistically aspire to the higher superscale 
posts within the PTD. It would seem, so they thought, that integration 
would condemn them to a permanent junior status for the most part, or 
perhaps the whole part, of their administrative careers. Through the 
Kedah SCS Union they rejected the integration plan.^ At issue was 
the unease of the Division II officers of the Kedah SCS over their 
chances of promotion, once integrated, frcm the PTA to the PTD compared 
to that within the Kedah SCS. Even if the Kedah SCS union were to have 
agreed to the integration plan, the Sultan’s consent would still have 
had to be obtained.^® He would and apparently did have the final say 
on this. When the State Exco received the integration plan it once 
again referred the matter without comment to the Sultan for his 
’advice'. The Sultan, perhaps recalling his father's unccmprcmising 
stand, wrote on the proposal page something to the effect that
"A Sultan without a State Civil Service will be without 
authority".
The Sultan saw the integration plan as an attempt by the Central 
Government to nibble away at the remaining powers that still remained 
with the State and thus viewed it as against the spirit of the State 
Agreement of 1957 He felt that the continued existence of the 
Kedah SCS was, if anything, more necessary and symbolic than ever in 
that it portrayed a semblance of State autonomy over matters that, to 
him, reflected indirectly on his own status, prestige and power. He 
wanted the Kedah SCS to remain as independent of the Central Government 
as possible.
57. Interview with Datuk Shaari. Most of the Kedah SCS officers did 
not like the idea of being uprooted frcm Kedah. They felt that 
through integration with the Central Services they could be 
transferred to other States. They did and still do exhibit a 
strong sense of commitment to Kedah. Members of the Kelantan SCS 
also opposed the plan. According to a former Kelantan SCS 
officer, who was formerly the Assistant State Development Officer 
in Kelantan, the Kelantan SCS officers were involved in corrupt 
practices especially in land dealings and they correctly believed 
that integration would undercut their vested interests. Interview 
with this officer, 16.12.80.
58. Interview with Datuk Shaari.
59. Interview with "A". The Sultan then was Sultan Badlisah.
60. ibid.
240.
The then Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, contacted and 
consulted the then MB of Kedah, Datuk Syed Ahmad Shahabuddin, over the 
State's refusal to accept the integration plan. The PM's intervention 
was to no avail. Obviously the MB^ was not successful in persuading 
the Sultan to change his mind. The Sultan's pcwer appeared decisive.
In August 1975, after the State bureaucracies of Penang and Malacca had 
been successfully integrated and federalised, the MB of Kedah, speaking 
in the State Legislative Assembly, reiterated that the State Government 
had no intention of allowing the integration of the Kedah SCS with the 
MCS.Rather quaintly, he argued that integration was not necessary 
because the State had its own civil service.63 a  respondent^ 
claimed that the Central Government, especially during Tun Razak's Prime 
Ministership, was gradually persuaded that the Kedah Government, Kedah 
SCS Officers and the Sultan were unyielding in their cppositon to the 
integration plan. It would seen that the Central Government had 
accepted Kedah's position frcm the mid-1970's when it agreed to improve 
the Kedah SCS' s pay scales. The impliciation was that the Central 
Government had accepted the importance that Kedah placed on the need to 
maintain the 'autoncny' of its SCS. Kedah's response to the Central 
Government's federalisation plans had indeed been true to its history. 
Pahang and Kedah compared
Impact of State Public Services Commissions: The Pahang PSC was
established on February 10, 1961.66 Its responsibilities include
" ... perlantekkan, pengesahan kemasckan da lam jawatan tetap atau 
bersara, naik pangkat, pertukaran, kawalan tata tertib di-atas 
pegawai^ di-dalam perhidmatan awam Negeri. "Pertukaran" tidak 
termasak pertukaran dengan tidak menukar pangkat sama ada di-dalam 
suatu jabatan atau di-antara jabata^ kerajaan".
[Translation:
" ... appointment, confirmation to a permanent or pensionable
61. He belonged to the same political party, the United Malays
National Organisation (UMNO), and the PM was the President of
UMNO. Since power, as indicted in chapter 9, is concentrated in 
the office of the President tremendous pressure could have been 
placed on the MB to try and persuade the Sultan.
62. Straits Times (ST), 18.8.75. This was in reply to a question 
raised by an Independent Member of the State Legislative Assembly, 
HJ. Abdul Rashid b. Mehad, during a debate in this Assembly.
63. ibid.
64. Interview with Datuk Shaari.
65. Through the Suffian Report of 1969 and 2 subsequent Cabinet 
Coranittee Recommendations of 1976 and 1980.
66. Pahang PSC, Annual Report, 1962, p. 1.
67. ibid. The Pahang PSC comprises the Chairman and three other
members. They are appointed by the Sultan on the MB's advise for a 
three-year term.
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post, promotion, transfer, supervision of discipline over officers 
within the State public service. "Transfer" does not include 
transfer without a change of rank whether within a government 
department or between departments." ]
Phahang depends on the Central PTD and PTA, professional and technical
services to fill the State's key administrative, professional and
6fttechnical posts respectively. As Central Services' officers they
are subject to the rules and conditions of service controlled
prinicipally by the Central Government. Seconded to posts within the 
69State bureaucracy , they remain members of the respective Central 
70Services and are therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the
71 72 . . .Central PSC. A respondent explained that they are, in principle,
responsible to the State Government as State officers but their career
prospects are determined by the Central PSD and PSC. The Constitution
provided the Central PSC with powers
"to appoint, confirm, emplace on the permanent or pensionable 
establishment, promote, transfer and exercise disciplinary control 
over members of the service or services to which its jurisdiction 
extends".
Thus, the Pahang State PSC's jurisdiction, despite the statement of its
responsibilties and jurisdiction, is practically confined to the State's
own Clerical Services and those below this. The State PSC's powers over
seconded Central officers in State posts are in fact limited for these
officers are subject to the jurisdiction of two Central institutions,
the PSD and PSC.
In 1967, Pahang attempted to have seme say over disciplinary
matters within the State Public Service. Through an amendment of the
State PSC Enactment^ the State PSC's powers and functions, except
that of initial appointment to permanent or pensionable posts, were
75taken over by a Board appointed by the Ruler-in-Council. The Board
had responsibilities, as defined in 1969, over promotion and
68. Officers of the 'Central Service' are those public servants who 
are recruited by and whose terms and conditions of service are 
governed by the Central Government even though many of these 
officers may be responsible to the individual States in the 
execution of their duties.
69. Article 134(1) of the Constitution.
70. Article 134(2) of the Constitution.
71. Articles 132(1) and 139(1) of the Constitution.
72. Interview with Dr. Elyas Omar.
73. Article 144(1) of the Constitution.
74. Undang2 (Pindaan) Surdhanjaya Perhidmatan Awam Negeri, 1967
(Enactment Bill 7/1967). See Pahang PSC, Penyata Tahunan, 1967, 
p.l.
75. ibid. The Board assumed its functions on December 15, 1968. See 
Pahang PSC, Penyata Tahunan, 1968, p. 1.
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disciplinary natters and it was stated that
"Sunggoh pun begitu Raja dan Majlis telah menetapkan bahawa 
Lembaga Rayuan Tata-Tertib bagi pegawai2 Perhidmatan Awam dalam 
1 dan 11, ia-lah Surdhanjaya Perhidmatan Awam Pahang
[Translation:
"Notwithstanding this the Raja and Council had decided that the 
Disciplinary Appeals Board for Division 1 and 11 officers of the 
Public Service is the Pahang Public Service Commission."]
77 .However, a respondent indicated that the Sultan rather than the 
State PSC or the Board had exercised, although infrequently, influence 
over disciplinary matters involving Divisions 1 and 11 officers.
The Kedah PSC, established in 1960, was similarly empowered
"to appoint, confirm, emplace on the permanent or the pensionable 
establishment, promote, transfer and exercise disciplinary control 
over persons in the public service of the State".
Officers of the Central Services seconded to Kedah do not come under the
7 9Kedah PSC's jurisdiction. They, therefore, in both Kedah and 
Pahang, are in a similar position vis-a-vis the respective State PSCs'. 
The crucial and main difference is that while all of Pahang's top 
administrative posts are held by seconded PTD officers, such posts in 
Kedah are held by Kedah SCS officers. Thus, Kedah, through the State 
PSC, can exercise 'closer' supervision and control over its top 
administrative officers; Pahang's State PSC cannot similarly exercise 
supervision and control over its seconded Central officers occupying the 
State's top administrative posts.
76. Pahang PSC, Penyata Tahunan, 1969, p. 1.
77. Interview with a former State Secretary of Pahang (subsequently 
referred to as "B"), 20.8.80. This was not surprising since these 
officers were seconded to and accepted by the State with the 
Sultan's consent and he could withdraw such consent if any of the 
officers were, to him, found wanting. Such cases had produced 
tension with the PSD which initially recorrmended such officers to 
the State.
78. State of Kedah, State Public Service Catmission, Enactment, 1959, 
Section 8 (1).
79. ibid., Section 2 (2) (e). The State PSC comprises a chairman and
not less than 2 and not more than 3 members. They are appointed
by the Sultan acting in his discretion but after considering the 
advice of the MB. See ibid., Section 3 (2). The Chairman is 
appointed frcm among members of Kedah's SCS or frcm members of the
Central judicial and legal service, Central general public service 
or the joint public services. See Article 132(1) (b), (c), (f) and 
(g) of the Constitution. In Pahang a similar procedure applies in 
the appointment of the State PSC's Chairman. However, since 
Pahang does not have its cwn SCS frcm among whose officers to 
appoint as the PSC's Chairman, it therefore must depend on members 
of the Central Service. As in Kedah and Pahang, the MB's advice 
to the Sultan regarding whcm to appoint as Chairman and members of 
the respective PSCs may be crucial in determining the
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Appointments: Certain posts within State bureaucracies can be designated
80as 'special posts' by the Ruler or Governor of a State. These refer
to posts held by the Head or Deputy Head of a State department or by an
officer Who in the Ruler's or Governor's opinion is of similar status.
Appointments to these posts are made by the Ruler or Governor acting on
the State PSC's recomnendation and after considering the MB's 
81advice. Thus, Rulers and Governors are in a position to influence 
appointments to these posts. Suitability of candidates recommended for 
such posts may well be crucial. Sheridan commented that
"Such a provision is presumably designed to ensure that in those 
senior posts in the public service in Which the personality of the 
holder is a matter of importance to the government, that 
government shall have a (duly circumscribed) influence in 
the matter of such appointment".
The designated 'special posts' include the posts of State 
Secretary (SSec) State Financial Officer (SPO) and the State Legal
OO
Adviser (SLA). In Kedah and Pahang these posts, with the exception 
84of the SLA's post , are filled by Kedah SCS officers and seconded PTD 
officers respectively.
These special appointments, and the politics involved, differ 
between Kedah and Pahang. In Kedah the politics of such appointments 
and also the appointments to other key administrative posts are confined 
to within the State generally. The active participants in this include
79. (Cont.) 'inclination' of the respective PSCs. The MB's advice, if
acccepted by the Ruler, could produce a close political link 
between the State PSC and the State's political leaders. This was 
the case in Kedah. See Rohani Ahmad, "Personal Administration in 
Kedah Civil Service", Graduation Exercise, Faculty of Economics 
and Administration, Uni. of Malaya, Kuala Lunpur, 1972/1973, p.
26. Similarly in Pahang, the Sultan had sometimes appointed, on 
the MB's advice, party stalwarts and even ex-MBs as members of the 
State PSC. See Mbhd. Ali Hanafiah Sh. Ruji, "The Pahang Public 
Service Commission", Graduation Exercise, Faculty of Econcmics and 
Administration, Uni. of Malaya, Kual Lunpur, 1970/1971, p. 36.
80. Article 144 (4) of the Constitution.
81. ibid., and Article 144 (5) of the Constitution. In the case of 
Pahang, since it depended on the PTD and PTA, the PSD, in 
collaboration with the Central PSC, recommend PTD and PTA officers 
for such designated posts.
82. Sheridan, L.A., ed., Malaya and Singapore, the Borneo Territories? 
The Development of their Laws ans Constitutions, London, Stevens 
and Sons, 1961, p.88.
83. The Laws of the Constitution of Kedah, Jabatan Penchetak Kerajaan, 
Perseketuan Tanah Melayu, 1963, Article 36. The Laws of the 
Constitution of Pahang, Jabatan Penchetak Kerajaan, Perseketuan
Tanah Melayu, 1963, Part 11, Articles 11-13.
84. The SLA's post in Kedah and Pahang is filled by a seconded officer 
of the Central Judicial and Legal Service.
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the Sultan, the political party in pcwer, the SCS officers and the State 
PSC. More often than not such appointments are keenly competitive and 
the political manoeuvres intense. These posts are desired because they 
are at the top of the Kedah SCS salary scales and through appointment to 
such posts access to the State political leaders and the Sultan becomes 
formally established. This is because the S Sec, and the SPO are ex­
officio members of the State Exco and State Legislative Assembly. Such 
appointments are treasured because they accord confirmation of high
QC
status within the State to the successful appointees.
In Pahang, special appointments necessarily involve Central
institutions like the PSD and PSC and, informally, Central political
leaders. The Sultan, advised by the MB, has to appoint frcm a list of
names of PTD officers drawn up essentially at the Central level by the
PSD and PSC after consultation with the Central political leaders. In
this the Central political leaders usually consult the MB, to determine
86the Sultan's preferences. According to a former S Sec. of 
87Pahang , regarding the appointment of the S Sec, the PSD usually 
submits a list of names of PTD officers to the MB and then to the 
Sultan. The Sultan will then choose anyone he thinks 'suitable' to be 
the S Sec. Appointments to the posts of SPO and SLA are similarly 
made.
In these apointments the 'suitability* of prospective candidates
as perceived by the State political leaders is important. The Sultan
also will normally wants to be assured that the officers he appoints to
special posts can get along with the State authorities and people in the
88State and, more important, commit themselves to State interests.
There were occasions when the Sultan insisted on his 'choice' being
89accepted as the S Sec for example.
Among the most important other appointments within the State 
bureaucracy include appointments as the State Director of Lands and
85. Not surprisingly, all the State Secretaries and SPOs were in time 
honoured by the Sultan with the title ' Datuk'.
86. Interview with Dr. Elyas Omar. Interview with Datuk Rozhan Kuntum, 
Deputy Chief Secretary to the Government within the PM's 
Department, 19.8.80.
87. Interview with "B".
88. ibid.
89. One such occasion was in 1978. In Pahang in 1978 the State 
Secretary's post was a Superscale C post while the SPO's was a 
Superscale E post. When the State Secretary's post became vacant 
on 1.1.1978 because of the promotion of the then State Secretary, 
the Sultan apparently insisted that a 'son of Pahang' should be 
appointed as the next State Secretary. Several names were 
submitted to the Sultan by the PSD but he did not agree to any.
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Mines or Pengarah Tanah dan Galian (PTG)# District Officers (DO), and 
Heads of State technical departments. In Kedah appointments to the 
PTG's and DO's posts are made from among SCS members by the Kedah PSC. 
Appointments of Heads of State technical department are made frcm 
seconded officers of the Central Technical and Professional services.
In Pahang all these appointments are made frcm seconded officers of the 
Central Administrative, Professional and Technical Services.
There is seme competition for experienced and capable Central 
officers especially between States with federalised bureaucracies.
Pahang also competes for such officers. On one of the rare occasions 
of public ccmment on such matters, the Sultan of Pahang, speaking at a 
dinner for MCS officers serving in Pahang, declared that he had no 
intention of monopolising for the State the services of all capable 
Central Government servants. He realised that
"other States and Ministries [also] require Government servants 
with calibre too, but I hope due consideration Will be given to ny 
State Which is experiencing rapid development".
Pahang needed officers with calibre and who should be able to identify
with and committed to Pahang's interests. The Sultan revealed as much
when he stated that
"I do not care whether they are iry subjects or not as long as they 
are loyal to me and ny Government".
Kedah stays aloof frcm this competion. There is no need for such 
Central officers, except temporarily vhen there are shortages, since it
89. (Cont.) The Sultan in turn suggested En. Kamarulzaman (a son of
Pahang) who was then the Perak SPO (a Super scale E post). Thus 
the Sultan's choice was very junior for the post of State 
Secretary of Pahang. The Sultan insisted on his choice and 
agreed to allow the downgrading, temporarily, of the State 
Secretary's post frcm Superscale C to D. This was possible 
through categorizing that post as 'personal to holder' and thus 
making it possible for En. Kamarulzaman to be appointed as the 
State Secretary of Pahang without junping a scale. Interview with 
a former Deputy Chief Secretary to the Central Government, 19.8.80 
(subsequently referred to as "C"). The fact that he was appointed 
in June 15, 1978, six months after the post became vacant 
indicated the extent and nature of the controversy. En. 
Kamarulzaman was duly awarded the title of 'Datuk'. Information 
obtained frcm the Pahang State Secretariat.
90. Malay Mail (MM), 12,1.76.
91. ibid. Certain States, Pahang included, have been gradually 
attempting to replace Central officers in the States with Central 
officers who were frcm their own States. In these States, 
sometimes, Central officers holding State posts have been 
'captured' by the States within which they served. Interview with 
a senior PSD officer, 20.7.80.
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has its own SCS. Furthermore, it is in the interests of SCS officers to 
ensure that the top administrative posts in the State bureaucracy remain
Q9their exclusive preserve. These top posts represent to them the 
few available promotion opportunities within the SCS. The SCS 
represents an entrenched group, with vested interests, within the State 
bureaucracy. Its presence and stand help stiffen the State's resolve 
against Central penetration of the State bureaucracy, in this case 
through the appointment of Central administrative officers to State 
posts.
Several adminsitrative posts in Kedah had originally been 
designated as posts to be held by MCS officers. Table 5 illustrates 
this. Indicative of Kedah's dogged insistence on maintaining a degree 
of 'autanaiy', all these posts were left vacant until they were taken 
over by SCS officers or abolished. The posts of 'Adviser Lands, Kedah' 
was left vacant frcm 1960 and abolished in 1962 and a post 'Director of 
Lands, Kedah' was established and held by an SCS officer. The posts of 
Assistance S Sec (Emergency) was left vacant frcm 1960 and was abolished 
in 1963.^3 The other two Assistant S Secs 11 and IV posts were left 
vacant from 1960 and taken over by SCS officers in 1968.94
The creation of the post of the State Commissioner of Lands and 
Mines (SCLM) or Pesurohjaya Tanah dan Galian later renamed as State 
Director of Lands and Mines or PTG within the State establishment 
provided another example of Kedah's adherence to its notion of 
' autonomy'. On the basis of the Report of the Commission on Land 
Administration the National Land Council (NLC) in 1958 reccmmended the 
re-organisation of land administration in the Federation and in all the 
States through the appointment of a Federal Ccmmissioner of Lands (FCL), 
renamed later as Federal Director of Lands (FDL), and a Commissioner of 
Lands and Mines in each State.95 The SCLM's were not, however, made 
formally responsible to the FCL. The FCL was made, formally, a chief 
adviser on technical matters regarding land to both the State
92. Interview with "A".
93. With the ending of Emergency in 1960 this post was no longer 
necessary.
94. These two posts were still designated as 'Central' posts up to 
1970 within the Federation's Staff List, 1970. See also Kedah, 
Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure, 1968, Appendix.
95. Majlis Mesyuarat Tanah Negara (National Land Council Meeting), 
Kertas 3/1958. See Federation of Malaysia, Resolusi-Resolusi 
Majlis Tanah Negara, 1958 - 1978, Dicetak di Jabatan Percetakan 
Negara, Semenanjong Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur. 1980, p. 5, (a) and 
(b).
Ta
bl
e 
5
s 
Ad
mi
ni
st
ra
ti
ve
 
Po
st
s 
wi
th
in
 
th
e 
Ke
da
h 
Bu
re
au
cr
ac
y 
de
si
gn
at
ed
 
as
 
po
st
s 
to
 
be
 
fi
ll
ed
 
by
 
MC
S 
Of
fi
ce
rs
.
2^7 .
c^-
VO
ON
rH
NO
NO
ON
rH
NT\
NO
ON
-3-
NO
ON
rH
NO
Os
CV2
NO
O n
rH
NO
ON
O
NO
ON
rH
W
£
8
w £
o
£
o £
• • •H 0
to to to
p •rH •H
to > >
o •H 'd
Ph Q <C
0
p
cd
p
to
>> 
>> Ou £
-p  
£
cd cd 0
•P -p  tifl
n o h 
•H  £  0  
ra O S
to <d W<; co w
-P
cd H  
-P  H
CO
+» >i 
£  £  
cd cd 
p  p  
to 0  
•h £ 
to o  
co 0 
<5 co
0
p
cd >  
-P H
co
-P > j 
-P -p
to 0 
•H  £  
to o  
co 0
< CO
•
to
0
o
•H
Td
£ £
cd 0
P i
00 P i
NO <
O n
rH «h
1 00
i—1 NO
NO O n
ON i—1
l—1 1
O
•» NO
to ON
-p l—1
to
•H 0
P 1 £
p
<H p
<H •H
cd
p £
CO 0
P i«b X
cd W
•H
to Td
>> £
cd c3
rH
cd 0
S p
£
Td 0
£ >
CO 0
K
cd
>> *H
A
O
cd 0
S 0
P
<H cd
o £
•H
£ P
o to
•H W
+5
cd «fc
£ .£
0 cd
'£ Td
0 0
(H W
248.
QC
Governments and SCLMs. In addition, he was required to arrange
97meetings of all the SCLM's at least once a year. The SCLM was 
made formally responsible to the Ruler-in-Council (that is Exco) over 
land administration within each State. He could be elected by the Ruler 
or Governor to attend State Exco's meetings and State Legislative
qq
Assembly meetings When land matters are to be discussed. The State
qq
Exco was empowered to determine the SCLM's responsibilities.
Within the State bureaucracy the SCLM's position was belcw that of the S 
Sec.-^^ However, in terms of formal access to the State Exco and the 
Ruler or Governor, his position was potentially similar to that of the S 
Sec, SPO and SLA.
Land is a State subject. It was, therefore, in the States* 
interest to ensure that the officer appointed as the SCLM should be 
acceptable to the State and be committed to protect State interests over 
land. For States with their own SCS, this might be ensured by 
appointing their SCSs officers to such posts. It was also in the 
interest of SCSs officers to ensure that such posts became and remained 
their exclusive preserve since this would inccrease the number, although 
marginally, of Division 1 posts within the SCSs. Before the acceptance 
of the NLC's recaimendation and before Malayan independence, an MCS 
officer serving in each State bureaucracy held the post that had 
responsibilities over land administration.The NLC's reccnmendation 
could thus be seen as an attempt, after independence, to standardize 
land administration and policy through formally recognising and 
continuing a system of land administration within Which MCS officers 
played a crucial role before independence.The PCL's task was to 
work towards proper and reasonable working relations between the Central
96. ibid., p. 5, (a) (111).
97. ibid., p. 5, (a) (iv).
98. ibid., p. 5, (b) (i) and (ii)
99. ibid., p. 5, (b) (iii).
100. The State Secretary was recognised by the NLC as the head of the 
public service of the State, ibid., p. 5, (b) (iv).
101. See Federation of Malaya, Staff List, 1st Jan. 1957, Kuala Lunpur, 
Government Press, 1957.
102. Before independence land was in fact controlled by the British 
colonial administration and as such there was no Central or State 
land. Hence at independence, When land was included in the State 
List, there was a need to distinguish between what was Central 
land in each State and What was State land. With this distinction 
a necessity was created for a Central department to lock after 
such Central land. Thus the establishment of the post of the 
Federal Ccmmissioner of Lands. Interview with Datuk Nasaruddin 
Bahari, currently the Federal Director of Lands, 29.8.80.
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and State Governments over land natters through frequent Federal-State
1 0 3Commissioners meetings.
By 1960 all the States had established the posts of SCLM with
the exception, inevitably perhaps, of K e d a h . T a b l e  6 indicates
this. In Kedah, the pre-independence MCS post of "Adviser, lands1 was
still listed as an MCS post but was left vacant until abolished in
1962.105 Alongside this the post of Director of lands was established
and held by an SCS officer. This post, however, had a lower salary scale
and was re-named as SCLM only in 1 9 6 7 . As Table 6 indicates, only
Kedah had this post continuously held by an officer of the State's cwn
SCS. This assertation of 'autonomy' highlighted then as it does new the
difference between Kedah and the former FMS, Straits Settlements and,
interestingly also other UFMS States.107
In Pahang's case, as in the other States except Kedah, the PSD
usually consults the PCL over whan to appoint, frcm among PTD officers, 
1 0 8as SCLM. Once appointed, these officers are primarily responsible 
to the respective State Governments. As only an Adviser to the State
I QQ
Governments , the FCL has no power to enforce any of the proposals 
submitted to the State Govemements even through the SCLMs who are PTD 
officers. Nevertheless, he tends to have a closer relationship with 
SCLMs who are PTD officers compared with those who are SCSs officers.
He tends to have more sway over the former because he is in a position 
to influence their promotion and mobility.These PTD officers 
serving as SCLMs, as in Pahang, have to face two potentially opposing
103. ibid. Such meetings were usually held two or three times annually.
104. Federation of Malaya, Staff List, 1st Jan. 1960, Kuala Lumpur, 
Government Press, 1960.
105. Federation of Malaya, Staff List, 1960-62, Kuala Lumpur,
Government Press, 1960-1962; Kedah, Estimates of Revenues and 
Expenditures, 1960-1962, Appendixes 2.
106. Kedah, Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure, 1967, Appendix 2.
107. According to Datuk Nasaruddin Bahari the State Ccmmissioner of 
Lands and Mines post is a 'Central' post within the State 
bureaucracy. In the former EMS and Straits Settlements States 
this post was held by PTD officers and in the former UFMS States 
by officers of the respective SCSs on secondment to this 'Central' 
post. Interview with Datuk Nasaruddin Bahari. One could expect 
that such a 'Central' post to be listed within the Federation's 
Establishment List. Interestingly, the post for each State except 
for that of Kedah was listed in the Federation of Malaya and 
Malaysia, Staff List, 1960-1975.
108. Interview with Datuk Nasaruddin Bahari.
109. Interview with En. Nik Mohd. Zain, currently Deputy Director of 
Lands, 29.8.80.
110. This 'sway' had been strengthened lately by the inclusion of the 
FDL as a member of the Promotions Board of the PSD. Interview 
with Datuk Nasaruddin Bahari.
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forces; State and Central interests in land policy and administration - 
a position not endured by the SCLM in Kedah.
Kedah's success in maintaining a semblance of administrative 
autonomy, small but significantly greater than the former FMS and 
Straits Settlements States, has not gone unnoticed. To criticisms that 
the Kedah State Government was employing only "Kedahans" as civil 
service officers, the MB, Syed Nahar Shahabudin, responded that such 
criticisms could affect the State's good name and creat dissatisfaction 
among outstation officers serving or wanting to serve in Kedah.^^ He 
admitted that the State was actually having a shortage of technocrats 
that should have been seconded by the Central Government and errphasised 
that
"We will always welccme the services of MCS officers as long as 
they help us in speeding up the development projects".
The MB assured Central officers serving in Kedah that their services
were indeed required and he hoped to create a better understanding
between SCS's and Central officers.Officers of Kedah's SCS
resented the presence of PTD and other Central officers within the State
bureaucracy. The relationship between the two sets of officers had at
best been 'correct'. As with Pahang, the Kedah Government would insist
that seconded Central officers should serve the State with loyalty and
dedication.
Size and composition; Table 7 compares the respective sizes and 
composition of the Kedah and Pahang bureaucracies frcm 1960 to 1975.
The size, in absolute numbers, of the Pahang bureaucracy increased at a 
faster rate than that of the Kedah bureaucracy and, consequently, its 
size by 1966 had more than equalled that of Kedah and by 1975 had 
outstripped that of Kedah. The total number of Division 1 and 11 posts 
in the administrative component in Kedah remained almost constant while 
that of Pahang increased from 1960 to 1975. While the administrative 
component was bigger in Kedah than that of Pahang, though the gap was 
progressively narrowed, the number of Division 1 posts in the 
administrative component of the former was less than that in the latter 
and only by 1972 was the number the same for both States.
As indicated in chapter 5, States’ control over the size and 
composition of the State establishments, with minor exceptions, had been
111. New Straits Times (NST), 28.6.79.
112. ibid.
113. ibid.
114. ibid.
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severely curtailed. State Governments can, therefore, increase the 
sizes of their establishments only in the lover salary levels of the 
State bureaucracies and not in the key administrative and higher salary 
levels. The exceptions apart, inter-Governmental consultation, usually 
involving negotiation and bargaining, is necessary before the size and 
grading of posts within the State establishment could be increased and
l i e
improved respectively.
Entry qualifications: the administrative services; The entry
requirements for the Kedah SCS are different from that for the PTD and
PTA. Before Independence those eligible to apply for entry into the
116Kedah SCS were, in order of preference ,
1) Malays bom to Kedah parents,
2) Malays bom outside Kedah,
3) Non-Malays bom in Kedah, and
4) Others.
Although this preferential structure has since changed, the Kedah SCS is
1 1 7still very much a Kedah 'Malay' preserve. In Pahang, only Malay
liftofficers of the PTD and PTA were normally seconded. Thus, the Malay 
administrative element in the Pahang bureaucracy was and still is also 
exclusively Malay but also included non-Pahang Malays.
The qualifications of Kedah SCS officers in 1980 ranged from the 
Honours degrees to the Senior Cambridge (G.C.E. 'O' level). Table 8 
illustrates this. From 1976, all those accepted into the Kedah SCS had 
University degrees. Out of 27 accepted between 1976 and 1980 24 had 
Honours degrees and 3 had General degrees. This change in the entry 
qualifications of those entering the Kedah SCS is illustrated by Table 
9.119
The entry qualifications for the PTD and PTA, officers of which 
make up the administrative element of Pahang's bureaucracy, were 
generally much higher than those for the Kedah SCS, at least before 1976. 
With the exception of those entering the PTD via prcmotion frcm the PTA 
or by application frcm the SCSs, PTD officers are increasingly recruited
115. As will be seen later, the Central Government wielded this power 
in its relations with the Kedah Government and bureaucracy.
116. Interview with Datuk Mohd. Sheriff.
117. ibid. There have, however, been a sprinkling of non-Malays.
118. Interviews with Datuk Wan Sidek, former State Secretary of Pahang, 
20.8.80., and Dr. Elyas Omar.
119. A new Service Scheme was introduced for the Kedah SCS on the 1st 
Jan. 1976. This scheme, called the General Degree Scheme with a 
higher slary scale, was obviously designed to attract candidates 
with University degrees.
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directly frcm among University graduates with Honours degrees. After 
Independence applicants to the MAS were required to have at least the 
General University degrees. In mid-1970s, with the re-structuring of 
MAS into the PTA, the number of successful applicants with Honours 
degrees entering the PTA had been increasing.
Posts and Salary Scales: Similar posts exist within the
administrative component of both Kedah's and Pahang's aministration. In 
Kedah the posts of S Sec, SFO, SLA State PTG, DOs and State Director of 
Planning (SDP) have always been held by Kedah SCS officers but in Pahang 
these posts have always been held by MCS/PTD officers. Tilman held that
"The posts usually filled by the State civil services in the 
former Unfederated Malay States generally devolve upon personnel 
of the Malay Administrative Service in the States of the former 
Fms".120
However, officers of the Kedah SCS also held most, if not all, of the 
senior administrative posts in Kedah while MAS/PTA officers held only 
the junior administrative posts in Pahang.
The Kedah SCS is a Service that stradles both Divisions 1 and 11 
but the PTD and PTA are Divisions 1 and 11 Services respectively. There 
is a similarity in types of posts being held by the Kedah SCS officers 
and PTA officers. However, Kedah SCS officers also held posts similar 
to that filled by PTD officers in Pahang. Tilman's statement must be 
re-stated to indicate that generally only the Division 11 posts that are 
held by the Kedah SCS officers are also held by the MAS/PTA officers 
serving in Pahang.
Despite the similarity in the types of administrative posts in 
Kedah and Pahang, there is generally no similarity in the Divisional 
grades and salary scales for the same type of posts. Tables 10 and 11 
indicate this.
Table 12 compares the salary scales of the Kedah SCS and those for 
the MCS and MAS which also apply to Pahang. The super scale posts, 
according to classification, had the same nominal value in both Kedah 
and Pahang. In Kedah, be lew the Superscale posts, other Division 1 
posts were classified as Class 1A or Class IB posts. In Class 1A 
salaries ranged frcm M$l,057 - M$l,141 per month in 1960 and changed in 
1967 to the flat rate M$l,254 per month. In Class IB salaries ranged 
frcm M$836 - M$l,032 per month in 1960 and changed in 1967 to a range of 
M$l,094- M$l, 196 per month. These salary scales remained unchanged up to
120. Tilman, cp.cit., p. 82, n.l.
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1971. By 1980, all Class 1A posts had been upgraded to Superscale G or 
above and Class IB salary scales ranged frcm M$l,805 - M$2,205 (as Table 
10 indicates). In Pahang, apart from superscale posts, the Timescale 
for the MCS ranged frcm M$592 - M$l,254 per month in 1960 and remained 
unchanged up to 1 9 7 1 . Compared to Kedah's SCS Class 1A and Class 
IB, the MCS's Timescale, although with a lcwer entry point, had the 
higher ceiling of M$l,254 per month, and only in 1967 did Class 1A 
attained a similar value. Significantly, in Divison 1 only Kedah's SCS 
Class 1A and IB salary scales have been improved respectively bringing 
them nearer to the top of the MCS Timescale respectively. Hcwever, the 
salary scales for the Kedah SCS and MCS in Division 1 remained different 
in 1971.
The Division 11 Timescale posts in Kedah had salary scales 
ranging frcm M$280 - M$813 per month in 1960. In 1967 this scale was 
changed to M$310 - M$l,014 per month and remained unchanged up to 1971. 
For the same period, the Division 11 MAS salary scales, including for 
Cadets and Timescale posts, ranged frcm M$415 - M$813 per month in 1960. 
In 1966 this was changed to M$430 - M$l,014 per month and in 1969^^ 
it was further changed to M$310 - M$l,014 per month. Thus, the salary 
scales of Divisions 11 posts in the Kedah SCS and Pahang MAS were 
uniformalised. This was achieved by upgrading the floor and ceiling 
values of the salary scales of the Division 11 SCS posts in 1967 and 
lowering the floor value of the salary scales of the Division 11 MAS 
posts in 1969. In 1971 the salary scales for both MAS and SCS's 
Division 11 posts were essentially the same.
In Kedah, as Table 10 indicates, the posts of S Sec, SFO, PTG, 
Assistant S Sec (1) and four DOs posts were Division 1 posts but the 
other six DOs posts were Division 11 posts in 1960. In Pahang, hcwever, 
for the same year, these and four Assistant DOs posts were Division 1 
posts as Table 11 indicates. In 1960 in Kedah only the S Sec's post 
was a Superscale post (D) while in Pahang the posts of S Sec, SFO, PTG 
and eight DOs posts were Superscale posts.
Perhaps the most striking difference was in the Divisional 
grades between the posts of Kedah and Pahang DOs and Assistant DOs. As 
Table 10 indicates the DOs posts in Kedah were gradually upgraded and
121. In 1972 the MCS Timescale was changed. See Federation of Malaysia, 
Staff List, 1972.
122. In 1969 the MAS was divided into two schemes: Scheme A (M$430- 
M$l,014 per month) and Scheme B (M$310HM$1,014 per month).
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by 19801^  aii the DOs posts were graded as Division 1 posts. A
respondent1^  explained that the disparity in the grading of the DOs
posts in Kedah (and also those of the former FMS States) and those in
Pahang (and also those of the former UFMS States) was due principally to
the fact that before Independence the DOs posts in Pahang were held by
British MCS officers While all the DOs posts in Kedah were held by Malay
Kedah SCS officers. Then the Divisional grades and salaries of MCS
officers were generally higher than for those of Kedah SCS officers.
Therefore, DOs posts held by the MCS officers in Pahang had higher
grades and salaries than similar posts held by the Kedah SCS officers.
Upgrading of Posts and Promotion; Upgrading of posts within the State
bureaucracy necessarily involve joint Centre-State consultation since,
as indicatd in Chapter 5, upgrading would increase the financial
liability of the Central Government. The Central Government, therefore,
had an interest in and the pcwer to block the upgrading of posts.
125Several respondents held that the Central Government had frequently 
used and, in their opinion, abused such power. Kedah SCS officers 
resented the manner in Which the Central Government used this power.
They viewed this as the attenpt, first, to limit their career prospects 
and, second, to undermine whatever administrative autonony that Kedah 
still then enjoyed. Upgrading of posts within the Kedah bureaucracy was 
crucial because it affected the SCS's officers career prospects Which 
were already limited by the availability of cnly a few Division 1 posts 
with Superscale gradings.
On several occasions the Central Government had used this 
pcwer. ^ 6  The controversy over the upgrading of the PTG's post in 
Kedah provides an illustration. In 1960 (see Table 6) the PTGs' posts 
in all the States, except that in Kedah and Perlis, were Superscale 
posts. The Kedah PTG's post was a Class 1A post, a grade with salary 
scales similar to the top ranks ofthe MCS Timescale, and this remained
123. Kedah, Staff Liit, 1980. According to Datuk Mohd. Sheriff the
upgrading of DOs posts in Kedah was undertaken by the 1976 Cabinet
Committee Salary revision. Interview with Datuk Mohd. Sheriff.
124. ibid.
125. Interviews with officers of Kedah's SCS.
126. Discussion based on interviews with officers of Kedah's SCS. A
former Kedah State Secretary held that Kedah was made to suffer 
the 'opportunity cost' of rejecting the Central Government 
integration proposal and made life difficult for officers of the 
SCS. It attenpted to 'squeeze' the SCS's officers especially 
regarding the upgrading of posts within the Kedah SCS. Interview 
with "A”.
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unchanged up to 1971 and only by 1980 was it listed as a Superscale F 
127posts. Interstingly, in I960, Kedah already had an 'Adviser Lands, 
Kedah' post with Superscale F grading but it was designated as an MCS 
post. This post was 'allowed' to lapse in 1962 and with it went the 
Superscale F grade. Kedah failed to acquire and transfer this grade to 
the then Director of Lands which subsequently became the PTG post.
The Central Government pursued a clear "carrot and stick" ploy in 
the controversy over upgrading of posts within Kedah. Its bargain was 
that it would be willing to upgrade posts within the Kedah bureaucracy 
if the State was in turn willing to accept more Central officers. If 
Kedah were to accept this general principle then Central money, 
necessary for any upgrading of posts, would be made available.
Regarding the Kedah PTG's post, the Central Government proposed that 
this post should be upgraded to Superscale G, as in the other States, 
only if Kedah accepted this condition? that the Kedah SCS officer should 
hold the upgraded PTG's post on a 'personal to holder' basis and on his 
retirement the post should be filled by an MCS officer. This 
represented short-term gain for the Kedah SCS but in the long-term it 
would lose this post to the MCS, thus reducing the number of tcp posts 
and damaging what they viewed as State ' autonomy'. A committee of the 
Kedah SCS Union viewed this as the process of attrition and rejected the 
proposal. The Kedah SCS Union succeeded in persuading the State 
Government to create a 'special allowance' for the PTG's post so as to 
cover, somewhat, the difference between that post's salary compared to 
that offered by the Central Government.1^® Thus, the Central 
Government failed in what was viewed as its attempt to undermine State 
' autonomy'.
The Central Government's attempts to selectively upgrade other 
posts within Kedah provide further illustrations. The Kedah State
I OQ
Government had continuously requested upgrading of the DOs posts.
These requests were reasonable since only four DOs posts, before 1980, 
were Division 1 posts while all of Pahang's DOs and several Assistant 
DOs posts were Division 1 posts. Additionally, if DOs posts were upgraded
127. Kedah, Staff Liit, 1980.
128. This 'special allowance' had to be paid for frcm State funds by 
the State Government. By giving this allowance, hcwever, the 
basic salary of the Kedah PTG was not increased and since there 
was no upgrading the Central Government could not use Article 112 
to block this allowance. Its effect, hcwever, was to provide the 
PTG with more money. Hcwever, the other former UFMS States 
accepted Central officers to fill the PTG's post in their 
respective States. Interview with "A".
129. Interview with En. Zainul Rashid b. Hj. Ahmad.
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then Kedah would also be in a postion to request the upgrading of 
Assistant DOs posts and perhaps even for the creation of more Assistant 
DOs posts as the result of this upward movement. The Central Government 
proposed that the DOs posts in Kedah should be upgraded but in return 
the Assistant DOs posts should be filled by either the MCS or MAS 
officers. If Kedah had accepted this the SCS would have lost such posts 
to Central officers thus affecting the career prcpsects of junior 
officers of the SCS and moreover the Kedah Government would have to pay 
the salaries of these Central officers frcm the already limited State 
funds. Since the Kedah Government rejected this proposal the 
Central Government implemented a selective policy of upgrading DOs posts 
gradually and not upgrading Assistant DOs posts.
Other significant differences between the Kedah and Pahang 
bureaucracies are in the scope and pace of promotion available to either 
the administrative officers of Kedah or Pahang. The highest post 
available to the Kedah SCS officers is the S Sec's post, a Superscale C 
post in 1980. As Table 8 shews, in 1980 out of ninety-two posts in the 
Kedah SCS ten were Super scale posts; one each was Super scale C and E, 
two were Super scale F, and six were Superscale G. The promotion and 
career prospects for the administrative officers of Pahang, as PTD and 
PTA officers, are much wider. The respective Central Services that they 
belong to were and still are much larger in size than that of the Kedah 
SCS. Their promotion and career propsects, unlike that of officers of 
the Kedah SCS, are not confined to the State bureaucracy. They can be 
transferred to other State bureaucracies or to Central Ministries and 
Department. The top post within the PTD is the Chief Secretary to the 
Government or Ketua Setiusaha Negara which is a Staff Appointment and 
below this are the Superscale A to G posts. PTA officers can apply to 
enter the PTD.
Table 13 compares the total numbers of Super scale posts out of 
the total numbers of posts within the MCS/PTD1®1 and the Kedah SCS. 
Between 1960 and 1971 the ratio of Superscale posts to total posts 
remained almost constant, at about 1:2.5, for the MCS while that for the 
Kedah SCS had improved from 1:72 to 1:37. In 1975 the ratio had 
worsened marginally for the PTD to 1:3.6 and in 1980 the ratio for the 
Kedah SCS had improved dramatically to 1:9.6. Nevertheless, on the
130. Since these posts were within the State estblishment, the 
operating expenditure was met from State funds.
131. Since the top administrative officers of Pahang were MCS, and 
subsequently PTD, officers their career prospects were and still 
are contained within this service organization.
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whole, based on these ratios, one could expect that the pace of 
promotion for MCS/PTD officers would have been much faster because of 
the increased promotion opportunities compared to that for Kedah SCS 
officers.
Tables 14 and 15 respectively indicate the number of years taken 
by the MCS and Kedah SCS officers from first entry into the respective 
Services to occupy Superscale posts. Since most of the Superscale MCS 
officers in 1971 started service either in the MAS or the SCSs their 
length of Government service would be longer than indicated in Table 14. 
These former MAS and SCSs officers had opted to join the MCS and 
benefited because of the larger number of Super scale posts. If the 
former SCSs officers had remained in their respective SCSs their career 
prospects would have been limited. The Kedah SCS was and still is too 
small to provide rapid promotion and that breadth of career prospects 
available within the PTD and PTA.
Changes in development administration introduced by the Central 
Government: Inpact on and responses of Kedah and Pahang.
The Central Government's role in national development had been 
strengthened by the States' poor finances and the fragmentation of 
powers in their areas of resposibility. Its national development 
efforts, as indicated in Chapter 6, require the harnessing of both 
Central and State bureaucracies. At the administrative level Kedah has 
a State officer system while Pahang has a Central officer system. The 
federal structure provided the former with legal protection. This 
limits the Central Government's legal access to it. Hcwever, the latter 
is not similarly protected and since it is part of the compliance 
structure of the Central bureaucracy the Central Government has direct 
legal access to it.
In development matters the Central Government, because of the 
federal structure, had to obtian access to State bureaucracies 
especially to those with State officer systems as in Kedah. For only 
thus could it ensure that officers of such bureaucracies would comply 
with Central directives, especially in land matters. Land has always 
been vital to the Central Government development plans. Hcwever, land 
and land administration are States' responsibilities.^^ The creation
132. In each State land adminstration is headed by the State Director
of Lands and Mines or the Pengarah Tanah dan Galian (PTG). At the 
District level the DOs are responsible for land administration and 
in this they are responsible to the State PTG. In Kedah the PTG 
and DOs belong to the State Officer System. In the former UFT4S
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of the post of SDO and the establishment of State and District level 
Development Committees as co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms in 
each State were examples of Central Government attempts to gain access 
to State bureaucracies and bring State Government officers within its 
direct control.
The SDO's post in each State is a Central post and paid for by 
the Central government.1^  According to Esman1*^ the SDO's post was 
established in 1959 under the directive of Tun Abdul Razak who was then 
the Deputy PM and Minister of Rural Development. The State Governments' 
opposition to the SDO's establishment, if any, was muted. Several 
reasons could be advanced. First, the SDO's establishment was made on 
the initiative and directive of Tun Razak who, apart from being the 
Deputy PM and Minister of Rural Development, was the Deputy President of 
UMNO, the dominant partner within the Alliance Government at 
both Central and State levels. Since the Alliance then controlled all 
the State Governments, except that of Kelantan and Trengganu, the Deputy 
PM's directive could not be easily ignored. In the Alliance-controlled
132. (Cont.) States the DOs belong to the respective State Officer
system with seconded Central officers holding the respective State 
PTG's post, in all the other States, as in Pahang, these posts are 
held by officers of the States' respective Central Officer System. 
The Centre's land development projects require the co-operation of 
State Governments and State officers involved in land 
administration.
133. This post was originally that of the Rural Industrial Development 
Authority's (RIDA) State Rural Development Officer. It was simply 
substituted by the post of SDO when it was created by the newly 
formed Ministry of Rural Development. This Ministry also assumed 
the co-ordinating function for which RIDA had previously been 
responsible for. See Ness, G.D., Bureaucracy and Rural 
Development in Malaysia: A Study of Complex Organization in 
Stimulating Economic Development in New States, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, Uni. of California Press, 1967, p. 145, n. 5.
134. Esman, M.J., Administration and Development in Malaysia; 
Institution Building in a Plural Society, Ithaca, N.J., Cornell 
Uni. Press, 1972, p. 101. According to a respondent, hcwever, the 
SDO's post was established in early 1960. Interview with a senior 
Implementation, Co-ordination Unit officer, 24.7.80. (subsequently 
referred to as "D"). The SDO was initially attached to the 
Ministry of Rural Development, then to the Ministry of National 
and Land Development, in 1972 to the Inplementation, Co­
ordination, Development Administration Unit (ICDAU) and new to the 
Inplementation Co-ordination Unit (ICU). Each State has to 
approve the SDO's appointment and usually the State would insist 
that Central officers appointed as SDO should be frcm the State 
where they cure to be posted as the SIX). This was meant to ensure 
the SDO's oomnittment to the State within which they serve. 
Nevertheless, these officers are still viewed with suspicion and 
considered as 'Central' men. Interview with a senior PSD officer,
18.8.80 (subsequently referred to as "E").
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States, party political links were partly instrumental in persuading the
State Governments to accept the Central Government's directive.
Hcwever, inspite of the absence of similar links, the Kelantan and
Trengganu Governments were not especially adverse to this Central 
135directive. Second, the post was to be located m  each State but
not within the State Secretariats or placed within the State
Establishment, and it was to be paid for by the Central Government.
Hence its establishment would not incur additional expenditure to the
States. Oppostion could have been more vociferous if State Governments,
especially of States with their cwn SCS's, were 'required' to establish
the SDO's post within the respective State Secretariats and
Establishments and pay for it frcm State funds, while the Central
Government retained the right to appoint MCS officers to such posts. If
this had been the case State Governments would have incurred additional
expenditure and at the same time officers of the respective SCSs would
have been denied the opportunity of holding such posts. It is
conceivable that had the post been placed within the State Secretariat
and Establishment SCSs' officers would have campaigned for this post to
be held by one of them. According to several respondents1^  it was
bad enough to have a Central post and officer in their midst but it
would be unbearable if this post and officer were anchored within the
State Establishment. They could at least tolerate the former but would
oppose the latter. Third, the States accepted the SDO's establishment
because they knew that Central money would be offered through his office
137for development purposes within the State. This was a substantial
inducement since States lack adequate finances for development purposes.
1 3RFinally, according to several respondents , under the Agreement of 
1391957 the Central Government was not barred frcm establishing 
Central posts paid for from Cental funds within each State.
The establishment of the SDOs, State and District level 
Development Committees, were also part of the Central Government's 
reorganisation of development administration at the State level. In
135. Interviews with Tan Sri Da to Abdullah Ayub, the Chief Secretary 
to the Government or Ketua Setiusaha Negara (KSN), 8.8.80, Datuk 
Rozhan Kuntum and Dr. Elyas Omar.
136. Interviews with officers of Kedah SCS.
137. Interview with Dr. Abdullah Sanusi, Director-General of MAMPU, 
25.7.80.
138. Interviews with Datuk Shaari, Tan Sri Dato Abdullah Ayub, Datuk 
Rozhan Kuntum, and others.
139. Agreement for the Constitution of a Federation Establishment,
1957, in Tilman, R.O., Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya, 
Appendices A and B.
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this reorganisation the State Secretariats, considered inadequate for 
co-ordinating the development effort because of their lack of interest 
in the developmental departments, were by-passed.1^ ® This 
reorganisation was also a response to the need for decentralizing the 
management of development.1^ 1 A respondent1^  held that Tun Abdul 
Razak initiated this reorganisation in order to improve the implementing 
capacity of the State bureaucracies which were both slew and 
cumbersome.
Through the SDOs, State Rural Development Committees (SRDC) and 
District Rural Development Committees (DRDC), the Ministry of Rural 
Development would get
"direct access to the local units despite the nation1s federal 
structure, which gave the States responsibility for the District 
Officers and for land matters".1
In general, through the SDOs, SRDC and DRDC, Tun Razak attexipted also to
"bypass the archaic machinery of state government and put his men 
in a position to ride herd on the functional departments, federal 
and state, which are responsible for implementing projects at the 
state and district levels".1^ *
To the Central Government the SDO in each State was to be instrumental
in speeding up
"the implementation of projects through monitoring the progress 
with project implementation at state district levels, and by 
providing a 'trouble-shooting' capacity to identify bottlenecks to 
progress and to find ways and means for removing or getting 
around the impediments; and hold a watching brief over the 
activities of the state governments".
This watching brief was aimed especially at the former UFMS States that
have their own SCSs.1^  As such the SDO, being independent of the
State Government, was to function as a kind of management audit.1^
140. Esman, op.crt., p. 101.
141. Bruce, Colin, "Strengthening the States' Planning and 
Implementation System." State Rural Development Project, Economic 
Plannit Unit, Prime Minister's Department, 15.1.79, p. 3.
142. Interview with "B" who was one of the first MCS officers to be 
apointed as the SDO. Tun Razak was personally committed to this 
re-organisation and he enphasised the role of the SDOs and their 
offices within it. Thus the SDOs were always attached to the 
Ministry over which he had control over and when he became PM in 
1971 the SDOs were transferred frcm the Ministry of National and 
Rural Development to the PM's Department. Within the PM's 
Department the SDOs came initially under ICDAU and finally in 1975 
under the ICU.
143. Ness, cp.cit., p. 144.
144. Esman, op.cit., p. 137.
145. Bruce, Colin, cp.cit., p. 4.
146. ibid., p. 16.
147. ibid., p. 25.
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Resistance to this reorganisation which interfered with the State
and District Officers working conditions and schedules came especially
from SCSs officers of the former UFMS States. Kedah SCS officers viewed
this reorganisation as an attempt by the Central Government to undermine
the State's administrative autonomy and their cwn positions within the
14ftState bureaucracy. The fact that the SDO was and remains a Central
officer directly accountable to the Central Minister convinced them that
its establishment had the clear aim of ensuring their compliance with
149Central directives on development matter. They resented the 
establishment of this Central outpost within the State as an intrusion. 
In addition Central Government development plans, in the context of this 
reorganisation, would make more vigorous demands on their time and 
energy as State and District officers: demands that came essentially 
frcm the Central Government rather than frcm the State Government. They 
faced these new demands with apprehension. Referring to SCSs' officers
in general, Ness argued that rrany of them
"simply preferred the relaxed office routine of the past [which]
left considerable time for leisure. They would continue their old
office hours even in the face of tight deadlines set by the 
Federal Ministry. Others felt that the Federal directives were 
not to be taken seriously unless backed by acceptance and urgent 
demands for compliance by the State Government".
In the former UFMS States, resistance frcm the SCSs' officers
delayed the estabishment of DRDCs and the actual implementation of
development schemes. In contrast, there was no resistance frcm Central
officers serving as DOs and State officers in the former EMS States.
Pahang responded quickly to the Central directive of January 1960. The
first meeting of the Pahang SRDC was held in March 1960 with all of its
DRDCs following in quick succession.1^1 Hcwever, the Kedah SRDC had
its first meeting at the end of May 1961 but it was by June and July
1961 before most of its DRDCs were functioning. The different
speeds with which Pahang and Kedah responded to the Central directive
reflected the variation in access that the Central Government had to the
mechanisms of control of the Central and State officer systems of Pahang
and Kedah respectively.
148. Interviews with Kedah SCS officers.
149. That many SCS's officers held this view was generally held to be 
the case by Central officers. Interview with SDO, 9.9.80 
(subsequently referred to as "F").
150. Ness, G.D., "The Malayan Bureaucracy and its occupational 
Communities; A carment on James de Vere Allen's 'Malayan Civil 
Service, 1874-1941'," in Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1970, p. 183.
151. Ness,G.D., Buraucracy and Rural Development in Malaysia, p. 162.
152. ibid.
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The federal structure provided legal protection to officers of
the State officer system and thus the material rewards available to
these officers were not directly accessible to and controlled by the
Central Government. This was reinforced by a high degree of social
insulation which resulted frcm the fact that officers of the State
officer systems were members of self-sustaining, close-knit organisation
and subcultural group in each State. They were confindent and secure
about their high status and position within the State. Their already
high status probably sustained their high degree of social cohesion and
separateness. In Kedah this could be indicated by the number of
officers in the Kedah SCS who were from named or high status 
153families. Table 16 indicates that between 1960 and 1967 the number 
and percentage of officers frcm such families, although declining, make 
up a substantial minority within the SCS. Homogeneity in background was 
quite widespreed. Even though there were SCS's officers who did not 
belong to such families, they as Kedahans, would tend to identify with 
the separateness and cohesion generated by the SCS as an organisation, 
especailly in situations of contact with officers of Central 
orgainsations. According to Ness the high status occupational position 
of officers of the State officer system within the bureaucracies of 
former UFMS States was the result of their prior high family status:
"Thus their status in their local ccnmunities was not determined 
directly by their jobs, which essentially made the occupational 
position less critical for them. Further their self-images as 
ruling elites and bureaucrats was amply protected by their close 
association with other officers. In these two ways, the 
indigenous officers were insulated frcm their jobs as instruments 
of diffuse control. They consequently did not take seriously the 
directives frcm Kuala Lumpur that set ambitious schedules for them 
to meet in preparing local development plans".
The situation of officers of Central officer systems was
different. The Central Government had legal pcwer over them with regard
to their position within both the Central and State bureaucracies. They
did not belong to a subcultural group within each State. They did not
share a homogenous background of high family status. Recruited frcm all
153. These families were usually titled and were locally held to belong 
to ruling class. They included the Terikus', Syeds, and Wans. In 
Malay Society those who claim descent frcm the Prophet is 
recognised by the honorific title 'Syed' which confers status equal 
to that o f a Raja of Royal descent. See Gullick, J., Malaysia: 
Economic Expansion and National Unity, London, Ernest Benn, 1981, 
p. 40. 'Tengkus' have Royal descent and 'Wans' are titles awarded 
by the Sultan which are passed down to their descendents.
154. Ness, G.D., "The Malayan Bureaucracy and its occupational 
Communities: ...", p. 184.
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parts of the Federation they belonged, instead, to a Central 
organisation that was, in principle, essentially based on the 
achievement criteria. Their occupational position within the Central 
organisation defined their achieved status, position and self-images.
Not surprisingly officers of the Central officer systems within the 
bureaucracies of the former EMS States
"were more immediately and directly controlled by the formal 
hierarchy within which their occupations were set. There was no 
conflict between bureaucratic and subcultural loyalties".
With a Central officer system Pahang did not have the same degree of
legal protection and social insulation from the Central Government that
was available to the State officer system of Kedah. The legal
protection and social insulation of the latter had to be breached if
similar co-operation was to be obtained by the Central Government from
the State and Central officer systems of Kedah and Pahang respectively.
The Alliance-controlled State Governments could not afford to
ignore the development policies of the Alliance-controlled Central
Government, especiallly When these were given top priority. Tun Razak's
political argument as expressed to State Governments, to quote Ness,
"was simple and direct; it was made privately to them on a number 
of occassions and was constantly reinforced in the public 
discussion of politics and elections carried by the press. The 
Minister argued that the government would stand or fall as a 
result of this development program. If State leaders wanted to 
continue to be elected, they must ensure that their bureaucratic 
functionaries give full support to the development program".
Clearly, the survivial of the Alliance-controlled Central and State 
Governments, it was argued, depended on the successful implementation of 
the Cental Government's development plans. It also contained an implied 
threat that if State political leaders failed to ensure the full co­
operation of their bureaucratic functionaries they would lose the 
confidence of Central political leaders and, since their political 
careers depended on retaining the confidence of Central political 
leaders in them, this would damage their political careers. In short, 
it would be in the States' leaders interest to ensure the co-operation 
of their State civil servants. In this way the party machinery was 
instrumental in undermining the legal protection that protected the 
officers of the State officer system.
Tun Razak's personal ccmmitment and identification with the 
development effort were shewn in his frequent on-the-spot inspection of
155. ibid.
156. ibid. p. 165.
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development projects in progress. In this he came into face-to-face 
contact with State civil servants. Such contacts resulted in loosening 
the social insulation of State officers and in making them vulnerable to 
Tun Razak's powers, both traditional by virtue of being a member of the 
traditional ruling class and democratic in his capacity as a 
democratically elected leader. Ness argued that
"The status of the local officer might be protected if the 
contacts were distant, private, and formal, but when they were 
face-to-face contacts, in the presence of colleagues and 
subordinates of the officer, the latter was almost totally 
vulnerable".157 
158A respondent , expressing this feeling of vulnerability, remarked 
that even though the Kedah State civil servants were beyond the Central 
Government' s or its Ministers direct ' control', Tun Razak' s penchant for 
unannounced on-the-spot inspection of any District Office had engendered 
anxiety and uneasiness among the State and District officers. They did
not want to be publicly reprimanded for their inefficiency and to have
. . . . 159it reported that their district were not efficiently administered.
To further enphasize his personal commitment and identification
with Central development efforts, Tun Razak was involved, initailly, in
choosing the MCS officers as SDOs. He would choose those he thought the
brightest and most comnitted to pursuing National development 
160goals. The PSD was opposed to this procedure of appointment.
However, in ignoring such objection he was quoted as saying that if the
PSD or the relevant department could not appoint the ' right' officer to
161the SDO's post then he would make the appointment. Normally, the 
SDOs are appointed by the PSD from among PTD officers of the 
Implementation Co-ordination Unit (ICU) on the advice of the Director- 
General of the ICU.1^ ^ Seme times the PSD had appointed SDOs without
157. ibid.
158. Interview with Datuk Mohd. Sharif. Similar views were also 
expressed by other members of the Kedah SCS.
159. For an account of one such case involving a DO of a State officer
system, see Ness, G.D., Bureaucracy and Rural Development in
Malaysia, pp. 164-165.
160. Interview with "C".
161. Interview with "E".
162. Interviews with Datuk Suffian Majid, Director-General of ICU,
5.8.80 and Datuk Rozhan Kuntum. As in the appointments of Central 
officers to Central posts within a State, the appointment of the SDO 
to a State was usually made after prior consultation with and the 
apporval of the State. Several States have sometimes requested, 
sometimes insisted, that the SDOs should be from their respective 
States so as to ensure their ' conmittment' to the States within 
which they serve. Interview with "E".
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such advice.1^
The SDO was meant to be the Centre's man on the spot in each
State: the Centre's trouble-shooter in each State. located
strategically within the SRDC as its executive secretary, with pcwer
over the disbursement of substantial amounts of Central money for
development purposes in each State, the SDO was in a position to exert
considerable pcwer. In addition, the SDO through the SRDC had direct
access to the State political leadership and State Government and
through the Director-General of the ICU and then to central Ministers,
he had access to the top Central political leadership.
Through regular meetings of all SDOs the Central Government kept
track of the progress or otherwise of the implementation of development
plans at the State level. These meetings were held at least once in six
months and sometimes as often as once in three months. Tun Razak
sometimes chaired the meetings Which normally were chaired by the
Director-General of the ICU Who would then report to Tun Razak or to the
PM. At these meetings Tun Razak frequently reminded the SDOs of their
obligation and duty to the Central Government concerning development
matters. Such reminders were thought necessary since they would come
under tremendous pressures at the State level to toe or acquiesce to the
State line. The last thing the ICU or the PM wanted was an SDO
164'captured' by the State. Such pressures and the political problems 
affecting the implementation of development plans were usually reported 
to the Director-General of the ICU and through him to the PM. In this 
way State pressures and the political problems were redirected to the 
political level and were usually discussed at the PM/MBs/CMS
I (LC.
Conferences.
At the meetings of SDOs, each SDO would submit progress reports on
each State for discussion and Where projects were making slew progress
1 66the Director-General of the ICU would personally intervene. The
167States were consulted in the preparation of such reports. In one
163. Interview with "D".
164. Interview with "F".
165. Interview with "F". At the PM/MBs/CMs Conferences the PM is
advised by the Director-General of the ICU and other relevant 
Director-Generals of Ministries, and MBs and CMs are advised by 
their State Secretaries. Interestingly, since 1978 the SDOs have 
also been attending these meetings. This indicates the growing 
importance of development matters and the SDOs attendance have 
been used to emphasise their close links with the Central 
administrative and political leaders.
166. Interview with Datuk Suffian Majid.
167. Interview with "F".
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of the meetings Tun Razak advised the SDOs not to be timid in the 
exercise of their duties and urged them to take the initiative in 
solving problems encountered in the State. He stated that
"You don't have to wait until I make a visit to your area to pass 
on your problems to me ... All problems should be solved 
immediately at state level. If this is not possible, they should 
be forwarded to the Implementation, Co-ordination, and 
Administrative Development Division".
The inpact of the SDOs' direct access o both State and Central political
leaders, especially when Tun Razak was the Deputy PM and then the PM,
was to provide them with the political 'muscle' within the
State.169
The SDO co-ordinated the implementation of development plans at 
the State level in two ways; as the executive secretary of the SRDC and 
as chairman of the meetings of all DOs and State department heads. In 
Kedah all the DOs were SCS officers. The State department heads in both 
states were officers of Central professional and technical Services.
The SDO thus had to work with and obtain the co-operation of the 
ccmnunity of State officers of the SCS and that of Central officers in 
Kedah, but simply the community of fellow Central officers in Pahang. 
Mohamad Nor Abdul Ghani, perhaps suggesting that it made no difference 
whether DOs were members of either Central or State community of 
officers, argued that
"Since the ICU has the State Development Officer and the District 
Officers under its direct control, it can acquire direct feedback 
information on development progress at the State and District 
level for a more effective monitoring of such development. Such 
feedback is not obtained through a formal and standardized 
reporting system, but rather through ad hoc reports and regular 
meetings, often chaired by the Prime Minister himself".
The problem was whether the State officers of Kedah would respond in the
same way as Central officers of Pahang to Central directives channelled
through the SDOs. Central officers, although in principle responsible
to the State within which they served, tended to be more sensitive to
Central 'needs' and policies. This tendency could be explained by the
fact that their terms and conditions of service, and especially their
promotion chances, were determined essentially at the Central level by
168. Straits Times (ST), 17.8.73.
169. Interview with "C".
170. Mohd. Nor Abdul Ghani, "Evaluation Techniques in Malaysia", Socio- 
Economic Research and General Planning Unit, PM's Department,
Kuala Lumpur, Paper presented to the UN Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization Regional Seminar on the Application of 
Evalution Techniques, Kuala Lurtpur, 26-30 November, 1979, p. 15.
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the Central Government. State officers of Kedah, conscious of their
separateness and cohesion as members of a State organisation, did not
share this tendency.
As the chief administrator for development matters in each State,
the SDO faced two important and recurrent problems. These concerned the
relationship between the SDO and DOs and the SDO's status in each State.
On the former, the important question was whether the SDO could direct
DOs, especially those who belonged to SCSs as in Kedah. On the latter,
the important question concerned the status of the SDO in the State and
his relations with the SSec who had overall responsibility over State
administration. These problems and the related questions emerged
because the post of SDO was not listed within the State Constitution.
Hence, the SDO's relationship with the SSec and other State officers,
his areas of jurisdiction, the identity of his ultimate master to whcm
he had to answer concerning his activities in the State were largely not
defined. The potential for conflict was considerable. Through the SSec
the DOs were formally responsible to the MB/CM, but in the
implementation of development policies they were made responsible and
1 7 1subordinate to the SDO. The situation was rather more complex and
troublesome, especailly since SDOs were appointed primarily as watchdogs
over the implementation of Central development projects at the State
level. Their effectiveness depended on the willingness of State
officers', especially those who belonged to SCSs as in Kedah, to accept
their role in each State. As indicated, the SDO could use his
considerable political power, based on his links with both Central and
State political leaders, to ensure that DOs and State officers complied
with Central directives on development matters. But according to a 
1 7 2respondent the SDO had to use this pcwer sparingly because its
frequent use would not only sour his relations with the State civil
servants but would also indicate his ineffectiveness in winning their
ungrudging co-operation. This respondent further argued that in Kedah
the SDO had singularly failed in soothing the fears and anxieties of
1 7 3Kedah SCS's officers and in winning their ungrudging co-operation.
1 7 4According to another respondent the SDO was perceived as being over
171. Development Administration Unit, "Land Adminstration ; Seme 
Critical Areas, "Prime Minister's Department, Kuala Lumpur, 1968 
(MIMED), unpublished, p. 2. See also Ness, G.D., cp.cit., p. 151.
172. Interview with "F". He referred to the case of the SDO in 
Trengganu, in mid-1974, who had to resign because he could not get 
along with officers of the Trengganu SCS.
173. ibid.
174. Interview with a senior Kedah SCS officer in the State Secretariat,
15,12.80 (subsequently referred to as "G").
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willing to expose the weaknesses or inefficiencies of the State
administration and thus paving the way for Central 'help' to overcome
these. As such the activities of the SDO within the State were viewed
with considerable apprehension. Most feared was the SDO's
'independence' within the State which was strengthened by his direct
link to the Centre. To undermine this and exercise sane form of control
over the SDO's activities in the State, Kedah, among others, suggested
that any carrnunication frcrn the SDO to the ICU or a Central Ministry
concerned with development should be 'passed' and made through the
SSec.175 The ICU, with the PM's backing, refused to accept this
suggestion. In Pahang, the SDO working within a cormunity of fellow
1 76Central officers had a more comfortable existence.
The SDO's power within each State rested to a large extent on
the strength of their relations with the MB, on the one hand, and with
Central leaders, on the other. In Kedah, because of the State officer
system, if action had to be taken against a recalcitrant and negligent
State Civil Servants the SDO could do two things. The SDO could
persuade the MB to take action or make a report to his Central superior
who could then convince the PM that disciplinary action was necessary.
Through the party machinery, the PM would be in a position to persuade
the MB to take the necessary disciplinary action. In this case Centre-
177State party relations would be crucial. In both cases the MB would 
then, through the SSec, have to take such action if he was sufficiently 
convinced or persuaded. The MB, however, had to tread carefully because 
the smooth working of the State administration depended on the co­
operation of the State Civil Servants. The Kedah MB had occasionally 
reminded and warned State Civil Servants of their duty to serve the 
elected State Government. In one such occasion, the MB, Datuk Syed 
Nahar, speaking at a meeting of Heads of State Government Departments,
advised State Civil Servants to take State Government directives without 
178question. He said that many problems in Kedah could be overccme if 
the Government officers were dedicated and loyal to the Barisan Nasional 
State Government, and warned that
175. Interview with "D". Kedah's suggestion was generally supported by 
Jdhore, Kelantan and Trengganu. These States were referred by him 
as "problem States". These States were alleged to be feet- 
dragging in the implementation of development programmes.
176. Interview with "F".
177. Not surprisingly, successive SDOs posted to PAS-controlled 
Kelantan had ccmlained that they encountered difficult working 
conditions. Interviews with PTD officers.
178. The Star, 16.7.78.
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"Action would be taken against these Government servants who fail 
to toe the line of the party in pcwer".
Conclusion
The different nature of British administrative participation 
sustained the tradition of administrative autonomy in Kedah but 
engendered a tradition of administrative dependence on the Centre in 
Pahang. The Independence Constitution provided for the continued 
existence of the Kedah SCS but it did not provide for the establishment 
of a Pahang SCS. The Constitution, thus, failed to provide for the 
uniformalisation or equalisation of the administrative status of Pahang 
to that of Kedah or vice versa. Several attempts by the Central 
Government since Independence to achieve this through federalising the 
Kedah SCS failed.
The Kedah SCS, protected by the federal structure, provides Kedah 
with a certain degree of administrative autonomy. Pahang has to depend 
on seconded Central officers who are naturally inclined to be favourable 
towards Central policy needs and goals. On the administrative level, 
State policies are executed by SCS officers in Kedah but by seconded 
Central officers in Pahang.
Kedah SCS officers, as members of a State organisation, have 
developed and sustained a sense of seperateness and cohesion. This has 
been especially heightened during situations of contact with the Central 
Government (over the federalisation plans) or with Central officers 
(over the execution of Central development plans) and in their fight to 
protect and enhance their career prospects within the State bureaucracy. 
The significance of the existence of the SCSs had sometimes been 
underestimated. For example, according to Esman,
"The smooth working relations between the States and the Centre 
that characterized West Malaysia since Independence can be 
attributed to two factors: the key position of the MHFS and 
members of other federal services in the state administrations and 
control of all state governments save one by the Alliance 
Party".180
As far as Pahang is concerned this statement, on the whole, may well be 
accurate. However, as far as Kedah is concerned the statement is 
misleading since no MHFS officers held or later PTD officers hold key 
positions within the State administration. What provides for the
179. ibid.
180. Esman, M.J., cp.cit., p. 92. MHFS referred to the Malaysian Home 
and Foreign Service. This was the re-organised MCS and the MHFS 
was later re-named as the Malaysian Administrative and Diplomatic 
Service (MADS) or Perhidmatan Tadbir dan Diplcmatik (PTD).
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qualitative difference in the organisation of the state bureaucracy in 
Kedah in contrast to that in Pahang is the existence of the relatively 
autonomous Kedah SCS whose members tenaciously cling to their sense of 
separateness and cohesion.
Chapter 8
282.
Political Parties and Federalism: Development of the Argument and the
Peninsula Malaysian Case.
Political parties and party systems respectively embody, foremost,
relations of pcwer and influence within and between parties. Within
parties these relations may be inexorably shaped by Michels? "*""iron law
2
of oligarchy" or, oppositely, by Eldersveld's "balkanization". These
relations are centralised and concentrated at the top of the parties in
the hands of a single leadership corps, in the case of the former, or are
decentralised and fragmented at the different levels of the parties, in
the case of the latter. The reality may well be a mix of the two and
characterised by inter-dependence between the top and lower levels of
the parties. The power relations between parties cannot sinply be
3
assessed by counting the number of parties in the party system. This 
must include, among others, an assessment of the place of parties in
4
society and the political system. These power relations, in important 
ways, affect Centre-State relations. Looking at the impact of parties, 
especially the power relations within and between parties, on 
federalism is one way of placing the study of federalism within a 
political context.
5
K.C. Wheare's restrictive conceptualisation of federalism
neglected several crucial areas that have increasingly been considered
£
vital to the working of any federal arrangement of government. These
1. Michels, R., Political Parties, translated by Eden and Cedar Paul,
New York, Dover Publishers Inc., 1959, p. 11. Duverger is in general 
agreement with this. See Duverger, M., Political Parties, London, 
Methuen & Co., 1959, p. 133.
2. Eldersveld, S.J., Political Parties; A Behaviourial Analysis, Chicago, 
Rand McNally & Co., 1964, p. 9.
3. For a dicsussion and forceful statement of this point, see Sartori,
G., Parties and Party Systems; A Framework for Analysis, Volume 1, 
London, Cambridge University Press, 1976, Chapter 5.
4. Morris-Jones, W.H., "Dominance and Dissent: Their Inter-Relations in 
the Indian Party System", Government and Opposition, Volume 1, Number 
4, July-September 1966, p. 453.
5. Wheare, K.C., Federal Government, London, Oxford University Press,
3rd ed.,. 1953.
6. Riker, W.H., Federalism: Origin, Operation and Significance, Boston 
and Toronto, Little, Brown & Co., 1964; Truman, D.B., "Federalism and 
the Party System", in MacMahon, A.W., editor,' Federalism: Mature and 
Emergent, New York, 1955, pp. 115-136; Wildavsky, A., ed., American 
Federalism in Perspective, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1967; 
Friedrich, C. J., Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice, London, 
Pall Mall Press, 1968, especially Chapter 5.
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areas are those occupied by what can be termed components , for example 
political parties and party systems, of the political system. The 
"federal constitution" provides formal boundaries within which these 
components operate. Federal relations are shaped not only by the 
constitutional division of powers between the Centre and State 
Governments, correctly emphasized by Wheare, but also by the operation 
of these crucial components within the federal political system.
Federal relations are not static and emphasizing the latter provides the 
clue to the necessarily dynamic nature of such relations. In Livingston's 
perceptive re-formulation, both a critique and refinement of Wheare's 
approach,
"The essential nature of federalism is to be sought for, not in the 
shadings of legal and constitutional terminology, but in the forces 
- economic, social, political and cultural - that have made the 
outward forms of federalism necessary. Federalism, like most 
institutional forms, is a solution of, or an atteirpt to solve, a 
certain kind of problem of political organisation. It is true, on 
the whole, that federal governments and federal constitutions 
never grew simply and purely by accident. They arise in response to 
a definite set of stimuli." 8
These forces are indeed organised and channelled into, most importantly,
political forms within a federation. Emphasizing and focussing on the
operation of political parties and party systems in a federation is one
way of going beyond Wheare' s legal-formal formula in analysing federalism.
Put simply, political parties and party systems are crucial in shaping
Centre-State relations.
Several questions, accordingly, about the relationships between
political parties and the federal structure can be raised. Are the
relationships between the two levels of government dependent on or
influenced by the kinds of relationships that members of political parties
at both levels establish with one another? What defines the different
kinds of relationships established? First, in cases where members of the
same political party control the two levels of government, the manner in
which the party is organised and the informal party relationships become
important to federalism. Second, in cases where members of different
political parties control the two levels of government the rivalry and
7. Other components include pressure groups, political movements, political 
attitudes, competing political elites, bureaucratic organisations, and 
so cn.
8. Livingston, W.S., "A Note cn the Nature of Federalism", in Wildavsky, 
op. cit., p. 36. See also Livingston, W.S., Federalism and 
Constitutional Change, London, Oxford University Press, 1956.
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competition between governing parties become important to federalism.
Third, in cases where the National government is controlled by one, the
9
biggest, of the different Regional or State parties , the activities of 
the National government are subject to the influence of the Regional or 
state governing party. Fourth, in cases where the same coalition of 
parties govern both levels of government elements of both the first and 
the second will be present. Important also are questions about the impact 
of the federal structure on both the pattern of organisation of the 
different political parties and the relationships between the parliamentary 
and extra-parliamentary wings of the parties at the two levels of 
government. These questions emphasize the importance of the extra­
constitutional and informal elements - in this case political parties - 
in the dynamic federal relationships.
Truman^0 was among the first to recognise the importance of the 
relationship between political parties and federalism. His argument runs 
as follows. A political party has two essential dimensions: the formal 
structural, conventionally classified by National, State and Local levels, 
and the informal which is characterised by
"the extent to which the persistent and effective relationships 
among men and groups of men active in party affairs are clustered 
around one or a number of individual offices located on one or 
two or all three levels of the formal hierarchy." 11
In the United States, the existence of Rational or inter-State party
machinery is devoted chiefly to the nomination and election of a
President. For Congressmen the essential and primary supportive structures
are located in the States and localities because
"the risks and sanctions to which most members of Congress are 
particularly sensitive have their focus within the states and 
localities." 12
Sometimes Congressional candidates will operate through more or less
independent organisations of their own creation. Thus the party system in
American'federalism displays a confusing complexity and is capable of
13showing a remarkable degree of separation and autonomy.
It is, however, the distribution of power within the party system, 
generally accepted as being decentralised, that is crucial in the context 
of federalism. This is crucially dependent on
9. The Nigerian case, before 1966 and Military rule, is one example.
10. Truman, D.B., op. cit.
11. ibid., p. 116.
12. ibid., p. 117.
13. ibid., pp. 117-118.
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"the relative significance of the various functions of the party 
and of the degree of decentralisation of pcwer in connection 
with the most important of them." 14
It is in the area of the noninaticn of election candidates, the most
important party function, that decentralisation of the American party
system is most apparent and within which States and localism are
emphasized. The lack of cohesion that this produces within the parties
especially on important policy matters underlines the Central
leadership's lack of control at the nominating stage. Congressmen's
risks are thus localised and they will lock in that direction when
deciding matters of policy. The American party system then is the cne that
"tends to be characterised by decentralisation of pcwer with respect 
to its most crucial function, by structural can federation, and by 
lack of cohesion on matters of public policy." 15
Federalism, because it creates States as separate and self-sustaining
centres of power, privilege and profit, contributes to the decentral-
16isaticn within the party system. First, it channels the claims of local
socio-economic groups. Second, these centres can be used as leverage
against federal action by local interests, and this is not conducive to
either centralisation or cohesion of the parties at the national level.
Third, given the multitude of elected positions and the degree of
ambiguity in the pattern of political careers, it enables the conflicting
but inter-dependent clusters of loyalty and aspiration to build up around
various positions in the governmental structure. It thus provides for
competing and frequently incompatible nuclei of decentralised intra-party
conflict. These three in various combinations
"go a long way towards indicating that there is something inherent 
in federalism which induces decentralisation and lack of coherence 
in a party system.' 17
18The Canadian and Australian experiences also shew that federalism
produces tendencies towards decentralisation and lack of cohesion in the
19party system. However, other political and social factors by moderating
these tendencies have encouraged the development of centralised pcwer.
Apparently, in the American case
"these additional political and social facts have accentuated or at 
least perpetuated the centrifugal tendencies." 20
•
1—1 ibid. P- 118.
15. ibid. P- 122.
•
VO 
1—1 ibid. pp. 123-125.
17. ibid. P- 125.
•
00 
1—1 ibid. pp. 126-129.
19. These other factors will be discussed later.
20. ibid., p. 129.
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-The structural fact of federalism alone is not a sufficient explanation
for the decentralisation of power within the American party system. It
encourages irreducible elements of decentralisation and disruption in
the party system; it is as these
"reflect the underlying pace of political process and as they are 
harnessed to regionally differentiated issues and clusters of 
organisation that they find their most impelling dynamic." 21
Thus
"In a federal system decentralisation and lack of cohesion in the_ 
party system are based cn the structural fact of federalism, but 
.... the degree to which these become the dominant character­
istics of the distribution of power within the political parties 
is a function of a variety of other governmental and social 
factors which are independent of the federal structure or are 
merely supportive of its tendencies." 22
Riker too recognises the importance of political parties and
party systems to the working of a federal government or more precisely
23the maintenance of the 'federal bargain'. He argues that the 
'administrative theory of federalism' which explores the relationships 
between fiscal and administrative arrangements, the influence of the 
federal institutions of government, and the pattern of political 
attitudes are not crucial to the maintenance of federalism. He considers 
that, over time, the pattern of relationships operating within the party 
system is crucial. In his cwn words,
"Whatever the general social conditions, if any, that sustain the 
federal bargain, there is one institutional condition that 
controls the nature of the bargain in all instances here examined 
and in all others with which I am familiar. This is the structure 
of the party system, which may be regarded as the main variable 
intervening between the background social conditions and the 
specific nature of the federal bargain." 24
The structure of the party system, thus, reflects and responds to the
forces of both diversity (background social canditicns) and unity (the
specific nature of the federal bargain). This structure can either be
centralised or decentralised.
Riker argues that in the United States the forces emphasizing
decentralisation and localism within the political parties are
supported by tradition and the absence of any effective device for
unifying party
21. Ibid., p. 132.
22. ibid., p. 133.
23. Riker, W.H., op. cit. It must, however, be admitted that Wheare 
held that a federal structure functions best with a two-party 
system. See Wheare, K.C., op. cit., p. 87.
Riker, op.cit., p. 136.
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25ideologies and organisation. Except perhaps during presidential
26elections, political parties are not nationally oriented but 
permanently locally oriented and decentralised. Several Presidents
have attempted to use ideological and organisational devices to 
tighten the party organisation but they have failed not for want of
27effort but because of the decentralised character of the party system.
In his own words
"the decentralisation of the two-party system is sufficient to 
prevent national leaders (e«g« Presidents) from controlling their 
partisans by either organisational or ideological devices. As 
such, this decentralised party system is the main protector of the 
integrity of states in our federalism.1 28
Decentralisation, thus, reduces or weakens the National leaders1 ability
to control or influence State politics and this safeguards the identity
and autonomy of States. Accordingly, Riker concludes that
"The federal relationship is centralised according to the degree 
to which the parties organised to operate the central government 
control the parties organised to control the ccnstitutent 
governments. This amounts to the assertion that the proximate 
cause of variations in the degree of centralisation (or peripheral- 
isation) in the constitutional structure of a federalism is the 
variation in degree of party centralisation." 29
Riker's argument emphasizes the level of decentralisation or 
centralisation in the structure of othe party system in explaining the 
working of federal governments and relations. Whether the structure of 
the party system is centralised or decentralised depends cn the inter­
play of several factors - leadership, ideology, organisation and 
tradition - within each of the political parties.
The question of the respective impact of types of government - 
Parliamentary (Cabinet) or Presidential - in a federation cn the types 
or kinds of party system that emerges has also been considered 
important. In Camell's view there is no necessary relationship between 
the two. He argues that
25. ibid., pp. 91-92.
26. ibid., p. 93. Although the President is the main national official, 
"the life of a President ... is one of constant bargaining".
27. ibid., pp. 93-100.
28. ibid., p. 101.
29. ibid., p. 129.
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"Other conditions for parliamentary government being present, a 
lot depends on the type of party system which emerges in a 
federation." 30
To this Colin Leys argues that Came 11's proposition should be amended
because it does not differentiate between the different types of
government and thus fails to assess their consequently differential
impact on the type of party system that emerges. In his own words,
"Surely whether there is a cabinet or presidential government makes 
a big difference to what sort of [party] system does emerge." 31
Hew the different types of government affect the emergence of the types of
party system is not made clear. Truman, in explaining the difference
between Canada and Australia cn the one hand and America on the other in
respect of their party systems, throws some light cn this question.
Truman argues that Canada, Australia and America have one thing in
common; a party system which, because of the structural fact of federalism
is decentralised and lacking in cohesion. However, the distribution of
power within each party system differs. In Canada the centralisation of
power in the party system is higher than that in the American case. The
explanation lies in the inter-play of two factors, both associated with
the Parliamentary-Cabinet system, the absence of 'separation of powers'
and the political fact that the positions of the provincial Prime
Ministers are points from which direct succession to the most important
political post, Prime Minister of Canada, can take place. The former
means that there is no separate popular election of the head of the
government and this is significant because
"it implies narrowing and rather sharply defining the alternative 
lines of succession to the position of principal influence." 32
It is, however, the political fact which seems most significant because
"the advantages of political ambiguity, which adhere to the 
governor of an important state or to a presidential aspirant whose 
prominence rests on a non-political career in the United States, 
lie with the experienced politician at the national level. This 
seems to produce a somewhat cocptative pattern of succession which 
... increases dependence upon the party leader. In the hands of a 
gifted politician such as a Laurier or a MacKenzie King - 
historically not important political facts in themselves- the 
system can produce long and durable national leadership and reduce 
the disruptive influences of federalism to a minimum." 33
30. Came 11, F.G., "Political Implications of Federalism in New States", 
in Hicks, U.K. et. al., Federalism and Economic Growth in Under­
developed Countries, London, Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961, pp. 47-48.
31. Leys, C., "Coirment", in Hicks, op. cit., p. 63.
32. Truman, op. cit., p. 127.
33. ibid.
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In Canada, then, the political fact shaping the pattern of leadership
permits a level of centralisation of power in the Canadian party
system not attainable in the American case.
In Australia the Parliamentary-Cabinet system is undoubtedly
partly responsible for the level of concentration of power, especially
34in the Australian Labour Party (ALP). Central leadership is also
important in determining this. Thus, in the hands of a John Curtin,
"it is apparently possible so to use the machinery of party 
conference, caucus discipline, and the solidarity pledge as to 
offset state control of nominations." 35
The great oentraliser of power especially in the ALP has been the
existence of intense social and class conflicts, both historically and
contemporarily, that cut State boundaries and are national in scope.
Thus,
"the chief significance of the Australian system for Americans is 
that matters of constitutional form are far less important than 
in Canada. The degree of discipline and of centralisation which 
marks the ALP and its rivals by partial adeptaticn, is 
fundamentally a reflection of underlying social conditions." 36
Watts also emphasizes the differential impact of Parliamentary or
Presidential federations not so much cn the type of party system that
emerges but cn the role of political parties as managers of regional
37diversities within a federal consensus. He argues that in the
Parliamentary system of Cabinet government the real seat of Central
38power lies in the House of Commons. The political parties working in 
this chamber will have to bear the main responsibility for managing or 
accommodating regional interests. In contrast, the balanced institutions 
of the bicameral legislature in the Presidential systems of the united 
States and Switzerland provide the framework for this task. In his own 
words,
34. ibid., p. 129.
35. ibid.
36. ibid.
37. Watts, R.L., Multicultural Societies and Federalism, Studies of the 
Royal Carmissicn cn Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Ottawa, 
Information Canada, 1971, pp. 64-65.
38. The Lower House or the House of Representatives or the Dewan Rakyat, 
as in Malaysia, as it is sometimes called. The Australian Parliament 
is an exception to this general statement. This is because the 
division of power between the Houses of Representatives and Senate is 
more 'balanced' and is closer to that of the American Congress.
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"in federations where pcwer, legislative and executive, is mainly 
concentrated in a single chamber, it is primarily within the 
political parties working in that chamber that the reccnciliaticn 
of regional viewpoints in the formulaticn of a federal consensus 
must take place. The political parties, therefore, bear a much 
heavier responsibility for this task in Parliamentary federations 
than in the United States or Switzerland." 39
Whether the federal system survives or not depends cn its ability to
accommodate the particular demands (sometimes changing) of the society
40on which it is based. In this political parties, in generating a
positive consensus that is not merely based cn the re conciliation of
41distinctive regional out locks, are crucial. Thus, in Parliamentary
federations, political parties, as aggregative components within the
federal system, bear the main responsibility for generating this 
42consensus and the survivability of the federal system in turn depends, 
perhaps not totally, on how successful political parties are in handling 
this task.
It is possible to argue that a Presidential federation may
encourage the growth of naticn-^ wide and nationally-oriented political 
43parties. This, hcwever, assumes that no single or state party would be
able to capture the Presidency. The Northern Peoples' Congress (N C P )
44in Nigeria, was just such a regional party. This resulted in the
regianalisation of central power under the N C P based in the north of
Nigeria. As Dudley puts it, in Nigeria
"Federal super-ordination has in practice turned out to be 
Northern dominance.1 45
In the context of Nigerian federalism it is, therefore, desirable to
have genuinely national (in orientation and support) political parties
which are capable of managing and encompassing the federation imposed by
territorially defined tribal difference.
39. Watts, op. cit., pp. 64-65.
40. ibid., p. 11.
41. ibid., p. 22.
42. ibid., p. 75.
43. See "Discussion" in Hicks, op. cit., p. 67.
44. Ibid. See also Dudley, B.J., "Federalism and the Balance of 
Political Power in Nigeria", Journal of Commonwealth Political 
Studies, Volume 4, 1966, pp. 16-29; Akindele, R.A., and Varma, S.N., 
"The Problem and Prospect of National Parties in Nigeria", in 
African Review, 4(3), 1974, pp. 381-400; Dudley, B.J., Parties and 
Politics in Northern Nigeria, London, Frank Cass and Co., 1968; 
Mackintosh, J.P., "Electroal Trends and Tendency towards a One- 
Party System in Nigeria", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 
Volume 1, 1962-1963.
45. Dudley, B.J., "Federalism and the1 Balance of Political Paver in 
Nigeria", p. 21. ’ • _
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Parliamentary or Presidential federation, arguably, may determine
the type of party system that emerges. It is, however, not so much the
type of party system as the ability of political parties, as the
aggregative components, to manage simultaneously the forces for diversity
and unity which is vital to the working and survivability of the federal
system. In this the genuinely national, in contrast to the genuinely
regional, political parties will be more able to generate and maintain a
federal consensus. It is in the handling of such forces that political
parties become the arena for shaping and maintaining - either as
centralised or decentralised or mixed - Centre-St&te relations.
The experience of older federations, especially those of the United
States, Australia and Canada, has been to show the relevance of two-party
systems to federalism. Against this background Came 11 observed that
"It is a paradox in the new states that responsible government 
functions best with a cne-party system. Countries like India and 
Malaya have strong, stable, federal executives." 46
What prevails in either India or Malaya/Malaysia is, rather a multi-party
47system characterised by cne-party dominance. This paradox aside, one-
party dominant systems need not be inimical to federalism and may indeed
facilitate its working. This happens, however, not by the suppression of
opposition (especially those experiencing regional or territorial
interests) but through the internalisation of such opposition or, to use
48Friedrich's phrase , a "multiplication of intra-party opposition" 
within the dominant party. This dominant party is still the federaliser 
but whether it does so in either the centralising or decentralising 
direction is the crucial question. The answer to this will oome from an 
examination of the internal organisation and processes of the dominant 
party.
46. Came 11, op. cit., pp. 47-48. It is quite misleading to talk about 
"cne-party systems"! In a country where there is only cne party there 
really is no party "system" because a "system" inplies the existence 
and interaction of parts. It is difficult to conceive of a one-party 
state as being conducive to "responsible" government. See Sartori, G., 
op. cit., Chapter 2.
47. More about this later. In Nigeria, between 1950-1966, one-party 
dominance was the outcome of the entrenchment of a regional political 
party, the NPC, at the Centre. This destabilised the Nigerian federal 
system. Hcwever, in India and Malaya/Malaysia, one-party dominance 
was able to handle the federal needs of society and thus enhance the 
stability of the federal system.
48. Friedrich, V.J., "Federalism and Opposition", Government and 
Opposition, Volume 1, Nunber 3, April 1966, p. 294.
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Both Riker and Truman have drawn attention to the inter-dependence
49between party structure and federal structure. A brief survey of the
role and structure of political parties in the American, Canadian and
Australian party systems reveals, inter alia, a tendencey towards
organisational decentralisation or non-centralisaticn of the political
parties to the extent that national parties are federations of regional 
50or State parties. The Indian experience emphasizes the dominance of
one formally united party, the Congress; 'formally' because what is
being referred to is the tight and centralised organisational set-up
imposed by the Congress's constitution. Thus, in India, the existence of
social and structural federalism did not hinder the establishment of a
formally tightly-knit political organisation. The inter-dependence
argument, formally at least, does not seem to fit in India's case. This,
however, is not the full story. The clue is contained in Truman's
51observation, quoted earlier , and it refers essentially to what
influences the pattern of internal or intra-party politics - the
52"invisible politics" to use Sartori's phrase. This in a situation,
like India, of cne-party dominance, at the Centre and State levels, to
understand Centre-State relations means locking at that as dominant party
politics. So it is in India that
"in order to understand Union - State relations, it has always 
been necessary to look at them in terms of Congress politics 
rather than constitutional law." 53
Congress Party dominance, thus, makes available an alternative and extra-
54constitutional channel for the operation of Centre-State relations.
49. Riker, op. cit., p. 129 and Truman, op. cit., p. 115.
50. Key, V.O., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, 5th ed., New York, 
T.Y. Crowell & Co., 1964, p. 330; Dawson, R.M., The Government of 
Canada, 4th ed., Toronto, Toronto University Press, 1963, p. 488, 
Miller, J.D.B., Australian Government and Politics, revised 3rd ed., 
London, G. Duckworth, 1964, pp. 64-65.
51. See note 22.
52. Sartori, op. cit., p. 95.
53. Morris-Jcnes, W.H., "India's Political Miracle", The Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, Volume 7, Number 2, August 1966, 
p. 219.
54. The Setalvad Report wrote: "Where a single party has control over 
affairs at the Centre as well as in the States, an alternative and 
extra-constitutional channel becomes available for the operation of 
Centre-State relations. The political network connecting Centre and 
State leadership was used amply to resolve conflict and ease tension 
or even postpone consideration of inconvenient issues. In the process 
the constitution was not violated, at least not deliberately or 
demonstrably, but was often bypassed". Quoted in Aiyar, S.P., "The 
Structure of Power in the Indian Federal System", Journal of 
Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, Volume 111, Number 4, 
Octcber-Decenber 1969, p. 59.
i
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Congress dominance in Indian politics is indeed a political miracle
because under its capacious urrbrella federalism, among others, has been
55allowed to settle down.
What then is the inpact of Congress politics cn federalism, and
especially cn Centre-State relations in India. Santhanam argues that the
effect of a centralised Congress organisation on Union-State relations
"was to emphasize the strength of the Central Government and the 
relative subordination of the State Government. Another consequence 
was the State Congress organisation, the State Congress Committees, 
and the Di£rict Congress Committees became mere implementing bodies 
rather than policy-making bodies". 56
In other words, Congress became the foundation for national control of
State politics. However, in practice the situation is more complex, fluid
and changeable. This can be understood by considering the nature of the
debates over and resolution of the issues concerning Congress party
constitution and organisation, especially before 1967, and party-
govemment relations. These issues and their resolution define the balance
of power between the Central and Regional or State Government and party
leaders. As Kochanek indicates, the study of the processes in and
operation of important Congress Committees - the all-India Congress
Committee, the Working Committee, the Congress Parliamentary.Board, and
the Central Election Committee - in relation to the handling of these
57issues is vital for an understanding of Centre-State relations. But 
they are necessarily debated and resolved within Congress. Both the 
strength and weakness of Congress dominance is its comprehensiveness at 
the Centre and State levels. Almost everything significantly political
55. Morris-Jones, op. cit., p. 220. See also Morris-Jones, W.H.,
"Dominance and Dissent: Their Inter-relations in the Indian Party 
System", and also his "The Indian Congress Party: A Dilemma of 
Dominance", Modem Asian Studies, Volume 1, 1967, pp. 109-132;
Kothari, R., "The Congress System", Asian Survey, Volume 15, Number 
2, December 1964, pp. 1161-1173. If an analogy with the banking 
system is made, then the Congress party is the clearing house of the 
political transactions.
56. Santhanam, K., Union-State Relations in India, Bombay, Asia Publishing 
House, 1960, p. 63. Similarly, Park wrote that "India ... has 
concentrated authority and power in the hands of the central 
government to bolster the country's sense of national uniiy. The result 
has been a tendency to impose authoritarian decisions upon resisting 
state and local governments. The Congress Party, which controls almost 
every major governmental unit in the country, through its disciplined 
and centrally controlled party power, bypasses intern-party compromises 
that might otherwise strengthen the position of leaders at State 
levels". See Park, R.L., "India", in Macridis, R.C., and Ward,R.,
Modem Political Systems; Asia, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice 
Hall Inc., 1963, p. 293.
57. Kochanek, S.A., The Congress Party of India, Princeton, New Jersey, 
Princeton University Press, 1968; see also Morris-Jcnes, "Dominance and 
Dissent: Their Inter-relations in the Indian Party System", and his 
"The Indian National Congress: A Dilemma of Dominance".
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takes place under it. This allows it to monopolise power, tends to 
reduce inter-party competition, and also breeds factionalism or 
1 groupism'. Factionalism can be a source of strength and dynamism within
Congress through shaping the pattern of internal conflict, criticism and
change, and ensuring elite recruitment from a diversified membership.
58However, as Brass argues, it can also weaken Congress dominance.
The inter-play of several factors within Congress politics is
important to the definition of the balance of power between the Centre and
State. First, the reorganisation of the Indian states chiefly along
linguistic lines has made them into territorially well-defined cohesive
59units and consequently renders them, politically, more powerful. This,
according to Santhanam,
"neutralises to same extent the centralising influence of # . the^Q 
political centralisation of Congress and other all-India parties".
The reorganisation of States cn linguistic lines encouraged the
regicnalisaticn of power within Congress. This, as Harrison suggests, was
reflected in the rising prestige of State leaders from mid-1950 and their
colonisation of the Congress Party apparatus. The latter, especially,
meant increasing regionalisation of Congress Central leadership through
the recruitment of men who had initially made their political conquests
at the State level. This, however, did not necessarily weaken the party 
62Centre. The fact of the matter is simply that the gravitational pull
within the party is towards the centre. Here the top leaders congregate
and are concentrated and the State leaders' political survival depends cn
their being in the good bocks of the top leaders. State interests are
important but there is insufficient evidence to shew that leaders at the
63centre are there merely to push the interests of their own State.
64Watts argues that the views of the National organisation usually prevail 
in situations of conflict between the National and State party 
organisation. However, this argument needs modification since, as
58. Brass, P.R., Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party 
in Uttar Pradesh, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1965, 
especially pp. 232-243.
59. See Government of India, Report of the States Reorganisation Committee, 
New Delhi, 1955.
60. Santhanam, op. cit., p. 68.
61. Harrison, S.S., India: The Most Dangerous Decade, London, Princeton 
University Press, 1960, Chapter 3.
62. Morris-Jones, "The Indian Congress Party: A Dilemma of Dominance", 
p. 131.
63. Morris-Jones, "India's Political Miracle", p. 219.
64. Watts, R.L., New Federations: Experiments in the Commonwealth, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, pp. 336-338.
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65Kochanek indicates, the relationship is one of fluidity and inter­
dependence. Several factors, the degree of State and central leadership 
unity being one of the most important, account for this.
A second factor is the oohesiveness or solidarity of Central and 
Sfate party organisations and leaders. This affects the Centre's and 
State's ability to conduct their respective affairs without undue 
interference and control from the other levels. Thus, in cases of State
party deadlocks, invariably the result of factionalism, the Central 1
66leadership, if united, is the decisive arbitrator. Put differently, 
intra-party deadlocks indicate that the State party organisation and 
leaders are unable to handle the divisions caused by factionalism and 
these provide a united Central leadership with the opportunity to 
intervene in and shape State party affairs. In examining the selection 
process for Congress election candidates, Roy indicates that the evidence 
suggests that the nature of factional competition is a crucial variable
in determining the extent of influence and power that the top command can
67assert on the lower echelons of the party.
68Marcus Franda's study of West Bengal provides another illustration
69and it also emphasizes the bargaining process in Centre-State relations. 
His basic thesis is that Centre-State relations, at the time the study was 
conducted, were dependent cn the degreee of State party cohesion and 
political mobilisation. When the State Congress Party organisation was 
internally cohesive and able to mobilise the State population, the Centre 
was unable to inpose its decision on the State. He presents evidence to
65. Kochanek, op. cit., passim. Congress pcwer is decentralised to the 
extent that it depends cn local power wielders. This is well 
illustrated by Weiner's study of the Congress Party in a Mysore
. constituency. See Weiner, M., "Traditional Role Performance and the 
Development of Modem Political Parties: The Indian Case", Journal of 
Politics, Volume 6, Number 4, November 1964, p. 849.
66. Brass, P.R., "Factionalism and the Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh", 
Asian Survey, Volume 4, Number 9, September 1964, pp. 1037-1047. See 
also Kochanek, op. cit., passim.
67. Roy, R., "Factionalism and "Stratarchy": The Experience of the 
Congress Party", Asian Survey, Volume 7, Number 12, December 1967, 
pp. 896-908.
68. Franda, M.F., West Bengal and the Federalizing Process in India, 
Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1968.
69. The bargaining element within Congress has earlier been recognised by 
Morris-Jones, W.H., Government and Politics in India, revised 3rd 
edition, London, Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1971, pp. 150-156.
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show that on three issues - state boundaries, the Damodar 
Valley Project, and land reform - the Central Government, at 
times, was unable to exercise its 'dominance* over the West 
Bengal Government. The degree to which the population in 
West Bengal was politicized was as high as anywhere else in 
India. Although the party situation was complex and antagon­
isms extremely strong, conflict with the Centre over these 
three issues tended to unite the factions. This at the very 
least, provided the factions, in their assertion of States' 
rights, with a platform which was both common and 
competitive. In Franda's own words
"the success of the State in pursuing its own 
conceptions of its own interests was largely a result 
of the ability of the state party unit to attain a 
high degree of cohesion behind a policy that benefited 
those of its supporters that were highly mobilised 
for political action." 70
The preceeding discussion on the Indian experience is 
premised on the dominance of the Congress Party in Indian 
politics. After the 1967 general election this dominance 
weakened, perhaps only marginally. Consequently, as Wallace 
argues
"No longer can Indian politics be characterized as 
Congress dominated, although it is undeniable that 
Congress remains the single most important party. The 
Congress model of compromise and accommodation, 
negotiation and co-option - within a parliamentary 
framework - has continued within the larger Indian 
political scene." 71
The weakening of Congress dominance also produced a conditr-
ion of extreme fluidity in State politics in many parts of
the Indian Federation. The result was large-scale defections
by dissident State Congress groups and the necessarily
continuous process of forming non-Congress State coalitions
in most States, in which sometimes ex-Congress groups
provided the key leadership. This perhaps inevitably resulted
70. Franda,* o p .cit.. p. 178.
71. Wallace, P., "Indias The Dispersion of Political Power", 
Asian Survey. Vol. 8, No. 2, Feb. 19 68, p. 88.
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in State Governments* instability"^ and coincided with the
strengthening of regional parties. With the weakening of
Congress, power and influence were dispersed on a regional
basis and between many parties. The arena for competition was
widened to include intra-Congress and inter-party competition.
Consequently, the understanding of Centre-State relations in
India requires going beyond merely focussing on internal
Congress politics, to look for example at the politics of
coalition-making and inter-party competition at the State
73level and their impact on Centre-State relations.
72. ibid... p. 89. Kochanek, S.A., "Political Recruitment in 
the Indian National Congress* The Fourth General 
Elections", Asian Survey. Vol. 7* No. 5* May 1967* 
p. 303; Kayshap, S.P., The Politics of Power* defections 
and state politics in India. Delhi, National, 197^;
Sharma, M.C., "Politics of Defections and Democracy", 
Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies. Vol. 
13(3)* July-Sept. 1979* pp. 328-351; Nangia, B.,
"Politics of Defection", The Indian Political Science 
Review. Vol. lb, No. 2, July 1980; Brass, P.R., "Party 
Systems and Government Stability in the Indian States", 
American Political Science Review. 71(b), December 1977* 
pp. 1385—1405•
73» See Franda, M.F., "Federalizing India* Attitudes,
Capacities and Constraints", South Asian Review. Vol. 3* 
No. 3* April 1970* PP. 199-213* and Morris-Jones, W.H., 
"From Monopoly to Competition in Indian Politics", Asian 
Review. Vol. 1, No. 1, Nov. 1967* PP* 1-12. It may be 
possible to argue that the weakening Congress dominance 
started with the reorganisation of State on linguistic 
lines in 1956. This made the States more effective as 
units of power in competing with the Centre. This has 
generated factionalism at the State level. But factional­
ism, inter-group rivalries, opposition and a lot more, 
were conducted under the Congress umbrella. Before the 
1967 general elections the tendency towards fragmentation 
was balanced by an equal tendency toward party consolida­
tion, necessary if a party wanted to win national power 
in Dehli. This balancing act failed, especially after 
1963 up to 1967. If before 1967 ignored Congress men would 
in most cases, not contemplate leaving the Congress for 
fear of descending into relative political wilderness, 
after 1967 such Congressmen hoped to share power in some 
States by defecting from Congress. What however, makes 
for the difference between the pre and post 1967?
According to Kochanek, the Working Committee, as the 
chief executive of the Congress Party,- had been effective 
in arbitrating and mediating the competing claims of 
factions and groups at the State levels. However, the 
Committee's effectiveness depended crucially on the 
unity of the Central party and Government leadership 
which after 1963 was tenuous. As Kochanek puts it,
"Let the central leadership once become so divided that 
it is unable to intervene decisively and one of the (cont)
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The dominance and successful operation of the Congress 
Party for two decades after Independence in federal 
bargaining and negotiations go a long way in explaining the 
the working of India's federal arrangement. Not surprisingly 
and apprehensively after 19^7 , with a divided and weakened 
Congress, the question of after Congress, who or what, became 
more urgent and especially so in the context of Centre-State 
relations.^ With the benefit of hindsight and as indicated
by the I97I general elections, this question was
perhaps premature but the concern was real enough.
Morris-Jones wrote:
"The electorate ... restored Congress to its former 
dominance. The end of the dominant party had been too 
readily proclaimed in 19 6 7* ^or eve^ in these past 
four years several features of dominance survived in 
the two sets of rival party "constellations"; now it 
is back. With it, the feared slide of central politics 
towards unmanageable fragmentation and coalition is 
firmly halted. With it, the authority of the central 
government and central leadership in relation to state 
parties is substantially restored ... [and] the 
opposition parties go back to a position of greater 
dependence, forced to operate less by confrontation 
than by interaction by segments of the-centre mass."''5
However, because what the electorate restored it could
similarly withdraw, and Indirafs Congress lacked a strong
party organisation, the situation is different from that of
the pre 1967 one dominant party system.^
The Indian experience suggests three phases - pre 19 67*
I967-I98O and beyond. The pre 1967 phase was a period of
Congress dominance and this makes the understanding of
Congress politics crucial to the understanding of Centre-
State relations. It was a period when Congress became a
73* (cont.) most important stabilising forces in the Congress 
will have been removed. Since it is just such a pattern 
which has characterised the years of divergence, party 
solidarity and dominance have been seriously undermined", 
Kochanek, The Congress Party of India, p. 232.
7b, For an examination of this question, see Chopra, P., 
Uncertain India: A Political Profile of Two Decades of 
Freedom. Dehli, Asia Publishing House, 1968, pp. 3^2-385. 
On November 1969 the Congress split into tv/o with the 
largest rump led by the PM, Indira Gandhi.
75- Morris-Jones, "India Elects for Change - and Stability", 
Asian Survey, Vol. XI, No* 3, p. 7^ 0.
76. ibid.. pp. 7^0-7^1.
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national institution within which Centre-State relations 
were unambiguously shaped and conducted and interdependence 
of State and Central leaders (although their primacy was 
recognised) was expressed# The I967-I98O phase was a 
period of weakening Congress dominance with, simultaneously, 
the rise of Opposition (essentially State-based) parties#
The Congress organisation was devided by factionalism 
(sometimes precipitated by Central leaders) which resulted 
its formal splitting. The processes and operation of 
important Congress committees, for long the shaper of 
Centre-State relations and the hallmark of Congress 
dominance, increasingly came into disuse because of 
divisions and factionalism among the Central and State 
leadership and the rise of Opposition parties at the State 
level. Thus, the channels and arenas for shaping Centre- 
State relations became ambiguous# This was directly linked 
to the nature of' Congress politics and, most importantly, 
inter-party competition at both Centre and State levels. 
Janata rule at the Centre further emphasised this ambiguity. 
The year I98O began with the return of Indira Gandhi's 
Congress to pov/er at the Centre and in most States. However, 
this does not mean that the Congress dominance of pre-1967  
has been re-established. Far from it. This is precisely 
because the accommodative and aggregative elements of the 
pre-1967 Congress organisation and the important Congress 
committees were neglected. These have been taken over by 
Indira Gandhi. The style of Indira Gandhi and the nature 
of her personal relationship to both Central and State 
Congress "leaders" are now crucially and unambiguously 
shaping Centre-State relations. Today's Congress is not a 
strong party organisation as such but it is firmly directed 
and controlled from the Centre.^
77. See Manor, J., "Indira and After : The decay of party 
organization in India", Round Table, 272. October I978, 
pp. 315-32^; Wallace, P., "Plebiscitary Politics in 
India's I98O Parliamentary Elections : Punjab and 
Haryana", Asian Survey, Vol. 20, No. 6, June 1980,
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The Peninsula Malavsian Case.
Several writers have acknowledged the importance of
political parties to the working of federalism in Peninsula
Malaysia. Esman writes that
"the smooth working relations between the states and 
the centre that characterized West Malaysia since 
Independence can be attributed to ... (among others! 
the control of all state governments save one by 
the Alliance.” 78
It is through retaining party control over State Governments,
as Gullick argues, that
"there was no party conflict between the federal and 
the state regimes." 79
Milne and Mauzy similarly argue that
"The best guarantee of happy federal-state relations
does not lie in any constitutional provisions but
rather in the harmonizing influence of party". 80
Presumably, the greater the spread of this party, through 
extending its control of most, if not all levels of govern­
ment, the more harmonious Centre-State relations become. 
Collectively, their emphasis on the crucial role of 
political parties is well placed. However, we need to know 
essentially the definition of the balance of power and 
influence between the Centre and States and what affects 
this. This cannot be anticipated just by looking at whether 
the same party controls or different parties control the 
different levels of government.
The party system in Peninsula Malaysia since 
Independence has been dominated by a multi-party coalition, 
the Alliance before 1969 and the National Front (NF) after 
1971 following a two-year rule by the National Operations 
Council (NOC). The Alliance comprised the United Malays 
National Organization (UMNO), the Malayan Chinese
77* (cont.) pp. 617-633; and Jyotinindra, D.G., "India in 
I98O : Strong Centre, Weak Authority", Asian Survey.
Vol. 21, No. 2, February I98I, pp. l47-l£l.
78. Esman, M., Administration and Development in Malaysia.
Ithaca, New Jersey, Cornell University Press, 1972, p. 92.
79* Gullick, J., Malaysia : Economic Expansion and National 
Unitv. London, Ernest Benn, 1981, p. 120.
80. Milne, R.S., and Mauzy, D., Politics and Government in
Malaysia, Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 
1978, p. 107.
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Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC). In
Peninsula Malaysia the NF comprises the former Alliance
partners, the Peoples1 Progressive Party (PPP) and the
Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (GRM or the Malaysian Peoples*
Movement). The Party Islam (PI), formerly called the Pan
Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP) or Parti Se Islam Malaysia (PAS),
was a partner in the NF from 1973 to 1977-
Both the Alliance and the NF have dominated national
politics and the Opposition, ever since the first election,
81does not look like a credible alternative. In the 1955
Legislative Council Elections the Alliance won 51 out of 52
seats and 81.8% of the valid votes. In the first Parliamentary
Elections of 1959 after Independence the Alliance won 74
out of 104 seats and 49.4% of the valid votes. In the 1964
Parliamentary Elections the Alliance won 89 out of the 104
seats and 58% of the valid votes. In the 1989 Parliamentary
Elections it won 67 out of 104 seats and 48.5$ of the valid
votes. The 1974 Parliamentary Elections provided the first
electoral test for the NF. In this election it won 104 out
of 114 seats and 60.8% of the valid votes. In the 1978
Parliamentary Elections it won 94 out of 114 .seats and 5 8.8%
of the valid votes. The same pattern of Alliance and NF
dominance is repeated at the State levels, with the
exception of Kelantan (1959-1989)» Trengganu (1959-1982) and
Penang (I969). The Alliance and then the NF monopolised
power at the Central and,with few exceptions, State levels.
What are the relations of power and influence between
the parties in the coalitions7 Milne and Mauzy have no
reservations as to where power and influence are located
within these coalitions. They argue that
"Since the first national elections, a dominant party 
system has prevailed in Malaysia. Both the Alliance 
and the National Front, as institutionalised permanent 
coalitions, have dominated the political process. 
However, one must look within the coalitions to find 
the key to‘the dominant party system : that key is 
UMNO. It has always had the largest number of seats 
in Parliament; from its ranks come the top Cabinet 
posts, including every Prime Minister and Eeputy Prime 
Minister; it is clearly recognised as the most
81. See Appendix 1
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powerful and influential party whose leadership 
determines the direction of party and government 
policy; and it sets the pattern and conditions for 
multi-racial accommodation. It is inconceivable, as 
long as UMNO does not split, that any ruling coalition 
could be formed without UMNO, and without UMNO as the 
leading partner.” 82
At the State levels, again with very few exceptions, all the
Mentri Besars or Chief Ministers of the States, the majority
if not all, members of the State Executive Councils (Exco -
the State Cabinet), and the majority of members of the State
Legislative Assemblies come from UMNO. Its dominance is
further indicated by the fact that among the coalition
partners it receives 50% or more of the seat allocations for
all the Parliamentary Elections and 50% or more of all the
seat allocations in each State, with the exceptions in Penang,
Selangor (1964) and Kelantan (1974), for all the State
elections.
The exceptions to the rule, PAS-controlled Kelantan 
(1959-1989) and Trengganu (1959-1962) and Gerakan Rakyat 
Malaysia (GRM)-controlled Penang (I9 8 9) - before the NF v/as 
established - are significant in that both parties are 
essentially regionally based parties. What is interesting is 
the coincidence of ethnicity with the success of both 
parties. The PAS has its base in Kelantan, Trengganu and 
Kedah; historically States of the former Unfederated Malay 
States, relatively underdeveloped and almost totally Malay 
in composition.®^ The Chinese parties, the MCA (1959-1989) 
and the GRM (I969-I978), controlled the key posts in the 
Penang Governments historically a State of the former Straits 
Settlements, relatively more developed and with 58.3$ of the 
population being Chinese and with 69*4% of the population 
being non-Malay. Thus, with the exception of Penang, the 
relationship between the State Governments and the Central 
Government is one between the Malay dominated State Govern­
ments and Malay dominated Central Government. The relation­
ship betv/een the Penang State Government and the Central
82. op.cit.. p. 217* My emphasis. See also Grosshotz, J., 
"Integrative Factors in the Malaysian and Phillipine 
Legislatures", ponrparative Politics. Vol. 3» No. 1, 
October 1970, p. 106.
83. See Appendix 2.
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Government is one between a Chinese dominated State 
Government and a Malay dominated Central Government. In this
context Penang appears unique.
The dominant pattern in Peninsula Malaysia, however, 
is one between the UMNO dominated State Governments and UMNO 
dominated Central Government. It is for this reason that 
focussing on UMNO politics will be helpful in unravelling 
and understanding Centre-State relations. The next two 
chapters will do this by, first, examining UMNO as a
national political organization, and second, examining the
relations between UMNO-controlled Pahang and UMNO-controlled 
Centre as they are affected by the Endau-Rompin case. Also 
Kelantan as the exception to the rule will be examined in 
Chapter eleven.
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Chapter 9
The United Malays National Organisation: A national political
organisation.
The relations of pcwer within UMNO are shaped formally and 
informally. Formally, the party constitution shapes these relations, for 
examples between Centre and State party leaders, and locates the 
repositories of power within the party. Informally, these relations are 
shaped by the competitive relations between individuals or groups at 
or between the different levels of the party organisation. This chapter 
concentrates on the formal relations.
History and Development up to 1955.
UMNO began as a loose grouping of the separate State Malay 
political associations.^  It was formed in response to the urgent need 
for Pan-Malay unity so as to oppose the British Administration's 
imposition of the Malayan Union Scheme in 1946.^ Malay political 
leaders viewed this scheme as a threat to Malay rights. This, perhaps 
more than any other consideration compelled state leaders to extend 
their attention and activity to beyond the State level, thereby giving an 
impetus to the process of national orientation.
The initial grouping, then called the Pan-Malayan Malay Congress or 
the Kongress Melayu Sa-Malaya^, lacked organisational unity. Ihe 
Congress, with representatives from the separate State Malay political 
associations, had its first meeting on March 1, 1946 and considered the 
formation of a Malay National Movement or Pergerakan Kebangsaan 
Melayu.^ It agreed to name this movement the Pertubohan Kebangsaan 
Melayu Bersatu or the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and a 
committee was appointed to draft its charter and constitution.^ The
1. See Ishak bin Tadin, "Dato Onn and Malay Nationalism, 1945-51", 
Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 1960, p. 
61; Mohamed Nordin Spoiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore 
Separation: Political Unification in the Malaysia Region, 1945-
1965, Kuala Lumpur, Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 1976, pp. 24-29? 
Stockwell, A.J., British Policy and Malay Politics During the 
Malayan Union Experiment, 1942-1948, Malaysian Branch of the Royal
Asiatic Society Mono. No. 8, Kuala Lunpur, 1979, pp.64-72; Moore, 
D.E., "The United Malays National Organisation and the 1959 
Malayan Elections," Unpub. Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, 
1960, chp.l? Means, G.P.,Malaysian Politics, London, Hodder and 
Stoughton, 2nd edition, 1976, pp. 98-102 and 112-114.
2. See Allen, J. de V., The Malayan Union Scheme, New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1967, chp. 1? Stockwell, A. J., cp.cit., chp. 4; 
Milne, R.S., and Mauzy, K.D., Politics and Government in Malaysia, 
Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1978, pp. 26-29.
3. Stockwell, cp.cit., p. 69. UMNO, 20 Tahun Pertubohan Kebangsaan
Melayu Bersatu, 1966, p. 36.
4. Stockwell, cp.cit., p. 69.
5. ibid., p. 70.
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Congress meeting of May 11 and 12, 1946 approved the charter and the UMNO 
was officially inaugurated.^
The UMNO charter, drafted at short notice, was designed to achieve 
Pan-Malay unity by acccmmodating as many State Malay political 
associations as possible; the separate associations were simply 
incorporated under the umbrella organisation. This incorporation into 
UMNO was based, as Stockwell points out, on
"the lowest cannon denominator of a motley collection of 
associations and clubs, the autonomy of which was explicitly 
safeguarded".^
The President of UMNO and his Executive Committee were empowered oily to
p
direct the affairs of the overall organisation. They and UMNO 
headquarters were not empowered to direct the affairs of affiliated 
member associations.^ These, with their autonomy and identity left 
intact, were still controlled by State or local leaders. UMNO's links to 
the individual Malay members were mediated by these leaders.^  Thus,
"The loyalty of the individual Malay was to his local association 
... and political control rested not with UMNO headquarters but 
with the affiliated associations which were numerous, of varied 
natures and sometimes at loggerheads with each other". 1
UMNO leaders had to depend on and work with these State and local
leaders. Handicapped in this way, UMNO leaders soon suggested that the
party should be strengthened, especially at the State level, by
reorganising the system of UMNO affiliates.^ On May, 1947 the UMNO
General Assembly (GA) adopted a resolution designed to reorganise UMNO on
~6~. UMNO, cp.cit., p. 36; Stockwell, cp.cit., p. 70. This Congress 
was held in Johore Bahru.
7. Stockwell, cp.cit., p. 118.
8. ibid., p. 116.
9. ibid., pp. 104, n. 86 and 118.
10. UMNO's original constitution prevented it from accepting direct
individual membership and establishing its own branches.
Individuals were members of UMNO only through being members of the 
separate associations which were affiliated to UMNO. See 
Stockwell, op.cit., p. 118. n. 65.
11. ibid.
12. Interviews with Mohd. Khir Johari, former Secretary-General of
UMNO and Cabinet Minster, 29.9.80., and Ghaffar Baba, former Chief 
Minister of Malacca, Cabinet Minister and UMNO Vice-President of 
long standing and currently still one, 1.10.80. See also 
Stockwell, cp.cit., p. 119. As it was, several political 
associations and clubs were present in each State and they were 
affiliated to UMNO. The consolidation of UMNO at the State level 
would thus depend on the willingness of such associations and 
clubs to dilute, perhaps dissolve, their separate identity and 
autonomy. Selangor was at the forefront of this reorganisation 
drive.
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the basis of direct membership. ^  By June, 1948, UMNO affiliates in 
Kedah, Malacca, Pahang, Perak, Perlis, Selangor and Trengganu were 
dissolved and State brandies of UMNO established.1^ This re­
organisation was ratified by the GA in May 1949.1  ^ By mid-1949 UMNO, 
spanning the Centre and State levels, could be described as a truly 
National political party.
The resignation of Dato Jaffar Onn, UMNO's first President, in 1951 
was followed by the migration of his supporters frcm UMNO to his newly- 
established party, the Independence Malaya Party (IMP). This disrupted 
UMNO's organisation.1^ UMNO's new President, Tengku Abdul Rahrran, thus 
needed to establish his control over the party, strengthen its 
organisation and give it a new sense of direction - and this in the 
context of doubts and disputes among National and State party leaders 
regarding the extent of Central direction over lower party bodies. The 
UMNO constitution and organisation became a focal point of contention as 
illustrated by the Centre-State party conflict in 1953 between Tengku 
Abdul Rahman and Dato Panglima Bukit Gantang, Chairman of Perak UMNO.1  ^
The 1955 UMNO Constitution and Organisation.
The continuous tussle within UMNO about the nature and extent of
Central direction over lower party bodies led to the adoption of a new
1 ftUMNO Constitution in 1955. With this the relations between the Centre 
and lower party bodies were formally reorganised. For the first time the 
need to establish and strengthen State party organs at State level was 
recognised and emphasised, with Tengku Abdul Rahman defending this in 
terms of improving UMNO's organisation efficiency for facing electoral
13. The resolution was adopted by 20 votes to 5. Stockwell, cp.cit.,
p. 120.
14. ibid. p. 121.
15. ibid. Three Malay associations - Persatuan Melayu Sabak Bemam of 
Perak, Serberkas of Kedah and Kesatuan Melayu Singapura - retained 
their affiliate status within UMNO.
16. See Moore, D. E., op.cit., pp. 34-35.
17. Dato Danglima Bukit Gantang opposed the Tengku's and UMNO Central
Executive Committee's policies of associating with the Malayan 
Chinese Association (MCA). In March, 1953, he formed a separate 
political organisation as part of his opposition. As a result he 
was expelled frcm UMNO in April, 1953. However, by 37 votes to 15, 
the Perak branches of UMNO passed a vote of confidence in his 
leadership of Perak UMNO. In response Tengku threatened the rebel 
branches with expulsion from UMNO. A large segment of Perak UMNO 
finally left UMNO and joined Dato Panglima Bukit Gantang' s new 
Perak National Party (PNP). See Means,op.cit., pp. 139-140.
18. Passed at the 10th UMNO General Assembly, 25-26 December, 1955.
UMNO, UNdang-p Tuboh, Pertubohan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu, 1955.
(UMNO, Constitution of the United Malays National Organisation. 
1955). This referred to simply as the "1955 UMNO Constitution".
307.
challenges.1  ^Indeed a clear whole hierarchy of National, State,
Division and Branch levels was set up.
O f )
At the National level overall authority was vested in the
General Assembly (GA) within which UMNO's overall authority was vested.
As the chief executive body at this level, the Supreme Executive Council
(SEC) or the Majlis Kerja Tertinggi (MKT) was responsible for the
administration of UMNO nationally and functioned under the GA's
91authority. At the State level , UMNO's authority was vested in the
State Delegates Conference (SDC) with the State Executive Committee
(SECcm) or Jawatankuasa Ker ja Negeri (JKN) as the chief executive body.
The SECcm was responsible for the administration of the State UMNO and
functioned under the SDC's authority. At the Division and Branch 
oolevels respectively UMNO's authority was vested in the Divisional 
Delegates Meeting (DEM) and the Branch General Assembly (BGA) with the 
Division Executive Committee (DEC) or Jawatankuasa Keja Bahagian (JKC) as 
the chief executive bodies respectively. The DEC and BEC were 
responsible for the administration of UMNO within the Division and Branch 
respectively and functioned under the authority of their respective DEM 
and BGA.
The SEC^1 comprised the President, Deputy President, three Vice- 
Presidents and not more than fifteen persons all of whom were elected 
annually at the Annual UMNO GA. It also included the heads of 
the National Youth ahd Women's movements who were elected by their 
respective general assemblies. Other members were apointed by the 
President and included the Secretary-General, Treasurer, Head of
24
Publicity and Information, and not more than 7 others. The SECcm 
comprised the State UMNO Head, Deputy Head and not more than ten 
persons all of whom were elected annually at the SDC's annual meeting.
It also included two Vice-Heads: leaders of the State's Youth and Women's
movements who were elected annually at their respective annual delegates 
conference meetings. Other members including the Secretary, Treasurer,
Head of Publicity and Information, and not more than five persons were
25 . . . .appointed by the State Head. The DEC comprised the Division Head,
Deputy Head, Secretary, Treasurer, Head of Publicity and Information, and 
not more than ten persons all of whom were elected annually at the annual
19. In a speech given to UMNO's 13th General Assembly, April 16, 1960. 
See UMNO, Penyata Tahunan, 1959/60, p. 24.
20. The 1955 UMNO Constitution, Arts. 10 and 11.2.
21. ibid., Arts. 15.1 and 16.8.
22. ibid., Arts. 18.1., 19.6, 21.1 and 22.5.
23. ibid., Arts. 11.1
24. ibid., Arts. 16.2-16.5 and 37.3.
25. ibid., Arts. 19.1-19.3 and 37.3.
308.
meeting of the DEM. It also incuded two Vice-Heads: leaders of the 
Division's Youth and Women's movements who were elected annually at their 
respective annual delegates conferences. In addition, the Division Head 
could appoint not more than five persons as members. The BEC^ 
comprised the Branch Head, Vice-Head, Youth Head, Women's Head,
Secretary, Treasurer, and several other persons all of whcm were elected 
annually at the annual BGA. In addition the Branch Head could appoint 
not more than one-third of the total membership. Thus, at each level, 
the executive body had an elected head and comprised both elected and 
appointed members. The elected head, with the power to appoint 
additional members, was thus in a strong position within each level of the 
party organisation.
The SEC had to approve the establishment of any State UMNO 
organisation while the establishment of Divisions in each State electoral 
constituency or in other areas in each State had to be approved by the 
SECcm. 27 in turn the establishment of Branches in each polling area or 
in other areas in each Division had to be approved by the DEC.^® While 
the SEC had overall responsibility over UMNO affairs, the SECcm had 
substantial formal powers within the State and over Divisions and
O Q
Branches.
The SEC was empowered to formulate for the Federation the 
principles, programmes and policies in the political, economic, 
educational, welfare and social fields.^0 These, however, had to be 
submitted to and approved by the UMNO GA. The SECcm, in turn and for 
each State, was provided with similar powers in relation to State areas 
of responsibility but the exercise of such powers were subject to the 
SEC's supervision and advice.^1 The SECcm's and State UMNO's powers in 
these matters were thus 'shared' with the SEC. The Divisions and Branches 
had no direct participation in such matters. In practice the extent of 
SECcm's influence over such natters depended on the relative strength of 
the State leaders and State UMNO organisation on the one hand and 
National leaders on the other.
The power to nominate candidates for elections, depending an the 
type of elections, was vested in the different levels of UMNO. For 
Federal elections^, the SEC had the power to select and determine
26. ibid., Arts. 22.1(h) and 22.2.
27. ibid., Arts. 25 and 26.
28. ibid., Arts. 27.
29. ibid., Art. 16.12.
30. ibid., Art. 11.9(a).
31. ibid., Arts. 11.9(b) and 16.12(a).
32. ibid., Art. 11.9 (c and d).
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candidates frcm among those proposed by the SDC and to assign the Federal
electoral constituency for each candidate. It also had the pcwer to
control, supervise, and decide on any mtter relating to Federal
elections. Potentially, the sccpe of the SEC's pcwer could be limited if
the SECcm was able to produce a list of candidates that had the unanimous
endorsement of the SDC. While unity at the State level would enhance the
State's power, disunity would provide opportunities to National leaders
in the SEC to influence the composition of the list of candidates to be
proposed by the SDC.
For State elections, each SECcm was empowered to nominate
candidates frcm among those elected by secret ballot at the SDC and to
assign each candidate to a State electoral constituency. The SEC's
participation in this was confined to settling any dispute concerning
State elections.^ Thus when the SECcm and the State UMNO were united
over State election matters the opportunity for the SEC to intervene
would be minimised. For Municipal, Tcwn and Local Council elections^
in areas within each Division, the DEC was empowered to nominate
candidates, and to assign to electoral areas frcm among those proposed by
the BGA.' s within each Division. It was also empowered to settle any
dispute over matters regarding such elections.
The UMNO GA, which was to meet annually, formally linked the
National, State, Division and Branch levels of the party by bringing
together the National and State leaders and representatives of UMNO
members. Delegates to the UMNO GA^ included the SEC members, State
3 7UMNO Heads, those elected by and frcm members of each SDC , not more
than two appointed by each affiliated body, and the Head and two other
3 f tmembers of each State's UMNO Youth Supervisory Ccmmittee. State
representation in the GA was unequal because the size of each State 
delegation depended on the membership size in each State. The larger the 
size of the State delegation, the larger the voting share and hence its 
power within the GA. State leaders with large delegations were thus in a 
position to be pcwer brokers especially in the election of SEC members. 
The three types of representational bodies in each State were, in
33. ibid., Art. 16.12 (b).
34. ibid., Art. 11.9(e).
35. ibid., Art. 19.10 (b,c and d).
36. ibid., Art. 10.3 (a and b).
37. One delegate each for every 1000 ordinary or afiliated members and 
750 ordinary women members respectively in the state or one 
delegate frcm those among 1000 and 750 respectively who had paid 
their party fees for that year. See ibid., Art. 10.3 (c and d).
38. ibid., Art. 10.3 (e and f).
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descending order, the SDC, the DEM and the BOV. Delegates^ to the 
SDC included SECcm members, each Division Head, Vice-Head (Women's 
movement) of each Division, Head of the State UMNO Youth Supervisory 
Ccmmittee and two UMNO Youth representatives frcm each Division and those 
elected by an from members of each DDM.^ Delegates to the DDM^1 
included DEC members, Heads of Branches in the Division, ordinary UMNO 
members who were Municipal, Tcwn or Local Council members, Head of each 
Branch UMNO Youth Supervisory Ccrrmittee, and those elected by each 
BGA..^ Delegates to the BGA included EEC members and all Branch 
ordinary and affiliated members.^
The 1955 UMNO Constitution provided for an organisation that 
emphasised and recognised the importance of each level of party 
organisation. Figure 1 shows the structure of UMNO according to this 
constitution. Before this there had been no State party organisation as 
such and the relations between the Divisions in each State were maintained 
through a State Liaison Committee^ (SLC) which was headed by an 
appointee of the SEC.^ The 1955 UMNO Constitution emphasized the 
State party organisation and placed direct control over the Divisions in 
the hands of the newly established SECcm. Overall the authority was 
vested in the UMNO GA to which the SEC was responsible. At the same 
time, State party bodies were also vested with specific pcwers and 
responsibilities in their respective States and these provided the basis 
for State party autonomy. The organisational focus and links were towards 
the Centre but were channeled through and shaped by the State party 
bodies. It was not a one-way traffic of Central influence and control 
over lower party bodies. The reverse flew was also important to the 
extent that Central leaders' political bases and strengths were located 
and had to be sustained in the States. The cultivation of State support, 
especially of State delegates support at the Annual UMNO GA, was crucial. 
The newly-established State party organisation and its SECcm was 
provided with a measure of autonomy and commensurate pcwer over State
39^  ibid., Art. 15.3 (a, b, d and e).
40. One delegate each for every 500 ordinary or affiliated and 300 
ordinary women members respectively in each division or frcm among 
the 500 and 300 respectively who had paid their party fees for 
that year. See ibid., 15.3 (c and d).
41. ibid., Art. 18.3. (a, b, e and f).
42. One delegate respectively for every 100 and 50 ordinary or
affiliated men and women members or frcm the 100 and 50 
respectively who had paid thier party fees for that year. See 
ibid., Art. 18.3 (c and d).
43. ibid., Art. 21.
44. Moore, op.cit., p. 32.
45. ibid. See, for example, UMNO, Penyata Tahunan, 1953, p. 69.
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Figure li
Structure of UMNO based on the 1955 Constitution.
u m o  p r es ide nt
(elected by UMNO GA)
Central
Level
SUPREME EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (SEC)
President, Deputy President, 3 Vice-Presidents 
and not more than 15 others - elected by UMNO GA. 
Secretary-General, Treasurer, Information Chief 
and not more than 7 others - appointed by President 
The respective heads of the national UMNO Youth and 
Women's Movements elected by their respective GAs.
I
State
Level
STATS.UMNO HEAL. 
'{elected by SDC}
STATE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (SSCOM)
members:
1. Head, Deputy Head and not more than 10 others - 
elected by SDC.
2. Secretary, Treasurer, Information Chief and not 
more than 5 others - appointed by State UMNO Head.
3. 2 Vice-Heads - the respective leaders of the State's 
UMNO Youth and Women's Movements elected by their 
respective State Delegates Conference (SDC).
I
District
Level
DIVISION UMNO HEAD 
(elected by DDM)
DIVISION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (DEC)
members:
1. Division UMNO Head, Deputy Head, Secretary, Treasurer, 
Information Chief and not more than 10 others - 
elected by DDM.
2. Not more than 5 others appointed by Division UMNO Head.
3. 2 Vice-Heads - the respective leaders of the Division's 
UMNO Youth and Women's Movements elected by their 
respective delegate's conferences.
Branch.
Level
BRANCH UMNO HEAD 
(elected by BGA)
BRANCH EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (BEC) 
members: '
1. Branch UMNO Head, Vice-Head, Youth Head, Women's Head, ^ 
Secretary, Treasurer and several others - all elected \, 
by BGA,. /'
2. Not more than a third of total membership appointed by J 
Branch UMNO Head.
UMNO GENERAL ASSEMBLY (GA)
Delegates:
1. Members of SEC.
^2. Head of each SECOM.
J. Delegates elected by 
each SDC.
4. Head and 2 other members
of each State's UNNO Youth.
5. Not more than 2 delegates 
from each affiliated body.
STATE DELEGATES CONFERENCE (SDC)
Delegates:
1. Members of SECOM.
2. Head of each DEC.
,3. Delegates elected by each
DDM.
4. Vice-Head (Women's Movement)
5. Head of the State UMNO Youth 
Supervisory Committee.
6. 2 UMNO Youth representatives 
for each Division.
DIVISIONAL DEIEGATES MEETING (DDM)
Delegates:
1. Members of DEC.
2. Head of each BEC.
3. Delegates elected by each BGA.
4. Municipal, Town or Local 
Councillors who were Ordinary 
UMNO members.
5. Head of each Branch UMNO Youth 
Supervisory Committee.
nERANCR GENERAL ASSEMBLY (EGA)Delegates:1. Members of BEC.2. All Branch Ordinary and Affiliated members.
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party affairs. The SECcm was the pivotal group that organised the party 
in each State. The 1955 constitution thus placed UMNO on a federal 
footing.
Thus control of the State party organisation and its SECcm became 
crucial. This stimulated the growth of separate party machines and in 
seme States resulted in prolonged factional fights over control of the 
SECcm. Such factional or group fights became increasingly intense with 
the approach of the first Federal and State elections in 1959.^ This 
was because the faction or group controlling the State party organisation 
would be able to influence, if not control, the nomination process: a 
necessary first step if they wanted to reap the "spoils of office", 
especially with regard to determining the Mentri Besar's (MB) appointment 
and the composition of the State Government.
Factionalism and group conflict at the State level was making life 
difficult for UMNO's Central leaders.^ They viewed this as 
undermining party unity and consequently threatening UMNO's success in 
the forthccming elections. In order to ensure seme control over divided 
and wayward State UMNOs, Tengku Abdul Rahman, the UMNO President,
45. For a discussion in Kedah, Pahang, Johore, Selangor, Perak, Neneri 
Penang and Malacca, see Moore, op.cit., pp. 64-69. See also 
Means, cp.ict., p. 196. These factions and groups were, as Gullick 
suggested, historically rooted in the various States. See Gullick, 
J.M., Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya, London, The 
Athlone Press, 1958, pp. 11-14 and 87-91. Accordingly Moore argued 
that when UMNO was established in each State, apart frcm co-opting 
the traditional elites, it "also fell heir to traditional 
factionalisms which had long previous histories in the various 
states. Thus Gullick's accounts of the internecine struggles in 
Perak are important in explaining relationships in the pcwer 
structure of the State UMNO organisation." Moore, qp.cit., pp. 63-
64.
47. Interview with Mbhd. Khir Johari, 29-9-80. State party
organisations were, formally at least, able to drag their feet, 
perhaps even ignoring Central party directives and policies.
These were important and concerned especially the cementing of 
relations within the Alliance. The effectiveness of Central party 
policies designed to achieve this, for example the allocation of 
seats to the component parties within the Alliance, depended on 
their being acccpeted at the State level. Factionalism, apart 
from weakening the party, rendered the acceptability of Central 
party policies and directives both problematic and subject to the 
vicissitudes of factionalism. Means argued that the pressures for 
decentralisation were greatest when UMNO National leaders had to 
work out cctrprcmises among Alliance partners over difficult 
issues, especially candidate election. At these times they were 
especially anxious to strengthen party discipline and ccentralise 
the party apparatus. See cp.cit., p. 196.
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4.0
resorted to the use of informal channels. Through these the inner 
workings of party politics and the relations between the Centre and State 
leaders were shaped. Such channels were used only in some States and not 
for all problems and what determined their use was the intensity of
4.Q
factionalism within the State UMNO.  ^ VJhere other National leaders 
were in firm control of the State UMNOs, the Tenku worked through 
them.^0
UMNO's Central leaders were convinced that the long-term goal of 
party unity and cohesion required a reorganisation of UMNO in which State 
UMNO's powers should be reduced and Central control over State and lower 
party organs should be increased. In Moore's words,
"The national leadership and the Turiku in particular saw as the 
only solution to this problem a return of the divisions to the 
direct control of the central headquarters which would usurp frcm 
any one state group the possibility of co-opting the choice of 
Mentri Besar or even frcm vying for it".
The Tengku's attempts in February 1959 to strengthen Central control
over State and lower party bodies by amending the 1955 UMNO constitution
were successfully blocked.^ At the Special UMNO GA on February 9,
1959, after failing to have his way, the Tengku accused the prospective
MBs and State leaders of generating factionalism within State UMNOs. He
stated that they had
"ceased to take advise frcm headquarters but have decided on and 
pursued their cwn separate policies ignoring the basic policies of 
the party. The direct consequence of their irresponsible actions 
has been constant strife and bickering, which has afflicted the 
organisation for seme time. I have ccme to realise that there are 
seme leaders at state levels who aspire to grab the post of Mentri
Besar and to pack the (State) Executive Councils with their own
men".^
48. Moore, cp.cit.,~pp. 108*109. Tengku Abdul Rahman entrusted En. 
Mohd. Khir Johari, then Chairman of UMNO's Publicity Caimittee, 
with the task of developing such channels. He was assisted by 
Ismail Yusoff, then UMNO's Secretary-General, and Syed Jaffar 
Alba. During 1958 and 1959, Khir Johari and his two assistants 
made frequent visits to States and Divisions where factionalism 
was splitting, thus weakening, the party or where the local party 
organisations were balking at following Central policies or 
directives.
49. Interview with Mohd. Khir Johari.
50. ibid. States like Johore and Pahang were, respectively, in the
firm control of the Abdul Rahman brothers, Dr. Sulaiman and Dr.
Ismail (both SEC members), and Tun Razak (then UMNO Deputy 
President). See also Moore, cp.cit., p. 110.
51. ibid., p. 116.
52. Several States, led by Selangor and Penang, successfully resisted 
such attempts. These States believed that such attempts would 
undermine "their authority and sovereignty". See ibid., pp. 116- 
118 and Means, cp.cit., p. 197.
53. Quoted in Moored ibid., p. 118.
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He advised the GA delegates that they should establish a committee in 
each State to study his proposal for amending the 1955 UMNO
CA
Constitution. Convinced that factionalism was threatening the 
party's electoral success, Tengku also announced his resignation as the
cc
PM in order to devote himself fully to party matters. J He explained 
that the problems facing the party required his personal attention and 
decision. Furthermore, he wanted to ensure that
"The right men go forward at both state and federal level so that 
when the Alliance Government is returned to pcwer it will have 
sound administration in every state and at the Centre". 1°
The full weight of the party Presidency and his personal intervention
were crucial ingredients in his attempts to tame factionalism at the
State level.
In 1959, the SEC identified the State UMNOs of Perak, Negeri 
Sembilan, East Coast States of Kelantan and Trengganu, and Singapore as 
the worst-affected by factionalism.^ It established a four-man 
commission to investigate the problems caused by factionalism in these 
States. At the same time it established a Jawatankuasa Mengubal dan 
Meminda Undang? Tuboh UMNO or UMNO Constitutional Revision and 
Amendment Committee to examine the weaknesses of and to recommend
CQ
amendments to the UMNO Constitution. This committee made 
recommendations^ and prepared a set of amendment proposals which were 
sent to each State UMNO and Division. These proposals were formally
54. ibid. The Tengku took several informal steps to overcome, 
temporarily at least, what he viewed as problems of organisation. 
For a discussion of these see ibid., pp. 118-120.
55. Tun Razak took over as PM. See ibid., p. 118.
56. Quoted in ibid., p. 151.
57. UMNO, Penyata Tahunan, 1959/60, p. v. Although factionalism
existed in if not all, states, seme were more serious than 
others.
58. The Commission comprised four SEC members. They included Tun 
Abdul Razak Hussein, Mohd. Khir Johari, Abdul Aziz Ishak and 
Bahaman Samsudin and were individually and respectively 
responsible for investigating the problems in the State UMNOs of 
Negeri Sembilan, Perak, Kelantan and Trengganu, and Singapore.
See ibid.
59. ibid. The Committee with Abdul Rahman Talib as Chairman comprised
Mohd. Khir Jchari, Tuan Syed Jaffar Alba, Tuan Syed Nasir Ismail, 
Ghazali Shafie, Hussein Mohd. Nordin, Mohd. Ismail Mohd. Yusoff 
and Wan Abdul Kadir Ismail. With the exception of Mohd. Ismail 
Mohd. Yusoff, all were SEC members.
60. ibid. '
61. Tengku Abdul Rahman's speech at the 13th UMNO General Assembly, 
April 16, 1960. Reprinted in ibid., pp. 22-32, see especially pp. 
23-24. According to Mohd. Khir Johari, the amendments were 
designed to centralise power within the party. Interviews with 
Mohd. Khir Johari and Mustafa Jaabar, currently Secretary-General 
of UMNO, 30.9.80.
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tabled at the Thirteenth UMNO GA on April 16 and 17, 1960. Teriku Abdul 
Rahman explained to the Assembly that these proposals were desinged to 
strenthen UMNO and make it a truly strong National party in view of 
the changing needs of the time. He argued that before the formation 
of UMNO the Malays were influenced by attitudes of "statenessor 
loyalty to each State. But the establishment of UMNO had changed this. 
However, UMNO needed to be a truly strong National party if Malay unity 
was to be assured. The 1955 UMNO constitution, establishing State UMNO, 
was designed to improve the party's organisation. The result, however, 
was both organisational incoherence and divisions with State UMNOs.
These weakened UMNO as a National political party. In Tengku's words,
"UMNO yang menjadi parti National itu telah pun menjadi state 
party. Tiap2 Negeri telah memandang dan mensifatkan diri-nya 
terlepas dan bebas dan tidak lagi bertanggong jawab kepada pusat 
msing2 hendak merribuat sekehendak hatinya. Dengan ini tidak 
sunyi UMNO Negeri daripada berbagai2 krisis besar dan kechil.
Perse lisehan dan pergaddhan dikalangan UMNO Negeri itu telah 
menyebabkan perpecahan sesama sendiri".^
[Translation:
"UMNO that began as a National party had become a State party.
Each State party viewed and considered itself free and independent 
frcm and not responsible to the Centre in anything it did. Because 
of this the State UMNO had been constantly afflicted by both major 
and minor crises. Disagreement and conflict within the State UMNO 
had resulted in splits within its own ranks." ]
He emphasised that amending the 1955 constitution was the only way to re­
establish UMsIO as a National party and its organisational coherence. He 
warned that if the amendment proposals were not approved UMNO would cease 
to be a truly strong National party. The Tengku' s argument recognised 
that States had become power centres in their own right. UMNO leaders at 
the Centre felt threatened by this and feared that if the party was not 
fundamentally reorganised they would ultimately lose control of the 
party.^ Despite the threat posed to State UMNO leaders, the UMNO GA
62. UMNO, Penyata Tahunan, 1959/60, p. 23.
63. The Malay phrase used was "perasaan ber-negerian". See ibid., p.
24.
64. ibid. According to Khir Johari these amendments were aimed at 
tightening a loose party structure at both the Centre and State 
levels. State party leaders had taken advantage of this
' looseness' and had thereby generated divisions and disunity 
within the party. Central leaders feared that a divided party 
would not be able to retain control at both the Centre and state 
levels. Reorganisation of UMNO was considered the only way out. 
Interview with Khir Johari.
65. Interview with Khir Johari. According to Mustafa Jaabar, the 
amendments were aimed at halting the resurgence of state 
loyalties. Interview with Mustafa Jaabar.
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unanimously approved the amendments.^
The 1960 UMNO Constitution and Organisation
The 1960 UMNO Constitution retained the organisational structure of 
the party at the National, Division and Branch levels. The SEC was 
strengthened and provided with full and wide-ranging powers to determine 
policies, select candidates for Federal and State elections, supervise 
and control lower party bodies, and settle party disputes.^ With 
this, at least formal power was centralised. Nationally, the authority 
of UMNO was still vested in the GA to which the SEC was responsible
CO
to. The President could now appoint only five, compared to seven, as 
the SEC's ordinary members. Apart from this, the SEC's membership
and methods of selection remained as before. ^
At the State level, the SDC and SECcm were abolished and a State 
Liaison Ccninittee (SLC) or Jawatankuasa Perhubongan Negeri (JPN) was 
provided for in each St ate.The SLC's establishment had to be 
officially confirmed and approved by the SEC.^ Compared to the SECcm, 
the SLC was provided with minimal authority over lower party bodies and. . 70
party matters within the State. It was not empowered, as the SECcm 
had been, to confirm and grant recognition to the establishment of 
Divisions in each State. This power was now vested in the SEC. The 
SLC was empowered only to recommend the establishment of Divisions.^
It was under the SEC's direct supervision and control and was to act 
purely as a liaison body linking the SEC to the Divisions and Branches in 
each State with its power over the Divisions and Branches limited to that 
of supervision and co-ordination.^ Again compared to the SECcm, the
66. UMNO, Penyata Tahunan, 1959/60, p. vi. The Malay Mail, 18.4.60, 
reported however, that the Selangor and Malacca State UMNOs 
opposed these amendments. These amendments were contained in UMNO, 
Undang-Undang Tuboh, Pertubohan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu, Di- 
persetujukan dan di-luluskan oleh Persidangan Perhimponan Agung 
UMNO Yang ke-Tiga Belas, pada 16 dan 17 April, 1960. (UMNO, 
Constitution of the United Malays National Organisation. Agreed 
and passed by the Thirteenth UMNO General Assembly held on the 16 
and 17 April, 1960). This Constution will be referred to simply as 
the "1960 UMNO Constitution".
67. The 1960 UMNO Constitution, Art. 13.9.
68. ibid.. Art. 13.2.
69. ibid., Art. 13.1(h).
70. ibid., Arts. 11.2-11.3 and 13.1(g).
71. ibid., Art. 15.1. A State party organisation was not even
mentioned.
72. ibid., Art. 15.2.
73. ibid., Art. 15.9.
74. ibid., Art. 13.9.
75. ibid., Art. 17.2.
76. ibid., Arts. 15.9 (a, b, and g).
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SLC had no powers over policy-making and could only recommend, but not
77select or determine, candidates for elections. Powers over these 
were with the SEC.^®
Central party control over the SLC was further emphasised and 
strengthened by the provision that its Leader be appointed by the UMNO 
President after consultations with, but not agreement of, the Division
7Q
Heads in each State.' Other SLC members included the Secretary, 
Treasurer, and Division Heads in the State. The Secretary and Treasurer 
were appointed by the Leader with the concurrence of the SLC's members and 
the Division Heads were elected by the respective Divisional Conference 
of Representatives (DCR).®® The Division Heads represented the only 
elective element in the SLC who were elected at the Division and not at 
the State level. Compared to the SECcm's State level elective element, 
that of the SLC's emphasised and strengthened the Divisions because now, 
unlike previously, the elected Division Heads were guaranteed a place in 
the SECcm.
At the Division level®'1', the DEM, now called the DCR, and the DEC 
retained much of their previous identity and powers. Previously 
Divisions were established in every State electoral constituency or in 
areas approved by the SECcm but they were new to be established in every
oo
FEderal electoral constituencey or in areas approved by the SEC.
Each Division was now under the direct supervision and control of the
SEC.®® The Divisions were now directly linked and answerable to the
77. ibid., Art. 15.9 (c).
78. ibid., Art. 13.9.
79. ibid., Art. 15.4.
80. ibid., Arts. 15.3, 15.5 and 18.2.
81. ibid., Arts. 17-18.
82. ibid., Art. 17.1-17.2. In Malacca there was only one Division,
controlled by Ghaffar Baba,who was then the CM, for the whole 
State. There were four Federal electoral constituencies in 
Malacca in 1960. Thus, if Article 17.1-17.2 was implemented 
immediately the one Division then in Malacca would have to be
reorganised into four Divisions. This would reduce Ghaffar Baba's
political grip on UMNO in Malacca. UMNO in Malacca was only 
reorganised into four Divisions in 1973 and this testified to his 
political strength in Malacca as well as Nationally. See Mhd. Nor 
Ujang, "Consensus and conflict in a dominant State political party 
- the case of Malacca UMNO", Graduation Exercise, Faculty of 
Economics and Administration, University of Malaya, 1973/1974.
For another study of Centre-Division relations, see Mohd. Esa 
Shariff, "National Constituency relationship: A study of the UMNO
with particular reference to the Pontian Selatan Division", 
Graduation Exercise, Faculty of Economics and Administration, 
University of Malaya, 1970/1971.
83. ibid., Art. 15.9 (g). The question was and still is this: hew 
could the SEC effectively keep an eye on the great number of 
Divisions? In 1961 there were 77 UMNO Divisions and by 1979 the
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Centre. Apart from the increase in the number of Vice-Presidents frcm
P4_
two to four , the membership of and methods of selection to the DEC 
remained as before.
At the Branch level® the BGA, new called the Branch General 
Meeting (BGM), and the BEC also retained much of their previous identity 
and powers. The establishment of a Branch in a Division was still to be 
approved and recognised by the DEC and its activities were still under 
the supervision and control of the DEC. Regarding the membership of 
the BEC, the Branch Youth leader was now excluded and the Branch Head 
could now appoint only five, not one-third of the total membership, as 
ordinary members.®^ These changes apart, the membership of and methods 
of selection to the BEC remained as before.
The overall executive authority was still vested in the UMSfO
op
GA. SEC members, as before, were entitled to be delegates to the GA. 
With the abolition of the SECcm and the SDC a new procedure was provided 
for the election of delegates to the GA. Delegates were new elected by
OQ
the annual DCRs. The Divisional Heads were now entitled to be
.......... qn   . . .
delegates to the GA. The SDC Leaders were entitled only to attend
91the GA and had no voting rights. In practice, most if not all SLC 
Leaders were delegates to the GA by virtue of being SEC members (as 
indicated later). Other delegates to the GA included not more than three 
delegates each from each affiliated members association and three 
delegates each frcm the Youth and Women's movements.®®
83. (Cont.) number was and still is 114 (equal to the number of Federal
electoral constituencies). See UMNO, Penyata Tahunan, 1961, pp. 
42-46, and UMNO, Penyata Tahunan, 197971980, pp. 17-31. One way of 
controlling Divisions would be through ensuring that Central 
leaders (Cabinet Ministers, Deputy Ministers or Member of 
Parliaments) or their supporters at the State level became the 
Divsional Heads, as the case of Pahang (examined in chapter 10) 
indicates. However, SEC's control over Divisions, as note 109 and 
119 suggest, has been uncertain.
84. ibid., Art. 18.1(c).
85. ibid., Arts. 20-21.
86. ibid., Arts. 18.10 (h, i, j) and 20.1-20.2.
87. ibid., Art. 21.1(g).
88. ibid., Art. 14.4(a).
89. One delegate for the first 500 members who have paid their party 
fees for the current year and one additional delegate for every 
other 250 members who have paid their party fees for the current
year. See ibid., Art. 14.4(b).
90. ibid., Art. 14.4(c).
91. ibid., Art. 14.5. UMNO MPs were also entitled to attend but they
had no voting rights.
92. ibid., Art. 14.4 (d, e and f).
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The majority of delegates to the GA were new elected by the 
respective DCRs. This, together with the abolition of the SECcms 
and SDCs, and the entitlement of Divisional Heads to be GA delegates 
further emphasised and strengthened the direct link of Divisions to the 
Centre. There were no State delegates as such but only Divisional 
delegates Who would and could be controlled by the respective Divisional 
Heads. The larger the membership in each Division the larger would be 
the number of delegates that it could send to the GA. It would still be 
possible for a State leader, assuming that he had control over or the 
substantial backing of Divisonal delegates, to be a pcwer broker within 
the UMNO GA. Even more than beore, Divisional Heads and their respective 
delegations were now potentially more important in such calculations of 
pcwer in UMNO.
Within eah State only the Division and Branch representational 
bodies were retained - the DCR and BGM. As before, delegates to the DCR
QO
included DEC members and Branch Heads. In addition, instead of only 
one delegate, there were new three delegates each frcm the Division's
QA
UMNO Youth and Women's movements. Other delegates were elected by 
the respective BGMs in each Division.®® Delegates to the BGM included 
members of the BEC and all Branch ordinary and affiliated members.
The 1960 UMNO Constitution thus de-enphasised the importance, 
though not the necessity, of State UMNO organisations. Figure 2 shews 
the structure of UMNO according to this constitution. The necessity for 
seme form of State level party body was recognised by the establishment 
of the SLC. It was, hcwever, provided with minimal authority over the 
lower party bodies in the State. Formal pcwer within UMNO was new more 
centralised and vested in the SEC. Formally the SEC must act under the 
direction of the UMNO GA. Hcwever, in practice and especially between 
GAs, the SEC generally and the UMNO President particularly could be its 
master.®®
Previously the SDC and SECcm were the organisational focus of the 
Divisions and Branches in each State. The SIC, hcwever, was not designed 
to be a similar orgfanisational focus. The UMNO GA and the SEC new 
provided this focus. In this the Divisions and Branches were directly
93. ibid., Art. 17.6 (a, b).
94. ibid., Art. 17.6 (c, d).
95. One delegate for every 50 members who have paid their party fees
for the current year. See ibid., Art. 17.6 (e).
96. As far as I know no UMNO GA meeting has ever voted against the 
SEC's actions. Hcwever, in 1979, the UMNO GA adopted a resolution
that was clearly opposed by the party leaders in the SEC. See
note 127.
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Figure 2: Structure of UMNO based on thfe i960 Constitution.
Central
Level
State
Level
—  UMNO PRESIDENT 
(elected by UMNO)
SUPREME EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (SEC)
Members:
1. UMNO President, Deputy President, 3 Vice-Presidents 
and not more than 15 others elected by UMNO GA .
2. Secretary-General, Treasurer, Information Chief and 
not more than 5 others appointed by UMNO President.
3. 2 Vice-Presidents - the respective Heads of UMNO 
Youth and Women's Movements elected by their 
respective General Assemblies.
.SLC LEADER 
(appointed by UMNO President)
STATE LIAISON COMMITTEE (SLC)
Members:
1. SLC Leader appointed by UMNO President.
2. Secretary and Treasurer appointed by 
SLC Leader.
-3. Head of each Division elected by DCR.
\ A
District
Level
-DIVISION UMNO H E A D ______________________r
(elected by DCR) -r
DIVISION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (DEC)________ '
Members:
1. Division Head, Deputy Head, 2 Vice-Heads, 
and not more than 10 others elected by 
DCR.
2. Secretary, Treasurer, Information Chief 
and not more than 5 others appointed by 
Division UMNO Head.
3. 2 Vice-Heads - one each from the UMNO 
Youth and Women's Movements.
UMNO GENERAL ASSEMBLY (GA)
Delegates:
Members of SEC.
3 delegates each from UMNO Youth 
and Women's Movement.
3. Head of each Division.
1*4. Delegates elected by each DCR.
5. 3 Delegates from each affiliated 
member associations.
(DCR)
Branch
Level
BRANCH UMNO HEAD 
(elected by BGM)
DIVISIONAL CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
Delegates:
* 1. Members of DEC.
>2. Head of each Branch.
)3> Delegates elected by each BGM.
4. 3 Delegates each from UMNO Youth 
and Women's Movements appointed by 
their respective Divisional 
Conference of Representatives.
BRANCH EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (BEC)
Members:
1. Branch UMNO Head, Vice-Head, Women's Head 
Secretary, Treasurer and several others 
elected by BGM.
2. Not more than 5 others appointed by 
Branch UMNO Head.
•1 r*
______________________ (BGM)
legates:
1. Members of BEC.
2. All branch Ordinary and Affiliated
BRANCH GENERAL MEETING
T
Members.
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linked to the SEC especially through its power of supervision and control 
over them and, in the case of Divisions, to the UMNO GA through the 
election of its delegates by the DCRs. Previously also State party 
leaders were able, through their control of the SECcms and State party 
bodies, to wield considerable influence in the party. The formal powers 
of the SLCs' Leaders were minimal but their effective powers were 
determined as much by their position as SLC Leader as by their close 
association with Central party leaders. They must, at the very least, 
have the approval of Central leaders and ccmnand the support of 
substantial numbers of Divisions and their leaders. Several of them 
were also members of the SEC.
The organisational fragmentation of the party at the State level 
meant that State leaders would have to assiduously cultivate both ends of 
the party organisation, the bottom and the top: the bottom, effectively
the Divisions and their leaders, because aspiring State leaders have to 
show the tcp (Centre) that they cormand the committed suppport of thoseat 
the bottom; the top, effectively the Central leaders in the SEC, because 
only they could officially confirm aspiring State leaders to positions of 
State leadership. Divisions and Branches do count in the calculations 
and competition of pcwer in each State and also at the National level.
To suggest, as K. V. Vorys did,^ that State-level party organisation 
had atrophied following the 1960 amendment of the UMNO constitution may 
be an exaggeration. It would seem, rather, that UMNO within the State 
had been reorganised so as to increase the influence, perhaps control, of 
National leaders in party activities within the State. It would thus 
improve the tcp-dcwn co-ordination within the party. This nevertheless 
requires a 'healthy' party organisation within the State although 
controlled frcm the Centre. Formally, at least, the SLC, unlike the 
SECcm, was not designed as the pivotal body with respect to the 
organisation of the party in each State. The pivotal group was new the 
SEC.
The 1960 LMNO constitution eroded the federal nature of the party 
and further strengthened the Centre. The centralisation of pcwer within 
UMNO integrated and tightened the party through reducing the importance 
of State level party organisation and directly linking the Divisions and
go
Branches to the Centre. National party leaders were thus placed with
97. Vorys, K. V., Democracy Without Consensus: Commanalism and
Political Stability in Malaysia, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton 
University Press, 1975, p. 254.
98. Khir Johari described this as the process of strengthening UMNO as 
a National party. He also stated that it was then believed that
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enhanced powers While the previous importance of State party 
organisations and their leaders were fundamentally altered and reduced. 
Subsequent Changes to UMNO's Constitution and Organisation
The structure of UMNO has remained as provided for by the 1960 
constitution. Subsequent changes to this did not affect the UMtfO 
structure as such but rather the distribution of powers between the 
Centre and the lower party bodies.
In 1971 several amendments to UMNO's constitution were made.^  
These further strengthened the centralisation of power within the UMNO 
organisation. The SEC's powers were increased and these further 
strengthened its control over nominations for Federal and State 
elections, party discipline, lower party bodies and policies.^® This 
centralisation of power was criticised by delegates at the UMNO GA then 
discussing the amendments. The tenure of elected SEC members - 
President, Deputy President, three Vice-Presidents, and twenty ordinary
98. (Cont.) the quality of the State leadership was lew and as such
the efficiency of the party administration was affected.
Tightening the party through centralisation, it was believed, 
would pave the way for improving the efficiency of party 
administration at the State level. Interview with Khir Johari.
99. UMNO, Perlenibagaan UMNO, Di-persetujukan dalam Persidangan 
Perhimpunan Agong Khas, Pada 8 dan 9 Mei, 1971 (UMNO, Constitution 
of the United National Organisation. Approved at the Special 
General Assembly on 8 and May, 1971). This referred to simply as 
the "1971 UMNO Constitution". The amendments in this consitution 
were prepared by the UMNO Constitution Sub-Committee. This 
committee was chaired by Ghaffar Baba and included UMNO Secretary- 
General Senu Abdul Rahman, Syed Jaafar Alba, Wan Abdul Kadir, Syed 
Nasir, Engku Mchsein, Othman Abdullah and Kamarul Ariffin. With 
the exception of Kamarul Ariffin, the others were SEC members.
See UMNO, Penyata Tahunan, 1971/1972, p. 177. The SEC was renamed 
as Majlis Tertinggi (MT) or Supreme Council (SC). For consistency 
the term SEC will be used.
100. 1971 UMNO Constitution, Clause 11. For the first time, provisions
governing party-govemment relations were provided. The SEC was 
made responsible for supervising the Government in implementing 
party policies and making the regulations governing political 
appointments. See ibid., clauses 11.2, 11.4 and 21. There was 
clearly a 'fusion' between party and government office holders 
since the top Central Government Ministers were also SEC members. 
Since the SEC was ultimately answerable to the UMNO GA the new 
provisions governing party-govemment relations seemed designed to 
make Government Ministers answerable to the GA regarding the 
implementation of party policies.
101. Straits Times, 10.5.71.
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members (five more than before) - was changed from one to three 
years. The other two Vice-Presidents - Heads of both Youth and 
Women's movements - were elected as before. The Secretary-General, 
Treasurer and Information Chief were still appointed by the UMNO President 
but would new hold office for two years. The President could also 
now appoint seven persons as ordinary members of the SEC.-**^  The 
change in tenure was explained in these terms:
"Dulu-nya tempoh jawatan ini ia-lah sa-tahun ia-itu satu jangka 
waktu yang di-kira terlalu pendek untak menfoolehkan ahli2 yang 
berkenaan menjalarikan program mereka". 05 
[Translation:
"The length of tenure for these posts before was one year which is 
considered too short a period for holders of such posts to be able 
to implement their programmes. " ]
The change was designed to ensure stability and continuity in the Central
leadership of the party. This could potentially strengthen the Central
Leader's hold on the party. This stability and continuity of Central
leadership was, nevertheless, already evident before the change. Not
surprisingly, this change was approved by a very small majority.
At the State level, the already minimal powers of the SLC were 
1 0 7reduced. It could no longer reccmmend the establishment of 
Divisions to the SEC and its previous participation in matters concerning 
candidates selection for Federal and State elections was deleted.
Formally, at least, the SLC's influence over party affairs seemed
1 Oftminimal. Several changes in the SLC's membership were also made.
In addition to the post of SLC Leader, new renamed Chairman, the post of 
Deputy Chairman was created. Both were to be appointed by the UMNO 
President after consultations with Division Heads in each State and would 
hold office for two years. The SLC's Secretary, Treasurer and 
Information Chief were appointed by the Chairman with the approval of the 
SLC and they would hold office until the appointment of a new Chairman or 
expelled by the SLC. The Division Heads remained as ordinary members. In 
addition, each State UMNO Youth and Women's movements were entitled to 
two representatives each, inlcuding thier respective leaders, in the 
SLC.
102. The 1971 UMNO Constitution, clause 9.4.
103. ibid., clause 9.5.
104. ibid., clause 9.3 (h).
105. UMNO, Penyata Tahunan, 1971/1972, p. 179.
106. ibid. The voting was 180 votes for and 175 against. See Milne 
and Mauzy, cp.cit., p. 174, n. 193.
107. The 1971 UMNO Constitution, clause 13.10. The SLC was renamed as 
Badan Perhubugan (BP) or Liaison Committee (LC). For consistency 
the term SLC will be used.
108. ibid., clause 13.2-13.5.
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At the Divsional level, the Centre's links to and control over 
the Divisions were tightened and strengthened."*^ The DEC's powers were 
reduced. It was new empowered only to consult the SEC over the 
nomination of candidates for Federal and State elections.Its 
power over local election matters was, however, strengthened.-*■•*•■*• Its 
power over the removal of any DEC members was new fully vested in the 
SEC. Changes in the DEC's membership were also made.-*--*-2 In addition 
to the Head and Deputy Head, there were now only three Vice-Head posts 
and these included the respective leaders of the Divisional UMNO Youth 
and Women's movements. The number of elected ordinary members were 
increased from ten to twelve. These members, apart from the leaders of 
the UMNO Youth and Women's movements, were now elected by the DEM once in 
two years. The Secretary, Treasurer and Information Chief and five 
ordinary members were appointed for a two-year period by the Divisional 
Head.
Several changes were also made at the Branch l e v e l . T h e  
limited powers of the BEC over election matters were deleted and Central 
control over its activities was further tightened.
The membership of the UMNO GA was slightly changed.-*-■*■^ In 
addition to SEC members, delegates frcm affiliated associations and 
Divisional Heads, the number of delegates frcm each of the Youth and 
Women's movements were increased frcm three to five. Ordinary delegates 
to the GA were, as before, to be elected by the annual DCR but on a new
109. ibid ., clauses 15-16. Changes at the Division level, according to 
a top official, were aimed at the entrenched positions of the lewer 
echelon party leaders Who had been in positions of control for far 
too long. This official described the situation in this way; "A 
man may have been chairman of a branch or division since 1946. His 
wife is the chairman of the local Kaum IBu. His son is the 
Chairman of the local Pemuda. His daughter is the Secretary of the 
Kaum Ibu. It is a family affair ... They create little errpires of
their cwn and carve out spheres of influence. Sometimes the State
leadership is held to ransom by these local warlords. They 
distribute patronage among their own followers. As a result party 
machinery stagnates, as we found to our cost during the last [1969] 
elections." Straits Times, 22.1.71.
110. The 1971 UMNO Constitution, clause 16.13 (a). The DEC was renamed 
as JawatarikUasa Bahagian (JB) or Division Committee (DC). For 
consistency the term DEC will be used.
111. ibid., clause 16.13(b).
112. ibid., clause 16.2.
113. ibid., clauses 18-19.
114. ibid., especially clause 19.13 (a, b and c). The BEC was renamed 
asJawatankuasa Cawangan (JC) or Branch Committee (BC). For 
consistency the term BEC will be used.
115. ibid., clause 12.4.
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b a s i s . T h e  participation of the SLC Chairman as non-voting
delegates was abolished. At the Division and Branch levels, the
membership of the DCR and BGM remained unchanged.
The UMNO constitution was further amended at the Twenty-Fifth UMNO
GA on June 29, 1974. ^ ^ The amendments affected especially the
Division level of the party organisation. The size of a Division's
delegation to the GA was limited to a maximum of ten delegates to be
118elected by the DCR. Previously the size of a Division's membership 
determined the size of its delegation. This limitation, potentially, 
would tend to reduce the influence of Division Heads who were alleged to 
have increased, through vote-buying, the number of 'bogus' members in 
their Divisions. In this way they had attempted to increase the number
1 1 Qof their Divisions delegates in the UMNO GA. x The size of each State's 
delegation to the UMNO GA new depended not on the size of UMNO membership 
but on the number of Divisions in each State. This in turn depended on 
the number of Federal electoral constituencies in each State because the 
UMNO constitution provided that a Division should be established in each 
constituency. The number of Federal constituencies varies frcm two in 
Perlis to twenty-one in Perak and accordingly the maximum number of 
Divisions possible varies. The amendment, thus, provided for a permanent 
unequal representation of States in the UMNO GA. The size of a Branch 
delegation to the DCR was also limited to a maximum of five delegates to
120be elected by the respective BGMs.
116. One delegate for every 500 members who have paid their party fees 
for the current year. See ibid., clause 12.4 (b). At the 
Fourteenth UMNO GA, on May 6 and 7, 1961, the Muar UMNO Division 
proposed an amendment to the basis by which delegates were elected 
by the annual Divisional Conference of Representatives. It 
proposed that delegates elected by this Conference should be on 
the basis of one delegate for the first 350 members Who have paid 
their party fees for the current year. This proposal was not 
approved. See UMNO, Penyata Tahunan, 1961, p. 15. The DCR and 
BGM were renamed respectively as Divisional Delegates Meetings and 
Branch Conference. For consistency the terms DCR and BGM will be 
used.
117. Referred to as "The 1974 UMNO Constitution".
118. ibid., clause 12.4 (b).
119. That such practices existed were indicated by Khir Johari in June, 
1968. See Straits Times, 17.6.68. Such corrupt practices were 
widespread according to Senu Abdul Rahman, then UMNO Secretary- 
General. See UMNO, Penyata Tahunan, 1974, p. 2. The amendment was 
designed to break the Divisions' Heads grip on Division delegates 
to the GA. Interviews with Mustafa Jaabar and Ghafar Baba. Vote- 
buying was also rampant especially during elections for the 
Division's Head post; considered a necessary first step tcward 
winning nomination for either Federal or State election.
120. The 1974 UMNO Constitution, clause 15.6 (c). this was also aimed 
at stepping the practice of vote-buying.
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Further, the Division's Heads position within the DEC was
strengthened toy an amendment which provided that the Division Head could
only be expelled from the DEC by the SEC. This must also be supported by
121 .two-thirds of the DEC members. In supporting this amendment, Tun 
Razak, The UMNO President, explained to the GA that
" ... sejak timbulnya kesedaran baru di peringkat Bahagian, 
nampaknya telah tirribul bermacam-macam tektik yang dilakiikan oleh 
golongan kecil untuk merebut kuasa. Satu cara yang dilakukan 
mereka ialah mempengardhi Ahli-Ahli jawantarikuasa Bahagian 
menyuarakan undi tak percaya terhadap Ketua Bahagian untuk 
menyingkirkan dan mencalurikan ketua yang baru. Hal seperti ini 
tidak berlaku di masa lalu tetapi saya nampak perbuatan seperti ini 
akan merebak jika tidak mengawalnya dari sekarang".
[Translation;
" .... since the emergence of a new feeling at the Division level, 
several tactics seem to have emerged and these were being used by a 
minority group to win power. One method used by them was to 
persuade Divisional Committee members to move a motion of no- 
confidence against the Division Head so as to topple him and 
suggest a new Head. This sort of thing did not occur before but I 
see that this would spread if it is not controlled from new on."]
The amendment thus strengthened the Division Heads position but at the
same time made them more dependent on the support of Central leaders.
The influence of the latter over the Divisions would thus tend to be
enhanced. The 1974 amendments were generally viewed as increasing the
power of the National UMNO leadership.123
Further amendments to the UMNO constitution were made at the
special UMNO GA of July 8, 1979. In a speech supporting the proposed
amendments, the UMNO President, Dato Hussein Qnn, argued that the UMNO
constitution, like the Federal Constitution, was a living document and as
such must be amended from time to time to keep up with current situations
and needs.12^ These amendments further centralised power within
the party. The SEC was provided with absolute pcwers to suspend or
. . • . 125dissolve any SIC, Divisional or Branch committees. However, the
Central leaders failed to block an amendment from the floor which reduced 
their pcwers over the nomination of election candidates. This amendment
121. ibid., clause 16.5 (k and 1).
122. Tun Razak' s speech titled "Cabaran Untck Keamanan" (or "Challenge 
for Peace") to the 25th UMNO GA, in UMNO, Penyata Tahunan,
1974/75, p. 120.
123. Milne and Mauy, op.cit., p. 192.
124. New Straits Times, (NST), 9.7.79. See also Dato Hussein Qnn's 
speech, "Jangan Pagar Makan Padi". [The Fence must not eat the 
padi], in UMNO, Penyata Tahunan, 1979/80, pp. 385-392.
125. The 1979 UMNO Constitution, clause 11.14. See also The Star, 
9.7.79.
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provided that any election candidate had to have been a member of the 
party for at least five years without any exception whatsoever. The 
Central leaders were defeated by a massive 409 votes to lll.12  ^ For 
the first time in UMNO's history the leadership was defeated on any issue 
in the GA. It was reported that
"To a large extent, the support given by the Assembly reflected the 
dissatisfaction of grass-root leaders over the recent trend of co- 
qpting able young leaders frcm the civil service and the 
professions and other newcomers to the party".
At this Special UMNO GA the Central party leaders proposed an
amendment which was designed to overcome, through the convening of a
State UMNO convention, the weaknesses of the party at the State level.
This amendment was made in response to the need for a State level forum
within which State level UMNO politicians would have the opportunity to
participate in formulating UMNO policy.12^ This need had been
frequently expressed before. Hussein Onn in stating that so far the SEC
had concentrated on activities at the Federal level implied that the
130State level need must somehow be met. In his speech to the GA, he 
stated that
"Dalam konvensyen ini pemirrpin-pemiirpin parti dari selunih bahagian 
dalam sesebuah negeri itu, dapatlah membincangkan berbagai masaalah 
yang tirribul di dalam negeri yang berkenaaan ... dan keputusan- 
keputusannya dijadikan asas tindakan oleh Kerajaan Negeri. 
Konvensyen seperti ini adalah penting supaya masaalah-masaalah di 
peringkat negeri diselesaikan segera diperingkat yang berkenaan ... 
[dan] membolehkan rakyat dan ahli-ahli parti menyuarakan sedikit 
sebanyak hasrat dan kesulitan mereka serta melahirkan pandangan 
dan teguran terhadap jentera pentadbiran dan dasar kerajaan di 
peringkat negeri ... Melalui konvensyen-konvensyen seperti ini juga 
dapatlah kita mempefkukuh hubungan dengan pucuk pemiirpin di negeri- 
negeri dan dengan itu memberi kepercayaan dan keyakinan yang lebih 
kepada pucuk pirtpinan bagi melaksanakan tugas dan tanggungjawab 
mereka".131 
[Translation:
"In this convention party leaders frcm all the Divisions in each 
State can discuss several problems that emerge in that State ... 
and its decisions can be used as the basis for the State Government 
actions. Such a convention is important in solving State problems
126. The 1979 UMNO Constitution, clause 23. Before this amendment the 
eligibility period was two years and exceptions could be made on 
several grounds by te SEC leaders.
127. NST, 10.7.79. Not coincidentally the amendment was proposed by a 
Pahang Division of UMNO. Not coincidentally because certain 
groups in Pahang had opposed the Centre's use of its nomination 
powers to bring in a new set of young politicians in Pahang. This 
discussed in the next chapter.
128. ibid.
129. Interview with Mustafa Jaabar.
130. NST, 28.5.79.
131. UMNO, Penyata Tahunan, 1979/80, p. 386.
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at the State level ... [and] will enable the people and party 
members to express their needs and problems including their views 
and criticisms concerning the administrative machinery and 
government policy at the State level ... Also through such 
conventions we will be able to strengthen the relations with tcp 
State leaders and provide them with the trust and confidence to 
implement their tasks and responsibilities".]
The GA approved the amendment Which required the SLC to convene a State
UMNO convention at least once a year. The SEC, however, was empowered to
132determine any natters concerning the convention. The SLC was
limited to determining the duration of the convention and the number of
■ . . . 133delegates frcm each Division in the State.
The UMNO SEC and SLCs
Following the 1960 reorganisation of UMNO the pivotal body within
UMNO has been the SEC where formal power became centralised. The
strength of this centralisation is further indicated by the composition
of the SEC, UMNO's chief executive body.13^ Since Malayan Independence
the President and Deputy President of UMNO have been respectively the PM
and Deputy PM. Since 1960 the SEC's membership has been consistently,
overwhelmingly and even increasingy made up of Central Cabinet and Deputy
Ministers, and Members of Parliament (MPs). Central Cabinet and Deputy
Ministers consistently make up one-quarter or more of the SEC's
membership. The number of Mentri Besars (MBs) and Chief Minister (CMs)
in the SEC had gradually increased. However, apart from these MBs and
CMs, there have been very few State Executive Council (Exco) members or
Assemblymen in the SEC. Table 1 shows the numbers in each of these
categories.
The UMNO President's influence within the SEC owes much to his
being the PM but is strengthened by the fact that he is empowered to
, . 135
appoint, at his discretion, additional members to the SEC (See Table
2). Of late the President has used this power to appoint those MBs and
CMs Who had not been elected by the UMNO GA as SEC members. A remarkable
feature of the SEC's membership, especially of its executive officers, is
its continuity and stability. This, indeed, is an index of the strength
132. The 1979 UMNO Constitution, clause 13.7.
133. NST, 7.12.79.
134. Information of this for the 1960 to 1979 period was calculated 
frcm UMNO, Penyata Tahunan, 1960/1979 (UMNO, Annual Reports, 
1960/1979), and from UMNO headquarters and Federal and State 
elections, 1959 till 1978. This information is condensed in 
Appendix 3.
135. The President of UMNO, with the exception of Suleiman Palestine's 
candidacy for the UMNO Presidency against Hussein Onn in 1978, has 
always been elected unopposed.
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and grip of Central UMNO leaders over the party. Another remarkable 
feature is the unequal representation of States in the SEC. Table 3 
illustrates this.
At the State level, the UMNO SLC provides the link between the SEC 
and lcwer party bodies. The SLC is formally under the SEC's control and 
has no formal existence without the SEC's approval. The SLC's Chairman 
and Deputy Chairman are appointed by the UMNO President. More often than 
not, the SLC's Chairmen have been National (usually Central Cabinet 
Ministers and sometimes even the PM or Deputy PM) and not State leaders. 
In short, representatitives of the Centre have been delegated State 
responsibilities. Thus, National or Central leaders provide and ccontrol 
the link between the highest and lower levels of the party and 
consequently tend to increase the Central sway over the party. Not all 
States, however, have National leaders as Chairmen of their SLCs. These 
States may well be perceived as 'safe' rather than that the State 
leaders, as SLC Chairman, have sufficient 'strength' to thwart Central 
intervention.
Appointments either as SLC's Chairman or Deputy bestow Central 
recongition of leadership status in a State. These are sought after and 
fought over but only the Centre, UMNO President, can appoint.
Cultivating the support and confidence of Central leaders is thus 
critical. In cases where the MBs are Chairmen of SLCs the usual
procedure is first the appointment as MB and then the MB's appointment as
Chairman of the SLC.^^
The SEC's formal membership indicates the dominance of UMNO's 
Central leaders and, most importantly, the merging of top party posts 
with tcp Central Government posts through the occupation of such posts by 
the same persons. Almost all MBs and CMs, either through appointment or
election, are also members of the SEc. Since the UMNO-dcminated
coalition (the Alliance and Barisan Nasional) controlled the Central and 
most of the State Governments, the SEC thus lends itself as an extra- 
constitutional arena for handling and co-ordinating, perhaps tightening,
136. This impression was gained through interviews with Central UMNO 
leaders. Appendix 4 lists the Leaders and Deputy leaders of UMNO 
SLCs (1957-1979).
137. See Mohd. Adam Kechik, "Mentri Besar: Perlantikan dan Pemecatan di 
Bawah Perlerribagaan Di Malaysia," Kertas Projek sebagai memenuhi 
syarat sebahagian daripada kehendak ijazah Sar jana Muda Undang- 
Undang (LE£), Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1978/1979, pp. 52-
53.
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Centre-State relations.^® There is, hcwever, no similar merging of 
the MB's or CM's posts with the top party posts at the State level 
precisely because there is no autonomous State UMNO body that could be 
captured and controlled.
Formally, at least, the SLC does not enjoy an independent 
existence. It was designed as an arm of the Centre in the State. Since 
UMNO Divisions and Branches are already directly linked to the Centre, 
the impact of this is to strengthen the centralisation and integration 
of the party. Not surprisingly several attempts at strengthening the SLC 
and hence the State party body have been made. A year after the 
introduction of the 1960 UMNO constitution, at the Fourteenth UMNO GA 
between May 6 and 7, 1961, the Batu Gajah UMNO Division in Perak proposed 
a constitutional amendment which was designed to guarantee equal State 
representation in the SEC and increase the SLC's pcwer. The proposal 
was
"Bahawa Persidangan ... ini mendesak UMNO Malaya bahawa Ahli2 
Jawatarikuasa Tertinggi UMNO Malaya hendak-lah mengandongi dua (2) 
orang daripada tiap2 Negeri yang di-pileh dan di-hantar oleh Ahli 
Jawatarikuasa Perhubongan Negeri".
[Translation:
"That this ... Assembly make a demand to UMNO Malaya that membership 
of UMNO Malaya's Supreme Executive Council should comprise two (2) 
persons frcm each State that are chosen and sent by members of the 
State Liaison Ccxnnittee"T]
The proposal was rejected.
In May 1976 several Perak UMNO State Assenblymen expressed the
need for a State level delegtaes meeting to co-ordinate the party and the
141 . .Government. They argued that in the past such a delegates meeting
was held annually with representatives frcm each UMNO Division in
the State. They remarked that
"At present, the relationship between the divisions, the State UMNO 
and the [State] Government is such that it is not conducive for 
members to air their views".
In response, Dato Sri Mohamed Ali Zaini, a member of the Perak SLC,
agreed that an extraordinary State delegates' meeting should be held. As
its chairman designate, he pointed out correctly that
138. The appointments of MBs and CMs by the President of UMNO as SEC 
members were designed to make the SEC into such an arena for co­
ordinating Centre-State policies. Interviews with Central UMNO 
leaders.
139. UMNO, Penyata Tahunan, 1961, p. 23. My emphasis.
140. ibid.
141. NST, 6.5.76.
142. ibid.
143. ibid.
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"The UMNO Consitution does not provide for a State level delegates' 
meeting. But for the good of the party the meeting should be 
held".144
Presumably such a meeting could only be formally held with the agreement
not only of the Perak SLC Chairman, Tan Sri Ghazali Jawi who was then
1 4Ralso the MB, but also of the UMNO President and the SEC. Such a
meeting, hcwever did not eventuate.
The clearest call to restructure the party within the State was
made in January 1977 by the Taiping Barat UMNO Branch in Perak. At
its Sixth Annual General Meeting, the Branch adopted a resolution urging
the UMNO SEC to take immediate steps to amend the constitution so that
147the SLC could be replaced by a proper State Committee. The 
resolution proposed the establishment of a State Ccmmittee whose chairman 
and members should be elected frcm and by the UMNO Divisions in the 
State. The resolution stated that
"At present, the various State Liaison Chairmen were chosen by the 
UMNO national President. It is often found that such appointed 
chairmen seldom command the majority confidence of the divisions 
and branches. The only way open to achieve this objective is that 
UMNO State Liaison chairman must be elected by the divisions in 
that particular State".
A similar call was mde by Datuk Ghani Ishak, the CM of Malacca, in
September 1978.14^
The above calls were not totally ignored as indicated by the 1979
amendment of the tMTO constitution which required the SLC to convene an
annual state UMNO convention. However, this fell far short of what was
demanded. The SLC remained unchanged. According to Ratnam and Milne,
144. ibid., 22.6.76.
145. The UMNO constitution does not provide the Chairman of the SLC 
with pcwers to act independently of the SEc.
146. The Star, 6.1.77.
147. ibid.
148. ibid.
149. NST, 18.9.78. Significantly both calls, one by those in Perak and 
the other by those in Malacca, were made in the midst of an 
unresolved carpetition for power at the State level. In the case 
of Perak those against the MB, Tansri Ghazali Jawi, believed that 
the MB's position had been further strengthened by his position as 
Chairman of the Perak SLC -a position that was bestewed on him by 
the Centre. Similarly also in the case of Malacca where Ghani Ishak 
was carpeting for the CM's post. For the dissident in Perak and 
Malacca, a change in the procedure for determining the ccnposition 
of the SLC, especially that of its Chairman, form one determined 
by the Centre to one determined by the State through election would 
provide the opportunity for the dissidents to undermine the MB's 
and CM's positions respectively. In both cases the result would 
have been a reduction in the Centre's dominance or State's 
dependence on the Centre.
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"The status of these committees has been a source of some 
disagreement within the UMNO, for it has been felt by the lower 
levels that entrenched cliques have tended to use them to promote 
their own interest. The Liaison Committees have consequently been 
given very few powers in recent years".
At the State level, the SLC was and is still perceived as an influential
body capable of influencing State politics and the careers of State 
1 sipoliticians.
Discussion and Conclusion
Formal power within UMNO, with the exception of the 1955 to 1960
period, has been progessively centralised. The impact has been to make
the SEC increasingly powerful and pivotal within UMNO. The SEC as UMNO's
chief executive body has been consistently composed of and dominated by
Central UMNO leaders who were at the same time Central Government
Minster. This tended to increase the Central sway of the party.
As the pivotal body within UMNO, the SEC has direct and substantial
pcwers over party affairs within State boundaries through its direct
control over both the SLCs and UMNO Divisions. The SLC, as a Centrally-
controlled monitoring and co-ordinating body, is a poor substitute of and
is not an autonomous State party body. It is provided with minimal powers
and led by a Central appointee, usually a Cabinet Minister. There is
thus no autonomous State level party body Which could be captured and
used by State leaders. They thus have to depend on a Centrally (SEC)-
controlled party machine to rraintain their leadership positions in the
State. The SEC's control over the nomination process, through Which
central leaders determine the pattern of elite recruitment, further
errphasizes this dependence. *^2
Party elections, the living part of the party's living constitution 
. 153according to Sarton determine the party's career system. Within 
UMNO elections are organised hierarchically at, and upward frcm, the 
Branches, Divisions and National levels but bypassing the State levels. 
UMNO leaders in a State can thus hope to win control electorally of a 
Division but this, though important, does not furnish a big enough
150. Ratnam and Milne, The Malayan Parliamentary Election of 1964,
Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, University of Malaya Press, 1969, p.
33.
151. This perception was evident during the Pahang crisis over the 
nomination of election candidates and appointment of the MB. This 
is discussed in the next chapter.
152. The SEC's and UMNO President's use of this power was clearly 
evident in the Centre's imposition of a candidates' line-up for 
the State elections in Pahang.
153. Sartori, G., Parties and Party Systemss A framework for analysis, 
Vol. 1., London, Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. 97.
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political base within the party. Ambitious State leaders who are anxious 
to consolidate their political bases, with no opportunities to win 
elections to State level party posts, are thus required to participate 
actively in elections at the National or Central level. The party's 
career system, thus, tends to further emphasise the importance of the 
Centre.
State leaders, including MBs and CMs, participation at the Centre
means becoming involved in UMNO GA politics, especially over the
elections of SEC members. In this control over State delegates votes in
the GA is crucial. This is one resource that State leaders can use
effectively at the Centre assuming that they effectively control the
votes of delegates from their States. In short, are they effective vote
managers? The occurrences of "block-voting" by States in the GA
154elections have been frequent and these evidenced the presence of 
State vote managers. The number of delegates' votes is also crucial to 
the effectiveness of vote managers and the practices, noted earlier, of 
creating 'bogus' membership was aimed at increasing this number. On this 
Milne and Mauzy argued that
"Since the votes of the delegates frcm a state were largely 
controlled by the Mentri Besar or Chief Minister, this E'bogus' 
membership] increased the power of the state leaders".
The importance of GA delegates' votes to State vote managers has, however,
been reduced by two developments: first, the 1974 amendment limiting the
number of GA delegates to Which each Division is entitled; second, voting
in the GA was made secret in 1975 in an apparent attempt to eradicate
block-voting.The one resource that State leaders had access to and
which they could at least hope to control was thus devalued. Their
dependence on the Centre is further underlined.
In an obvious reference to the interdependence argument - that
decentralisation and lack of cohesion in the party system are based on9
the structural fact of federalism - Indorf argued that in Peninsula
Malaysia the federal structure has contributed toward a proliferated 
1 57party system. He stated that
154. Interviews with Mustafa Jaabar and Khir Johari.
155. Milne and Mauzy, op.cit., p. 133 and also p. 203, n. 335.
156. Inrervievs with Mustafa Jaabar and Khir Johari. See Milne and 
Mauzy,op.cit., p. 203.
157. Indorf, H. H., "Party System Adaptation to Political Development 
in Malaysia During the First Decade of Independence, 1957-1967", 
Unpub. Ph.D. Thesis, New York University, 1969, pp. 196-197.
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"Traditional Rulers and their states still canmand the strongest 
loyalties. This cohesion has fostered active political regionalism 
which created its own anti-body against political infiltration frcm 
sources external to the State, thereby maintaining the parochial 
character of party politics, either though an independent party or 
as an autonomous state unit of a national organisation".
There are many parties but so far only Kelantan and Penang have provided
'safe' bases for opposition parties. The party system is dominated by an
UMNO-dominated coalition. As far as UMNO is concerned there is, however,
no autonomous State party unit within its structural make-up. Thus,
despite the federal structure, UMNO has been able to become, through the
centralisation of power, a highly and formally tightly-knit political
organisation. Within this structure the SLCs and later the State UMNO
conventions appear as enpty concessions to the federal structure. The
interdependence argument does not seem to fit in Peninsula Malaysia's
case.
UMNO was established to counter the threat to Malay rights posed 
by the Malayan Union Scheme. Its establishment also initiated the 
process of national orientation amongst previously State-orientated Malay 
leaders. Malay unity was essential to UMNO's opposition to the Scheme and 
to achieve this it was required to develcp organisationally at all 
levels. UMNO's success in having the Malayan Union Scheme withdrawn was 
due, not least, to its success in penetrating the States and mobilising 
the Malays on a Pan-Malayan basis. This success was salutary in that for 
the first time the capture and domination of the political Centrel was 
not beyond the reach of Malays provided that they were united. This 
success was to be followed by UMNO's involvement, togehter with the 
Sultans and later the MCA, in negotiations with the British for an 
alternative political structure. UMNO leaders also realised that the 
future political stability of a multi-communal Malaya depended not only 
on UMNO's domination of the political Centre but also on a political 
arrangment with the parties representing the non-Malays at both the 
Centre and State levels. For both communal unity was and still is vital. 
UMNO leaders believed that only a highly centralised and tightly-knit 
UMNO could maintain Malay unity and at the same time enable it to enforce 
at the State level any multi-communal bargain with non-Malay parties. It 
was thus not surprising that Central UMNO leaders were quick to repair 
the perceived damage caused by the establishment of fully-fledged State 
UMNO organisations as real centres of power. For they saw this damage 
not only in terms of communal solidarity but also in terms of their
158. ibid., p. 197.
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ability to control party affairs at the State level. With ccnmunal
solidarity undermined and control over State party affairs reduced,
Central UMNO leaders might not have been able to bargain with the non-
Malay parties frcm a position of strength and if a bargain was struck
they would be in a weak position to have it accepted at the State level.
Malay caiirunalism then is a centralising force within UMNO. It is a
force that cannot be contained by a federal structure precisely because
it traverses State boundaries and seeks resolution at the Centre. With a
strong Centre and a relatively weak State within the Peninsula Malaysia
Federation the centralising tendency of ccmmunalism is enhanced. For UMNO
ccmtrumalism indeed was the original causal force but centralisation has
subsequenlty been pushed by other factors including the impatience of
Central leaders with any check on their power, developmental drives and
needs of national identity.
UMNO has been singularly successful in establishing its dominance
at the Centre and in most States, with the exception of Penang and
Kelatan (before 1978). This enduring success must reflect, at least, its
ability to speak for and hold together many Malays who are active in
politics at the State and local levels. This is the basis of its 
1 5 9strength. UMSO's enduring success is a magnet and makes it all but 
indispensable to those aspiring Malay politicians in all States. Having 
made the choice to be in UMNO they still have to play the game according 
to, at least, the formal rules that shape the relations of power within 
the party. These rules are heavily weighted in favour of the Centre and, 
consequently, UMNO developed into a formally highly-centralised and 
tightly-knit party organisation.
159. Gullick, J., Malaysia: Economic Expansion and National Unity,
London, Ernest Bern, 1981, p. 126.
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Chapter 10
Pahang: The Endau-Rcmpin Case and Centre-State Relations
The dominant pattern of Centre-State relations in Peninsula 
Malaysia is one between an UMNO-dominated Centre and UMNO-dominated 
States. This does not, however, preclude conflict between the Central 
and State Governments. The Endau-Rcnpin (ER) controversy was just such 
a case of Centre-State conflict between the UMNO-dominated Central and 
Pahang State Governments. The party became the arena within which the 
conflicting interests of Centre and State were handled.
The ER controversy was one of the rare cases, perhaps the only 
one, of conflict between the UMNO-dcminated Central and State 
Governments which was debated, sometimes heatedly, under public gaze. 
Before this, Centre-State conflict of similar intensity and conducted 
also under public gaze had involved only the UMNO-dominated Centre and 
the PAS State Government of Kelantan. The relative 'rarity' of such 
public exhibitions of Centre-State conflict was partly due to IMtfO 
dominance at the Centre and in most States. Such conflict would have 
been part and parcel of intra-UMNO politics which is, to use Sartori's 
term, invisible. The ER controvesy for cnce made such conflict visible. 
It provides an exception and a convenient case study. In short, 
visibility he]ps in the examination of Centre-State relations.
The Endau-Rcmpin Case
Under the Central Government's Third Malaysia Plan (IMP) 
provisions were made to convert several matural forest reserves into 
National Parks. Endau-Rcmpin was one of these natural forest reserves 
area scheduled as part of the National Park Plan.-1- The proposed 
National Park comprised 500,000 acres and included, as 'core' areas,
90.000 acres in Pahang and 120,000 acres in Johore. In the second year 
of the TMP it was revealed that the Pahang State Government had already 
leased 30,000 acres of the 'core' area in Pahang to a favoured few.
7.000 of the 30,000 acres were then being logged by four of the six 
companies already granted logging concessions.
The environmentalists initiated a campaign against logging in ER,
an area that they believed the Pahang State Government had in 1972
3undertaken never to log. Their canpaign, effectively presented at
Tl Federation of Malaysia, Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-1980, Kuala 
Lunpur, Government Press, 1976, p.225, Table 11-3.
2. The Star, 28.7.77.
3. New Straits Times (NST), 7.5.77. The environmentalists were 
encouraged by the Central Government. Interview with a former 
Cabinet Minister, 1.12.80. Subsequently referred to as "A".
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public forums which were regularly reported in the press, in newspaper 
advertisements and on bumper stickers, received widespread public 
support. They appealed to both State and Central Governments to take 
the necessary steps to step what they called the 'rape' of ER.
The State Government defended its actions by arguing that it 
needed the revenue and declaring that human welfare was more important 
than animal welfare. In the words of the then Pahang State Secretary,
A
Datuk Wan Sidek Wan Abdul Rahman ,
"When it ccmes to choosing between human welfare and animal 
survival, the State has to cpt for the former.... The Pahang State 
Government does not object to the setting up of a National Park, 
but only after the State has fully exploited its economic 
potential".
Amidst continuing public protest, the Deputy Director-General of the 
Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment, Mr. S.T. Sundram, 
exclaimed that
"We are persuading the Pahang State Government to reconsider its 
stand and wer are not without hope that wiser counsel will 
prevail".
Pahang obtains a substantial proportion of its revenue frcm land 
in the form of forest revenue.^ Table 1 illustrates this. Land is a
7  . . . .State subject. Naturally, Pahang viewed logging in ER as its own 
affair and in its own interest. Datuk Wan Sidek saw the conflicting
o
State and Central Government interests in this way. He stated that 
it was well and good for the Central Government to plan for a National 
Park by bringing in an area that belonged to a State and including it in 
the IMP, but only the State Government had the jurisdiction and power to 
gazette an area or areas in the State before logging could be stepped. 
Before gazetting the State was within its pcwers to exploit timber 
resources in the designated area or areas in the State. The MB, Datuk 
Mohammad Jusoh, reiterated that logging in the 30,000 acres of the 
proposed ER National Park was perfectly legal and indeed agreed to by 
planners, including ecologists, of the proposed park. He emphasized
4. NST, 12.5.77.
5. ibid., 20.6.77.
6. To comply with the Central Government's National Forest policy 
would mean a reduction in the percentage contribution of forest 
revenue to total State revenue. This would consequently increase 
the dependence of the State on Central Government grants and 
allocations. The State Government expected to earn about M$7 
million from logging in the ER area. See NST, 5.9.77. This 
expected revenue was later estimated at around M$3 million. See 
NST, 15.8.78.
7. Ninth Schedule, List 11 - State List, No. 2 and 3, of the Federal 
Constitution.
8. Interview with Datuk Wan Sidek, 20.8.80.
9. NST, 22.7.77.
3^1.
Table 1: Pahang : Revenue from Forests Compared to and as a 
Percentage of Total Tax Revenue and Total Revenue
(1957-1975)*
Year Revenue from Forests Total Tax Revenue Total
Total~in as % of as % of as $ of Revenue
ft Million Total Tax R. Total R. ft Million Total R. ft Million
195? 2.4 39.3 12.4 6 .1 3 1 .6 19.3
1958 2 .6 42.6 2 0 .8 6 .1 48.8 12.5
1959 2.4 36.9 17 .0 6.5 46.1 14.1
i960 3.5 44.9 2 0 .7 7.8 46.2 16.9
1961 4.0 47.1 1 9 .8 8.5 42.1 2 0 .2
1962 5-0 5 0 .0 2 2 .6 1 0 .0 45.2 2 2 .1
1963 5.6 54.4 27.7 10.3 5 1 .0 2 0 .2
1964 6.4 57.0 30.4 1 2 .1 53.3 22.7
1965 8.7 6 1.? 3 0 .0 14.1 50.4 2 8 .0
1966 11.9 75.0 3 6 .0 18.4 55.6 33.1
1967 1 3 .8 71.1 39.2 19.4 55-1 35.2
1968 1 9 .8 78.3 46.3 25.3 59-1 42.8
1969 22.4 8 2 .1 46.9 27.3 57.1 47.8
1970 2 8 .6 84.1 51.9 34.0 61.7 55.1
1971 29.3 84.? 53.5 34.6 63.1 54.8
1972 35.1 8 6 .1 57.2 40.6 6 6 .1 61.4
1973 2 9 .6 81.5 47.3 36.3 5 8 .0 • 6 2 ,6
1974 33.2 8 3 .0 5 0 .2 40.0 60.5 6 6 .1
1975 33.8 8 2 .6 45.0 40.9 54.5 75.1
Source: Pahang, State Financial Statements, 1957-1975* 
Note: (R.) Revenue,
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that
"The [State] Government has no wish to abandon the park but its 
development should be suitable to the present needs of the 
government".
It was an assertive stand an what the State viewed as its interests.
The ER controversy was raised during a Parliamentary debate. The 
Minister of Science, Technology and Environment, Tan Sri Ong Kee Hui, 
explained that the Pahang Government had agreed to the park being set up 
but this decision had been set aside and the Central Government could 
not do anything.11 In response to this, an UMNO MP, Mcihamed Sopiee 
Sheikh Ibrahim (Kepala Batas-Perak), argued that because the Pahang State 
Government had reneged on its earlier agreement the Central Government
should now take tougher measures, including the use of sanctions and the
12witholding of financial grants, against the State Government. The
. . . . . . . 13Minister replied that the Cabinet would consider this suggestion.
In early August, 1977, the Minister of Science, Technology and
Environment indicated that his Ministry had been making representations
to the Pahang Government.1^  However, the State Government had decided
to continue logging in the core area of the park. The Minister also
reaffirmed his Ministry's stand aginst logging in the ER area while
noting also that only the State Government could step the logging
operations. He premised, however, that his Ministry was taking steps to
ensure that furture agreements between the State and Central Governments
on national parks and conservation areas would be adhered to by the
15parties concerned even though those areas had not been gazetted.
Despite continued public protest and Central Government concern, 
the Pahang State Government planned to increase logging in the ER area.
It was reported that more logging licenses were to be issued.1^ The 
Minister of Science, Technology and Environment could only appeal to the
State Government to reconsider its decision to issue more logging
17 .licenses. A newspaper editorial wrote:
"There is something disturbing in the progression: whichever way 
it is viewed what predominates is Pahang's disregard for public 
opinion, more pointedly the Federal Government's views. It 
arguably raises the spectre of State Governments retreating into
UK ibid..
11. ibid., 20.7.77.
12. ibid..
13. ibid..
14. ibid., 10.8.77.
15. ibid..
16. ibid., 25.8.77.
17. ibid., 26.8.77. Datuk Wan Abdul Aziz Ungku Hj. Abdullah, MB of
Pahang from 1959 to 1964 and then the Chairman of the Malayan
Nature Society, Pahang Branch, voiced his disapproval of the State
Government's actions.
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parochialism when the national purpose should have been served. 
Endau Rompin has become very nearly a test case of Centre-State 
understanding that ought to characterize planning ... Are we to 
suppose that the controversy had introduced a combative element in 
the making of policy?".
The damage that this uncontrolled logging was doing to forest resources
and, more importantly, to the Central Government's National Forest
Policy could not be ignored. At the opening of the National Forestry
Council Meeting in August, 1977, Dr. Mahathir, then Deputy PM, warned
the MBs and CMs that uncontrolled exploitation of forests, if continued,
would deplete the nation's timber resources and this would consequently
19affect the nation's economic growth. This warning failed to
convince the Pahang State Government and yet more logging licences were
20to be issued for the ER area. As part of the continuing pressure,
so far ineffective, being applied on the Pahang State Government, Datuk
Musa Hitam, Minister for Primary Industries, imposed on September 30,
211977 a ban on the export of logs from the ER area.
The continuing defiance of the Pahang State Government was raised
again in Parliament on October 24, 1977. An UMNO MP, Datuk Hj. Shafie
Abdullah, asked whether the logging activities in ER were contrary to
22the policy and objective of the IMP. The Minister of Science,
23Environment and Technology conceded that it was. He further argued, 
however, that the IMP did not indicate which particular area could be 
logged nor did it provide details on the inclusion of ER as one of the 
areas to be declared a national park. It was, he continued, during the 
planning of the IMP that a report proposed the declaration of the ER as 
a national park. This report also indicated that logging was 
permissible only on the fringes of the area. The Pahang State 
Government, hcwever, had allowed logging in the core area. In the 
Minister's words,
"apa yang berlaku sekarang ini ialah pembalakan yang sedang 
ber jalan ialah di pertengahan kawasan yang ditetapkan oleh lapuran 
tersebut dan lapuran ini adalah dibuat oleh satu Jawatarikuasa yang 
mengandongi juga wakil-Jwakil daripada kedua-dua buah negeri 
[Pahang dan Johore] yang terlibat".
[Translation:
"what is happening is that logging is being carried out in the
18. ibid., 29.8.77.
19. ibid., 30.8.77. During the discussion at the National Forestry
Council of the proposed national forestry policy the Pahang MB
assured the Council that the State Government would study the 
report concerning ER that had been submitted by the Minister of 
Science, Technology and Environment. See ibid., 5.9.77.
20. ibid., 5.9.77.
21. ibid., 30.9.77.
22. Malaysian Parliamentary Debate (MPD), Dewan Rakyat (DR), Vol. Ill,
No.26, 24.10.77, col. 2891.
23. ibid..
24. ibid., col. 2892.
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core area contrary to the report which was prepared by a Ccmmittee 
which included representatives of the two states [Pahang and 
Johore] that are involved".]
Another MP, Mahamad Scpiee Sheikh Ibrahim, urged the Central Government
to use its financial muscle to carpel State obedience to Central
policy.^ The Minister informed the House that the Central Government
could not withdraw financial allocations from Pahang because of the ER
issue. He stressed that the time had not come for it to use its pcwer
over this. Furthermore, the Pahang State Government had already
informed the National Forestry Council that it would not issue any new
27logging licences for the ER area.
In an apparent reply to the Minister's statement in Parliament,
the MB announced that logging in the ER area would continue for to do
28otherwise would be wasteful. He explanined that controlled mining 
and logging were not expressly prohibited by the report prepared by the 
sub-ccmnittee responsible for studying the proposed park plan. The 
statement explained:
"[The] sub-corrmittee, made up of representatives frcm the Pahang 
and Johore Governments, and the Forest and Game Departments, and 
chaired by an official frcm the Ecooncmic Planning Unit in the 
Prime Minister's Department agreed that consideration should be 
given towards exploitation of the area's natural resources".
He stated that Pahang was acting well within its rights and,
significantly, pointed out that it had already contributed 30% of the
30total land reserves in the country. Pahang, the MB emphasised,
could no longer afford the luxury of reserving large tracts of land for
31only one specific use, only as a national park.
During the dispute the Central Government was urged to go beyond 
persuasion by invoking either Article 83 or 94 of the Federal
Constitution to compel State obedience to the Centre's forest
32conservation policy. Such urgings fell on deaf ears. The feeling 
of disappointment among the environmentalists was well expressed by the 
Selangor Graduates Society's statement on March 6, 1978 that
"despite public protest and petition, the Federal and State 
Governments had taken no positive action to stop logging in Endau- 
Rarpin".
25. ibid., col. 2895.
26. ibid., cols. 2895-96.
27. ibid., col. 2896.
28. NST, 4.11.77.
29. ibid.
30. ibid.
31. ibid., 8.11.77.
32. See The Star, 29.7.77 and NST, 23.9.77. Article 83 concerns the 
acquisition of land for Federal purposes and Article 94 concerns 
Federal pcwers with respect to State subjects.
33. The Star, 6.3.78.
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Perhaps in appreciation of public and, most importantly, Central 
Government displeasure, the Pahang State Government gave a firm 
assurance on March 20, 1978 that logging would be stopped in the ER area 
after August, 1 9 7 8 . After the 1978 State elections the new MB of 
Pahang, Abdul Rahim Abu Bakar, reaffirmed this ccmmittment. He stated:
"The previous State Government had given its word that logging in
the area will step at the end of last month [August]. I will see
to it that it will step".
The Endau-Rcmpin Case, State Politics and Centre-State relations
The ER case represented a clash of interests and priorities
between the Centre and State. The Centre's interest was, inter alia, in
forest conservation. The State's interest was in generating as much
revenue as possible frcm a resource, land, which is under its
jurisdiction. Hie Central Government was not without seme
constitutional pcwers in the field of forest conservation.*^ In the
event, it did not invoke these pcwers.
The Central Government's interest in forest conservation had been
signalled as early as in 1971. The National Land Council's meeting of
December 20, 1971 approved the establishment of a National Forestry
37 . . .Council. Within this Council a National Forestry Policy would have
to be formulated by both Central and State Governments' representatives.
The ER area was planned and agreed to by the Central and the Pahang and
Johore State Governments as part of a National Park Plan. Pahang,
hcwever, asserted that logging in this area was well within the terms of
the agreement. The Central Government disagreed and bluntly stated that
logging in the core area was contrary to the agreement. The Pahang
Government's firm stand, shortlived as it turned out, on the issue was
very much influenced by State politics. Apart frcm generating revenue
for the state, vested interests wdthin Pahang urged the continuation of
logging in ER even if this was deemed as contrary to Central Government
policy. For Pahang - as in Trengganu and Kelantan, both States which
34. NST, 21.3.78. August 1978 was the expiry date of the last 
lecence issued.
35. ibid., 2.9.78. The MB, on taking office in July, 1978 frooze all 
timber concessions for three months. Interview with the MB, Abdul 
Rahim Abu Bakar, 22.10.80. After the three months were up, he 
refused to allcw logging and a tender system was introduced to 
undercut political corruption.
36. Articles 91.5 and 92.3 of the Federal Constitution.
37. National Land Council Paper No. 49/1971. See Federation of
Malaysia, Resolusi-Resolusi Majlis Tanah Negara, 1958-1978 
(National Land Council Resolutions, 1958-1978) Kuala Lumpur, 
Percetakan Kerajaan, 1980, p. 125.
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derived most of their revenue frcm timber royalties - timber and logging 
concessions have traditionally been the basis of political
OQ
partonage. The Pahang Royal Family was among those enmeshed in this
39web of the "politics of timber" or "politik balak". It was alleged 
that the Royal Family supported a syndicate involved in logging 
activities within the ER area.^ When environmentalists first raised 
the issue of logging in ER as being against the Central Government's 
National Park Plan, the MB of Pahang was caught between those holding 
logging concessions in the ER, including State UMNO politicians and the 
Royal Family, and the Central Government which was against such logging. 
The Central Government at first appeared reluctant to intervene 
effectively and risk a confrontation with the Royal Family.^1 The 
Pahang State Government's challenge to the Central Government's policy 
had to be overcome successfully lest other UMNO-dominated State 
Governments were encouraged by such acts of defiance.
The Central Government leaders resorted to the use of the internal 
mechanism of UMNO to overcome the intransigence of the Pahang State 
Government under its MB, Mohamad Jusoh. His assertiveness in stating 
the State' s case over ER had not endeared him to the Central leaders. 
They had gradually lost confidence in him and increasingly viewed him as 
a captive of the Royal Family.  ^ Not coincidentally, the Central 
Government under the Prime Ministership of Hato Hussein Qnn had been 
hardening its attitude over the Sultan's greed and corruption in State 
land deals. On this a Central Minister coirmented:
"It has got to stop. They are ruining the country. We cannot 
afford it ... It has all got out of hand. In some cases the 
Sultan has run up large gambling debts abroad and has ccme home, 
issued a fev more timber licences to help pay them off and provide 
more pocket money to continue his pleasures".
The MB of Pahang was seen as incapable of stepping timber concessions
being granted to the Sultan^ and other State UMNO leaders. The
38. Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), 30.11.79. p.54.
39. As referred to by a former MB. Interview with a former MB of 
Pahang, 16.10.80.
40. Business Times, 12.11.77. According to one source this syndicate 
comprised several State UMNO politicians.
41. ibid..
42. Interviews with "A" and another former Cabinet Minister (referred 
to subsequently as "B"), 2.12.80.
43. Quoted in The Guardian, 30.12.78.
44. The Sultan needed the timber concessions to support his 
extravagant lifestyle. These concessions could be easily 
converted into cash by selling them to a group or syndicate. This 
group or syndicate could then log the areas covered by the 
concessions. One of these concessions was in the ER area and had 
been similarly sold to a syndicate and logging was begun by this 
syndicate. Interview with "A".
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manner in which such concessions were distributed had also caused much
. . . 45infighting and dissatisfaction among UMNO State politicians. The 
Sultan's easy access to State land depended on his 'happy' relationship 
with the MB and the State Executive Council (Exco). It seemed to the 
Central Government that the MB's prior loyalty to the Centre was 
suspect. The key question then was this; hew could the prior allegiance 
of the MB to the Centre be ensured? If the MB cwed allegiance first to 
the Centre then it would be more likely that he would deny the Sultan 
land rights for his pleasure. A change of MB and in the State UMNO 
leadership was seen as the way to achieve this aim. The change must be 
such that it completely destroyed the existing partonage system.
The MB's links with the Centre had already been weakened following 
the death of Tun Abdul Razak, the former EM.^ His political strength 
within the State had also been similarly reduced because this had also 
depended on his close association with Tun Razak. In this situation 
Dato Seri Hamzah Abu Samah, Cabinet Minister and Pahang SLC Chairman, 
made clear the Centre's wishes by stating in early 1978 that a new MB 
was being sought.^ Not surprisingly, the Sultan expressed surprise 
and disappointment in this. Declaring his support for the embattled MB, 
he stated that
"As far as I am concerned the Mentri Besar Datuk Seri Mohammad bin 
Jusdh is doing well. He has guided the State through the slurrp of 
1975 to the present sound economic position".
He warned that
"I will do my utmost best to prevent the existent of friction 
among my people".
In short, the Sultan argued that there was no reason for replacing the
MB and threatened his personal intervention. In response to the
Centre's desire but secure in the Sultan's support, the MB declared his
5 0willingness to continue. The MB, however, was eventually
45. An example of such disstisfaction was expressed during a debate in 
the State Legislative Assembly in December, 1976 significantly 
just before the public scrutiny of logging in ER. In this debate, 
an UMNO Assemblyman, Muhammad bin Hj. Abdul Ghani (Chini), alleged 
that there was favouritism in the issuing of logging concessions 
in the State. He remarked that "It is difficult for the ordinary 
man to get a concession as this seems to be reserved only for the 
favoured ones." See NST, 16.12.76.
46. Tun Abdul Razak was the unchallenged political overlord in Pahang. 
Most interviewees in Pahang referred to him as the ' godfather'. 
Mohammad Jusoh was a relative of Tun Razak. He was chosen by Tun 
Razak as MB of Pahang in 1974.
47. Whtan, 12.1.78, and 2.1.78.
48. NST, 19.1.78.
49. ibid..
50. Watan, 24.1.78.
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'persuaded' by UMNO's Central leaders to retire after the end of his
5 1tern of office. When this became public knowledge the focus of the
political battle shifted to that of choosing the new MB.
The first phase of this battle was control of the party apparatus
- the SLC and the Divisions - within the State in preparation for the
next State election. Attention was accordingly focused on the elections
that were due to be held for posts in UMNO Divisions in May, 1978.
There were and still are eight UMNO Divisions in Pahang (See Table 2).
The Lipis, Jerantut, Kuantan and Temerloh Divisions were headed by
either Cabinet or Deputy Ministers, the Maran and Betong Divisions by
State Exco members, the Pekan Division by the MB and the Raub Division
by someone who held neither a State nor Central post. At the Divisional
elections the Cabinet or Deputy Ministers were elected unopposed to head
the Lipis, Jerantut, Kuantan and Temerlah Divisions. The State Exco
Head of the Maran Division was voted out and replaced by an MP. The
Heads of Bentong and Pekan Divisions were re-elected. The Head of Faub
Division was voted out and replaced by a State Assemblyman.
The competition for Divisional posts was especially keen in Pekan
and Temerloh: in Pekan because the MB was publicly kncwn to have agreed
to step down as MB; in Temerloh because it was Harazah Abu Samah's
political base and if he could be voted out as Head of Temerloh Division
he would have less claim to retain the post of Pahang UMNO SLC 
52Chairman.
In Pekan, the Sultan's younger brother, Tengku Arif Bendahara
(TAB), was encouraged to challenge the MB for the post of Pekan Division 
5 3head. Tengku Razaleigh, one of the UMNO Vice-President and Finance
. . . . . . . . . 54.Minister, advised TAB not participate in politics actively. TAB, in
agreeing to withdraw despite substantial support, had in fact accepted
5 5UMNO s Central leadership advice. After the withdrawal of three 
51~. Interview with "A".
52. Many in Pahang believed that the post of SLC Chairman is crucial
in the process of selecting a MB.
53. TAB was then also the President of the Pan-Malayan Bumiputra 
Timber Association. He was supported by about 10 Pekan Divisional 
Committee members, several UMNO brances and a State Exco member, 
Wan Abdul Rahman Wan Ibrahim. See Watan, 18.1.78 and 9.2.78.
54. Watan, 16.4.78. TAB's supporters resented Tengku Fazaleigh's, a 
Kelantanese, interference in Pahang politics. See Watan, 17.4.78 
and 19.4.78. Even Ghazali Shafie, a Cabinet Minister and Head of
Lipis UMNO Division, considered this an affront. See Watan,
1.5.78. Tengku Razaleigh's intervention, according to one source, 
had the backing of the Central UMNO leaders comprising the SEC's 
'inner' circle. Interview with a former MB of Pahang, 16.10.80.
55. Watan, 27.5.78.
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other contenders, only the Deputy Head of Pekan Division, Datuk Ibranhim 
Arshad, remained to challenge the MB. The MB wan by 116 to 102 
votes.^
In Temerloh, Datuk Seri Hamzah Abu Samah also faced the 
possibility of keen competition. He believed that certain groups within 
Pahang UMNO were actively campaigning against him hoping that if he were 
not re-elected as Division head he would lose his post as Chairman of 
Pahang UMNO SLC.^ He was in no doubt that
"certain groups from Pekan and Temerloh ... are trying to topple 
me in my post". 8
Several State UMNO politicians had declared their opposition to 
59Hamzah. They held him responsible, as Chairman of Pahang SIC, for 
ignoring veteran UMNO Pahang members in the nomination of candidates for 
the 1974 State elections. ^  These politicians had been involved in 
UMNO since the struggle for Independence and they resented being ignored 
and replaced by those who, they alleged, at one stage opposed UMNO.^ 
They stated that
"Jika tidak kerana kesilapan itu Datuk Seri Hamzah boleh mengarribil 
terrpat Allhyarham Tun Abdul Razak sebagai pemiirpin yang dihormati 
dan disanjung tinggi di Pahang".
[Translation:
"If it was not for this mistake Datuk Seri Hamzah could have taken 
the place of the late Tun Abdul Razak as a respected and honoured 
leader in Pahang".]
56. ibid., 30.5.78.
57. ibid., 14.3. 78.
58. NST, 14.3.78. He was also MP for Temerloh. While there was no 
doubt as to his support form UMNO's Central Leadership, his 
failure to retain the Division's Head post would seriously 
undermine his claim of leadership not only of Tenerldh but also of 
Pahang itself.
59. Watan, 15.3.78.
60. ibid.. This was a reasonable allegation. Out of the 16 UMNO State
Assemblymen in the 24 seats State Legislative Assembly before the
1974 State election five were renominated and eleven were not. Of 
the eleven five had been State Assemblymen since State elections 
were first held in 1955, three since 1964 and the other three 
since 1969. Included in the group of 1955 was Tan Sri Yahya 
Mohamad Seh, a MB frcm 1964 to 1972. Information obtained from 
the Office of the State Legislative Assembly of Pahang. The 
number of seats in the Assembly was increased to thirty-two for 
the 1974 elections and UMNO were allocated twenty-three. Thus, 
for the 1974 election, apart frcm the five that were renominated, 
eighteen new candidates were nominated. Information obtained frcm 
the Office of the State Legislative Assembly of Pahang. The 1974 
nomination reflected not so much the partiality of Datuk Hamzah 
but the preferences of Tun Razak, the PM and Pahang strongman. 
Interview with a former MB, 16.10.80. He was among those not 
renominated in 1974.
61. Watan, 15.3.78.
62. ibid..
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They succeeded in persuading Tan Sri Yahya Mohamad Seh, a former MB, to
challenge Datuk Seri Hamzah for the Temerloh Division head post. At
the last moment Tan Sri Yahya was persuaded to withdraw and Hamzah was 
64elected unopposed.
The next phase in the competition was the nomination of candidates 
for the 1978 State elections. In this the Divisions usually submit 
their list of candidates but the Centre (that is the UMNO President) 
nominates. The President of UMNO usually seeks the advice of the SLC 
Chairman. Hamzah was thus well-placed to influence the nomination of 
candidates for the Pahang State elections. This he used to good 
effect. Of the 23 UMNO Assemblymen ten, including the MB, were not 
renominated. (See Table 3). They were, in the main, considered as 
"troublemakers".^ UMNO was allocated 24 seats in the 1978 elections
63. ibid., 20.3.78 and 7.4.78. Tan Sri Yahya Mohamad Seh was made to 
resign as MB and as Chairman of Pahang SLC in 1972 by Tun Razak.
A new MB, Datuk Hj. Abdul Aziz Hj. Ahmad, was appointed. Tun 
Razak also appointed Datuk Seri Hamzah as Chairman of Pahang SLC 
in 1972. With Razak's death in 1976 Hamzah lost his political 
patron who was the PM, UMNO President and the acknowledged 
political master of Pahang.
64. Watan, 15.5.78.
65. Interviavs with a former MB of Pahang (16.10.80), "A", "B" and 
another former Cabinet Minister (subsequently referred to as "C"), 
29.9.80.
66. Interview with a former MB of Pahang, 16.10.80. All the three 
sitting State Assemblymen frcm the Lipis Division - representing 
Jelai, Bukit Betong and Benta - were not renominated. Of the 
three, the Jelai Assemblymen, State Exco member Wan Abdul Rahman 
Wan Ibrahim, had publicly supported TAB against the MB. See 
Watan, 9.2.78. The Division was and still is headed by Cabinet 
Minister, Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie. In the party elections before 
the 1978 elections, Wan Abdul Rahman lost his party post of Vice- 
Head of Lipis Division, the Assemblyman for Bukit Betong, Ramli 
Abdul Ghani, lost his party post of Division Secretary and was 
elected only a Division Committee member, and the Assemblyman for 
Benta was re-elected as a Division Committee member. Wan Abdul 
Rahman stood as an Independent in the 1978 State elections and was 
subsequently expelled from UMNO by the SEC on the advice of Datuk 
Seri Hamzah as SLC Chairman. See NST, 6.5.79. Two sitting 
Assemblymen frcm the Temerloh Division - Annuar Mohamad Seh and 
Mansor Silong - were not renominated. These two were prominent in 
the challenge against Datuk Seri Hamzah in the Temerloh Divisional 
elections. In the party elections, Annuar Mohamad Seh (a brother 
of former MB, Yahya Mohamad Seh) lost his party post of Deputy 
Head of Temerloh Division to the Speaker of the Assembly, Tok Muda 
Hj. Awang Ngah, and Mansor Silong lost the Vice-Head Division post 
to Idris Long (the political secretary to Datuk Seri Hamzah) and 
was elected as a Division committee member. Idris Long was 
nominated for the Mentakab State seat. See Watan, 8.5.78 and
15.5.78. One sitting Assemblyman frcm the Jerantut Division -
Da to Mohamad Khairuddin Mohamad Kawi representing Jenderak - 
was not renominated. He had already lost his party post of Deputy 
Head of the Division in 1976 and by 1978 did not hold any party
Table 3: Pahang UMNO State Assemblymen (1974-1978):their Government Posts and
Party Posts before and after the 1978 Party Elections and nominations
for the 197S State Elections.
UMNO State Electoral Names Party Posts Government Posts Nomination
Divisions Constituencies Before 1978 
Elections
After 1978 
Elections
for 1978 
State Elections
LiDis 1. Jelai
2. Bukit 
Betong
3. Benta
Wan Abd. Rahman
Nan Ibrahim (19&9) Lipis Div.
Vice-Head 
Ramli Abd. Ghani Lipis Biv. 
(1974) Secretary
Zakaria Mohd. Lipis Biv.
Taha (1974) Committee Mem.
Lost.Party Post State Exco Member
Lost.Div. Secretary; 
elected Div.
Committee Member
same -
Unrenominated
Unrenominated
Unrenominated
Jerantut 4. Tahan Harun Jaafar 
(1974)
Jerantut Div. 
Deputy Head
same - Renominated
5. Tembeling Abd. Rahman Bilal 
Akil (1974)
Jerantut Div. 
Committee Mem.
Jerantut Div. _ 
Vice-Head
Renominated
6. Jenderak Bato' Mohd. Kawi
(1955)
- - Unrenominated
7. Xerdau Mohd. Sallehudin 
Omar (1974)
Jerantut Div. 
Committee Mem.
- Renominated
Kuantan 8. Beserah Hj. Ismail Siabit 
(1974)
Kuantan Div. 
Deputy Head
same _ Unrenominated
9. Sungai 
Lembing
Wan Abdullah 
Wan Osman (1974)
Kuantan Div. 
Vice-Head
same - Renominated
Raub 10. Batu Talam Bato Abd. Rahman 
Ismail (1974)
SLC Treasurer 
Raub Div.
Vice Head
Lost all party Deputy Mentri Besar 
posts
Unrenominated
11, Bong Tengku Mustapha
Tengku Seti (1969) Raub Div.
Committee Mem.
- Renominated
Mar an 12. Paya Besar Abd. Rashid Abd. 
Rahman (1974)
Haran Div. Youth 
Leader; SLC Mem.
same — Renominated
13. Banda Haran Tok Muda Hj. Sulong Maran Div. Head Lost Div. Head State Exco Member 
Awang Hitam (1974) SLC Mem. elected Div.
Committee Mem.
Unrenominated
14. Jengka Puan Hajjah Sariah 
Kamiso (1974)
Maran Biv. 
Vice Head
Lost Vice-Head 
elected Div. 
Committee Mem..
Renominated
15. Chenor Hj. Mahmud Hj. Mat 
Taib (1974)
Maran Div. Comm 
Mem; SLC Inform 
ation Officer
Renominated
Bentong 16. Semantan Abd. Malek Mohd. 
(1974)
Division Head 
SLC Secreatary
same State Exco Member Renominated
Pekan 17. Kuala 
Pahang
Dato1 Sri Mohd. 
Jusoh (1959)
Pekan Div. Head 
SLC Deputy 
Chairman
; Div. Head; Mentri Besar 
Lost SLCDeputy 
Chairman
Unrenominated
18. Chini Mohd. Hj. Abdul 
Ghani (1974)
Pekan Div. 
Vice Head
Div. Vice Head _ 
Div.information 
Officer
Renominated
19. Banda Pekan Samsiah Dato1 Abd. 
Hamid (1974)
Pekan Div. Vice 
Head; SLC Mem. same - Renominated
20. Rompin Abd. Latiff Kantan 
(1974)
Pekan Div. 
Secretary
same - Renominated
Temerloh 21. Mentakab Anwar Hj. Mohd. 
Seh.(1974)
Temerloh'. Div. 
Deputy Head; 
SLC Mem.
Lost all Posts _
Unrenominated
22. Bandar 
Temerloh
Tok Muda Hj. 
Awang Ngah Tok 
Muda Hj. Ibrahim
(1955)
Temerloh Div.. Speaker State 
Deputy Head; Legislative Assembly 
SLC Head
Renominated
23. Bera Mansor Silong 
(1974)
Temerloh Div. 
Vice-Head
Lost Vice-Head _
post; elected
Div Committee Mem.
Unrenominated
Source; UMNO: Penyata Tahunan, 1976-1978, and Information from Office of the Pahang State Legislative Assembly. 
Note: Year in brackets indicates when fisrt elected.
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67and of these eleven were new nominations. (see Table 4). All the 
UNNO candidates were elected.
The competition for the MB's post began almost immediately after 
the elections. With the MB not renominated, there appeared to be no 
acknowledged leader among the new State Assemblymen. The competition was 
directed at influencing the Central UMNO leaders and especially the 
President of UMNO who, according to established practice, appoints the 
MB. Datuk Seri Hamzah's position as Pahang SLC Chairman was especially 
crucial in this competition because he provided the link between the 
State and the Centre. Thus he was in a position to influence the 
outcome of the competition.
The Pahang Constitution provided that the Ruler, in his 
discretion, appoints the MB from among whom that he
"considers commands the confidence of the Majority of the State 
Legislative Assembly members to head the Executive Council".
The Sultan of Pahang, thus, claimed that only
CQ
"I can appoint the Mentri Besar".
In exercising this power the Sultan said that he would naturally consult
the PM and the Chairman of the Pahang UMNO SLC over the appointment of 
7 0the MB. It was, however, established practice that the PM as UMNO 
President effectively appoints the MB. According to a former PM, Tengku 
Abdul Rahman, the Ruler was never consulted over the appointment of his
66. (Cont.) post, the Assemblyman frcm Kuantan Division, Ismail Siabit
representing Beserah, was not renominated despite being re-elected 
as Deputy Head of the Division. Abdul Rahim Bakar, eventually to 
become the MB, was nominated to replace Ismail Siabit. The 
Assemblyman from Raub Division, Datuk Abdul Rahman Ismail 
representing Batu Talam, was not renominated. As the Deputy MB 
he was considered to be too closely linked with Mohamad Jusoh's 
administration. He was also visibly in poor health and in the 
party elections lost all his party posts. The State Assemblyman 
for Bandar Maran in Maran Division, Tok Muda H. Sulong Awang, was 
not re-elected as Division Head and elected only as a Division 
Committee member. He was not renominated. The MB, Assemblyman 
for Kuala Pahang in Pekan Division, despite being re-elected as 
Division Head was not renominated. He just had to go. Interview 
with a former MB of Pahang, 16.10.80.
67. The Central UMNO leaders believed that those nominated could be 
trusted. They also believed that young politicians with the 
necessary academic and professional qualificaitons should also be 
given the chance in State politics. This was to improve the 
efficiency of the State administration. Interviews with a former 
MB of Pahang (16.10.80) and "B".
68. Art. 4, Section 2(a) of the Pahang State Constitution. This is 
also provided by the 8th Schedule, Part 1, Sec. 2(a) of the 
Federal constitution.
69. NST, 19.7.78.
70. ibid..
Table 4s Pahang UMNO State Assemblymen after the 1978 State elections; their
Government and rarty Fosts before and after the 1978 Party Elections.
UMNO
Divisions
State Electoral 
Constituencies
Names Party Posts 
Before 1978 After 1978 
Party Elections Party Elections
Government Posts
Lipis 1. Jelai Mohd. Hashim Idris 
(1978)
Lipis Div. 
Information Head
Lipis Div. 
Vice-Head
-
2. Bukit 
Bentong
Abu Bakar Chu 
(1978)
Lipis Div. 
Committee Mem.
same -
3. Benta Mohd. Zuki Hj. 
Kamaludin (1978)
Lipis Div. 
Committee Mem.
same State Exco Member
Jerantut 4. Tahan Harun Jaafar 
(1974)
Jerantut Div. 
Deputy Head
same State Exco Member 
(1979- mid 1980)
5. Tembeling Abdul Rahman Bilal 
Akil (1974)
Jerantut Div. 
Committee Mem.
Jerantut Div. 
Vice-Head
-
6. Jenderak Hj. Abd. Hashim 
Mohd. Ali (1978)
- Jerantut Div. 
Committee Mem.
-
7. Kerdau Mohd. Sallehudin 
Omar (1974)
Jerantut Div. 
Committee Mem.
- -
Xuantan 8. Beserah Abd. Rahim Abu 
Bakar (1978)
Kuantan Div. 
Committee Mem.
same and SLC 
Dep. Chairman
Mentri Besar
9. Sungai 
Lembing
Van Abdullah Van 
Osman (1974)
Kuantan Div. 
Tice-Head same -
Raub 10. Batu Talan Hj. Abd. Razak 
Hitam (1978)
- Raub Division 
Committee Mem.
State Exco Member
11. Dong Tengku Mustapha 
Tengku Seti (1969)
Raub Div, 
Committee Mem. _
Speaker State 
Legislative Assembly
Maran 12. Paya Besar Abd. Rashid Abd. 
Rahman (1974)
Maran Div. Youth 
Leader; SLC Mem.
same State Exco Member
13. Banda Maran Hj. Nasir Mat Piah 
(1978)
Maran Div. 
Committee Mem.
Maran Div. 
Deputy Head
State Exco Member 
(from mid-1980)
14. Jengka Puan Hajjah Sariah 
Kamiso (1974)
Maran Div. 
Vice-Head
Lost Vice-Head; 
Committee Mem.
-
13. Chenor Hj. Mahmud Hj. Mat 
Taib (1974)
Maran Div. Comm. 
Mem.; SLC Inform­
ation Officer.
- -
Bentong 16. Semantan Abd. Malek Mohd. 
(1974)
Division Head 
SLC Secretary
same State Exco Member 
(from mid-1980)
Pekan 17. Kuala Pahang Hashim Mohd. Zain 
(1978)
Pekan Div. 
Committee Mem.
same -
18. Chini Mohd. Hj. Abd. 
Ghani (1974)
Pekan Div. 
Vice-Head
Div. Vice-Head 
and Information 
Officer
-
19. Bandar Pekan Samsiah Dato' Abd. Pekan Div. Vice 
Head; SLC Mem. same -
20. Bukit Ibam Datuk Mohd. Khalil 
Yaakob (1978)
Pekan Div, 
Committee Mem.
Pekan Div. 
Deputy-Head -
21. Eompin : Abd.'Latiff Kantan 
(1974)-
Pekan Div. 
Secretary
- State Exco Member 
(mid-1979 to mid-1980]
Temerloh 22. Mentakab Hj. Idris Hj. Long 
(1978)
Temerloh Div. 
Committee Mem.
Temerloh Div. 
Vice-Head
State Exco Member
23. Bandar 
Temerloh
Tok Muda Hj. Awang 
Ngah Tok Hj. Ibrahim
(1955)
-
Temerloh Div. 
Deputy-Head; 
SLC Head
-
24. Bera Jaafar Salleh (1978) Temerloh Div.
Secretary
same -
Source: As for Table 3« Note: Year in brackets indicates when first elected.
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71MB. It was in the Centre's interest, especially in the case of 
Pahang, to ensure that the Sultan's discretion in this was minimal. The 
Centre wanted to ensure that the new MB owed prior allegiance and 
lcyalty to Kuala Lumpur rather than the Ruler of the State. This,
according to a Cabinet Minister, was indeed the intention of the Central
. . . . 7 2Government under the Prune Ministership on Katuk Hussein Qnn.
A few days after the elections, Datuk Seri Hamzah announced that a
7 3new MB of Pahang would be chosen soon. He indicated that the names
of five State Assemblymen had been submitted to the PM, as UMNO
President. ^  It was reported that the PM's decision on Who should be
7 5the MB would be submitted to the Sultan. In the meantime there were 
accusations that the Sultan was attempting to exert his influence on 
behalf of certain candidates. ^  After being informed of the PM's 
nominee - Abdul Rahim Abu Bakar - for the MB' s post, the Sultan took the 
opportunity to deny these accusations. He conceded that his role was 
purely a formal one and that
"Datuk Hussein Qnn, the National Front Chairman, has his choice.
I only give my blessings, and that I have given through Datuk Seri 
Abu Samah (Pahang UMNO liaison committee chairman) whom I met this 
morning".
After being officially installed as the MB, Abdul Rahim Bakar appealed 
for party unity and stated that
"The political game is over and the time has come for more hard 
work to fulfil the premises made to the electorate". 8
The new MB was young and a relative newcomer to Pahang
7Q
politics. His political base in the State was narrow and he had
71. The Guardian, 30.12.78.
72. ibid..
73. Watan, 13.7.78.
74. The five included Datuk Awang Ngah Tok Muda Hj. Ibrahim (former 
Speaker of the State Legislative Assembly and Assemblyman for 
Bandar Temerloh), Abdul Malek Mohammad (former State Exco member 
and Assemblyman for Semantan), Abdul Razak Hitam (newcomer and 
Assemblyman for Batu Talam), Abdul Rahim Bakar (newcomer and
Assemblyman for Beserah) and Mohamad Khalil Yaakob (newcomer and
Assemblyman for Bukit Iban). See Watan, 13.7.78.
75. ibid..
76. The alleged Sultan's candidates were Mohamad Khalil Yaakob, Abdul 
Razak Hitam and Hj. Nasir Mat Piah. See NST, 14.7.78.
77. ibid..
78. ibid., 20.7.78.
79. Before this he was a Central officer in the Malaysian
Administrative and Diplomatic Service. He had been seconded to 
serve as the General Manager of the Pahang State Economic 
Development Corporation and was persuaded to resign to contest for 
the seat of Beserah in the 1978 State elections.
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80been elected a Kuantan UMNO Division Committee member oily in 1976.w  
Clearly his political stature and position within the party in the State 
before his appointment were relatively insignificant and minor. Even 
after his appointment he admitted that he still had to find his
Q 1
political feet. Nevertheless, he was the one preferred by UMNO's
Central leadership. As the Centre's appointee he was left in no doubt
as to whan and where he cwed prior loyalty and as to why he was 
82appointed. It soon became apparent that the new MB had been
instructed by the Central Government to watch over the allocation of
83timber and other land concessions. As a political unknown, with 
apparently no substantial party support at the State level, the MB was 
dependent and increasingly so on the Centre. This fitted well with the 
Centre's desire of ensuring the prior allegiance of the MB to Kuala 
Lumpur.
Abdul Rahim Abu Bakar' s appointment was not popular especially with 
. . . 84veteran State UMNO politicians. They claimed that Datuk Seri 
Hamzah, as SLC Chairman, had neither consulted the SLC nor obtained the
DC
majority support of the State Assemblymen . In response, Datuk Seri
Hamzah explained and emphasised that the new MB was chosen by UMNO's
President, Datuk Hussein Qnn, and that he was involved only as an
adviser.®^  He claimed that no one opposed the President's choice at a
87meeting of State Assemblymen.u He also claimed that there was no
88opposition from any of the Pahang politicians at the Centre.
8CL See UMNO, Penyata Tahunan, 1976/1977, p. 291.
81. Interview with the MB, Abdul Rahim Abu Bakar, 22.10.80. According
to Ali Shariff, Head of Kuantan Division within which the MB's 
Beserah constituency was located, Abdul Rahim Abu Bakar had been
an UMNO member since 1962 and had been active in the Beserah
Branch. He was elected to the Kuantan Division Ccrnmittee in 1976.
See Watan, 2.8.78.
82. According to him he was picked by UMNO's Central Leadership for a 
particular purpose. Interview with the MB.
83. The Guardian, 30.12.78. On taking Office, the MB immediately 
froze all land and timber concessions for a period of three 
months. After this period was up he introduced a tender system 
for the allocation of such concessions so as to reduce political 
corruption. Interview with MB.
84. Watan, 14.7.78 and 15.7.78. Fifteen UMNO branches in Temerloh 
wrote to the PM urging him to make former Assembly Speaker, Datuk 
Awang Ngah Tok Muda Ibrahim (an Assemblyman since 1955), the MB 
and to transfer Datuk Seri Hamzah from the Law Ministry- Datuk 
Awang Ngah also refused to accept reappointment as Speaker of the 
State Legislative Assembly. See Watan, 18.7.78.
85. Watan, 14.7.78, 16.7.78 and 20.7.78.
86. Watan, 24.11.78 and Mingguan Malaysia, 1.6.80.
87. Watan, 24.11.78.
88. ibid., 26.11.78.
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Despite these disclaimers, Hamzah, as SIC Chairman, was widely believed
to be intimately and crucially involved in the State's leadership stakes
and through his close links with Kuala Lunpur certain candidates for MB
89and the State Exco were presented, discussed and preferred. They
blamed him for foisting a newcomer onto the State, someone who was not
even tutored in the 'old' ways of politics or the established 'rules of
the game.' To them the appointment of Abdul Rahim Abu Bakar was a
threat to their vested interests. The previous relationship between the
former MB and Excos to their respective clienteles was undermined.
However, their resentment was not directed at Datuk Hussein Qnn, the
UMNO President, although it was by implication. Directly to criticise
the UMNO President over the MB's appointment was to go against an
established convention. Conveniently, their resentment was directed at
Hamzah for giving the 'wrong' advice to the UMNO President.
Despite the formal acceptance of the MB, the Sultan was apparently
unhappy over the choice of MB because of the possible consequences to 
90his interests. The new MB had on taking office frozen all land and
timber concessions and started a new policy regarding their allocation.
This new policy, aimed at the optimisation of the benefits frcm the
State's land resources, was based on granting land and timber
concessions to public corporations rather than individuals. ^  That
this policy had the support of, if indeed it had not been formulated by,
the Central Government was errphasised by the Minister of Land and
Regional Development, Tan Sri Kadir Yusof. He declared that the
Government would alienate large tracts of land only to public agencies
9?and not to individuals. The Sultan was alleged to have cultivated 
the support of the senior Cabinet Ministers frcm Pahang - like Tan Sri 
Ghazali Shafie and Datuk Sharif Ahmad - in the hope that they would
advance his case at the Centre but this was apparently not
93 • • •successful. The Sultan was clearly involved in the political
94infighting over the MB's appointment and composition of the State Exco.
89. Interview with a former MB of Pahang, 16.10.80, and "A".
90. Interviews with "A" and "B".
91. Interview with MB. The Sultan apparently approached the Minister
of Land and Regional Development, Tan Sri Kadir Yusoff, to seek a 
clarification of the new MB's land policiies. Interview with 
"B".
92. Asia Research Bulletin, Vol. 8, No.9, 28.2.79, p.537.
93. The Sultan was apparently successful in persuading the two Cabinet 
Ministers to pursue his case at the Centre - to have the MB 
replaced and Datuk Seri Hamzah removed as SLC Chairman. Their 
efforts failed. Interview with "B". This indicates that certain 
Pahang Cabinet Ministers were not wholly supportive of the new 
MB.
94. Watan, 2.11.78.
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He was also clearly unhappy over the appointment of the new
In early November, 1978 the Sultan asked his Supreme Council or
Jemaah Pangkuan Negeri to investigate the manner in which the MB was
appointed. This investigation was related to Datuk Seri Hamzah's
failure to submit to the Sultan the question of the appointment of the 
97MB. The Council, meeting on November 15, 1978 under the
chairmanship of TAB, found that both Datuk Seri Hamzah and Datuk Ibrahim 
98Mohamed were responsible for dragging the Sultan into political
99controversy m  Pahang. The Council unanimously recommended that 
both men should be stripped of their titles and positions given by the 
Sultan.This was indeed
"tantamount to a call for a real snubbing of the Federal 
Government".
On November 19, 1978 the Sultan visited the EM to discuss the
102Pahang Supreme Council's recommendation. Several such meetings
103were held and a conprcmise was apparently agreed to. On July 10,
1979 the PM announced the resignation of Datuk Seri Hamzah as Pahang SLC 
Chairman and despite the availability and willingness of two Cabinet 
Ministers from Pahang to serve, the PM took over this post. ^ 4 
According to the UMNO Secretary-General, this was agreed to by both 
National and State UMNO leaders.The taking over of the post by 
the EM was a warning to Pahang politicians that the Central leadership 
under the EM was not to be trifled with.
95. The Guardian, 30.12.78.
96. ibid., and Watan, 7-8.11.78.
97. Watan, 7-8.11.78.
98. A prominent businessman who was once very close to the Royal
Family.
99. Watan, 16.11.78.
100. ibid..
101. The Guardian, 30.12.78.
102. Watan, 20.11.78. Seme would say that the Sultan was summoned to
see the PM. Interviews with a former MB of Pahang, 16.10.80, and
"B".
103. Interview with the MB. According to another source, the Sultan 
presented two choices to the PM; either Datuk Seri Hamzah resign 
from being leader of Pahang SLC or failing this the Sultan would 
withdraw all his royal titles. Interview with "A".
104. NST., 11.7.79. Although ill-health might have contributed to his
resignation, it was probably because of his continuing conflict 
with the Sultan and the compromise between the power groups in 
Pahang. Interview with the MB.
105. NST., 21.7.79. According to the MB the PM did not appoint any 
other man from Pahang - for example either of the Cabinet 
Ministers - because he did not trust them. The EM believed that 
any other Pahang man could be easily swayed by the Sultan. 
Interview with the MB.
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However, efforts to oust the MB or make his life unbearable
continued unabated, perhaps even with renewed vigour.Pahang UMNO
dissidents were apparently unhappy about the MB's reluctance to practice
107the "politics of distribution". According to UMNO officials, they 
were planning to move a motion of no-confidence against the MB at the 
sittings on 3rd and 4th September of the State Legislative
1 no
Assembly. It was to the Centre that the MB had to turn to for
protection. He submitted a full report cn the current political
situation in Pahang to UMNO headquarters and also consulted the PM
regarding the matter. The PM was unhappy, some would say frustrated and
109annoyed, over the reported moves to oust the MB. Not surprisingly, 
it was announced that the PM would soon visit Pahang to chair a meeting 
of the Pahang UMNO SLC so as to discuss the reported moves against the 
MB.^^ The PM's visit was also intended as a shew of support for the 
MB's leadership whose position was felt to be increasingly threatened by 
a group of UMNO dissidents.A conprcmise was apparently arrived at
i-i o
during the SLC meeting which was chaired by the PM.  ^ Hcwever, this 
conprcmise was shortlived because the underlying dissatisfaction with 
the MB remained.The MB, mirroring the divisions within UMNO 
members in Pahang, appealed for a return to the party tradition of 
moderation. He stated that
106. A Pahang Division registered its anger at the Centre's imposition 
of an unknown MB during the UMNO GA of 8th July, 1979. See note 
127 of Chapter 9. It was apparent that the majority of the 
delegates at this GA were against leaders being imposed out of the 
blue. See The Star, 21.7.79. Interview with Datuk Hj. Abdul Aziz 
Hj. Ahmad.
107. New Sunday Times, 19.8.78. The MB admitted that his unpopularity 
was due partly to his disavowal of the "old style politics" within 
which corruption or 'greasing' was a vital component. He was 
unwilling to be a patron within a clientele network based on 
corruption. Interview with the MB.
108. NST, 15.8.79. The UMNO Secretary-General confirmed that there was 
a move to unseat the MB but expressed confidence that it would not 
succeed. See NST, 19.8.78.
109. Interviews with "B", a former MB of Pahang (16.10.80) and UMNO 
Secretary-General, Mustafa Jaabar, 30.9.80. See NST, 20.8.79.
110. NST, 15.8.79 and 20.8.79.
111. Interviews vdth a former MB of Pahang (16.10.80), "A", "B" and 
Pahang State Exco member (17.10.80).
112. Interviews with the MB, a former MB of Pahang (16.10.80) and "B". 
The UMNO dissidents did not table the motion of no-confidence 
against the MB as originally planned.
113. See The Star, 31.5.80. The MB, with the reputation of being "Mr. 
Clean", was unyielding in his opposition to restarting the "old 
style politics" in return for the support of the UMNO dissidents. 
Interview with Pahang State Exco member, 17.10.77.
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"Moderation is always the best policy. It has worked well with 
UMNO and it has worked well for the country".
His appeal fell on deaf ears. There was, however, a limit beyond which
factionalism and divisions within UMNO in Pahang would not be tolerated
by the Central party leaders. Datuk Hussein Onn, canmenting on the
problems besetting the UMNO in Pahang, stated that
"there is no political crisis in the State. Whatever is happening 
there today will be solved eventually. But if it is decided that 
there is a crisis, then the Council [SEC] will intervene just like 
what we did in Malacca ... My position here is only temporary. I 
will hand back the post [of Chairman of the SLC] the moment it is 
decided that the problems in the State are resolved".
The MB's position in Pahang was weak in terms of his awn party
base of support, although he was appointed as the Pahang SLC's Deputy
Chairman after his appointment as MB. Despite his clear identification
with and over-dependence cn the Centre, perhaps because of these, his
position as MB was still threatened. The prospect of continuing threats
or opposition to his position compelled him to lock for ways of
strengthening his position within the party organization. The
opportunity for this came with the party elections of June, 1980. To
consolidate his position and build up his own base and support, the MB
decided to challenge for the Kuantan Division Head’s post then held by
Ali Shariff, a Deputy Minister.^^ UMNO sources stated that
"Once he's got a position of his own in Pahang UMNO, he will be 
able to hold his ovn against any opposition".117
It was equally irrportant for Ali Shariff to retain this post if he
washed to continue as Deputy Minister and have a chance of being
renominated for the next General Election. The PM made an official
visit to Pahang in the midst of the campaigning for the party post.
118This, according to UMNO sources had strengthened the MB's hand.
Despite this the MB withdrew, apparently because he wanted to preserve 
party unity, and agreed instead to stand for the Deputy Head's post. 
Party sources explained that
"The Mentri Besar feels there is no need be in a hurry for him to 
get to the top even though he is still locking out for a good 
political base ... He is not over ambitious and for the time being 
is quite satisfied with the job as deputy head".
114. NST, 11.2.80.
115. NST, 26.5.80. Factional disputes within UMNO in Malacca provided
the oportunity for national party leaders in the SEC to intervene
and impose a solution. See NST, 17.8.77, 12.9.77 and 27.9.77.
116. The Star, 31.5.80.
117. Quoted in ibid.
118. Furthermore, many UMNO members interpreted the PM's visit as a 
show of support for the MB. ibid.
119. Quoted in The Star, 2.6.80. The MB withdrew despite having
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They believed that in the next Divisional elections the MB was bound to 
120move up. Both All Shanff and the MB were respectively elected
121unopposed as Head and Deputy Head of Kuantan UMNO Division. Thus,
the MB was left without having control of a Divisional base, the main
UMNO organisational unit in the State.
The MB's position in the State was clearly weak and vulnerable.
He was apparently incapable of winning the confidence and willing
approval of the Sultan. The 'old guards' of Pahang UMNO resented his
rapid rise and viewed him as a threat to their vested interests in the
"old style politics". Datuk Seri Hamzah, popularly regarded and
resented as the MB-maker and one of the MB's supporters at the Centre,
had by mid-1980 lost both his Chairmanship of the Pahang UMNO SLC and
Cabinet post. The resignation of Datuk Hussein Qnn as EM in June, 1981,
deprived the MB of his strongest political patron. Perhaps not
surprisingly, in early November, 1981 the MB tendered his 
122resignation.
Discussion and Conclusion
The ER case represented a clash of priorities and interests 
between the UMNO-dominated Centre and State. Its significance goes 
beyond the mere question of logging in the ER area and lies in the 
question of the proper utilisation of land and its associated resources 
in which both the Central and State Governments have legitimate, 
sometimes mutually exclusive, interests. Land is a state subject and, 
for a long time, had been the main source of political partonage at the 
State level. In Pahang, this resulted in the development and 
perpetuation of a web of vested interests which included both UMNO 
politicians and members of the Pahang Royal Family. It was a situation 
that the Central Government had been increasingly keen to control.
119. (Cont.) secured over 90% of the nomination for the Division Head's
post. See NST, 2.6.80. There was virually no change in the other 
top UMNO Divisional posts. See The Star, 4.6.80.
120. ibid. Perhaps in a move to pave the way for the MB in the next 
Divisional elections, the PM in a Cabinet reshuffle on September, 
1980 did not reappoint Ali Shariff as Deputy Minister. Hamzah was 
not reappointed as Cabinet Minister. See Watan, 12.9.80. Hamzah 
was not reappointed ostensibly because of ill-health but probably 
because of disagreement wdth the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong (the 
supreme Monarch), then held by the Sultan of Pahang. See Report on 
World Affairs, 1st July to 30th September, 1980, p. 36.
121. The Star, 2.6.80.
122. FEER, 20.11.81. In the April, 1982 General Elections Abdul Rahim 
Abu Bakar was nominated to stand in the Federal constituency of 
Kuantan, a seat formerly held by Ali Shariff. He was elected as 
an MP in this election.
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Despite the weight of financial, and seme would argue constitutional, 
powers with the Centre, the Central leadership resorted to the use of 
the internal mechanisms and processes of the party to bring about the 
desired changes at the State level. This resulted in a continuous 
tussle between the Central UMNO leaders and UMNO groups in the State who 
have vested interests at stake. This is not surprising because the 
party, to quote Sartori,
"is an aggregate of individuals forming constellations of rival 
groups". 3
Consequently, the informal party proceses were, again to quote Sartori,
"riddled by disagreement, rivalry, manoeverings and 
battlings"
over the vested interests at stake. These then shaped UMNO politics, 
and consequently Centre-State relations, involving Central UMNO leaders, 
State UMNO politicians and members of the Pahang Royal Family.
Central UMNO leaders are for several reasons in a position of 
strength in their competition for power and influence with State UMNO 
politicians. First, the party machinery is highly centralised and that 
most of the substantive powers, especially over the nomination of 
election candidates, are located at the Centre. The UMNO President, who 
is also the PM, is thus equipped with substantial powers within UMNO. 
These powers placed him and his SEC in a position to determine and 
organise party affairs and the pattern of elite recruitment within the 
State.
Second, the SEC is the pivotal body within UMNO. As such, and 
because of the absence of a fully-fledged State party body, it organises 
the party within the State. The SLC is under the direct control of the 
Centre and, in the case of Pahang during the period examined, it was led 
first by a Cabinet Minister and then by the PM. The UMNO Divisions are 
directly linked to the Centre and, in the case of Pahang, they were 
controlled in the main by Cabinet or Deputy Ministers or MPs. The 
absence of a fully-fledged State pary organisation means that the MB or 
any other State UMNO politicians can only hope to capture control of 
one Division. Since there are several Divisions in Pahang, control of 
one Division is not sufficient to sustain one's claim to leadership 
status. The MB and UMNO State Assemblymen are thus dependent not on a 
State party machine but cn a Centrally-controlled party machine to keep
123. Sartori, G., Parties and Party Systems: A framework for analysis, 
Vol. 1, London, Cambridge University Press, 1976, p.72.
124. ibid., p.48.
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them in office. The manner of the dismissal and appointment of the MB
and the nominations of UMNO election candidates in Pahang bears this
out. This dependence is enhanced by UMNO's dominance both Nationally
and in most States, and especially so in Pahang. UMNO's dominance
ensures at least grudging loyalty to the party because there just is no
125other alternative route for a successful political career.
Third, the absence of a fully-fledged State party organisation 
means that there is no State-^ wide body which the MB could readily 
capture and control. This makes it difficult for the MB, who may 
control only one Division, to mobilize Statewide support either for his 
position or against Central party intervention in party affairs in the 
State or for State "interests". This was true of Pahang and probably 
also for other States. The difficulty is compounded by the 
organizational fragmentation of UMNO in the State into Divisions which 
are linked with one another through a Centrally-controlled SLC. This 
party structure does not encourage cohesion or unity of purpose, which 
could for example be expressed in defence of State "interests", among 
the Divisions in the State. A cohesive and closely-knit State party 
organization may act as an obstacle to centralized decision-making but 
its absence encourages, indeed requires, such centralized decision­
making.
In Pahang, such cohesion or unity of purpose as existed before
factionalism and divisions became rampant was due primarily to the tight
grip that Tun Razak, as the recognised and unchallenged leader of
126Pahang, was able to inpose on UMNO in Pahang. Not coincidentally, 
his death in early 1976 loosened this tight grip and resulted in the 
competition for Razak's position as the recognized and unchallenged 
political leader of Pahang. Tun Razak, perhaps attempting to grocm a 
successor, appointed Datuk Seri Hamzah as Chairman of Pahang UMNO SLC in 
1972. Datuk Seri Hamzah's political roots were neither deep nor
125. A different situation prevailed in Kelantan before 1978. See 
discussion in chapter 11.
126. Clearly expressed in interviews with Pahang politicians.
127. Datuk Seri Hamzah replaced Yahya Mohamad Seh, then MB, as SLC 
Chairman. Yahya Mohamad Seh was also forced to resign as MB in 
1972. He was then Head of the Temerloh Division and Datuk Seri 
Hamzah was Head of Raub Division. In the 1972 party elections, 
with Razak's approval, Datuk Seri Hamzah stood for the Temerloh 
Division Head's post and won. Interviews with a former MB of 
Pahang and other Pahang politicians. See also UMNO, Penyata 
Tahunan, 1972/73. Thus the demise of Yahya Mohd. Seh as MB and SLC 
Chairman was engineered by Tun Razak and Datuk Seri Hamzah was the 
beneficiary of his demise. Tun Razak also appointed Datuk Seri 
Hamzah, together with Ghazali Shafie and Shariff Ahmad, as Cabinet 
Ministers. Tun Razak was thus instrumental in Datuk Seri Hamzah's 
rise to political prominence and power both at the Centre and in 
Pahang.
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wide and his position depended on Tun Razak. With Razak*s death he was 
somewhat exposed. Not having the stature and prestige of Tun Razak, he 
could not intervene in State politics with inpunity even if such 
intervention was carried out in the name of the Central party 
leadership.
Fourth, traditional elites and the traditional pattern of support 
play a vital role in the development of UMNO as a national party. State 
traditional elites had been in the forefront of, seme would say vital 
to, the development of UMNO.^ 3® Through them UMNO was able to 
mobilize State supporters. Their participation in UMNO was aimed, most 
importantly, at establishing themselves in the Centre. In other words, 
they harnessed the local and State-based tradition of support so as to 
compete for power at the Centre. It is in this sense that most National 
UMNO leaders are State-based. This further centralised the party 
machine. The consequence of this is to deny State UMNO politicians the 
use of such traditional pattern of support as an independent source of 
support and consequently make them dependent on a traditional pattern of 
support which is controlled by a party leader at the Centre. This is 
especially so in Pahang which has its cwn distinct local tradition of 
social and political organization based on four hereditary chiefs, apart
1 OQfrcm the institution of the Sultanate. Tun Razak, as one of the 
chiefs, was the embodiment of the traditional elite in Pahang and his 
unrivalled power was rooted in such distinct local tradition. No other 
Pahang politician had achieved such unrivalled stature in Pahang. With 
his death, this network of tight traditional support became the focus of 
faction and group competition and was consequently fragmented. This 
explains both rairpant factionalism in Pahang and the inability of any 
Pahang politician to successfully bind again the traditional support 
structure. Thus divisions between the State UMNO politicians in Pahang 
not only presented an opportunity for but also required Central 
intervention in party affairs in Pahang.
The Central Government's and Central UMNO leaders' imposition of 
an MB in Pahang was opposed by the supposedly Constitutional Sultan. 
Constitutionally, the Sultan is the source and symbol of authority in 
the State and must act on the advice of the MB and the State Exco. The 
institution of the Sultanate is, however, a source of independent power 
within the State. Its power had been strengthened by the 1971
128. See Means, G.P., Malaysian Politics, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 
2nd ed., 1976, pp. 194-195 and Moore, D.E., "The United Malays 
National Orgainisation and the 1959 Malayan Elections", Unpub. 
Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, 1960, p.63.
129. Moore, ibid., pp. 81-82.
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Constitutional Amendments which placed the institution of the Sultan
130beyond and above public debate. Nevertheless, the Pahang case 
indicates that the Sultan's role was marginal although his unyielding 
apposition to the new MB (the Centre's nominee and agent) might have 
influenced the MB's resignation.
The Centre's imposition of an MB in Pahang was facilitated by a 
highly centralized party structure. But it was nevertheless resented 
and opposed by UMNO State politicians despite their dependence on a 
Centrally-controlled pary machine. The Sultan also opposed the Centre's 
inposition. Ultimately, hcwever, the MB had no choice but to resign.
The chief significance of the rise and fall of the MB is this: UMNO's 
Central leaders cannot construct a political base for its appointee 
unless that man already has a secure footing in the State. The State 
still matters in an apparently tightly-knit Federation with a powerful 
Centre.
130. See chapter 2. The Sultans participation in State politics was 
indicated in Trengganu, in 1962, after UMNO had successfully 
tabled a motion of no-confidence against the PAS MB. See Milne, 
R.S., Government and Politics in Malaysia, Boston, Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1967, p.144. Since 1971, however, the Sultans in 
respective States have been increasingly keen participants in 
State politics. The Sultan of Perak was partly instrumental in 
the resignation of the Perak MB, Ghazali Jawi, and the appointment 
of Wan Mohamad Wan Teh. Differences between the Sultan and the MB 
were often reflected in the public statements made by the Sultan 
and mainifested by the Sultan's refusal to open the State 
Legislative Assembly in 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1976. Not 
coincidentally, the Sultan opened the SLA meeting on the 28th 
October, 1977 after Wan Mohamad's appointment as MB. The Sultan 
of Kelantan, as discussed in the next chapter, was also a keen 
participant in Kelantan politics.
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Chapter 11
Kelantan ; The exception to the rule and Centre-State Relations
PAS-controlled Kelantan provided the case where members of 
different political parties controlled the two levels of Government in a 
Federation. It was thus an exception to the rule of UMNO dominance in 
the States and Centre of Peninsula Malaysia. The establishment of PAS^  
control in Kelantan in the 1959 State elections narked the beginning of 
the exception. Only after the formation of the Barisan Nasional (BN) 
coalition Governments at the Centre and State levels was PAS finally 
tamed and Kelantan brought within the dominant pattern after PAS lost 
the 1978 State elections to UMNO. This exception emphasised the 
’political distance' between PAS and UMNO and Centre-State relations 
became inextricably linked to UMNO-PAS competition at both Centre and 
State levels. Thus UMNO-PAS rivalry and competition became relevant to 
federalism.
Much of the story about PAS-controlled Kelantan relations to the 
Centre has been referred to in earlier chapters and by several writers, 
especially for the 1955 to 1959, 1959 to 1969 and 1969 to 1974 periods. 
In this chapter it will be necessary only to summarise the main features 
of this story for these periods, but more detailed account is given for 
the 1974 to 1978 period.
BACKGROUND
. . 2Kelantan has a rich history and cultural tradition which have 
more in ccmmon with three other States of the former unfederated Malay 
States (UFM) - Trengganu, Kedah and Perlis - than to the other States of 
Peninsula Malaysia. Like the three other States, Kelantan is
3
overwherlmingly Malay, 92.5% to be precise. The Kelantanese Malays, 
in their spoken Malay and clannishness, do exhibit and signal their 
distinctiveness frcm Malays of other States.^  Like the three other
T: For discussions can the origins of PAS see Funston, N.J., "The
Origins of Parti Islam se Malaysia", Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Vol.7., No. 1, March 1976, pp. 58-73; Y. Mansoor Marican, 
"The Political Accommodation of Primordial Parties: DMK (India) and 
PAS (Malaysia)", Unpub. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of British 
Columbia, Vancouver, 1976, pp. 58-73; Y. Mansoor Marican, "The Pan- 
Malayan Islamic Party: A Critical Observation", in Southeast Asian 
Affairs, 1978, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 
Heinemann Educational Bocks (Asia) Ltd., 1978, pp. 165-169; Means, 
G.P., Malaysian Politics,London, Hodder and Stoughton, 2nd ed.,
1976, p. 226. PAS also won control of Trengganu in 1959.
2. Roff, W.R., ed., Kelantan: Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay 
State, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1974, passim.
3. Only Trengganu has a higher percentage of Malays. See Appendix 2.
4. This is exhibited, for examples, in the student population of both 
Schools and Universities and in National gatherings where a
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States, Kelantan came under British protection only in 1909. Thus it 
was not subjected to the pattern of political, economic and social 
development then experienced by the States of the Federated Malay States 
(EMS), Straits Settlements and Johore. Kelantan viewed this development
with distaste and feared that British protection would foreshadow a
■ • . 5similar development in Kelantan. It was thus anxious to protect the
"Malayness" of the State. It took several measures to prevent the feared 
penetration of the British, of non-Malays, of other Malays, in short, of 
all outsiders. These measures included the bureaucratization of Islam 
through the establishment of the Majlis Ugama (State Religious Council) 
as one of the foundations of the Kelantan Malay society and emphasis cn 
the principle of the territorial inviolability of its land through the 
enactment of a Malay Reservations Act in 1930.^
Kelantan's economy has always been rural, peasant and 
7agriculturally based . It is still, compared to other States, 
economically the most underdeveloped (in terms of Per Capita State Gross 
Domestic Product) and financially very weak.® It is possible to 
describe Kelantan, for historical, economic, political, social and 
cultural reasons, as a hinterland of Peninsula Malaysia.
The internal differences and divisions in Kelantan society 
considerably influenced local political dynamics in the colonial period. 
These were continually expressed in the struggle for power between,
4~i (Cont.) significant number of Kelantan Malays are present. Kedah 
Malays also excel in this. It is like the group inclination 
exhibited by the linguistic and regional groups of India. See 
Morris-Jones, W.H., Parliament in India, London, 1957, pp. 18-19. 
Kelantanese distinctiveness is sometimes expressed in their claims 
that they are the 'bastion' of Malay culture and tradition. See 
Nash, M., "Ethnicity, Centrality and Education in Pasir Mas", in 
Roff, op.cit., p. 243.
5. Kelantan believed that the pattern of development then taking 
place in the States of the FMS, Straits Settlements and Jchore 
resulted in direct British participation in the affairs of these 
States and produced a radical transformation of the communal 
composition in these States by pulling in ever increasing numbers of
immigrant non-Malays to work the 'new' fields of economic activity.
See Kessler, C.S., "Muslim Identity and Political Behaviour in 
Kelantan", in Roff, op.cit., p. 280.
6. See Roff, W.R., "The Origin and Early Years of the Majlis Ugama",
in Roff, op.cit. ,pp. 101-152; Winzeler, R.L., "The Social
Organization of Islam in Kelantan", in Roff, op.cit.,pp. 259-271; 
and Winzeler, R.L., "Malay Religion Society and Politics in Kelantan! 
Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1970; Kessler,
op.cit.,pp. 280-281.
7. See Nash, op.cit., p. 243. See also Nash, M., "Tradition in 
Tension in Kelantan", Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol. 1., 
1966, pp. 310-314.
8. See chps. 3 and 4.
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essentially, two sets of elites - the traditional (the established 
nobility and aristocracy) and non-traditional (Malay school teachers, 
religious teachers, mosque elders and other opinion moulders).® The 
traditional elite used the Majlis Ugama, which it then controlled, to 
protect its pcwer. In this way it was able to regulate the religious and 
political disputes, especially in the 1930s, to its satisfaction, thus 
resisting the challenge of a non-traditional elite.In these 
disputes, the non-traditional elite, through the Majlis Ugama's lower 
functionaries, enjoyed the primary loyalty of the peasantry The 
introduction of elections in 1955 marked a new phase in Kelantan 
politics.
The 1955-1959 Period
Since 1955, electoral and party politics have been superimposed on
12the divisions of group and elite conflict. A political party was new 
the vehicle, through electoral politics, for the control of Kelantan. 
Party Negara (PN), in 1955, was the vehicle for the traditional elite, 
PAS for the non-traditional elite'*'®, with the Kelantan UMNO then 
controlled by
"a politically inexperienced group of Malay-educated leaders, sons 
of petty traders and lesser wage earning functionaries in the 
state1s administrative apparatus.
Two elements in this ’new* politics are discernible. First the 
carpeting elite's claim of support frcm the peasantry can new be 
periodically and electorally tested and such support has become 
increasingly important to the outcome of UMNO-PAS competition in the 
State. Second, because these parties are organizationally linked to 
National parties. State level politics became intertwined with National 
level politics.
In the first Federal elections of July 1955, UMNO won all five 
Federal Legislative Council seats in Kelantan. In the first State
15elections of September 1955, for a partially selected State Council ,
9. See Kessler, cp.cit., pp. 277-280 and Moore, D.E., "The United 
Malays National Organisation and the 1959 Malayan Elections", Unpub. 
Ph.D. Diss., University of California, 1960, pp. 69-80.
10. Kessler described the non-traditional elite as the radical 
intelligentsia and Islamic modernist. See Kessler cp.cit., pp. 278- 
280. See also Roff, "The Early Years of the Majlis Ugama", and 
Muhammad Salleh b. Wan Musa (with S. Othman Kelantan), "Theological 
Debates: Wan Musa b. Haji Abdul Samad and His Family", in Roff, ed., 
cp.cit., pp. 153-176.
11. Kessler, cp.cit., p. 280.
12. ibid., p. 277.
13. ibid., pp. 284-285.
14. ibid., p. 284.
15. The partially elected State Council comprised 16 elected and 17 
nominated seats.
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UMNO won all sixteen elected seats. The PN defeat compelled the
traditional elites to find another party through which to retain their
control of Kelantan.^ They turned to UMNO. The PAS defeat was due to
the personalities of the PAS leaders who collectively lack a clear
ideology and programme and an organizational apparatus capable of
17reaching the majority of voters in the countryside. PAS thus 
responded by mobilizing the Kelantanese in the countrside through an 
Islamic idiom, strengthening its organization and defining its ideology 
and programme.1®
UMNO, in spite of its electoral success, did not have a majority
19in the State Council and was powerless. Its effectiveness and 
credibility became increasingly suspect and were further weakened by its 
members continuous entanglement in bureaucratic politics and corruption. 
Most damaging, perhaps, was the intensification of rivalry among the 
Kelantan UMNO leaders as the 1959 Parliamentary and State elections, the 
first after independence, neared: several valuable prizes were at stake 
for the first time including the posts of Mentri Besar (MB or Chief 
Minister), Executive Councillors (Exco) and all the State Legislative 
Assembly (SLA-the reconstituted State Council). They were thus jockeying 
for position and control of Kelantan UMNO in preparation for the "spoils 
of office". Preoccupied with internal rivalries and confident of victory 
as representatives of the "party of Independence", they increasingly 
lost contact with and thus lost the support of their countryside 
supporters.®® Factionalism®1 among the State UMNO leadership divided 
and weakened UMNO's approach to the electorate and provided the
traditional elites (ex-PN members) with opportunities to colonize the
92 . . .State UMNO. Consequently, UMNO became identified with the
. . • 23traditional elite.
16. See Kessler, cp.cit., p. 284. UMNO's success was attributable to 
its identification with a national UMNO then fighting for Malayan
Independence. The 1955 election was part of the process towards
Independence.
17. ibid., p. 285.
18. ibid., pp. 285-286.
19. ibid., p. 287.
20. ibid., p. 284. See also Y. Mansoor Marican, cp.cit., pp. 106 and
1507
21. This was especially marked in Kelantan. See Ratnam, K.J., and 
Milne, R.S., The Malayan Parliamentary Elections of 1964, Kuala 
Lumpur and Singapore, University of Malaya Press, 1969, pp. 34-35.
22. See Kessler, cp.cit., p. 287 and Means, op.cit., chp. 13. The 
controversy between Kelantan UMNO stalwart Hj. Abdul Khalid and 
Tengku Indra Putra (a traditional elite) was an example. See 
Moore, cp.cit., pp. 79-81.
23. In the 1959 elections all ten UMNO candidates for the ten 
Parliamentary seats in Kelantan were members of the traditional 
elite. See Moore, op.cit., p. 81.
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Meanwhile, PAS's political mobilization efforts were facilitated 
by the convergance of the anxieties of peasants and leaders of rural 
society-headmen, imams, religious teachers and pious men of the 
villages.®^  The peasants' anxieties centred on UMNO's neglect of land 
matters. The traditional leaders feared being supplanted by UMNO 
Assemblymen, party functionaries and bureaucrats. PAS's appeal was based 
on ethnic and religious, rather than class, themes which emphasised the 
threat to the Malays in general and Kelantanese in particular posed by 
UMNO's inter-cornnunal strategy.
Several factors thus conditioned the political climate before the 
1959 elections. UMNO, weakened and divided by factionalism, increasingly 
identified as the party of the traditional elite, viewed as increasingly 
corrupt, was considered by the peasants and the village leaders as 
ineffective for protecting their interests. They thus turned to PAS. In 
the 1959 elections, PAS won 9 out of 10 Parliamentary seats in Kelantan 
(UMNO winning 1) and 28 out of 30 SLA seats (UMNO and MCA winning 1 
each).®®
The 1959-1969 Period
PAS-UMNO competition after the 1959 State elections shaped the
relations between the UMNO-controlled Centreand PAS-controlled Kelantan.
In this UMNO leaders at the Centre used their "good offices" to support
Kelantan UMNO, /part from the differing positions that both parties held
on the issue of commnal integration, there were issues of land, money
and development around which party rivalry focused. These inter-related
issues affected both the Centre's and State's interests.
As the governing party in Kelantan, PAS controlled the
distribution of political patronage and the "spoils of office". Land, a
State subject, was judiciously distributed to maintain PAS' political
support and this engendered corruption and nepotism among PAS leaders 
97and members. This caused much soul-searching and, ultimately,
24. ibid., pp. 289-292.
25. Y. Mansoor Marican, cp.cit., pp. 146-150. In Kelantan patron-
client linkages were also improtant for political mobilisation.
See Kershaw, R., "Of race, class and clientship in Malaysia", 
Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics,Vol. 14, No. 3, 
Nov. 1976, pp. 717-718.
26. See Appendix I.
27. See Kershaw, R., "The'East Coast' in Malayan Politics; Episodes of
Resistance and Integration in Kelantan and Trengganu", Modem Asian
Studies,Vol. 11, No. 4, 1977, p. 251. UMNO supporters were
discriminated against. See Kershaw, R., "Politics in Kelantan,
West Malaysia: Parochial Integrity v. National Integration?" in 
University of London, Institute of Comnonwealth Studies, Autonony 
and Dependence in Parochial Politics, Inst, of Comnonwealth 
Studies collected Seminar papers, No. 7, Oct. 1968-March 1969, p.
55. See also Alias Mohamed, op.cit., p. 175.
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internal divisions within PAS.
The State Government's power over land, however, was weakened 
considerably by its limited financial resources. It could not afford to 
undertake large-scale land development on its own. It was thus open to 
the oft-repeated UMNO criticism that it was an ineffective State 
Government and, at the same time, subject to financial pressure frcm the 
Centre. Central Government funding and participation was and remain 
necessary for large-scale land developments in Kelantan. Through this 
UMNO hoped to demonstrate its political effectiveness and thus improve 
its chances in the struggle for political power. Equally, political 
calculations influenced PAS's refusal to co-operate with the Central
OQ
Government in development projects in Kelantan.
PAS and the Kelantan electorate were constantly reminded of 
development achievements in UMNO-controlled States and the "penalty 
clause" or "opportunity costs" for voting PAS.®® The Central 
Government emphasised two messages: first, that only the Central 
Government was rich enough to finance large scale development projects 
in the State and, second, that Central Government money and 
participation in development projects in the State would be assured only 
if the Alliance controlled the State Government. In short, vote for PAS 
and remain economically underdeveloped or vote for Alliance and be
28. ibid., pp. 172-173. See also Y. Mansoor Marican, op.cit., p. 152. 
Not surprisingly the Alliance, emphasizing the contrast, replaced 
former candidates of bad reputation for the 1964 elections. See
Ratnam and Milne, cp.cit., p. 106. See also Kershaw, R., "The
'East Coast' in Malayan Politics", pp. 521-522.
29. See Kessler, op.cit., pp. 293-294; Mansoor Marican, op.cit., pp.
213-214; Kershaw, op.cit., p. 521; Senftleben, W., Background to 
Agricultural Land Policy in Malaysia, Wiesbaden, Otto Harrosswitz, 
1978, pp. 67, 121-123, 212-213, 256 and 258-261; and Ness, G.D., 
Bureaucracy and Rural Development in Malaysia, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, University of California Press, 1967, p. 138. For PAS's 
criticismof the Central Government's use of its financial resources 
against Kelantan, see Rudner, M., Nationalism, Planning and 
Economic Modernization in Malaysia: The Politics of Beginning
Development, Beverley Hills, Sage Pub., 1975, p. 59, and Malaysian 
Parliamentary Debates (MPD), Dewan Rakyat, Vol. 1, 1st Session, 
Sept. 1959-Feb. 1960, col. 519, and Vol. V, No. 43, 10.1.64, cols. 
4772-4773.
30. The contrast was drawn especially with Trengannu, a former PAS- 
controlled State. See Ratnam and Milne, op.cit., pp. 152-153. See 
also Ness, cp.cit., p. 216; Warta Malaysia, 19.8.1967, p. 5, and
11.7.68, p. 4; Alliance Manifesto of 1969 for Kelantan, reproduced 
in Kershaw, op.cit., Appendix D; and Straits Times, 11.4.69 and
24.4.69.
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rewarded toy the inclusion of Kelantan into the mainstream of Centrally-
3 1directed and funded national development.
In the PAS-UMNO competition land and its development, as State
3 9issues, were unmistakably emphasised. Both parties justified their 
respective cases to the Kelantanese electorate by arguing that land and 
its development should benefit Kelantanese. For example, the controversy 
over the Kelantan Government planned leasing of land to a Singapore 
Chinese timber and mine company five days before polling day in the 1964 
elections.®® In this case both the Alliance (and hence UMNO) and PAS 
in their arguments invoked the historically and legally established 
principle of the territorial inviolability of Kelantan's land.®^
In the conflict between PAS-controlled Kelantan and UMNO-dominated
Centre, Kelantan's financial weakness was continuously exposed and
3 5exploited by the Centre. The PAS Government was continually plagued
by financial difficulties which the Central Government alleged were
caused by the PAS Government's financial mismanagement, especially in
its handling of the Kelantan River Bridge Project.®® PAS alleged that
the Central Government contributed to Kelantan's financial
difficulties by delaying payment of capitation grants, refusing to
honour its premise to give a loan for the Kelantan River Bridge Project,
not contributing for two years (1962 and 1963) to the cost of Islamic
education in Government assisted schools, and blocking disbursement that
3 7Kelantan was entitled to moke.
The PAS Government's financial difficulties weakened its position 
vis-a-vis the Centre. This was clearly underlined when, in December 
1967, the Kelantan MB, Dato Asri, approached the PM, Tengku Abdul 
Rahman, for a Central Government loan of M$1.5 million to pay the
31. This was the Alliance and UMNO leaders recurrent theme which, 
according to Vorys, revealed more a lack of understanding of the 
implicit assumptions of a federal system than a lapse in 
constitutional processes. See Vorys, K.V., Democracy Without 
Consensus: Caitnunalism and Political Stability in Malaysia, 
Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1975, p. 277.
32. See Ratnam and Milne, cp.cit., p. 193.
33. ibid., p. 153. See also Indorf, H.H., "Party System Adaptation to 
Political Development in Malaysia During the First Decade of 
Independence, 1957-1967", Unpub. Ph.D. Dissertation, New York 
University, 1969, p. 305. This 'leasing' plan was challenged by 
the Central Government in the Federal Court in 1968. See chp. 3.
34. See Ratnam and Milne, ibid., p. 154, and Y. Mansoor Marican, 
op.cit., p. 157.
35. See chp. 3.
36. ibid., See also Sunday Times, 29.11.64 and Alias Mohamed, cp.cit., 
p. 175.
37. Y. Mansoor Marican, cp.cit., p. 213 and Kershaw, cp.cit., p. 522 
and note 21.
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38December salaries of State Government servants. Perhaps unwilling to
see a State Government, even if controlled by an opposition party, going
bankrupt and, more importantly, to exploit the PAS Government's financial
weakness, the Central Government extended a M$1 million loan, under an
agreement, to the PAS Government. For through this agreement it hoped
to acquire some control over the State's finances. This agreement
required the PAS Government to seek the advice of Federal Treasury
officials when preparing future State budgets. However, the PAS
Government reneged when preparing its 1968 budget. It contended that
this budget was prepared before the agreement was signed. In
retaliation, no new Central financial assistance was extended to 
3 9Kelantan and with this Centre-State relations returned to their
normal antagonistic pattern.
The Kelantan PAS politicians were, first and foremost, political
animals, aware that their political careers depended on maintaining and
securing power in Kelantan. This in part depended on their ability to
respond to popular demands for economic development. It was here that
Central Government had the whip hand. The PAS State Government
acknowledged the intensity of these demands and the strength of the
Centre. For example, the PAS Government appeared to want cordial
relation with the Centre after the 1964 elections. The MB, Dato Asri,
pledged that the State Government would co-operate fully with the
Central Government in the field of development.^ This thaw in
Centre-State relations lasted for only six months. The reason was
clear: the Kelantan UMNO leaders feared that this cordiality would
eventually undermine their political strengths in the State and,
accordingly, applied pressure on the Central Government to change 
4 1  . .course. Political calculations again shaped Centre-State 
relations.
There was also an "Islamic" dimension to UMNO-PAS competition, 
well captured by the accusatory label of "un-Islamic". PASalways 
considered itself as the only truly "Islamic" party and had regularly
38. Y. Mansoor Marican, ibid., pp. 214.215. See also Alias Mohamed, 
ibid., p. 175. When Kelantan sought Central Government aid, 
Assistant Minister of Finance, Dr. Ng Kam Poh, speaking in the 
Dewan Rakyat of Parliament, said that "... they [PAS leaders] 
should develop sources of income frcm elsewhere, other than coming 
to the Federal Government ... we do not encourage such practices, 
especially frcm Kelantan". Quoted in Indorf, H.H., cp.cit., p. 455. 
My emphasis.
39. Y. Mansoor Marican, ibid., p. 215.
40. Berita Harian, 7.11.64.
41. See Mansoor Marican, ibid., p. 159. Tun Razak was then Chairman of 
Kelantan UMNO SLC.
42 .labelled UMNO as an "un-Islamic" party. To repair its Islamic
credentials, UMNO put forward plans for the building of mosques in
Kelantan. These were to be paid for by the Central Government^ and
implemented through the Majlis Ugama which UMNO was attempting to
44control, eventually with success.
Raising the "Islamic" issue was one way, so PAS hoped, of clearly
differentiating PAS from UMNO and weaning away Malay support frcm UMNO.
PAS was not without its problems of unity and cohesion. These
emerged, for example, during the 1964 leadership struggle for the
succession to Dr. Burhanuddin and Zulkifli Muhamad as the party's
45President and Deputy President respectively. The uneasy co­
existence of traditional, conservative and orthodox Ulamas on one side 
and a modernist-reformist group on the other further undermined its 
unity and cohesion. These internal divisions presented fertile grounds 
for UMNO in its unrelenting attempts to undermine PAS. UMNO baited 
"dissident" PAS leaders and members with finaincial rewards if they 
defected frcm PAS. In August, 1968, for example, Kelantan UMNO then 
under Tun Razak initiated a Trengganu-like manouevre by encouraging the 
defection of PAS Assemblymen to UMNO in the SLA. This, however, 
failed.^
Frcm 1959 to 1969, Centre-State relations were inexorably shaped by 
UNMQ-PAS competition. Confrontation and mutual accusations of non-co- 
operation characterised these relations. Both parties were obsessed by 
considerations of political advantage. The development of practical, 
not to speak of co-operative, Centre-State relations was hindered by
these two implacable foes. The 'political distance' between UMNO and
PAS as well as between Centre and State was both emphasised and clearly 
defined. Not surprisingly, the only two Court cases involving the 
Central and State Governments, those in 1963^ and 1968^, were 
between the Centre and PAS Government of Kelantan. In the 1969 
elections PAS retained control of Kelantan.
~%2, Ratnam and Milne, cp.cit., pp. 120-124.
43. ibid.
44. Kessler, cp.cit., pp. 294-295.
45. Alias Mohamed, op.cit., p. 169.
46. See Berita Harian, 19.8.68 and 14.9.68; Straits Times, 19-22.8.68.
and Y. Mansoor Marican, op.cit., p. 153. This tactic succeeded in 
Trengganu. See Alias Mohamed, cp.cit., pp. 1780 and 175: Means,
cp.cit., pp. 231-232; Milne, R.S. and Mauzy, D.K., Politics and 
Government in Malaysia, Vancouver, University of British Columbia, 
1978, p. 108.
47. Discussed in chp. 2.
48. Discussed in chp. 3.
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The 1969-1974 Period
Emergency rule through the National Operations Council (NOC) at the
4Q
Centre was imposed following the tragic events of May 1969. The 
NOC was linked to the State Operations Council (SOC) in each State. 
During the NOC rule frcm May 1969 to February 1971 party government and 
politics were suspended at the Centre and State levels and were
reinstated only after the rules governing inter-party ccnpetition were
50 . . . .changed. The changes, designed to ensure national political
51stability, tended to stengthen UMNO's dominance.
The decline, if not decay, of the Alliance institution was 
underlined by its component parties' loss of votes and seats in the 1969 
elections. The decline in the MCA's political base and credibility, 
made worse subsequently by factionalism, and the increasing support 
given to other essentially Chinese parties were alarming. UMNO's hold 
on its Malay clientele was considerably weakened by PAS's successful 
challenge in Kelantan, Kedah and Trengganu. According to Ratnam and 
Milne, more Malays voted for PAS than for UMNO in Malay majority
constituencies where the two parties were engaged in straight fights,
52probably in these three States. After 1969, the Alliance's claim 
to represent the majorities of the two cotimunal groups was tenuous. If 
the key to political stability in Malaysia depended on inter-communal
49. These events occurred immediately after the 1969 general elections. 
For accounts of these see Abdul Rahman, Turiku, May 13: Before and 
After, Kuala Lumpur, Utusan Melayu Press Ltd., 1969: Cheng Teik, 
Goh, The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy in Malaysia. Kuala 
Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1971; Gagliano, F.V., Ccmrtunal 
Violence in Malaysia 1969: The Political Aftermath, Papers in 
International Studies, Southeast Asia Series No. 13, Ohio 
University Centre for Intematinal Studies, Athens, Ohio, 1971; 
Slimming, J., Malaysia: Death of a Democracy, London, John Murray 
Pub., 1969; Reid A., "The Kuala Lumpur Riots and the Malaysian 
Political System", Australian Outlook, Vol. 23, No. 3, Dec. 1969, 
pp. 258-278. For a discussion of the 1969 elections, see Ratnam, 
K.J., and Milne, R.S., "The 1969 Parliamentary Election in West 
Malaysia", Pacific Affairs. Vol. 43, No. 2, Summer 1970, pp. 203- 
226; Rudner, M., "The Malaysian General Election of 1969: A 
Political Analysis'"", Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 4, No. I, 1970, pp. 
1-21; Vasil, R.K., The Malaysian General Election of 1969, Kuala 
Lumpar and Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1972.
50. Y. Mansoor Marican, cp.cit., pp. 168-169 and 198-202; Mauzy 
D.K., "Consociationalism and Coalition Politics in Malaysia",
Unpub. Ph.D. Diss., University of British Columbia, May 1978, pp. 
181-186.
51. Mauzy considered these changes necessary. See Mauzy, ibid., pp. 
182-183 and Mansoor Marican, ibid., pp. 198 and 202. A New 
Economic Policy (NEP), designed primarily to uplift the Malays 
economically, was also begun. For a discussion of this see Milne, 
R.S., "The Politics of the New Economic Policy in Malaysia",
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 2, 1976.
52. Ratnam and Milne, op.cit., p. 222.
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co-operation and understanding, then the Alliance institution was 
unsuitable in the post-May 1969 context and had to be replaced. The 
BN, essentially an extension of the Alliance "formula" by including 
several opposition parties, was the replacement preferred by Tun Razak
C O
and his colleagues m  UMNO .
The changes in the rules governing inter-party competition were
supported by PAS because it did not want the NOC rule to be 
54continued. If NOC rule were continued PAS leaders and members would
be denied, through competitive politics, a political role and access to
the "spoils of office" especiallyin Kelantan and in Kedah and Trengganu
where they believed that PAS had real possibilities of capturing power.
The changes, however, legally required PAS not to base its appeals on
the "sensitive" issues, previously the stuff of PAS politics, and
especially on that calling for the restoration of Malay sovereignty. In
55short, these changes appeared to undercut its potential grcwth. In
addition to these changes, several other reasons persuaded PAS leaders
to join the BN coalition and work with UMSIO.
First, the legal limits placed upon PAS's traditional political
style compelled PAS leaders to seek a practical alternative. Second,
they were encouraged by changes in UMNO's leadership, in 1970, which to
56thou represented changes towards their way of thinking. The PAS-
UMNO coalition, justified by both sides as essential to Malay unity and
the protection of Malay gains, could be further justified by PAS leaders
as 'natural' because of UMNO's move towards PAS views.
Third, the electoral support for PAS in Kelantan since 1959 had
steadily declined. This had generated fears among PAS leaders (and
hopes among UMNO leaders) that Kelantan might eventually come under UMNO 
57rule. They believed that joining the coalition would, apart frcm 
'freezing' UMNO-PAS competition in Kelantan, provide the Kelantan-PAS 
State Government and PAS members generally with access to Central
C O
Goverment assistance and Governmental pcwer outside Kelantan. This 
53^  Y. Mansoor Marican, cp.cit., pp. 206-207.
54. The return to democracy was on condition that these changes were
approved by Parliament. See ibid., pp. 169-170.
55. PAS responded to the changes by emphasizing Islam in place of 
'Malay Rights' and, before the formation of the BN, Alliance 
policies were accordingly criticised for neglecting Islamic and 
spiritual elements. See ibid., pp. 205-206.
56. Alias Mohamed, op.cit., p. 177. In 1970, Tengku Abdul Rahman was 
replaced by Tun Razak who in turn rehabilitated Tengku's main 
political adversaries, Dr. Mahathir and Musa Hit am.
57. See Kershaw, op.cit. ,p. 526 and Mansoor Marican, cp.cit., p. 212.
58. This was through the allocation of posts at the Centre and in the
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would thus improve PAS's hold on the Kelantan electorate by its becoming
through Central assistance a more effective State Government and by its
ability to distribute patronage to its supporters outside Kelantan.
Fourth, factionalism within Kelantan PAS had continuously
threatened Asri's position as MB and leader of Kelantan PAS. His PAS
opponents were critical of his nepotism, corrupt use of the MB's office
59and hostile postures towards the Centre. Factionalism, as in 
Trengganu, could profitably be exploited by UMNO to unseat Asri. 
Ironically, Asri felt that his hold on power depended on a working 
arrangement with UMNO.^
Fifth, PAS leaders feared that the Central Government's anti­
corruption moves might be directed at them if they refused to join the 
BN. Corruption was believed to be extensive at the State level and, 
according to Alias Mohamed,
"The need to set up the NBI [National Bureau of Investigation] was 
consideredmost urgent in view of the fact that the opposition was
in control of two state governments. Obviousy the Alliance party
had also taken into account the bad experience it had with the 
PMIP in Kelantan".
PAS-controlled Kelantan had been reduced to one massive "corruption
f\0network". The Central Goverment's anti-corruption drive through the
/TO
NBI had already resulted in the resignations of two UMNO MBs. They
were under no illusions as to what awaited them had they refused to join
the BN.
The PAS leaders decision to join the BN, hcwever, was not
. . . 64unanimously supported by PAS s members and hence divided the party.
This division, fuelled by Asri's distasteful personal leadership style, 
further weakened PAS. To those who were against, the coalition
represented the betrayal, and indeed the abandonment, of PAS’s ideals
. . 65and political struggles. After all, by joining the coalition PAS
58. (Cont.) other States and was contained in the "Per janjian 13
Perkara" or 13-Point Agreement which was reproduced in UMNO,
Penyata Tahunan, 1973, pp. 142-143.The Agreement allocated specific 
posts to PAS in the Central and State Governments of Kedah and 
Trengganu and to UMNO in the Kelantan State Government.
59. Alias Mbhamed, op.cit., p. 172 and Mansoor Marican, op.cit., p.
216.
60. ibid.
61. Alias Mohamed, op.cit., p. 176. The NBI, formerly the Anti- 
Corruption Agency, was estblished in 1971.
62. Allegations and descriptions of corruptions in Kelantan are 
graphically described in Mansoor Marican, op.cit., pp. 217-219.
63. Datuk Ahmad Said and Tan Sri Ibrahim Fikri of Perak and Trengganu 
respectively. See Alias Mohamed, op.cit., p. 173 and Vorys, 
op.cit., p. 192.
64. See Alias Mohamed, cp.cit., p. 170 and Mansoor Marican, cp.cit., 
p. 209.
65. Alias Mohamed, Ibid., pp. 170-171.
assumed with UMNO the formal responsibility for protecting the 
political, economic and cultural interests of both non-Malays and 
Malays. Remarkably, as Mansoor Marican puts it,
"For a party that began with the objective of restoring Malay 
sovereignty and regarded non-Malays as temporary residents of the 
country, this represents a fundamental change, a change brought 
about in part by its involvement in competitive political 
processes".
For UMNO PAS's inclusion in the BN was vital for two reasons. First, 
PAS's previous independent political actions had, through its increasing 
empahsis on Malay oomnunalism, considerably undermined UMNO's claim as 
the pre-eminent Malay party and its multi-communal approach to 
integration: the PAS's independence had to be reduced to protect UMNO's
dominance and to ensure the BN's success. Thus, coalition politics
6 7seemed most practical in terms of domesticating an implacable party.
Second, UMNO wanted to regain access to Governmental power in Kelantan
and the coalition would provide for this.
The PAS formally joined the BN Government®® at the Centre and
States on January 1, 1973. The coalition somewhat blurred the
'political distance' between UMNO and PAS and provided the opportunity
for developing practical, if not co-operative, Centre-Kelantan
relations. Not coincidentally, Central Government assistance, based on
the policy of equalisation just then resurrected, was provided for 
69Kelantan. UMNO-PAS relations, however, remained competitive but 
were conducted within the coalition and Centre-Ke lantan relations 
accordingly remained relations of power. Thus the question of dominance 
within the BN became crucial. UMNO had unreservedly arrogated and won 
dominance in the Alliance and this was re-enphasised before the BN's 
formation. In January, 1971 Tun Razak, then UMNO Deputy President and 
NOC Director, declared:
"The source of strength of our government lies with the party 
[UMNO]. UMNO members and leaders must be responsible in 
determining the guidelines to co-ordinate the policies of the 
Government and those of the party so that aspirations for change 
among the people may be fulfilled".
66. Mansoor Marican, op.cit., p. 219.
67. ibid., p. 210.
68. The UMNO-PAS coalition was based on the 13-Point Agreement. See 
note 58. For a discussion on the BN's formation see ibid., pp. 
207-211 and Mauzy, op.cit., pp. 200-235.
69. See chp. 4.
70. Straits Times, 24.1.71.
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The non-Malay parties in the BN had accepted UMNO's dominance as a
political fact. PAS's response was reserved and contesting, especially
when, in its view, UMNO was attempting to extend its dominance into 
71Kelantan. Several events defined the relations of power between 
UMNO and PAS, hence of Centre and State, and these point towards UMNO's 
dominance. PAS found this inimical to its interests.
The 1974-1978 Period
The 1974 Parliamentary and State elections provided the first
electoral test for the BN. Despite the challenge in Kelantan frcm PAS
72dissidents , the BN' component parties wen all the seats
73allocated. Soon after, factionalism within Kelantan PAS re-emerged 
and this centred on the competition for the MB's post. In the Alliance- 
controlled States the MB was always chosen by the Alliance National 
President, simultaneously the PM and UMNO President. This practice 
emphasised UMNO’s dominance within the Alliance. Should PAS, however, 
after joining the BN submit itself to this procedure in the appointment 
of the Kelantan MB, for long its prerogative? This power was crucial in 
terms of perpetuating and securing Kelantan for PAS and ensuring that 
its members past accumulation of profits were not exposed by a hostile 
MB.
The PAS President, Da to Asri, as a Cabinet Minister, was 
conveniently out of the race but he wanted his nominee, Wan Ismail bin 
Wan Ibrahim, appointed as the MB.^ On him rested the hopes and 
fortunes of Asri's supporters in Kelantan and, if appointed, he
"would most likely prefer to salvage the interests of his 
immediate mentor, Dato Mohamad Asri, and close associates".
The PM, Tun Abdul Razak, the BN and UMNO President, rejected Asri's
choice. He nominated another PAS Assemblyman, Dato Mohamad Nasir. Nasir
was appointed the MB with Wan Ismail as the Deputy MB. Nasir was
considered a 'naive' politician by PAS but he was reputed to be
71. See Kamarudin Jaffar, "Malay political parties: An Interpretive
Essay", in Southeast Asian Affairs, 1979, Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) Ltd., 1979,
p. 125.
72. See Kershaw, op.cit., pp. 527-528 and Alias Mohamed, op.cit., pp. 
171-172.
73. PAS, with twenty-two State Assemblymen compared to UMNO's thirteen 
and MCA's one, was the dominant party in the Kelantan BN. See 
Appendix I.
74. The former PAS MB was Dato Ishak Lofti, a nephew of Dato Mohamad 
Asri. Wan Ismail Wan Ibrahim was the Deputy MB to Dato Ishak Lofti 
in 1974 and was also once the political secretary to Asri in 1973.
75. Alias Mohamed, op.cit., p. 171.
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scrupulously honest. Tun Razak's choice was deeply resented and
77PAS only reluctantly accepted it. Kelantan UMNO, however, we leaned
PAS held Tengku Razaleigh, Kelantan UMNO SLC's Chairman and
79Finance Minister, responsibe for rejecting its nominee. The Sultan
of Kelantan was also believed to be involved in rejecting PAS's 
80nominee. Nasir was clearly more acceptable to UMNO and it hoped that
through him many of the serious problems involving land and
administration in the State would be solved.
Within a week of becoming MB, Nasir announced that his first task
81was to wipe out corruption. UMNO leaders unequivocally endorsed the
82MB's honesty and supported his moves. Nasir invited the NBI to
83investigate the alleged corrupt practices of PAS leaders. He also
introduced policies that damaged the interests of several PAS leaders
and members. For example in 1975, without consulting his party, he
84cancelled a timber cortpany's lease covering 350,000 acres of land 
and thus claimed to have 'redeemed' it for Kelantan by paying M$3.5 
million as compensation to the company. The State Government borrowed 
the money frcm the Central Goverment through Razaleigh' s good 
offices.®^
As the MB, with UMNO's backing and access to Central resources, 
Nasir was in a position to build up his personal following in Kelantan. 
Asri, as a Cabinet Minister, was cut off from his Kelantan following and 
was thus unable to counter Nasir's every move. Nasir's hold on Kelantan 
PAS, however, was tenuous. He lacked the backing of the men who
76. See Kamlin, M., "The Storm before the Deluge: in Crouch, H., et.al., 
Malaysian Politics and the 1978 Elections, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford 
University Press, 1980, p. 38.
77. Kamarudin Jaffar, cp.cit., p. 215. Asri, in the midst of the PAS 
conflict with Nasir in 1977, admitted that the late Tun Razak's 
appointment of Nasir as the MB of Kelantan was a fait accompli 
and that PAS reluctantly agreed because it wanted to safeguard the 
newly-formed BN. See New Straits Times (NST), 29.10.77.
78. Kamlin, op.cit., p. 38.
79. Kamarudin Jaffar, cp.cit., p. 217. See also Watan, 19.9.79.
80. Alias Mdhamed, op.cit., p. 171.
81. ibid., p. 172.
82. Kamarudin Jaffar, cp.cit., p. 217.
83. Alias Mohamed, op.cit., p. 172-173.
84. This was the much publicised 'land deal' mentioned earlier. As 
Mohamed Nasir recalled, the cancellation of the lease angered seme 
people. See The Star, 6.10.77; and Watan, 19.9.77; Kamarudin 
Jaffar, op.cit., p. 217.
85. ibid. Apparently the former PAS State Government had already 
decided to revoke the deal because it believed that the company had 
violated the agreement. For other examples, see The Star, 6.10.77; 
Alias Mohamed, op.cit., pp. 171-172; Utusan Melayu, 18.9.77; and 
Watan, 19.9.77.
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controlled the State and National PAS organisation.®® He thus had to
improve his political stocks. In June, 1975 Nasir challenged Asir for
87the PAS National Presidency, then held by Asri. Nasir's attempt 
failed but it sharpened factionalism in PAS.
Resentment towards Nasir led to demands, frcm within PAS, for
his resignation and this came from PAS members whose interests were
88damaged by Nasir's policies. They saw Nasir as having been
'captured' by UMNO, cultivating and becoming closer to UMNO leaders and
89apparently forgetting that he was a PAS nan. They also claimed that
he was following Razaleigh's directives rather than that of the PAS's
90SIC or even the State Exco. These soured relations between the Asri 
and Nasir factions and consequently also between UMNO and PAS.
Meanwhile, calls for a review of PAS's coalition with UMNO were
frequently made and were expressed for example, in the party' s Twenty-
91First Annual Congress of 1975. Leadership changes in UMNO further
strained UMNO-PAS relations because the new UMNO leaders were viewed as
92having little sympathy for PAS. PAS's dissatisfaction over the 
distribution of the benefits of coalition was also expressed.®® To 
this, UMNO leaders expressed irritation and maintained that "we have
9  A
given them more than we could afford". The PAS leaders were also
86. See Watan, 23.9.77.
87. Alias Mohamed, op.cit., p. 171.
88. ibid.
89. Bangkok Post, 11.11.77. See also Editorial, Utusan Melayu,
15.9.77.
90. Kamarudiii Jaffar, cp.cit., p. 217 and NST, 16.10.77.
91. Alias Mohamed, op.cit., p. 177. The threat of PAS's withdrawal was 
taken seriously and the BN and Kelantan UMNO did consider whether 
they could hold on to the State if PAS withdrew. See The Star,
11.8.76.
92. UMNO-PAS coalition negotiations were conducted by Tun Razak and 
Dr. Ismail, respectively the PM and Deputy PM and also the UMNO 
President and Deputy President, on the one hand, and Dato Asri, PAS 
President, and Abu Bakar Hamzah, on the other. See Mansoor 
Marican, op.cit., p. 209. Dr. Ismail and Tun Razak died in 1973 
and 1976 respectively. Asri had Abu Bakar Hamzah expelled frcm PAS 
in 1974. Only Asri was left to fulfil the various unwritten 
agreements between the two parties. Asri now had to conduct 
relations with Dato Hussein Qnn (the PM and UMNO President), Dr. 
Mahather (Deputy PM and UMNO's President) and Tengku Razaleigh 
(Finance Minister, UMNO's Vice-President and Chairman of Kelantan 
UMNO SLC). * Both Mahathir and Razaleigh have their respective 
political bases in PAS stronghold States of Kedah and Kelantan 
respectively. Kamarudin Jaffar suggested that both Mahathir and 
Razaleigh "perhaps saw the emasculation of PAS as one of the ways 
for strengthening UMNO in their States as well as maintainin their 
own standing within UMNO". Kamarudin Jaffar, op.cit., p. 217.
93. Alias Mohamed, op.cit., p. 177.
94. Quoted in ibid. The PAS dissatisfaction appeared to centre on its 
failure to penetrate the established institutions of society, like 
the bureaucracy and the army.
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persistently attempting to make cannon cause with extreme Islamic 
groups. During the 1977 PAS Annual General Assembly, for example, Asri 
expressed reservations, based on Islam, about the suitability of western 
democratic practice. These irritated UMNO leaders®® and further 
nourished the climate of mutual suspicion.
Many in PAS wanted to make a stand on the party's rights and 
interests within the coalition, especially in Kelantan. If not they 
might lose their Kelantan following to Nasir and UMNO. This stand came 
in 1977 and was directed at UMNO and Nasir. The resulting political 
conflict in Kelantan had its roots, however, in the divisions caused by 
the 1974 appointment of Nasir. According to a Malay newspaper 
editorial, the group opposed to Nasir
"disretui oleh beberapa pucuk pimpinan tertinggi PAS. Jadi 
jelaslah krisis yang berlaku sekarang bukan sesuatu yang baru, 
krisis ini sudah membengkak begitu lama".
[Translation:
"was supported by the highest level of the PAS leadership.
Clearly this crisis is not new and that it has been building up 
for a long time."]
Nasir had written to PAS President, Asri, indicating that he would
97retire on August 31, 1977. The date came and went without his 
resignation.
On September 10, 1977, the Kelantan PAS SLC, chaired by Dato Ishak
Lofti, demanded the resignation of Nasir for allegedly obstructing State
party affairs.®®Nasir, however, questioned the propriety of this
decision, taken without prior approval ofthe BN Supreme Council (SC) and
motivated by dissatisfaction over his anti-corruption policies; he 
99refused to resign. The PAS SLC, on September 11, 1977, gave notice 
of a motion of no-confidence against the MB to the SLA's Secretary.^-®® 
The PAS Religious Council, several National and State PAS leaders and 
other groups in Kelantan supported Nasir's stand.^®^ The National PAS
95. ibid., p. 178 and Kamarudin Jaffar, cp.cit., p. 216.
96. Utusan Melayu, 15.9.77.
97. Kamlin, op.cit., p. 40.
98. NST, 21.9.77. A group of 16 PAS Assemblymen had initially started
moves to demand the resignation of Nasir as MB. See Utusan Melayu,
14.9.77. He was given until September 20, 1977, to resign. See 
Berita Harian, 17.9.77. For Nasir's reasons as to why the PAS 
Assemblymen moved against him, see Utusan Melayu, 17.9.77, 18.9.77 
and 24.9.77.
99. The Star, 17.9.77 and 21.9.77. Nasir alleged that Asri was behind 
the PAS SLC's decision. He said that the PAS SLC met very soon 
after Asri appointed Lofti as its Chairman. See The Star, 19.9.77 
and Watan, 20.9.77.
100. NST, 21.9.77.
101. The Star, 21.9.77; Bintang Timor, 22.9.77; PAS alleged that 
Razaleigh and Kelantan UMNO supported Nasir. See Watan, 18.9.77.
383.
Central Executive Committee (CEC) meeting of September 26, 1977, chaired
102by Asri, demanded Nasir's resignation within three days. After
consulting Dr. Mahathir, then acting PM, Nasir announced that he would
not resign.'*'®® OnSeptember 29, 1977, the PAS CEC voted, although not
unanimously, to expel Nasir from PAS for not adhering to its earlier
decision. 1®^ This provoked several resignations from and sharpened
105the divisions within Kelantan PAS. Nasir announced that he would 
challenge the emulsion order in Court.
Expelled frcm PAS, Nasir was, in principle, no longer a BN member. 
Thus, as a party less MB he could not be protected by UMNO and MCA votes
in the SLA. Dato Hussein Qnn, the PM, BN and UMNO President, declared
106that the BN would also have to decide on this. Nasir urged the BN
to intervene but Asri argued against this, insisting that the conflict
107was an internal PAS affair. Later the PAS CEC's expulsion decision
was considered 'technically' invalid and Nasir was restored to PAS
membership.'*'®® However, a special PAS CEC meeting of October 10, 1977
109again decided by 13 votes to 7 to expel Nasir. With this Kelantan
PAS pursued its no-confidence motion in the SLA. This was a reassertion 
of PAS dominance in Kelantan. It challenged UMNO's presumption of 
dominance precisely by sacking the MB who was unmistakably UMNO's 
choice.
UMNO could not remain 'neutral'.11® Two days before the SLA
meeting the Kota Baru High Court restored Nasir to PAS membership.111
At the October 15, 1977 meeting of the SLA the no-confidence motion
against the MB was passed: surprisingly, all 20 PAS Assemblymen voted
for and Nasir, 12 UMNO and 1 MCA Assemblymen walked out while the votes 
112were counted. Hussein Ahmad, the UMNO leader in the SLA, declared
102. The Star, 27.9.77. See also Utusan Melayu, 28.9.77 and Berita 
Harian, 1.10.77.
103. NST, 28.9.77 and 29.9.77.
104. ibid., 30.9.77 and The Star, 30.9.77.
105. See NST, 3-4.10.77 and The Star, 3-4.10.77.
106. The Star, 1.10.77.
107. See NST, 3.10.77 and 5.10.77, and The Echo, 5.10.77. Dr. Mahathir, 
indicating that UMNO had prepared a report for Hussein ONN, 
supported Nasir's suggestion that the PM should resolve the crisis. 
See NST, 8.10.77.
108. The Star, 5.10.77 and NST, 7.10.77.
109. NST, 11.10.77 and The Star, 11.10.77.
110. The 13 UMNO and 1 MCA Assemblymen had tacitly supported Nasir, 
apparently with the prodding of Razaleigh. See Watan, 19.9.77.
See also Utusan Melayu, 12.10.77 and NST, 13.10.77.
111. NST, 14.10.77 and The Star, 14.10.77^
112. The Star, 16.10.77. See also The Star, 17.10.77. It was later 
revealed that PAS Assemblymen were not united over the no- 
confidence motion. Hussein Yaakob (Assemblyman for Telipot), on 
resigning as PAS Kota Baru Division Deputy President, revealed that 
several PAS Assemblymen had opposed the motion. If the voting had
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that UMNO would not co-operate with any new State Government formed hy
1 1 3 .the same PAS group. Nasir, encouraged by massive public
demonstration of support, requested the Regent of Kelantan for the SLA's 
dissolution.11^  The 20 PAS Assemblymen had apparently written to the
Regent before the SLA meeting requesting him not to dissolve the SLA if
115requested by the MB. The Regent, not supnsingly, tried to sit on
the fence.
The Kelantan PAS SLC, meanwhile, had decided on an al 1-PAS line-up
for a new State Government with a new MB, one of the 20 PAS 
116Assemblymen. PAS hinted that his line-up could form the new BN
117
State Government. Asri justified UMNO's exclusion by referring to 
the example of Sabah where the State Government was made up of only one 
party (Berjaya)and excluded the other (United Sabah National
lip
Organisation - USNO) which was also a BN member. Razaleigh
insisted that Hussein Qnn must approve PAS's line-up and that the BN
119concept required UMNO's inclusion. Asri replied that UMNO's
participation depended on the Kelantan PAS SLC and the new PAS MB whose
1 20name would be submitted to Hussein Onn for approval. It seemed 
that, with the Regent's indecision over the SLA's dissolution, Nasir's 
unwillingness to resign, and no agreement between UMNO and PAS over the 
composition of a new State Government, a political impasse had emerged. 
Negotiations between UMNO, PAS and Nasir were begun and three 'peace'
formulae were presented and discussed but the political impasse remained
121 . unresolved. UMNO and PAS were not able to agree on this: which
party should appoint the new MB and determine the composition of the
112. (Cont.) been secret, he and several other PAS Assemblymen would 
have voted against. Not all branches and divisions of State PAS 
organization supported Asri and Kelantan PAS leaders. See The 
Star, 22.11.77 and Utusan Melayu, 22.11.77.
113. UMNO Exco members were also expected to resign. See ibid.
114. The Star, 17.10.77. The Sultan of Kelantan was then the Supreme 
Monarch or Yang Di-Pertuan Agong of the Federation. Support for 
Nasir was expressed in several public demonstrations, several of 
which degenerated into violence and were followed by the 
impositions of curfews. See NST, 20-23.10.77. PAS alleged that 
these demonstrations were stage-managed by UMNO. See Bangkok Post
11.11.77.
115. NOT, 18.10.77.
116. ibid.
117. The Star, 18.10.77 and NOT, 17.10.77 and 19.10.77.
118. NOT, 17.10.77.
119. ibid.
120. NOT, 19.10.77 and The Star, 19.10.77.
121. For the first formula and arguments over it, see The Star, 23- 
25.10.77 and 28.10.77, and NST, 28.10.77. For the second formula 
and arguments over it, see The Star, 26.10.77 and NOT, 27-
29.10.77, 31.10.77 and 1.11.77. For the final formula and 
arguments over it, see NOT, 2-3.11.77 and 7-8.11.77.
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State Exco. PAS considered this to be its prerogative in Kelantan bat
UMNO was not willing to concede this even in Kelantan. Five PAS members
122in the Central Government resigned subsequently.
On November 8, 1977, a State of Emergency was declared and Kelantan
1 2 3placed under Central authority. A Director of Government, directly
responsible to the PM, with all the authority, powers, duties and
functions of the MB and State Exco was appointed to administer Kelantan.
1 24.The Director, Hashim Aman , was advised by a State Advisory
Council'*'of which he was the Chairman. The PM admitted that this,
politically, would reduce the MB, Exco and SLA to mere "puppets".126
Nasir and 3 UMNO Assemblymen remained as MB and Exco members respectively.
The status of PAS within the BN, however, remained to be settled. The
UMNO SEC meeting of December 9, 1977, decided that, to maintain BN party
discipline, PAS should be given until December 13 to expel those PAS MPs
1 2 7who voted against the Emergency Bill or face expulsion frcm the BN.
Hussein Onn explained that this decision was aimed primarily at the
present PAS leadership and if, after the party was expelled,
"a new leadership takes over later and apply to rejoin the Barisan 
we will consider their request".
The BN SC endorsed UMNO's decision. PAS duly refused to comply and
on December 14, 1977 Asri announced that PAS considered itself expelled
122. NST, 9.11.77. These included Asri (Minister of Land and Regional
Development, Abu Bakar Umar (Deputy Minister of Health), Mustapha 
Ali (Deputy Minister of Science, Technology and Environment),
Zahari Awang (Parliamentary Secretary to the Housing and Village 
Development Ministry), and Hj. Abdul Wahab Yunus (Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Ministry of Finance). PAS Deputy President,
Hassan Adli (Minister of Local Government and Federal Territory), 
did not resign and was expelled frcm the party by the PAS CEC. See 
NST, 9.11.77. The PAS also directed the six PAS Exco members in 
Kelantan to resign. See NST, 17.11.77 and The Star, 17.11.77. In 
Trengganu, initially, PAS continued to support the BN State 
Government but later PAS State Exco members resigned. See The 
Star, 15.12.77.
123. The Emergency Powers (Kelantan) Bill, 1977. See discussion in chp. 
2.
124. A senior Malaysian Administrative and Diplomatic Service Officer 
who, before the appointment, was Secretary-General of the Ministry 
of Defence.
125. This Council comprised the State Secretary, State Financial 
Officer, State Legal Adviser, the State Director of Lands and 
Mines, the Chief Police Officer and up to four other officers to be 
appointed by the FM.
126. The Star, 9.11.77.
127. ibid., 10.12.77.
128. NST, 1.11.77.
129. The Star, 14.12.77.
386.
frcm the BN.^® On Decmeber 17, PAS was expelled frcm the BN.
Meanwhile, Nasir announced the formation of another party, Barisan
Jumaah Islamiah Malaysia (Berjasa), and pledged co-operation with
UMNO. The split within PAS had new taken organisational form.
For about two months before Central rule, the Kelantan State
Goverment was paralysed. Under the State Constitution the Regent could
dissolve the SLA in preparation for new State elections but he was
indecisive. Hussein Onn explained that this was probably because the
Regent feared that his decision might create friction among the various 
1 3 2groups. The Regent's indecision, possibly prcmpted by fatherly
advice of the Sultan of Kelantan, indicated keen interest in the
. . . . . 1 3 3political manouevenngs within PAS and between PAS and UMNO.
On February 12, 1978, after a four-month period of very 'dynamic'
State Government by a development-orientated Federal Director, Emergency
rule was lifted. Full governing powers were returned to Nasir and the
three UMNO Exco members. After the MB's request the Regent
dissolved the SLA on February 13, 1978. A caretaker State Government
l 3Rwith Nasir as MB, Hussein Yaakob as Deputy MB, and the previous
1 Ifithree UMNO Exco members was formed. A partial UMNO-Berjasa
electoral pact was agreed for the State elections scheduled on March 11, 
1 371978. In the elections PAS won only two seats, UMNO twenty-two
1 3 8seats, MCA one seat and Berjasa eleven seats. A BN State
Government was formed with an UMNO MB and several Berjasa Assemblymen as 
1 3 9Exco members. Thus, UMNO dominance in Kelantan, lost in 1959, was 
re-established and Kelantan ceased to be the exception to the rule.
130. ibid., 15.12.77.
131. ibid., 13.12.77.
132. ibid., 9.11.77.
133. It is difficult to ascertain the role of the Regent and the Sultan 
of Kelantan in this beyond speculation. As noted earlier, Asri and 
his PAS faction were not the Sultan's favourites. See note 80.
The Regent's indecision might be because of the Sultan's atterrpts, 
but unsuccessful, to find an acceptable alternative to the Asri 
faction.
134. NST, 13.2.78. All the PAS Exco members had resigned after the 
imposition of Central rule.
135. The PAS Assemblymen who had earlier declared his support for Nasir. 
See note 112.
136. The Echo, 14.2.78 and NOT, 14.2.78.
137. NOT, 16-182.78. There was a partial BN-Berjasa electoral pact 
which covered 23 seats. Of these UMNO contested ten, MCA one and 
Berjasa 12 seats against PAS. Of these seats UMNO won 9, MCA 1, 
Berjasa 11 and PAS 2 seats. There were three-cornered contests 
(not including Independents) involving UMNO, PAS and Berjasa in 13 
seats. UMNO won all 13 seats. See NOT, 23.2.78 and 13.3.78.
138. See Appendix I. See also NST, 15.2.78. For an account of the 
election see Kamlin, cp.cit., pp. 37-68.
139. NOT, 20.3.78 and The Star, 24.3.78. Former MB, Nasir, would be 
appointed a Cabinet Minister.
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Discussion and Conclusion
The federal system, by providing opportunities for a party to win 
power at the State level had made possible the exception of Kelantan 
controlled by an opposition party. Although the Peninsula Malaysia 
Federation is a tight one with a very strong Centre, States are provided 
with certain powers, especially over land1^ , and can be effective 
centres of political patronage with which the governing party can reward 
loyal and potential supporters. The PAS Government in Kelantan used 
such powers to disburse patronage and resist the implementation of 
Centrally-financed development projects.
The PAS used Kelantan as the political base from which to 
challenge UMNO's pretentions as the pre-eminent Malay party and its 
model of multi-ccmnunal integration. In this way PAS was able to 
nourish the dedication and hope of its members in other States and it 
hoped to displace UMNO as the pre-eminent party at the Centre. For 
UMNO, PAS-controlled Kelantan had to be tamed lest the exception 
eventually became the rule. For PAS, Kelantan as an indispensable
140. The Central Government has substantial powers which could be used 
to challenge States' power over land, especially in the field of 
national development. These powers, for example, under Article 92 
of the Constitution, have not been used, so far, by the Central 
Government to corrpell a State to alienate State land for National 
Development purposes.
141. A somewhat similar exception was also represented by Singapore 
when it was still in the Federation and then controlled by the 
Peeples Action Party (PAP). The PAP's challenge to the Alliance's 
multi-ccmnunal integrative and developmental strategy proved to be 
more unmanageable and eventually led to what can be termed as 
'divorce by agreement' of Singapore frcm the Federation in 1965.
See Leifer, M., "Singapore in Malaysia: The Politics of
Federation", Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 6, No. 2, 
Sept. 1965, pp. 54-70; Milne, R.S., "Malaysia: Internal Strains and 
Stresses", Australia's Neighbours, 4th Series, No. 11-12, Jan-Feb., 
1964, pp. 1-3; Milne, R.S., "Singapore's Exit frcm Malaysia: The 
Consequence of Ambiguity", Asian Survey, Vol. 6, No. 3, March 1966, 
pp. 175-184? Parmer, N.J., "Malaysia 1965: Challenging the Terms of 
1957", Asian Survey, Vol. 6, No. 2, February 1966, pp. 111-118. 
PAP's Singapore was similar to PAS's Kelantan in that the 
opposition to the Alliance and UMNO Centre was ccmrrunally based on 
the Chinese and Malays respectively. Similarly, the Gerakan 
Rakyat Malaysia's (GRM-Peoples' Movement of Malaysia) success in 
winning control of the State Government of the predominantly 
Chinese Penang in 1969 posed a threat to the Centre. Unlike 
Kelantan and Penang, Singapore had more formal and financial pcwers 
within the Federation and the PAP could sustain a Singapore-based 
apposition to the Centre, just like a Parti-Quebecois' opposition 
to Ottawa. Singapore's belligerent opposition to the Centre could 
presumably be stepped in its track by the imposition of Central 
rule through a declaration of Emergency in Singapore by Parliament. 
However, as long as Singapore remained within the Federation, with 
its consitutional pcwers and rights intact, the Singapore problem 
would remain and could continue to be the base for opposition
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142power base had to be maintained and secured. Consequently, UMNO-PAS 
competition for control of Kelantan generated Centre-State tensions but 
without the federal system that competition could not have been so 
effective. Thus, the combination of communal and national politics with 
the federal system provides added significance to States as centres of 
power. As Enloe correctly emphasised,
"The importance of state regimes and thus state level politics in 
western Malaysia [Peninsula Malaysia] stemmed from their relation­
ship to the model of national ethnic integration on which the 
Alliance [UMNO] has staked its power".
PAS claims to be a National party and appeals to State and 
National electorates. Support for PAS, however, has been consistently 
strongest in Kelantan. Its success varies directly with the 'Malayness' 
of States - the degree of Malay concentration in each State. That this 
kind of situation can provide the basis for regionalism in a federation 
was suggested by Hicks and supported by Watts and Means. However, 
the 'Malayness' or homogeneity of States as such cannot adequately 
explain PAS's success in Kelantan. It is the elements or ingredients 
making this 'Malayness' specifically 'Kelantanese' that are crucial.
These include the socio-economic and cultural milieu, the pattern of 
divisions and elite competition, and the patron-client links in Kelantan 
society. These define Kelantan's 'regionalness' and, after PAS captured
141 (cont.)parties to argue their respective cases against the Centre. 
Mutually 'agreed' separation was the option taken to solve the 
Singapore problem. With Singapore's departure the racial balance. 
Nationally, returned to one of Malay dominance. With the benefit 
of hindsight, the separation of Singapore frcm the 
Federation was contrary to Emerson's belief that communal 
distribution throughout the country prevents any geographical 
possibility for separation. See Emerson, R., Representative 
Government, in Southeast Asia, Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, 1955, p.91.
142. See Ratnam, K.J., and Milne, R.S., The Malayan Parliamentary 
Elections of 1964, pp. 154 and 193. See also Kershaw, op.cit., 
p. 524 and Appendix B. 'State's rights has an added meaning to 
PAS and for this reason, as Kershaw suggested, it supported the 
assertion by Kalong Ningkan, the Chief Minister of Sarawak, of 
State's rights in his conflict with the Centre in 1966. See 
Kershaw "Politics in Kelantan, West Malaysia", p. 59. This case 
is discussed in chp. 2.
143. Enloe, C.H., "The Neglected Strata: States in the City-Federal 
politics of Malaysia", Publius, Spring 1975, p. 157.
144. See "Discussion" in Hicks, U.K., et.al., Federalism and Econcmic 
Grcwth in Underdeveloped Countries, London, Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 
1961, p. 65; Whtts, R.L., Multicultural Societies and Federalism, 
Studies of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 
Ottawa, Information Canda, 1971, p. 2; Means, G.P., "Federalism in 
Malaya and Malaysia", in Serbyn, R., ed., Federalisme et nations, 
Montreal, Presses de l'Univ. du Quebec, 1971, pp. 236-237; and 
Dikshit, R., The Political Geography of Federalism: an inquiry into 
origins and stability, Macmillan Co., India, 1975, p. 236.
pcwer here, its 'political distance' vis-a-vis the Centre and other
1 4 5  . .States seemed complete. As such, several conditions and interests
were and still are present. 'Malayness' helps toy making Kelantan a
fully-fledged Malay society and therety creating conditions
"wherein modem politics were intra-Malay politics centering upon 
divisions within Malay society rather than (as elsewhere in the 
peninsula) being dominated ... toy interethnic issues".
PAS used these ingredients and conditions to successfully mobilize the
Kelantanese for competitive and electoral politics against UMNO, its
success in this was considerably influenced toy the active support it
received frcm the leaders of rural society, especially religious 
1 4 7leaders - the gurus, mubhalirs and imams - who were and still are
influential as cpinion-leaders. UMNO tried to win their support through
1 4 8financial and other inducements. PAS's success was rooted in the
1 4.Q
conditions and interests derived frcm within Kelantan itself.
Thus, PAS was a firmly Kelantan-based, if not a Kelantan, party.
In the other States PAS's conpetitive and electoral performances 
were poor and uneven. It won control of Trengganu in 1959 but lost it 
in 1962 after an UMNO-inspired defection. Only in the 1969 elections 
did it achieve reasonable success in Trengganu and Kedah, signficantly 
the States 'closest' to Kelantan. UMNO was and remains dominant in the 
other States. Several reasons account for this. First, the distinctive 
conditions and interests in Kelantan were not present to the same degree 
in other States. In Kelantan these have produced, for example, a 
tradition of competition between the traditional and non-traditiona 1 
elites which was expressed after Independence in terms of UMNO-PAS 
rivalry. No similar tradition of similar scale and significance 
wasexpressed in other States. In these Statesthere was competition for 
influence, if not control, of the State tout these were essentially
145. Similarly Nash wrote that Kelantan "has a cultural cast, an 
economic pattern, a social organization, and a political stance 
that differentiates it from the larger society and political 
system of which it is a party. Nash, "Ethnicity, Centrality and 
Education in Pasir Mas", p. 243. Sane would argue that the 
distinctive Kelantanese political stance is embedded in its 
political culture, described toy Kershaw as the "orientation 
towards opposition". See Kershaw, "The 'East Coast' in Malayan 
Politics", p. 529, note 39, and p. 531.
146. Kessler, op.cit., p. 281.
147. Ratnam and Milne, cp.cit., p. 190.
148. ibid., p. 415.
149. Kessler, op.cit., p. 293. See also Moore, cp.cit., p.75.
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intra-traditional elite affairs. UMNO, however, had co-opted such 
1 5 0elites Who before Independence were involved in 'court'
politics. Not surprisingly UMNO also fell heir to the traditional
1 59factionalism dividing the traditional elites. UMNO also
1 5 3successfully recruited lesser elites - like Malay school teachers.
Thus, in these States UMNO successfully co-opted the power structure 
within Malay society Which was used successfully to mobilize the Malays. 
Means argues that
"In most instances, UMNO merely incorporated existing Malay 
political and administrative office holders into the party, thus 
capitalizing on a political ccmrunication and authority system 
already in existence".
In these States, unlike Kelantan, electoral and party politics
emphasised the durability of the traditional acceptance of the
traditional elites' leadership. This implies a difference in the
political culture and tradition between that in Kelantan and that in
other States, especially concerning political attitudes of ordinary
Malays to the States' traditional elites.
This leads to the second reason Which refers to the role of rural
and religious elites in Malay society. In Kelantan PAS was successful
in mobilizing such elements in opposition to UMNO. In the other States,
however, according to Ratnam and Milne,
"the Alliance (UMNO) often had the upper hand; this, however, was 
not of equal significance since in these states the religious 
elites were both less active and less politicallyinfluential.
This difference is perhaps best explained in terms of the more 
traditional nature of Kelantan society, a fact Which has helped to 
sustain the influence of traditional cpinion-leaders. Helped by 
the continuance of traditional values and relationships, there was 
also proportionately a greater number of religious leaders in that 
State".155
150. See Means, Malaysian Politics, p. 194; Moore, cp.cit., p. 63.
See also note 14.
151. For a discussion of such 'court* politics see Gullick, J.M., The 
Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya, London, The Athlcne
Press, 1958.
152. Moore, cp.cit., pp. 63-63 and 330.
153. Means, cp.cit., p. 195.
154. ibid., p. 21.
155. Ratnam and Milne, cp.cit., p. 415 and chp. lX(a). The position and 
importance of religious leaders in Kelantan society was sustained 
by a pattern of social organization within Which religion and 
religious education were emphasised especially through the suraus 
and pondok system.
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In short, because the other States were less traditional in nature, the 
religious elites were proportionately smaller in number and less active 
and politically influential than in Kelantan. Further, their 
allegiance, together with that of other lesser elites, was to UMNO.
Thus, those elaments of society that PAS depended on and successfully 
mobilized in Kelantan were in the other States supporting UMNO.
In the competition for control of Kelantan, between 1959 and 1969, 
UMNO had several things in its favour. First, it had ready access to 
the Centre's resources which it used to undermine the PAS Government's 
effectiveness. Second, there was no viable alternative to the UMNO- 
dcminated Alliance at the Centre. Nevertheless, PAS retained control of 
Kelantan, although its electoral support declined. It failed to win 
control of the Centre and its only prospect of winning pcwer remained 
confined to the State level.
After the 1969 elections, several reasons drew the two implacable 
foes into a coalition. Hcwever, UMNO-PAS rivalry persisted and centred 
on the issue of dominance within the BN. Both attempted to cultivate 
and consolidate their hold on the Malays. Already PAS had to pay a high 
price for joining the BN when, after the 1974 elections, the PM selected 
the MB. The political crisis of 1977 having its roots in the 1974 
appointment of Nasir was shaped by the unrelenting UMNO-PAS rivalry. 
Intentionally or not, this appointment worked to UMUO's benefit for 
several reasons. First, Nasir, cpposed by the Asri faction who 
controlled the Kelantan PAS SLC and National PAS CEC, was made dependent 
on UMNO and the Centre. Second, encouraged by UMNO, Nasir became the 
focal point for the coalescence of an alternative Kelantan PAS 
leadership. With access to Central resources, he was capable of 
widening his personal following in Kelantan to the detriment of the Asri 
group. Consequently, and third, internal divisions were generated and 
these hampered and weakened Kelantan PAS. The Asri group, threatened by 
Nasir's moves against corruption and facing the prospect of the 
irretrievable loss of its Kelantan following, initiated moves within PAS 
and the SLA to oust Nasir as MB.
Nasir was duly expelled frcm PAS and voted out in the SLA.
Hcwever, supported by UMNO, he did not resign and, intriguingly the
156. On this Ratnam and Milne wrote: "As long as the PMIP attempts to
consolidate its support through unccmpromising religious propaganda 
and by evoking hostile feelings towards the non-Malays, it will 
forfeit all chances of ever gaining control of the Central 
Government. Its tactics may have been ideally suited to help it to 
come to pcwer in Kelantan and Trengganu in 1959, but they can have 
little appeal in the more advanced states in western and southern 
Malaya". Ratnam and Milne, op.cit., p. 51.
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Regent did not dissolve the SLA on Nasir*s request. UMNO-PAS 
negotiations to overcome the impasse proved fruitless. With each new 
round of negotiations UMNO, sensing an opportunity and gaining in 
confidence, hardened its attitude and PAS was finally presented with an 
ultimatum. PAS rejected this and Central rule was imposed.
The period of Central rule provided the opportunity for 
advertising the determination of the Centre and of UMNO to establish, in 
contrast to PAS, a clean, efficient and effective State Government 
especially by introducing and accelerating development projects. The 
PAS leaders, discredited by allegations of corruption, dispirited and 
disunited, were further weakened by the loss of its support to the new 
Berjasa party. UMNO sensed that the opportunity to regain dominance in 
Kelantan had arrived and suddenly on February 12, 1978, Emergency rule 
m s  lifted, the SLA dissolved and State elections scheduled. In the 
elections PAS, facing a partial UMNO-Ber jasa pact, performed abysmally 
and lost its dominance to UMNO.
Several reasons accounted for PAS's failure to secure Kelantan 
as the exception. First, UMNO's ruthlessness in pursuing its self- 
appointed task. Second, PAS, discredited, dispirited, disunited and 
burdened by a history of administrative inefficiency, corruption and 
internecine factionalism, had its previous pure soul and image 
successfully challenged by, if not lost to, a devout and self-effacing 
Nasir and his Berjasa party. Consequently, the Kelantan PAS was unable 
to mobilize its traditionalKelantan following who were already divided, 
bewildered and disenchanted. PAS's task was made more difficult by 
UMNO-Ber jasa co-cperation. Third, UMNO's access to Central resources 
enabled it to cultivate and secure the support of followers and clients. 
It suggests that UMNO-promised development, which had failed to convince 
the Kelantanese before 1978, was acceptable as long as it was not 
perceived as corrupting. Fourth, the pace of events after the no- 
confidence vote worked to UMNO's advantage. If the Regent had 
immediately dissolved the SLA and PAS was still a BN member it might 
have performed better. Then UMNO still believed that PAS's hold on the 
Kelantanese was strong. Thus, even if UMNO had wanted to discipline PAS 
for provoking the crisis, it probably would not expel PAS frcm the BN 
for fear that PAS might still have won Kelantan and then take Kelantan 
back to its pre-coalition 'independent' ways. Furthermore, an inmediate 
expulsion of PAS could have worked to its advantage by portraying it to 
Kelantanese as the innocent victim of the Centre's pcwer play. The delay 
thus enabled UMNO to gauge and undermine PAS's support and to generate a
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sense of crisis and urgency which provided the excuse for the imposition 
of Central rule. PAS's expulsion frcm the BN followed soon after.
After Central rule was withdrawn UMNO, newly confident, offered only a
partial pact to Berjasa but still won all 13 three cornered contests in
157 . . .the State elections. PAS would have done better if it had still
been in the BN.
Frcm 1959 to 1978 several phases of Centre-Ke lantan relations can 
be identified. First, between 1959 and 1969 when the relations were 
shaped by intense UMNO-PAS competition thereby emphasizing the 
'political distance' between UMNO and PAS and between Centre and 
Kelantan. Second, after NOC rule, between 1971 and 1977 when UMNO-PAS 
competition was conducted witin the BN thereby blurring somewhat the 
'political distance' between UMNO and PAS and providing the basis for 
practical Centre-Ke lantan relations. Third, during Central rule and the 
1978 elections when UMNO won control of Kelantan thereby returning it to 
the dominant pattern of Centre-State relations. Throughout the three 
phases State and National UMNO leaders employed the resources of the 
Centre.
The Kelantan case suggests that several other conditions, apart 
frcmthe federal system, are required to secure the survival of State- 
based parties. First, the presence and importance of State-derived 
economic, social, political and cultural forces in the State's political 
process. A party can then feed on and reflect these forces in mobilizing 
State voters. PAS's ability to do this largely contributed to its 
success in Kelantan. A second requirement is unity and cohesion in the 
State-based party. Not coincidentally, PAS, weakened by divisions and 
a formal split failed to mobilize the Kelantan voters and suffered 
electorally in 1978. Third, State-based parties must come to a 
practical and working arrangement with an UMNO-dcminated Centre 
especially so within the tightly-knit Federation of Peninsula Malaysia. 
This is premised on the fact that the State Government's effectiveness 
depends on Central assistance and there is no viable alternative to an 
UMNO-dcminated Centre. Furthermore, can it's past records, UMNO will 
assert its dominance at the Centre or State by almost any means. Thus, 
at the very least, State-based parties controlling State Governments 
must accept, grudgingly perhaps, UMNO' s dominance and approach to multi- 
canrrunal integration in return for Central assistance which is crucial 
in establishing an effective State Government.
The Federal system, to function effectively, requires a State and
157. See Note 137.
National leadership that is tolerant of political diversities. The 
Kelantan case suggests that although Central UMNO leaders were 
implacably opposed to PAS-contro 1 led Kelantan, it was nevertheless 
tolerated for a long time. This does not mean that they eschewed any 
conceivable opportunity to undermine PAS in Kelantan. It does mean, 
however, that Central leaders - whatever their wnshes - simply have to 
tolerate State-based oppositions which are invulnerable in their State.
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Conclusion: The Federal Factor 
Harold Laski's insistence over the end of federalism'1' 
was premature; as it turned out and as Max Beloff indicated,
federalism and the federal device were becoming increasingly
2
popular. For Peninsula Malaysia, as a whole, the federal
device was first used in the establishment of the Federation
of Malaya in 19^ -8 and, subsequently, the Independent
Federation of Malaya in 1957*
The resort to the federal device may not necessarily
be 'logically* suggested by the history of Peninsula
Malaysia. Nevertheless, history played its part. Camell
puts it rather strongly:
"In Malaya, federalism was as inevitable as in 
Nigeria. It was the outcome of the British system 
of ruling through the sultans of protected Malay 
States, and a response to the problems posed by the 
survival of nine Malay monarchies. In 19^6 the 
mystique of monarchy was so strong among local 
British officials and Malay nationalists as to rule 
out any possibility of the formal apparatus of a 
unitary state." 3
r
Thus, the historical net has to be cast backwards to the 
Pre-British period precisely because the institutions of 
the Sultanate in each State - on which British rule was 
founded - were the heart of the indigenous political system
Ll
which in turn had its roots in the Malacca Sultanate. As 
Bedlington argued
1. Laski, H.J., "The Obsolescence of Federation", The New 
Republic, Vol. LXXXXV111, No. 12?4, May 3. 1939. P. 369.
2. Beloff, M. , "The 'Federal Solution' in its Application 
to Europe, Asia, and Africa", Political Studies, Vol. 1, 
No. 2, June 1953» P- 11^ . For a recent study of the 
federal idea see Davis, S.R., The Federal Principle:
A Journey Through Time in Quest of a Meaning, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 197^ .
3. Carnell, F.G., "Political Implications of Federalism in 
New States", in Hicks, U.K., et.al., Federalism and 
Economic Growth in Underdeveloped Countries, London, 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961, p. 5^ .
Bedlington, S.S., Malaysia and Singapore: the building of 
new states, Cornell University Press, 1978, p. 28. For a 
good account of the indigenous political system in 
Peninsula Malaysia, see Gullick, J.M., Indigenous 
Political System of Western Malaya, London, University 
of London, The Athlone Press, 1969*
"The pattern of indigenous political culture 
established by the Malacca Sultanate has thus given 
an aura of legitimacy to its succesors [the nine 
Malay monarchies} on which to erect a federalized 
state system rather than one central political 
authority." 5
But the impact of history in the vari ous States was, 
unsurprisingly, neither unilinear nor even. The conequences 
of this differential impact were manifested in the 
establishment of three separate political units - the 
Unfederated Malay States (UFMS), Federated Malay States (FMS) 
and Straits Settlement States - covering Peninsula Malaysia, 
in the different patterns of economic organization and 
activities, and in the different patterns of social, 
cultural and communal developments. Centralisation and 
uniformity of rule and administration were goals pursued by 
the British but these were not evenly achieved in all States, 
thus indicating the differing levels of resistance and 
resilience of States V indigenous systems . What emerged were 
States with dissimilar political and administrative 
traditions, economic structures and stages of development, 
and communal composition. In each State the Sultan was and 
still remains the symbol of authority, if not the focus of 
loyalty. These then were the legacies upon which the federal 
device was placed. In that sense the presence of federalism 
in Peninsula Malaysia may be attributed to the existence of 
political distinctions bounded by the political role of the 
Sultans and their States^ and the powerful loyalties, 
especially among Malays, attracted by the Sultans and the 
States. It may also, by extension, be attributed to the 
different patterns of social, cultural, and communal 
development in the various States and the differences in 
their economic activities and levels of economic development.
5. ibid.
6. The view of Bedlington. See ibid., p.1^ 2.
7* The view of Milne. See Milne, R.S., "Politics and
Government", in Wang Gung Wu, ed., Malaysia : A Survey, 
London, Pall Mall Press, 1964, p. 324.
8. The view of Pye. See Pye, L.W., "Federalism in Malaya", 
in Livingston, W.S., ed., Federalism in the Commonwealth:
A Bibliographical Commentary, London, The Hansard Society, 
1963, p. 159.
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Such territorially-contained diversities do indeed still 
presist.
The federal device and with this the federal element 
- that is, the relations between Centre and States - in 
Peninsula Malaysia is manifested in four main features: the 
Constitution, finance, administrative organisations and one- 
party dominance. The Constitution formally orders the 
relations between the Centre and States. In this the initial 
act of choice as to what should be emphasised in this 
relationship was crucial: the Reid Commission was directed 
to establish a strong Centre and provide the States only 
with a "measure of autonomy". The Commission’s 
recommendations and the 1957 constitutional provisions 
placed the Centre in a strong position vis-a-vis the States 
and the Centre ever since has been getting stronger. The 
States of Peninsula Malaysia have been constitutionally on 
an equal footing. This has a double aspect: first, the 
constitutional provisions relate all States to the Centre in 
the same way* second, the Constitution insists that the 
internal constitutional structure of all States must be 
identical in certain specific and important repects.
The strength of the Centre is overwhelming in the area 
of finance. The Constitution provided for this by allocating 
to the Centre almost complete taxing powers. The 
Constitution also provided the Centre with the responibility 
of undertaking and financing national economic development. 
With its massive financial resources it alone is well-placed 
to face the task. However, the Constitution is silent as to 
how it should pursue this, except by requiring that such 
development should be in the ’national interest'. Thus, at 
the informal and extra-constitutional plane, the Central 
Government’s national economic development planning also 
shapes the actual organisation of Centre-State financial 
relations. States are financially weak and dependent on the 
Centre but in different degrees* unevenness characterises 
the nature of Centre-State financial relations.
The strength of the Centre is also overwhelming in the 
administrative sphere. The Constitution again has provided 
the Centre with substantial powers in this respect. Three 
points need emphasis. First, there is a qualitative 
difference between the federalised bureaucracies of States
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of the former FMS and Straits Settlements, on the one hand, 
and the non-federalised bureaucracies of the States of the 
former UFMS, on the other. This difference is provided for 
and protected by the Federal Constitution, thus placing 
States in this regard on a clearly uneven basis. Second, and 
consequently, the Centre's administrative penetration of the 
States (or the States' administrative dependence on the 
Centre) is uneven. States with non-federalised bureaucracies, 
as the case of Kedah suggests, are better able to resist 
such penetratidn and consequently are less dependent on the 
Centre. Finally, the Centre's administrative dominance has 
been further emphasised by its dominant role in national 
development planning and implementation. All these factors 
join to define Centre-State administrative relations« these 
are characterised by the albeit uneven Central administrative 
dominance over and penetration of the States.
One-party (UMNO) dominance at both the Centre and State 
levels has done much to shape Cente-State relations. UMNO is 
centrally and tightly organized. Substantial powers are 
located at the Centre of the party and with Central control 
and loyalty to the Centre being its modus operandi. UMNO 
dominance thus further centralizes power and strengthens the 
already strong Centre of the Federation. When one-party 
dominates both the Centre and State then the internal 
politics of that party shape Centre-State relations and 
define the relations of power between the Centre and State, 
as discussed in the Pahang case. When, however, different 
political parties control the Centre and State then inter­
party competition shapes Centre-State relations and define 
the relations of power between the Centre and State, as 
discussed in the Kelantan case. The former and latter are 
indeed opposite poles on the axis of 'political distance'. 
With UMNO's capture of Kelantan in 1978* and apart from 
Penang, the 'political distance' between the Centre and 
State was and is determined by the nature and demands of 
UMNO politics. Nevertheless, the 'political distance' is not 
equal for each State because the tightness of Central 
control over party members at the State level varies between 
States. In the case of Pahang, the 'political 'distance' was 
closer during rather than after Tun Razak's time as Deputy PM 
and then PM. Thus, although UMNO's dominance at the Centre
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and States tightens and centralizes power within the 
Federation, the 'political distance* between the Centre and 
each State is not necessarily equal. The Centre's dominance 
and the unevenness of this characterise Centre-State party 
relations.
The character of the federal element is necessarily 
also influenced by the environment of which it is only a 
part. This environment has also been shaped by the periods 
of national emergencies (19^8-1960 and 1969-71), the national 
development needs, the patterns of thought and attitude of 
national political leaders and communalism. All these may 
encourage, as Tilman suggests^, the centralization of power.
The two national emergencies emphasised the security 
needs of the newly independent federation. These needs, like 
those of national development, are national in scope and may 
well have influenced the national leaders' conception of 
'national interests'.What seems clear, however, is their 
consistent emphasis on the 'national interests', however 
conceived or conceptualised, and on the Centre's responsib­
ility for their protection. For example, Tun Razak, then 
Deputy PM, expressed this without reservation*
"Provincialism or parochialism must give way to 
national interests to make the country strong and 
viable. We should not always be thinking in terms 
of how much the Federal Government can give to the 
States and vice versa but should rather think and 
act in terms of how much we all can contribute to 
the well-being and strength of the nation ••• For 
a Federation to succeed it should have a strong 
system of Central Government entrusted with the 
necessary powers to develop the country ... Malaysia 
will be sure to succeed if all of us act and think 
in terms of the whole nation - national interests 
should come before self or State interests." 10
This emphasis, if carried to its logical conclusion, may
yet prove deleterious to the federal element in the
political structure of Peninsula Malaysia.
9* See Tilman, R.S., In Quest of Unity: The Centralizing 
Theme in Malaysian Federal-State Relations, 1957-1975, 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Occasional Paper 
No. 39* May 1976.
10. Quoted in Straits Times, 18-8-196 .^
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Communalism is another important political force in 
Peninsula Malaysia.^ Communal differences and divisions 
cut right across State boundaries, although the level of 
communal concentration varies between States. This,
according to Livingston, makes for a plural rather than a
12federal society. The federal element then necessarily 
co-exists, or even competes for priority, with communalism 
as an ordering framework of society. Many believe that the 
impact of communalism is towards increasing centralisation
13
of power. J In this way it tightens the integration of
States within the Federation and helps explain its success.
Dikshit suggests that
"it is the geographical distribution of the communal 
elements in the population that have saved the 
Federation of Malaysia (especially Malaya), because 
in view of the fact that communal cleavages in the 
country are almost water-tight, it is easily 
understandable that had the communities occupied 
clearly defined areas of occupance - one seperate 
from the other - a union of any strength could 
hardly have been bom." 14
In summary, two points about the federal element in 
Peninsula Malaysia need emphasis. First, the Centre which 
was initially placed in a strong position has grown even 
stronger. Second, the impact of the Centre's dominance is 
uneven among the States.
11. For the impact of this on the politics and government 
of Peninsula Malaysia, see Ratnam, K.J., Communalism 
and the Political Process in Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 
University of Malaya Press, 1965? Means, G.P., Malaysian 
Politics, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 2nd ed., 1976, 
especially chp. 21; Milne, R.S., and Mauzy, D.K. , 
Politics and Government in Malaysia, Vaneouver, 
University of British Columbia Press, 1978.
12. Livingston,W.S., Federalism and Constitutional Change, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 195&, p. 2.
13* For examples, see Camell, F.G. , op.cit., p. 28;
Simandjuntak, B., Malayan Federalism, 1945-1963, London, 
Oxford University Press, 1969* pp. 207-208; and Lai Ah 
Hoon," Problems of Federal Finance in Plural Societies*. 
Case Studies of Malaya and Malaysia" Ph.D. thesis, York 
University, June 1968, pp. 41-43.
14. Dikshit, R.M., The Political Geography of Federalism: 
an enquiry into^origins and stability, India, Macmillan 
and Co., 1975, p. 137.
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The tendency is towards the Centre, There seems to be 
no reason why, despite episodes of States* resistance, 
this tendency will not be maintained. There may, however, 
come a time when the continuous accumulation of power at 
the Centre is either accepted as fact and irrevocable or it 
may even be viewed as no longer tolerable and thus opposed 
by States. In both cases adjustments may have to be made 
and these conceivably may include for example changes in 
Centre-State financial arrangements and even in the 
Constitution. For the future, militant and fundamentalist 
Islamic groups, because of their unitary disposition, pose 
a threat to the federal structure.
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Appendix I t Seats Contested and Won by Political Parties: 
1955> 1959*1964, 1969, 1974 and 1978 Federal 
and State Elections.
General Note: Appendix 1 comprises 11 Tables. Each Table 
identifies the individual parties of the Alliance and 
Barisan Nasional or National Front coalitions, and main 
Opposition parties. The official election reports do not 
identify the Alliance or Barisan Nasional candidates 
according to their parties. As the three Alliance partners 
represented three distinct communal groups, the candidates' 
party identity was based on their ethnicity (as indicated 
by their names). This procedure became difficult when PAS 
( a Malay party ) was in the Barisan Nasional. In this 
case the candidates' party identity was based on 
information obtained from UMNO Headquarters.
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